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Abstract
Over the last thirty years there has been a remarkable functional convergence in the way companies are
run.  Behind  directors,  asset  managers  and  banks usually  participate  the  most  in  setting  the  ultimate
direction of  corporations, as they have assumed the role of  stewardship over shareholder voting rights. At
the same time, an increasing number of  people’s livelihoods and old age now depend on the stock market,
but these ultimate contributors to equity have barely any voice. Why has there been such a separation of
contribution and participation? 
Two  positive  theses  explain  this  convergence  in  corporate  governance,  one  political,  one
economic. The first positive thesis is that laws which guarantee participation rights in investment chains
(either  for  shareholders  against  directors,  or  for  the  ultimate  contributors  against  institutional
shareholders) were driven by a progressive democratic movement, but very incompletely compared to its
social ideals. The second positive thesis is that when there have been no specific rights in law, the relative
bargaining power of  different groups determined the patterns of  participation, whether the outcomes
were reasonable or entirely arbitrary. In practice, the separation has grown between those who contribute
to  equity  capital  and  those  who  participate  in  governance.  These  theses  are  preferable  to  existing
narratives in political literature, and law and economics, which entail predictions of  different forms of
rational interest-driven institutional evolution. On the contrary, participation in corporate governance is
largely unprincipled. The evidence is found in the historical development of  participation rights in the
UK, Germany and the US.
Does the separation of  contribution and participation matter? One normative thesis is derived
from the historical evidence. It proposes that the separation of  contribution and participation is a pressing
concern,  precisely  because  participation  in  corporate governance,  as it  stands,  manifests  no coherent
principles. Asset managers and banks have gathered shareholder voting rights through no better reason
than their peculiar market position as investment intermediaries. They have significant conflicts of  interest
when they exercise voting rights with other people’s money. They are able to use votes like any other self-
perpetuating  interest  group  would,  because  they  are  not  effectively  accountable  to  their  natural
beneficiaries:  the  ultimate  investors.  To  ensure  that  the  successes  of  modern  corporate  law  are  not
unravelled, corporate governance should protect the principle of  a symmetry between contribution and
participation.  This  will  mean  that  in  the  future,  corporate  governance  becomes  more  economically
efficient, sustainable, and just. 
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PART I. CONCEPTS
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
At the heart of  economic life, in modern democratic society, lies a tension between the benefits
of  large-scale organisation and the concentration of  power. When Adam Smith remarked in 1776
that directors were prone to ‘negligence and profusion’, because they were in charge of  ‘other
people’s money’, he may well have hoped that large corporations, like mercantilism, would soon
be a thing of  the past.1 It  might have been hoped that partnerships of  butchers, bakers and
brewers would make the economy,2 so that Britain’s wealth, and the wealth of  all nations, would
come from small competitive businesses. From the late 19 th century, and then particularly with
Berle and Means in 1932,3 corporations had won legitimacy. Discussion moved away from the
inherent flaws of  some people managing ‘other people’s money’ to how to manage the ‘separation
of  ownership and control’. Another change came over late 20 th century discourse. Problems of
corporate accountability in mass production were gradually resolved into strategies for limiting
agency costs when principals’ welfare was at stake. Now, in the wake of  the financial crisis that
began in 2007, it is apparent that modern systems of  investment have led more people to depend
on the fortunes of  the stock market than ever. But at the same time very few of  those same
people exercise any economic voice. Asset managers and banks tend to hold most voting rights in
corporate governance. This may not differ so much from the long course of  history, but why do
some people participate in corporate governance more than others, and does it matter? 
There are no neat answers that a single, unqualified thesis could capture. Instead, three
theses are proposed – two positive and one normative – but all come with uncertainty. Chapter 2
starts by summarising the state of  corporate governance today to show that on the question of
who  participates  most,  there  has  been  a  remarkable  functional  convergence  in  modern
economies. Financial institutions, particularly asset managers and banks, have assumed the role of
stewardship. They have done this chiefly by appropriating the votes bought with retirement and
other savings from most of  the working population. Because of  the relatively new nature of
intermediated  investment  and retirement,  the  language of  the  ‘separation  of  ownership  and
control’ has become outdated. The concept of  the ‘separation of  contribution and participation’
enables a broader view of  the agency problems in modern investment. It captures those who
ultimately contribute to equity capital (whether by buying shares through a broker, having a trust
1         A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  the Wealth of  Nations (1776) Book V, ch 1, §107
2 Smith (1776) Book I, ch 2, §2
3 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) 
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or contract based pension, or life insurance policy),  but do not necessarily retain ‘ownership’
rights. It captures everyone who participates in controlling a company, but does not hold control
completely.  The chapter concludes by acknowledging that  a  participation right, like the more
absolutist notion of  control, is just one mechanism of  accountability, like markets or legal duties.
However these different mechanisms of  accountability are best seen as complements, rather than
substitutes. This justifies an independent focus on participation in corporate governance. 
Chapter  3  elaborates  the  two  positive  theses.  The  first  is  that  the  gradual  spread  of
participation  rights  in  corporate  governance  is  the  product  of  a  progressive  democratic
movement, but it remains very incomplete. Progressive democrats have consciously sought to
ensure that directors were accountable through the vote, that dispersed shareholders had voting
rights,  and to some extent that the ‘ultimate contributor’ of  equity capital  had a voice. They
wanted to socialise, not ownership, but power: to put power into the hands of  the many, and not
just the few. But this social ideal has plainly not been carried into full effect. Nor is it possible to
see the law as successfully carrying any other political ideology through. This political narrative
explores what shaped the law. The second positive thesis holds that, when there was no specific
regulation  for  participation  rights,  the  patterns of  participation  over time reflect  the  varying
bargaining power of  economic actors. Many existing political and economic theories stress or
presume there is a rational process of  institutional development. But the outcomes of  politics, or
a  market  buffeted  by  bargaining  power,  cannot  be  equated  with  rationality.  Very  often  the
outcomes were arbitrary from a welfare viewpoint. History shows, and human behaviour means,
that we continually deviate  from welfare maximising patterns of  choice,  both in politics  and
economic affairs. Ultimately, this means participation in corporate governance is unprincipled. 
The historical evidence that supports these two positive theses is provided in Part II. The
United Kingdom, Germany and the United States provide the main case studies. The reason to
focus  on these  jurisdictions  is  that  in  terms  of  ‘legal  family’,  they  can be  taken as  broadly
representative  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  European  Union,  while  the  US  is  a  unique
jurisdiction in itself. This captures a large part of  the global economy, and their differences in
ownership and regulatory structure serve to illustrate vividly, not just the familiar varieties, but
also the fundamental commonalities of  modern corporate governance. As pre-eminent industrial
economies, the UK, Germany and the US also have among the longest and most challenging
histories. 
Chapter  4  examines  the  changes  of  rules  on  director  elections,  in  terms  of  both
appointment and removal rights. The idea that directors ought to be easily electable or removable
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by a majority of  voters in a corporation’s general meeting can be traced into the old common law,
and Hanseatic  traditions in  German  Länder,  but it  had met heavy opposition from executive
interest  groups  who  wished to  be entrenched.  After  Berle  and Means’  foundational  treatise,
Labour and Democrat governments in the UK and US saw it as good corporate governance to
make those traditions compulsory. To some degree this approach was revived in Germany in
1965. However, before there were compulsory rules, or as those rules were relaxed, UK directors
could typically be removed only by a 75 per cent vote, German directors insulated themselves
from the general meeting with two-tier board structures, and US directors tended to push for
staggered elections where they could only be dismissed for a good cause. Company constitutions
too frequently erected obstacles to directors’ electoral accountability, deepening the separation of
anyone who contributed to a company from the ability to participate in governance.
Chapter 5 examines how shareholder voting rights  were distributed.  Before there was
specific regulation in the US and Germany in the 1920s, and as the number of  small investors
grew, companies began issuing vast swathes of  ordinary shares with no voting rights or shares
with  multiple  voting  rights  for  management.  Threatened with  disenfranchisement,  a  popular
outcry in the US, particularly supported by Woodrow Wilson and an economist named William
Ripley, pressured the government and the New York Stock Exchange into adopting a one-share,
one-vote rule. In Germany, a one-share, one-vote law was proposed in 1931 in a still-democratic
state. Perhaps paradoxically, it was adopted in 1937. In the UK, after the sniff  of  a similar wave
of  voteless share issues in the late 1950s, the London Stock Exchange applied regulatory pressure
and institutional  investors exercised their muscle,  to maintain a one-share, one-vote standard.
Thus,  the  historical  evidence  shows  that  a  one-share,  one-vote  standard  was  not  what  an
unregulated market would produce. Instead, when left to the market, participation rights were
shaped by arbitrary fluctuations in bargaining power,  which progressive democrats sought  to
contain with law reform.
Chapter  6 goes behind the modern shareholder,  ‘piercing the institutional  veil’.  What
shaped the  participation  rights  of  those  who made  the  ultimate  contributions  that  went  to
financial institutions, and then into companies’ equity capital? In the UK, Germany and the US
today, beneficiaries of  pension funds often have a vote to elect their trustees, to some extent. In
the UK this was largely a product of  collective agreements made by trade unions. The law then
codified the practice in 1995 and 2004. In Germany, the codetermination rights had their roots in
the  1848  democratic  revolutions  and  the  1918  Stinnes-Legien  Abkommen.  The post-war  Social
Democrat government codified these practices and traditions into law. In the US, a voice in
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pension funds came out of  collective agreements in the private sector (when trade unions were
strong)  but  also,  and  particularly  from 1997,  the  laws  of  many  states.  Still,  there  has  been
significant instability in the voice that pension beneficiaries have had, particularly because rights
usually depended on the legal form of  the pension. In all countries, changes in the collective
organisation of  beneficiaries and workers changed the number and strength of  codetermined or
multi-employer plans. 
In the other sectors of  investment, life insurance policy holders would typically have no
voice, even though insurance based pensions were offered by employers as pure substitutes to
codetermined pension schemes. Mutual fund investors were frequently incapable of  exercising
any voice (even if  they wanted to). People buying shares through a retail bank or other broker
would find that the bank invariably appropriated voting rights on shares through standard form
contracts. Significantly, because of  the peculiar rules on share deposits, German banks came to
vote on all kinds of  shares: they used their dominant market position to acquire voting rights
through standard form contracts. This market practice was codified into law in 1937. In the UK
and US, asset managers were usually delegated management of  pension fund assets, and would
appropriate shareholder voting rights in the same way. In the end, apart from large pension funds
that  were  codetermined  and  took  investment  in-house,  asset  managers  and  banks  in  all
jurisdictions tended to participate most in modern corporate governance. 
Chapter  7 contains the third thesis.  It  uses  the evidence from Part  II  to address the
normative question of  whether the separation of  contribution and participation represents  a
pressing concern. Overall the historical evidence suggests that our patterns of  participation in
corporate governance cannot be regarded as the product of  any principle. Significant scope for
‘negligence and profusion’ in financial institutions and on corporate boards remains.  Modern
corporate law has ensured minimum standards of  accountability of  directors to shareholders, but
the risk is that financial intermediaries will continue to cut the ultimate contributor out. The one
normative thesis is that, if  the successes of  modern corporate law are not to be undone, the law
must strive to maintain a symmetry between people’s contributions to equity, and their right to
participate in its use: a symmetry between ultimate investment and voice. As a minimum, through
every  link  in  the  chain  of  investment  the  contributor  should  have  a  right  to  vote  for
representatives  who  –  at  least  via  intermediates  –  ultimately  elect  the  company  board.  The
persuasiveness of  this principle depends on the goal one seeks. But whether the goal is more
expertise and better stewardship, whether it is to ensure an economically productive or socially
just system of  corporate law, the symmetry thesis embodies an irreplaceable principle. In contrast
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to  the  basic  principle,  no  single  policy  option  should  be  regarded  as  ultimately  ‘right’.
Accordingly, three different models to create a symmetry of  contribution and participation, and
their application to each country’s legal tradition and context, are proposed. Chapter 8 concludes. 
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2. THE SEPARATION OF CONTRIBUTION AND PARTICIPATION
Although the ‘separation of  ownership and control’ has been central to corporate governance, its
meaning has an ambiguous relationship with modern investment. There is little doubt about its
cross-disciplinary  centrality,  in  law, management,  economics,  and sociology,1 and that in  most
cases it remains a useful proxy for discussing agency costs in one particular setting. ‘Ownership’
engenders proprietary relationships,2 as in owning a share. ‘Control’ is closely allied to the idea of
exclusive dominium, which in turn ties to the old incidents of  property.3 These relate to legal
concepts, but ones that were more appropriate when people bought shares directly, and thus had
a relatively direct  relationship to companies.  Today most people make the contributions that
become equity capital through a multitude of  transactions, usually intermediated. 
Because of  intermediaries, it has been said that there is now a problem of  ‘separation of
ownership  from  ownership’.4 However  many  people  who  are  separated  do  not  keep  any
ownership  rights  at  all.  Some  people  may  be  direct  registered  shareholders.  Many  have  an
equitable ownership interest in shares under a trust. Some invest in a managed fund where they
receive an ownership interest in that fund, though not the target of  their investment. But others
might have contract based pensions, or be life insurance policyholders, only with contractual, not
‘ownership’  rights.  Moreover,  it  is  rare for any single  person to exercise ‘control’  in modern
corporate  governance.  Instead many voices  participate  in  shared  decision making.  Corporate
governance involves an increasingly complex and global network of  financial intermediaries. So if
the goal  is  to understand properly why some participate in corporate governance more than
others, is the best conceptual vocabulary still the separation of  ownership and control? 
This chapter contends that the language of  a separation of  contribution and participation
better describes the problems of  modern investment. Section (1) suggests that while there may
still be a variety of  ownership structures around the world,  there has in fact been functional
convergence in corporate governance to a remarkable degree for some time. Exemplified by the
UK, Germany and the US, this lies in the fact that financial institutions – asset managers and
1 eg  B Cheffins,  Corporate  ownership  and  control:  British  business  transformed (2008),  EF  Fama  and  MC Jensen,  ‘Separation  of
Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of  Law and Economics 301, GC Means, ‘The Separation of  Ownership and
Control in American Industry’ (1931) 46(1) The Quarterly Journal of  Economics 68, and K Marx and F Engels, Das Kapital
(1894) vol 3, ch 27
2 AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) ch V, refers to ‘those legal rights, duties and
other incidents which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the greatest interest in a thing admitted by a mature
legal system.’ 
3 MR Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8
4 L Strine, ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of  Managers and Labor in a
More Rational System of  Corporate Governance’ (2007) 33 Journal of  Corporate Law 1
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banks – participate most in casting shareholder votes, while the ultimate contributor of  equity
capital  is  usually separated from meaningful influence.  Section (2)  elaborates the concepts of
contribution  and  participation,  and why  they  are  preferable  to  ownership  and  control.  It  is
suggested that the core idea of  a ‘contribution’ is where a person gives something of  value over a
period of  time in expectation of  a return. The critical welfare problems arise when that person is
a ‘non-adjusting investor’, so they cannot easily change other investments to counteract the risks
upon the contribution they make.  They lack bargaining power. ‘Participation’  means having a
voice through a representative vote in a joint decision making procedure. Section (3) concedes
that, just like control of  assets was never the only way to protect ownership, participation is not
the only way to safeguard a contribution. Markets, and a mix of  rules, standards and regulation,
sit  alongside participation rights  as  mechanisms of  accountability  in  enterprise.  However  the
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  these  different  mechanisms  suggest  they  are  best  seen  as
complements rather than as substitutes. This means participation rights – and their separation
from the ultimate contributor – deserve independent attention in modern corporate governance. 
(1) Participation today: a summary 
Ownership structures vary a great  deal  across different countries,  but functional convergence
appears to have largely been achieved in terms of  who participates most in corporate governance.
This is not immediately apparent without looking behind the institutional shareholder, so it is
necessary to give a short summary of  how modern corporate governance works. In almost any
system, participation can be analysed on three levels, so as to simplify the chain of  investment.
First, there are rules for election or removal of  directors. Second, there are rules on how voting
rights may be allocated among shareholders. Third,
there  are  rules  concerning  the  influence  of  the
ultimate contributor on institutional shareholders.
Millions of  contributors’ investments are organised
by  various  shareholding  institutions,  and  toward
the top asset managers and banks are able to deal
directly  with company boards.  This  is  the capital
side of  investment, although analogous rules and
relationships  can  be  said  to  exist  for  employees
who invest their labour, and trade unions which organise employee voice. Outside the private
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sector, publicly administered enterprises, or enterprises subject to specific regulation can involve
appointees  by  governments,  consumers,  or  other  stakeholders,  if  it  is  thought  that  standard
private sector and competition rules fail to protect those groups’ interests. In the diagram above,
labour  lawyers  have  traditionally  focused  on  the  three  spheres  to  the  right:  the  relationship
between the employer (represented, in companies, by a board), the trade union, and employees.
Company lawyers have traditionally focused on the two spheres on the top left: the relationship
between directors and shareholders. But less has been said about the relationship between the
shareholder, particularly when it is an institution, and the ultimate beneficiaries. This is where the
picture of  convergence begins to emerge. 
(a) United Kingdom
In the UK, first, most large company boards are appointed by existing board members,5 but the
company’s  general  meeting  can  always  remove  any  director  with  28  days’  notice  and  a  fair
hearing.6 The fact that this power is not publicly exercised except in a few cases is less important,
because it  is a potent weapon to ensure directors respond to the general meeting’s interests.7
Second, the general meeting is composed of  whoever is on the members’ register,  though in
practice the members are shareholders.8 The voting rights of  members follow, by default, a ‘one-
ordinary-share, one-vote’ standard,9 and public companies do not deviate in practice. 
Third, most registered shareholders are institutions managing assets for a vast pool of
beneficiaries,10 primarily pensioners, life insurance policyholders, or investors in mutual managed
funds. Pension trust beneficiaries have some statutory voice to hold their trustees accountable, 11
but these rights are form-dependent:  applicable only for pension trusts or trust corporations.
Also, pension trustees usually delegate investment management to an asset management firm.12
Today, under 10 per cent of  listed shares are individually held.13 Many of  these retail investors
buy shares through a High Street bank or online broker, which could potentially be the registered
shareholder  itself.  Both  asset  managers  and banks  assume shareholder  voting rights  through
standard-form contracts with their clients. Asset managers typically have, say, a one to six person
corporate governance department, which is given instructions on how to cast votes by the fund’s
5 Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 reg 20(b) and the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 B.2
6 Companies Act 2006 ss 168-169
7 cf  M Moore, Corporate governance in the shadow of  the state (2013) 210 ff  on the ‘statutory shotgun’
8 CA 2006 ss 112-113
9 CA 2006 s 284
10 The word ‘beneficiary’ is used in a non-legal sense here, so as not to prejudge whether in fact a beneficial proprietary interest
exists. It is used in a largely synonymous way to ‘contributor’. 
11 Pensions Act 2004 ss 241-243
12 Expressly foreseen by the Trustee Act 2000 s 11
13 See the chart at ch 6(1)(a) 
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managers on issues that appear important.14 Otherwise, the corporate governance department
will follow a ‘proxy advice’ company’s recommendations.15 The recommendations will be in line
with the asset managers’ own priorities. At any given general meeting in a large UK company, the
majority of  votes are fixed in this way: by asset managers, sending instructions through proxy
advice firms.
(b) Germany
Germany’s system of  corporate governance differs in board and beneficial structure, though less
in shareholder voting rights. First, the board is split into two-tiers: an executive (Vorstand) runs
matters  day-to-day,  while  according to the law a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)  oversees the
general strategy.16 The executive is appointed by the supervisory board, except that one executive
director  should  hold  the  employees’  confidence.17 Any  executive  can  be  removed  by  the
supervisory board for an important reason, which includes a non-binding majority vote of  a
company’s shareholders.18 The supervisory board in companies with over 2000 staff  is elected
half  by shareholders, and half  by employees, albeit that the chair with a casting vote is invariably
a shareholder representative.19 The general removal standard is a three quarter majority vote of
shareholders or employees.20 Companies with 500 to 2000 staff  have one third employee board
representatives,21 and in principle a German public company can (like a UK company) adopt a
Societas  Europea  structure,  with  a  one-  or  two-tier  board  and  a  different  configuration  of
employee rights.22 This has slowly become more common.23 Second, among shareholders the rule
of  one-ordinary-share, one-vote prevails.24 
Third, banks usually exercise most shareholder voting rights. Germany does not have as
large a retirement savings base as the UK because there is an income linked state pension. Where
occupational  pensions  do  exist,  pensions  beneficiaries  may  be  able  to  codetermine  their
representatives  if  they  are  in  ‘fund’  or  ‘facility’  form.  But  these  pension  types  remain  as  a
minority. Most occupational pensions either come from insurance contracts or, with insurance,
14 This point emerged from the author’s discussions with fund management staff, and corporate governance department staff, at
various anonymous firms in the City of  London. 
15 eg MC Schouten, ‘Do Institutional Investors Follow Proxy Advice Blindly?’ (2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1978343 
16 Aktiengesetz 1965 §§76 and 111
17 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 §33
18 AktG 1965 §84(3)
19 AktG 1965 §101 and MitbestG 1976 §§8-9 and 27
20 AktG 1965 §101 and MitbestG 1976 §§23
21 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2004
22 See PL Davies, ‘Workers on the Board of  the European Company?’ (2003) 32(2) ILJ 75
23 See H Eidenmüller, ‘Contracting Employee Involvement: An Analysis of  Bargaining over Employee Involvement Rules for a
Societas Europaea’ [2012] JCLS 201
24 AktG 1965 §12
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are simply a contractual promise from the employer, allowing balance sheet savings to accumulate
on  the  employer’s  books  and  so  be  ‘reinvested’  back  into  companies.25 This  considerably
strengthens Germany’s insurance industry and gives each company a large accounting surplus.
Probably in part because of  this, many more shareholders in Germany are other companies.26
Most shares in German companies were traditionally required to be bearer shares, and deposited
in banks  for safe  keeping.  Whatever  the  source  of  contribution,  banks acquire  voting  rights
through standard-form contracts, and may cast votes on their depositors’ behalf, subject to the
duty that they act in the depositor’s interests.27 They should follow instructions, but these are rare.
Although German banks have low proportions of  share ownership, their proportion of  voting
rights is usually a collective majority, and this is usually enough to pre-determine all elections for
the shareholder supervisory board representatives, and the executive.28 
(c) United States
The US system of  corporate governance differs from the UK and Germany at the board and
shareholder level, but resembles the UK at the beneficial level. First, most large US companies
incorporate under Delaware law, though other states are not radically dissimilar in their main
features.  Directors  are  generally  appointed  by  the  existing  board  subject  to  stock  exchange
independence  standards,29 but  unlike  in  the  UK,  shareholders  are  typically  excluded  from
proposing new nominees until such time as the Securities and Exchange Commission implements
rules to implement that right at federal level.30 Directors can be removed by the shareholders, but
if  companies opt to stagger elections over three years, shareholders must show a ‘cause’. If  the
board is not staggered, shareholders can remove directors ‘without cause’. Most companies with
initial  public  offerings  have  staggered  boards,  but  in  2010  the  trend  was  that  institutional
shareholders  were  pressuring  companies  to  opt  back  into  non-staggered  boards  over  time.
Second,  shareholder voting rights  are mostly  one per ordinary share,  but there are far  more
multiple voting shares than in most Commonwealth or European countries. 31 Stock exchanges
have a loose limit, requiring voting rights not to be ‘disproportionate’.32
Third,  shareholders are predominantly institutions which represent retirement savings:
pensions, life insurance, and mutual funds. A minority of  pension funds that are large enough,
25 Betriebsrentengesetz 1974 §1
26 See ch 6(3)(b)
27 AktG 1965 §135(2)
28 F Kübler, ‘Comment: On Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets’ (1998-1999) 5 Columbia
Journal European Law 213
29 eg New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual §303.00
30 Dodd Frank Act 2010 §971
31 ISS, Shearman & Sterling and ECGI, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union (12 June 2007) 47-49
32 NYSE Listed Company Manual §313.00
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primarily public sector or collectively bargained multi-employer plans, take corporate governance
in house. The trustees are frequently half  or partly elected by their beneficiaries, depending on
collective agreements and state law. Asset managers mostly provide investment services to smaller
funds, private employer plans, 401(k) savers, insurance policyholders and investment company
shareholders.  The  US  retains  a  larger  base  of  individual  shareholders,  who  invest  through
brokers, but these brokers may not vote on their clients’ behalf.33 Brokers apart, asset managers
routinely take over the role of  voting on behalf  of  their ultimate beneficiaries, guided again by
proxy advice firms.
(d) Functional convergence and costs
It  would  be  wrong  to  suggest  that  between  the  UK,  Germany  and  the  US  there  are  not
meaningful  differences  of  principle  and  practical  importance.  In  ‘The  End  of  History  for
Corporate Law’,  the  differences that  Henry  Hansmann and Reiner  Kraakman focused on in
relation to shareholder, labour or managerialist models of  corporate law persist 15 years on: 34
relative to one another, the UK remains more pro-shareholder, Germany is more pro-labour, and
the US is more pro-director. But these are characterisations which place their focus on the top
tiers of  corporate governance. They leave out the patterns of  participation through the whole
investment chain. 
The  central  ambiguity  in  all  theses  that  focus  on  shareholder  primacy  in  corporate
governance is that, even assuming shareholder primacy might be an end point, it is not at all clear
who the shareholders will actually be. If  the ‘shareholder franchise’ had become ‘the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of  directorial power rests’,35 what did that really mean?
In fact,  behind the  registered title  of  ‘shareholder’  today,  intermediary  institutions are in  the
driving  seat  in  all  three  systems.  For  participation  rights,  emphasis  upon  the  ‘varieties  of
capitalism’ starts to seem less significant than the startling commonality of  all modern economic
systems.36 For participation rights, debate over when or whether systems might converge and
history  might  end has  come to  seem less  pressing  than why  there  already  has  been such a
remarkable functional convergence. In its simplest terms, in no major economy do people who
make the ultimate investments in companies have the most significant voice. Financial institutions
do. 
The remarkable functional convergence in modern corporate governance systems raises
33 Dodd-Frank Act §957
34 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of  History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439, 441-445
35 Blasius Industries Inc v Atlas Corp, 564 A2d 651 (1988) per Chancellor Allen, who adds the qualification that institutions make
shareholder voting ‘a less predictable affair than it has been’.
36 cf  P Hall and D Soskice (eds), Varieties of  Capitalism (2001) ch 10 
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the question of  what associated costs might arise. Adam Smith believed directors were prone to
‘negligence and profusion’. Majority shareholders, if  unregulated, are thought to extract ‘private
benefits of  control’. Would financial intermediaries similarly exercise voting rights in their own
interests rather than in the interests of  the ultimate contributor? This is  critical because in a
systems of  block ownership managerial agency costs might be reduced but minority/majority
costs rise. In dispersed ownership systems, minority/majority agency costs may be fewer, but lead
to exacerbated managerial agency costs.  The two might cancel  each other out.37 Yet in either
system, institutional intermediaries can create a ‘third dimension’ of  agency costs, visualised in
the chart below. Institutional agency costs are a function, not of  ownership structure, but of  the
absence  of  rights  of  the  ultimate  contributor.  Smith’s  twin  categorisation  remains  a  good
framework: there is, first, a risk of  ‘negligence’ if  institutional shareholders can continue in office
without  working  diligently.  Second,  there  is  a  risk  of  ‘profusion’  (or  unjust  enrichment)  if
institutional  intermediaries  can  use  their  voting  rights  in  companies  to  further  interests  that
conflict with their clients. 
To  give  a  central  example  of  ‘profusion’,
suppose that  an asset  manager specialises  in  selling  a
particular  type  of  retirement  product  to  companies,
such as life  insurance,  individual  defined contribution
pension accounts, or contract based pensions. It, and its
competitors in the same market, will  have a collective
incentive to encourage the companies where they own
shares to abandon competing  products,  such as  trust
based pensions, especially those shared among multiple employers, which are large enough to
have asset management in house. Asset management firms (e.g. Legal & General,  BlackRock,
Henderson, AXA, or State Street) will be naturally antipathetic toward such pension schemes. In
the case of  German banks (e.g. Commerzbank or Deutsche Bank) an equivalent incentive exists
to use shareholder voting to encourage directors to buy Hausbank services from one of  the big
three. When banks hold blocks of  shares in the major insurance firms (e.g. Allianz) there is also
an incentive to use shareholder voting power to sway companies to buy insurance based pensions,
rather  than  collective  and  codetermined  pensions.  These  potential  conflicts  of  interest  are
systemic, in the same way that they are for auditors which also sell  management consultancy
services, or credit rating agencies that price government debt while their shareholders trade in
37 B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (2008) ch 2
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international bonds. 
An example of  ‘negligence’ is asset managers being ‘rationally reticent’, so that they may
cast votes, but do little in the way of  positive governance proposals.38 This problem would seem
to derive from further underlying conflicts. For instance, asset managers or bank managers tend
to be very  highly  paid.  They may therefore  not  wish  to challenge super-inflationary  rises  in
director pay, lest the spotlight reflects back on them. The economic gulf  that exists between top
financial managers and their ultimate clients creates more general conflicts. The highly paid will
have a natural scepticism of  more equal company pay scales, regardless of  the socio-economic
merits. This will foster a hostility to trade unions, or other people who seek to control inequality
across the workforce, regardless of  the socio-economic merit in doing so. This can be called a
‘social’  conflict  of  interest.  What  views  do  asset  managers  and  bankers  typically  have  on
environmental and social responsibility? It is not clear, but the more that the socio-economic
position of  asset managers and bankers deviates from other people, the more it can be expected
they will  vote differently in aspects of  corporate governance. This is relevant because all that
voting is done using other people’s money.
The normative debate will be returned to in chapter 7. But before this, the essential point
here is that the possibilities for conflicts of  interest would not necessarily be captured by the
language of  ownership and control.  The ultimate investor may or may not own anything, for
instance if  they have a life insurance policy, or a contract based pension. But the issues do not
change. Moreover, the institutional intermediary may or may not control anything, because they
are not large block-shareholders. So can, and should, the language of  ownership and control be
replaced? 
(2) Contribution and participation
(a) Ownership to contribution 
It  seems that  ‘ownership’  has become a  concept  that  is  unsuitable  in  the  world of  modern
investment, but what could go in its place? It could be agreed that the language of  agency costs is
closer to the mark, and it is functional. A standard definition is that there is an agency problem if
one person’s welfare is at stake through the actions of  another.39 But what was it about the old
separation of  ownership and control that raised the particular  welfare problem? One answer
38 RJ Gilson and JN Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of  Governance
Rights’ (2013) 113(4) Columbia LR 863, 889-890, identifying one source of  the problem as internal performance metrics.
39 eg R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda and E Rock,  The Anatomy of
Corporate Law (2009) ch 2, 35
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given by Stephen Ross, one of  the 20th century economists to revive John Stuart Mill’s language
of  ‘delegated agency’,40 was that a welfare problem arises because of  asymmetric information. 41
Asymmetric information is found in almost all transactional relations,42 so focus on information
imbalances alone would probably capture too much. However it is very notable that Ross himself
did ‘not treat the bargaining problem explicitly’.43 Can the concerns that motivated the separation
of  ownership and control be reconciled with an understanding of  agency costs to form one
concept that is particularly applicable to corporate enterprise?
The first step is to recognise that ownership truly is unsuitable, and that non-ownership
relationships raise functionally identical concerns. ‘Ownership’ is a troublesome collective noun, a
proxy concept for a bundle of  rights, duties or incidents.44 But the concerns that lie behind the
separation of  ownership and control, or delegated agency, are distinct from the proprietary and
personal distinctions that it engenders. Legal form and abstract categories, when they are not
updated in line with social needs, can both conceal and obscure much more than they explain. On
concealing, Otto Kahn-Freund wrote that bourgeois law had a tendency:45
to cover social facts and factors of  social existence with abstractions: property, contract,
legal  person.  All  these  abstractions  contain  within  them  socially  opposed  and
contradictory  phenomena:  property  used  for  production  and  property  used  for
consumption, agreements between equal parties and agreements between unequal parties,
capitalist and worker. Through abstraction it is possible to extend legal rules, which are
appropriate to the social phenomenon for which they were originally developed, to other
social phenomena, thereby concealing the exercise of  social power behind a veil of  law.
In  other  words,  the  general  categories  of  ‘property’,  ‘contract’  and  ‘person’  can  hide  very
different types of  each.  Significant differences could emerge when talking about people who
make an initial investment and (1) rely on the return for consumption, not production, (2) make
the investment as a dependent, not a commercial party, or (3) are natural and not legal persons.
But  in  this  case,  the  concept  of  ownership  is  not  so  much  concealing the  extension  of
40 JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book V, ch XI, §11
41 SA Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of  Agency: The Principal’s Problem (1973) 63 American Economic Review 134, 135
42 SJ Grossman and JE Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of  Informationally Efficient Markets’ (1980) 70(3) American Economic
Review 393
43 Ross (1973) 63 American Economic Review 134, 134
44 See AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed),  Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) 113-128 lists eleven, non-exhaustive
incidents.
45 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer 1875-1945’ in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic  (1981) 102. Kahn-Freund is
explaining Sinzheimer’s ‘legal anthropology’.
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inappropriate rules, as  obscuring a clear view: focus on ownership limits, in an unwarranted way,
the scope of  the welfare problems.
The second step is to see that the incidents of  ownership can be scattered anywhere
along the investment chain, subject to compulsory rules. Most (but by no means all) transfers of
the incidents of  ownership stem from an objective manifestation of  consent.46 For example, if  A
has £1000 and wishes to give it to B in expectation of  a profit in return for a fee, A and B could
manifest an intention that (1) ownership in the £1000 passes to B, subject to a contractual right
to a specified return, like in a life insurance contract, or (2) ownership remains with A while B
carries  out  the  investment  work,  as  in  an agency  and bailment  relationship,  or  (3)  legal  and
beneficial title splits, as in a trust, or (4) the money is invested in a company, where ownership
transfers, but A acquires ownership in the chose-in-action known as a share. Along with the right
to a return, the right to exercise any votes, or to sell assets, can be combined and extended along
multiple  steps  of  investment  chains.  Retaining  legal  or  beneficial  ownership  has  several
advantages,  the  main  one  of  which  is  probably  priority  in  insolvency.47 Although,  generally
speaking, ‘property carries responsibility’, fewer potential liabilities attend to holding money than
physical property. Thus, it is often better to have ownership rights. But precisely because it is
better, a person who gives up ownership could well be more vulnerable in welfare terms than one
who retains it. 
In the examples just given, if  A and B change the agreed fee, A can be compensated for
the risks of  giving up ownership rights. Also, A might be able diversify other investments so as to
minimise any risks of  the transaction. But some parties are better at adjusting their risk profile
than others. The ability to diversify derives from the volume of  resources a party holds: with
more assets, there tends be a greater ability to ‘adjust’. Commercial banks can diversify the risks
of  their lending business as easily as an asset manager can diversify its share portfolio. But, there
are  also  non-adjusting  creditors,48 and  similarly,  there  are  non-adjusting  investors.  A  lack  of
capacity to diversify risks means that the non-adjusting party is more vulnerable. All transacting
parties may give consideration for a bargain, ownership might go here or there, but some will
make contributions where their welfare is more at stake.
If  the key welfare problem centres upon the non-adjusting investor, it makes sense to
abandon the language of  ownership, in favour of  a functional understanding of  contribution.
46 eg National Provincial Bank v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431, 449-450, per Atkin LJ
47 PL Davies and S Worthington, Principles of  Modern Company Law (2012) 1213
48 See E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of  Chicago Law Review 775 and LA Bebchuk and JM Freid, ‘The
Uneasy Case for the Priority of  Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 857, 881-890. They identify tort victims,
employees, consumers and, potentially, small businesses as non-adjusting creditors, whereas a bank would typify an adjusting
creditor. 
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Ironically, the language of  the separation of  ownership and control was originally formulated by
Marx and Engels in relation to the industrial worker, at a time when the labour theory of  value
posited that  people owned their  bodies and so should own the product  of  their  work.  The
worker was said to be separated by contract from the fruits of  labour. Marx and Engels extended
this analysis in a brief  passage to shareholders and corporations,49 but then the idea underwent a
subtle  shift.  It  is  virtually  certain  that  Berle  and Means  were  directly  inspired  by  Marx  and
Engels,50 but in their analysis the separated actor – the shareholder – did have ownership of  a
share. The relevant separation had become the separation of  this ownership right from ‘control’.
But the original concern covered people who contributed something of  value to companies (i.e.
workers investing their labour), whether or not they still held ownership rights in law. 
Whether or not the old Marxist discourse was ever appropriate, modern investment has
outpaced it. A more natural conceptual language should be used. If  the language of  contribution,
centring  on  the  non-adjusting  investor,  is  adopted,  it  would  capture  everyone  down  the
investment  chain  that  ultimately  provides  investments  to  companies.  The  hallmark  of  a
contribution would be exchanging value for a period of  time in expectation of  a return, but
lacking  the  ability  to  adjust  other  investments  to  compensate  for  the  risk.  A  large,  wealthy
shareholder could still be regarded as making a contribution, even if  they had the capacity to
adjust their risk, but only if  they make a transaction (e.g. buying a share) that would be formally
equivalent to a non-adjusting investor (taking on the risk of  failure).  However, such a party’s
welfare would not be at stake, and therefore this person lies at the periphery of  the analysis. The
welfare concern lies with the non-adjusting party, which would have no equivalent capacity to opt
into a comparatively risk free transaction. The same concept of  a non-adjusting investor would
also extend to employees of  an enterprise, to non-adjusting creditors in the approach to and in
insolvency,  to  consumers  of  enterprises  that  hold  a  natural  monopoly,  to  the  public  in
systemically  central  enterprises,  and  so  on.  It  has  much  the  same  outcome  as  stakeholder
analysis,51 but poses the analysis in precise transactional terms.
Ultimately any conceptual dividing line will be formulated to serve the normative analysis
49 K Marx, Das Kapital (1894) vol 3, Part IV, ch 27
50 Berle said he sought to be ‘the American Karl Marx’, see Beatrice Bishop Berle Diary (12 September 1934) which was held,
and cited, by JA Schwarz,  Liberal: Adolf  A. Berle and the Vision of  an American Era  (1987) 62. See also H Brick,  Transcending
Capitalism: Visions of  a New Society in Modern American Thought  (2006) ch 2, 76. It is also noteworthy that Berle was tutored by
Harold Laski. AA Berle and GC Means,  The Modern Corporation and Private Property  (1932, Harcourt 1991) 5 the ‘property
owner who invests in a modern corporation... surrenders his wealth’ in the same manner as the ‘wage laborer surrendering the
direction of  his labor to his industrial master’. 64, ‘With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost to the property
owner much as it has been lost to the worker through the industrial revolution.’
51 eg  TA Kochan  and  SA Rubinstein,  ‘Toward  a  Stakeholder  Theory  of  the  Firm:  The Saturn  Partnership’  (2000)  11(4)
Organizational Science 367, 369, defining a stakeholder as (1) one which invests valuable resources, (2) is at risk if  the firm
fails, and (3) the power they have in or over the organisation. The definition offered here prefers to focus on their points (1)
and (2), precisely because (3) is not a given.
22
of  the author.52 Pro-shareholder theorists seek a concept of  risk bearing,  and the like, which
appears to elevate the normative claims of  shareholders, while pro-stakeholder theorists choose a
concept  which  to  them  delineates  a  larger  group  of  people.  Conceptual  delineations
simultaneously  embody  normative  assertions,  sometimes  subtle,  but  always  there.  Here,  the
normative assertion is that the welfare of  non-adjusting parties is more at stake than for others,
and this  entails  the  economically  and morally  significant  agency  problem that  was  originally
conceived by the language of  separating ownership and control. Whatever views may exist about
the broader stakeholder debate, the focus remains here with those who ultimately provide equity
capital. But whatever else, it should be agreed that the functional concept of  contribution is more
suitable for discussing modern investment than the legal formalism, and notional confines, of
ownership. 
(b) Control to participation
If  ‘ownership’ can be replaced, does ‘control’  need to be too? Control is clearly still a useful
concept in any context where someone exercises exclusive influence, though admittedly even a
legal-beneficial owner of  personal property is curtailed by the implicit, underlying regulation of
all property rights by the state.53 Although this may have greater importance as a philosophical
matter than in practice, control of  things is always shared because individuals rely on society for
mutual recognition of  one another’s rights. When sovereignty is shared,54 the idea of  control
already seems too absolute. In companies, as with all social institutions, control is shared even
further.  Capital  is  ultimately  utilised according to the directions  of  the board.  But  particular
decisions are delegated to managers, supervisors, and other employees, according to the firm’s
perception of  the productively efficient division of  labour. Often a worker at the end of  the
chain  of  delegation  has  much more  practical  control  than  a  director.  Even more,  company
shareholders (or other stakeholders) retain residual authority over the board through the relevant
statute  and  the  company  constitution’s  system  of  appointment  and  removal  rights.  In  turn
institutional shareholder decisions may be influenced by whatever rights are bargained for by, or
are  set  in  statute  for,  the  ultimate  beneficiaries.  This  very  fact  of  multiple  divisions  of
competence makes the concept of  ‘control’ descriptively uncomfortable. Like ownership, control
can be and is scattered everywhere. 
At any particular  level  in the chains of  employment and investment,  as organisations
52 cf  FS Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35(6) Columbia Law Review 809, 840-842
53 K Gray and S Gray, ‘The Idea of  Property in Land’ in S Bright and JK Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (1998)
43-51
54 See generally, MR Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8
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grow,  the  likelihood of  there  being any single decision  maker  decreases.  Employees  in  large
organisations work in groups, or their tasks are set in consultation with supervisors. A director is
one member of  a board. There is not necessarily a majority shareholder, rather than millions of
dispersed shareholders. And then millions and millions of  people make the initial contributions
that work their way into the stock market through institutional investors. In this manner, people
necessarily participate – albeit with different levels of  influence – in reaching a decision about
what to do, rather than having the exclusivity of  influence that the word ‘control’ might suggest.
At the level of  the shareholder, or below, people’s views will usually be aggregated through voting
for representatives, rather than voting on specific proposals. If  there is disagreement, a majority
or super-majority of  votes will determine the collective decision. But if  decision-making is joint,
shared through a vote, then it is plainly more appropriate to speak about ‘participation’ instead.
Whether one speaks of  ownership or contribution, in modern enterprise it is no longer ‘control’
from which there is a separation.
(3) Participation and other mechanisms of  accountability
Chapter  2(2)  has  contended that  the  separation  of  contribution and participation  is  a  more
functionally accurate way to describe the problems of  modern investment. Before, control was
seen as a potential (but not a necessary) incident of  ownership and a way to reduce agency costs.
Control rights could decrease the vulnerability of  a non-adjusting investor’s welfare to agents
which used the investment. But just as ‘control’ is not the only potential incident of  ownership, it
must be conceded that ‘participation’ is far from being the only strategy to reduce agency costs
that come with a contribution to investment. Two other major ‘mechanisms of  accountability’ are
commonly identified as the market, and legal duties.55 There are different ways to enumerate and
categorise strategies to make an agent act in a principal’s interest,56 and none have a monopoly on
correctness. But if  participation is just one among a number of  mechanisms of  accountability, in
a way that control might have been,  can it  be substituted? Could a system of  rights  on the
market, or a group of  legal duties, perform a replacement function of  accountability? The best
answer seems to be that all mechanisms of  accountability have strengths and weaknesses, and this
indicates why they should be seen as complements, rather than substitutes for one another. 
55 cf  RC Clark, Corporate Law (1986) 93
56 eg AO Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) and R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G Hertig,
K Hopt, H Kanda and E Rock, The Anatomy of  Corporate Law (2009) ch 2, 39 ff
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(a) Markets and non-transaction costs
The basic strength of  markets as an accountability mechanism is that they potentially allow the
freedom to associate and disassociate with different people and organisations. The classic idea of
a market is that people are free to make or not make contracts on terms they choose themselves.57
If  shareholders sell their shares, if  pension funds change their asset managers, or if  investors in
an American 401(k) plan can shift their provider, this can potentially send a signal about their
satisfaction with the quality of  the investment’s management. Market signals tend to operate in a
negative fashion: by itself  disassociation does not convey a preference about what (if  anything)
was unsatisfactory. However, it can have an indirect instructive effect if  a market leader is visible
providing different products or terms, which its competitors can observe, emulate, or improve
upon.58 
Adam  Smith  identified  three  kinds  of  competition:  competition  among  buyers,
competition among sellers, and ‘competition’ between any given buyer and seller as they higgle
over price and terms. The first two competitions make the extent to which people actively buy,
sell or switch their stakes highly relevant. In mass markets, with millions of  shares, and millions
of  saving accounts, an isolated act will do little. But in a very competitive market with narrower
profit margins, highly effective signals can be sent by buyers to sellers with a small proportion of
people changing business (e.g. not one person but perhaps, say, 3 per cent of  investors). What
happens ‘at the margin of  the market’ can determine what happens in the terms for everyone, 59
depending on how effectively the seller is capable of  practising price or term discrimination, and
whether competition law permits. The market mechanism does involve positive transaction costs,
chiefly in the form of  gathering information, searching out an appropriate contracting partner,
the costs of  negotiation, and so forth.60 But even so, markets tend to have an advantage over legal
rights, which require potentially very costly litigation to enforce, and voting mechanisms, which
typically require a majority to achieve an outcome. 
A drawback of  markets is that in practice one side in Smith’s third ‘competition’ can have
more choice than another. If  the disadvantage to all sellers of  changing a particular transaction
57 See also, below at ch 3(2) for definitional qualifications. 
58 A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  the Wealth of  Nations (1776) Book I, ch 7, para 9
59 MJ Trebilcock, ‘An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of  Unconscionability’ in BJ Reiter and J Swan (eds) Studies in Contract
(1980) 380, 412-413, asking ‘whether at the margin of  the market, there are enough consumers who are sensitive to the
content of  these clauses to bring effective pressure to bear on suppliers to modify them in an acceptable way.... For example,
if  only  10  per  cent  of  the  buyers  of  insurance  policies  or  dry-cleaning  services  studied  all  terms  scrupulously  before
contracting and were influenced in their choice of  policy by their evaluation of  the so-called fine print clauses, and if  no
supplier of  insurance or dry-cleaning services was able to ‘term discriminate’ between these consumers and other consumers
in the market, there would be strong competitive pressures on each supplier to adjust the terms of  his contracts so as to avoid
losing this potential business....’
60 JR Commons, ‘Institutional Economics’ (1931) 21 American Economic Review 648, R Coase, ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’
(1960) 3 JLE 1, 15, and H Hansmann, The Ownership of  Enterprise (1996) ch 2 
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term cannot  be  outweighed by  buyers  acting  collectively  to  trigger  a  loss  of  business,  then
markets will be foreclosed as a mechanism of  accountability.61 One party is told to ‘take it or
leave it’,  and lacks the bargaining power to get a different result.62 This seems very similar to
identifying  ‘imperfect  competition’  where  there  is  wide  departure  from  ‘perfect  elasticity  of
supply’ for market participants.63 In the context of  equity investment, these are all different ways
of  saying that one party is a non-adjusting investor. 
What makes an investor ‘non-adjusting’, or lacking in bargaining power, or unavoidably
subject to ‘take it  or leave it’  deals? Classic reasons have ranged from saying that the market
participants are not informed,64 or they are insufficiently organised to take collective action,65 or
they cannot ‘hold out’ as long as long in negotiations because they hold fewer resources. 66 Thus,
the concept of  bargaining power in any negotiation derives from (1) information asymmetries, (2)
relative ability to take collective action, (3) relative wealth. The consequence is that one party is
more likely to appropriate more of  the joint surplus in a transaction than another.67 This differs
from supply and demand per se, which envisages that markets clear at an equilibrium intersection
of  the two. The concept of  equilibrium economics was originally formulated with commercial
sales markets in mind, and originally it rightly excluded those markets where there could be an
ample joint surplus, and where unequal bargaining power could be most pervasive.68 
The most controversial element in the concept of  bargaining power is whether relative
access to resources (as opposed to information, and collective action problems) limits the utility
of  markets. This suggests that inequality of  wealth is habitually perpetuated into transactional
terms. ‘Freedom of  contract’ becomes a fearsome weapon in the fist of  the rich, and a blunted
tool  in  the  clutch  of  the  poor.69 It  suggests  that  markets  are  increasingly  deprived  of  their
normative justification, because ‘private autonomy’ becomes one party imposing its intentions on
another.70 This legitimises society in declining to spend taxpayers’ money on courts to enforce
61 cf  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 3(4) JFE 305, 330, ‘If  my competitors all incur agency costs equal to or greater than mine I
will not be eliminated from the market by their competition.’
62 F Kessler, ‘Contracts of  Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of  Contract’ (1943) 43(5) Columbia LR 629, 632-3,
‘standardized contracts are frequently contracts of  adhesion; they are á prendre ou á laisser. Not infrequently the weaker party to
a prospective contract even agrees in advance not to retract his offer while the offeree reserves for himself  the power to
accept or refuse; or he submits to terms or change of  terms which will be communicated to him later.’
63 cf  J Robinson,  The Economics  of  Imperfect  Competition  (1933) Book IX, ch 25,  1.  This definition of  imperfect  competition
appears indistinguishable from the concept of  inequality bargaining power because resource inequality would seem to be a
common basis for imperfect elasticity of  supply that Robinson mentions. This is discussed just below. 
64 eg WS Jevons, Theory of  Political Economy (3rd edn 1888) ch 4, §74
65 eg JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book V, ch XI, §§8-12
66 eg Smith (1776) Book I, ch 8, §12
67 RA Epstein, ‘In Defense of  the Contract at Will’ (1984) 51(4) University of  Chicago Law Review 947, 973-976
68 F Jenkin, The graphic representation of  the laws of  supply and demand and other essays on political economy  (1887, 1996 edn Routledge)
Part I discusses commercial sales markets, and first formulated the classic graph later adopted by Alfred Marshall. Part II
discussed labour markets, where the same principles and graphical representation were thought to not be applicable.
69 O Gierke, Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (1889) 22
70 M Weber, The Theory of  Social and Economic Organization (1915, translated 1947) ch I, §16
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any agreement it perceives as unfair.71 One view is that, so understood, bargaining power lacks
‘any economic basis’.72 This seems to go too far, given that Adam Smith himself  spoke squarely
in terms of  workers being incapable of  holding out in a dispute because of  their relative wealth. 73
A second view is that inequality in resources potentially corrupts all market transactions, making
‘freedom of  contract’ a cruel euphemism for ‘blind coercion’.74 This view, held by many socialists,
appears to go too far in the other direction, because it can readily be seen that there are many
transactional contexts (e.g. commercial sales) where two parties genuinely do stand upon an equal
foot.
A third view is  that  any attempt  to maintain a  unified theory  of  market  interactions
should be abandoned. Plainly in some transactions, among some parties, information asymmetry
or collective action problems will be more clearly at issue than relative wealth. Friedrich Kessler
found it natural to speak of  people buying insurance policies, including life insurance,75 as lacking
bargaining power, while in contracts for reinsurance it was typical that ‘parties of  equal skill and
bargaining power are dealing with [one] another.’76 Similarly, among workers who are saving for
retirement, and therefore buying into occupational pensions, bargaining power may be spoken of
in  the  classical  terms  familiar  to  Adam Smith.  Thus,  the  bargaining  power  of  the  ultimate
investor – the life insurance policyholder, or the pension beneficiary – can realistically be seen to
be shaped by a greater relative need, based on lack of  resources. What about shareholders? It can
probably be said that for many small, individual shareholders, markets ceased to be a mechanism
of  accountability a long time ago, probably because many individual shareholders used also to be
ordinary  people  looking  to  save  for  retirement.77 By  contrast,  among  organised  institutional
shareholders, including trade unions which run pension funds, asset managers, banks, and so on,
issues of  relative wealth are less pressing, while collective action and information problems come
to the fore.
It is possible that the language of  bargaining power would not be comfortably received in
corporate governance discourse. However this issue can be easily overcome by instead using the
language  of  the  ‘non-adjusting  investor’.  If  the  issue  of  relative  wealth  also  appears  as  an
uncomfortable conceptual ‘transplant’, the issue can likewise be overcome by speaking of  ‘non-
71 JS Mill, On Liberty (1859) Chapter V, para 4.
72 RA Posner, ‘Reflections on Consumerism’ (1973) 20 University of  Chicago Law School Record 19, 24-25, ‘The argument of
“exploitation” based on “unequal bargaining power”, however, lacks, so far as I can see, any economic basis.’ 
73 Smith (1776) Book I, ch 8, §12
74 S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1920) Part III, ch 2, 687-8 comes close. This analysis was seen to justify the gradual
replacement of  the market with nationalised industry, without the limits defined. 
75 See also, F Kessler, ‘Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract’ (1954) 374 Insurance Law Journal 151
76 Kessler (1943) 43(5) Columbia LR 629, 633
77 See ch 5(3)
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transaction costs’. Transaction costs are plainly embedded in corporate law discourse, 78 but less
attention has been given to the costs that each party has if  they do  not  reach agreement. For
instance, if  the non-adjusting investor risks an undignified retirement, while an asset manager
risks nothing by not coming to an agreement, then the non-adjusting investor has higher ‘non-
transaction costs’. The ‘costs of  not transacting’ could also affect a director of  a company (who
wants to maintain a job) compared with a very large activist investor (who can get anyone), an
asset  manager  in  a  competitive  market  (who needs  to  hit  revenue  targets)  compared with  a
massive pension fund (which can switch business), or a group of  pension trustees compared with
a  trade  union  representing  its  members’  interests  in  retirement.  Typically,  the  costs  of  not
transacting will be higher for a natural person bargaining with a corporation, or at any rate a
corporation with considerable organisational resources. Plainly these issues represent a central
controversy in the history of  advanced economies, and are not likely to be satisfactorily resolved
soon because people have different interests at stake. This will be returned to in more detail in
chapter 7(2)(c). But for now there appear to be good enough reasons to suppose that markets do
not solve everything, and are often limited in achieving accountability in corporate governance. 
A final  potential  drawback of  markets  is  that  over-reliance on them as accountability
mechanisms can  produce  standoffs  that  shut  down production.  The use  of  ‘exit’  in  various
contexts can be beneficial if  the message is gradually received and acted upon, but quick shocks
can also be destructive of  value,  for instance if  a mass exodus of  custom or capital leaves a
business bankrupt while slower changes could have allowed the enterprise to be rescued. 79 While
markets operating in limited fields can be beneficial, it is important to see there is room for the
use of  other mechanisms, and so to avoid ‘economic civil war’.80
(b) Legal rights and minima
Some of  the shortcomings in market interactions can be remedied through courts imposing, and
ultimately  supervising,  compulsory  terms  in  transactions.  Problems  of  collective  action,  or
holding resources, need not apply to the same degree when bringing a claim in court, 81 provided
78 The  concept  comes  from  JR  Commons,  ‘Institutional  Economics’  (1931)  21  American  Economic  Review  648,  who
understood bargaining power well. JR Commons and JB Andrews, Principles of  Labor Legislation (Harper 1916) ch 1, 9
79 Hirschman (1970) 24
80 AA Berle, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365, 1368-9, ‘The only
thing that can come out of  [giving unlimited power to directors], in any long view, is the massing of  group after group to
assert their private claims by force or threat - to take what each can get, just as corporate managements do. The laborer is
invited to organize and strike, the security holder is invited either to jettison his corporate securities and demand relief  from
the state, or to decline to save money at all under a system which grants to someone else power to take his savings at will. The
consumer or patron is left nowhere, unless he learns the dubious art of  boycott. This is an invitation not to law or orderly
government, but to a process of  economic civil war.’
81 JC Coffee, ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 Columbia LR 1618-
1691, 1622
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that  the  court  system  does  not  erect  substantial  barriers  to  filing  and  pursuing  litigation.
Directors’ duties, fiduciary duties, and duties of  care for asset managers or trustees, implied terms
that cannot be excluded from contracts, and specific terms made compulsory by law, can all be a
potential way to ensure some modicum of  accountability. Rules, standards or principles can be
formulated at high levels of  generality, or with minute specificity. A court can develop precedents,
and a  regulator  could be empowered to issue  ad hoc guidance or  binding regulations to suit
changes in the market over time. 
The main drawback of  compulsory  legal  rights, however,  is  that  their  mechanisms of
enforcement tend to be institutionally incapable of  doing much more than either enforcing rigid
patterns  of  behaviour,  or  creating  minimum  standards.  Assuming  that  the  outcome  is  the
imposition of  some kind of  liability, ‘they cannot, unlike the market and market-linked devices,
create a more positive motivational environment.’82 This is another way of  saying that the human
capacity to innovate is not by itself  assured by court based remedies. This is true whether a right
or a duty is formulated in a positive manner or not. 
For example, what is typically called a duty of  loyalty, and equally what is called a duty of
care, in practice resolves into a duty to avoid various conflicts of  interest, and to stay above a
standard regarded as negligent. Such rules and standards are critical in themselves to ensure that
directors, asset managers, fiduciaries, trustees, or other contracting parties maintain some level of
professional conduct. It can also be true that by emphasising the positive view (‘loyalty’, ‘care’,
and so on) there is an ‘educational and socializing’  effect in the law.83 The development of  a
positive  culture  of  professionalism  and  accountability,  however,  takes  time  and  may  remain
vulnerable to an unscrupulous few driving the competition where strong incentives point in a
different direction. Such duties have to be policed by the courts or a regulator. They penalise bad
behaviour, but they are hardly capable of  enforcing any particular model of  good behaviour.
Such rights and duties necessarily create ‘a space within which culture and ethics... can be fostered
and  come  to  play  a  meaningful  role’,84 although  what  else  might  influence  that  culture  is
debatable, and probably multi-faceted. 
To give a fuller example, company law typically imposes a duty on directors to act in the
interest of  shareholders or other stakeholders. In the UK, this is found in section 172, while
many American states have enacted ‘constituency statutes’ requiring directors act in the interests
82 JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (1993) 134
83 JC Coffee, ‘Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (1984) 52 George
Washington Law Review 789, 796
84 D Awrey,  W Blair  and  D Kershaw,  ‘Between Law and  Markets:  Is  There  A Role  for  Culture  and  Ethics  in  Financial
Regulation’ (2013) 38(1) Delaware Journal of  Corporate Law 191, 194
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of  all  stakeholders.85 This resembles the German duty,86 following from the understanding of
acting in the interests of  the Unternehmen an sich. It usually comes down to directors’ discretion to
balance the interests of  all stakeholders. These kinds of  provisions are particularly instructive
because, though applicable to directors, the same issues arise with all duties to act in another’s
interests. Such duties are found throughout the chain of  investment: for UK and US pension
trustees and asset managers,87 and German banks.88 Terms can also be implied in contracts to
require actions which fulfil the parties’ ‘reasonable expectations’, particularly in the case of  life
insurance companies.89 These duties are formulated in a pro-active way. But less comes from pro-
active formulation than the aspirational idiolect might suggest. In the UK, the Companies Act
2006 section 172 is worded ambiguously, but for this very reason serves to illustrate the point. It
proclaims that a director has a duty to do what ‘he considers’ in ‘good faith’ will ‘promote the
success of  the company, for the benefit of  its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard’
to the long term consequences and just about every stakeholder (except directors). But however
this section is interpreted, it can do no more than require minimum standards of  conduct.
One interpretation of  section 172 is  that it  creates an ‘enlightened shareholder value’
hierarchy, so that if  company decisions could not conceivably make profit in the long term, a
director will  be in breach of  duty by not  putting that shareholder interest  first.  Section 172
cannot be breached unless the director subjectively ‘considers’ (perhaps after a rational process of
thought) he or she is not putting shareholder value first, and so cases of  breach being established
will be rare. But, on this view, the subjective nature of  the duty only underlines the requirement
that directors think and act (and think they are acting) in the interests of  shareholders first, and
above other stakeholders.90 If  this, the strongest view, were taken it still would only be in marginal
and  occasional  cases  such  as  careless  public  announcements,91 or  distributions  pending
insolvency,92 where liability might bite. Constant supervision by the court would be impractical to
achieve a more positive objective. Yet the actual case law to support such a strong shareholder
value interpretation is difficult to find at present. 
A second interpretation is that section 172, despite its syntactical ambivalence, could not
85 eg New York Business Corporations Law §717(b)
86 BGHZ 64, 325, 330 = NJW 1975, 1412
87 e.g. Armitage v Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279 
88 e.g. Aktiengesetz 1965 §135
89 See Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2000] UKHL 39
90 cf  M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of  the State (2013) 192-3
91 e.g. the old decision of  Dodge v Ford Motor Co, 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919) This probably does not represent the law any more in
most US states, including Michigan. See LA Stout, ‘Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford’ (2007) UCLA School of  Law,
Law-Econ Research Paper  No.  07-11.  Its  supposed shareholder  value view was  squarely  refuted  by the majority  of  the
Supreme Court in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Inc, 573 US _ (2014) per Alito J at 23-24
92 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654. This is, however, reversed by statute, now in CA 2006 s 247.
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have the effect of  requiring shareholder value be pursued, enlightened or otherwise, not least
because  the  words  ‘shareholder’  and  ‘value’  simply  do  not  appear.  Section  172  speaks  of
‘members’  because  many  companies,  such  as  those  limited  by  guarantee,  may  have  no
shareholders, and a member is whoever is entered on the members’ register.93 True, members are
shareholders most of  the time, but companies can if  they choose register employees as members,
or people in the community, or any stakeholder, and they will hold all member rights. Moreover,
directors are meant to promote the success of  the ‘company’, but the part of  the existing law that
was codified was not the old idea that the company means shareholders.94 Instead, section 172 re-
codified the conception of  the company that composed employees and members,95 and all the
stakeholders who are connected by the web of  relevant rules (admitting that those rules could
favour some more than others).96 
On this second, stakeholder-balancing view, such an interpretation is not merely a matter
of  preference. It is compelled, among other things, by the textual distinction section 172 draws
between ‘the company’ and ‘the members’. If  companies and members were the same, the two
could  not  be  distinguished  in  section  172.  Directors  may  place  employee,  environment  or
community interests over dividends whenever, according to their conscience, this would promote
the company’s success.  This  is  the same as a ‘constituency’  statute in effect, 97 although more
specific rules could exist elsewhere, such as for takeovers. The case law supports this view. For
example, in  Shepherd v Williamson it was contended that a director, Shepherd, breached his duty
under section 172 by reporting to the Office of  Fair Trading that the company was in a cartel. 98 It
was  argued  this  did  not  promote  the  company’s  success,  and  indeed  on  any  rational  view,
Shepherd’s actions were not going to increase shareholder profits, especially as the company was
being wound up. But Proudman J held that  under section 172 Shepherd was promoting the
success of  ‘the company’. Effectively he did this by placing the interest of  the community (in
93 CA 2006 s 112 and Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, Sch 3, art 1
94 cf  Greenhalgh  v  Arderne  Cinemas  Ltd [1951]  Ch 286,  291,  where  Lord Evershed MR refers to  ‘corporators’  as  being  the
company.  Technically  this  would  indicate  whoever  subscribed  to  a  memorandum,  and  this  may  or  may  not  include
shareholders, directors, employees and others, although it appears Lord Evershed MR mainly had shareholders in mind.
95 See  the  Companies  Act  1985  s  309(1)  ‘The  matters  to  which  the  directors  of  a  company  are  to  have  regard  in  the
performance of  their functions include the interests of  the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of  its
members.’ This was introduced following the recommendations of  the Report of  the committee of  inquiry on industrial democracy
(1977) Cmnd 6706 albeit without the requirement for employee voting rights for directors. 
96 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, 507, per Lord Hoffmann at [10] ‘Judges
sometimes  say  that  a  company  ‘as  such’  cannot  do  anything;  it  must  act  by  servants  or  agents.  This  may  seem  an
unexceptionable, even banal remark. And of  course the meaning is usually perfectly clear. But a reference to a company ‘as
such’ might suggest that there is something out there called the company of  which one can meaningfully say that it can or
cannot do something. There is in fact no such thing as the company as such, no ding an sich, only the applicable rules. To say
that a company cannot do something means only that there is no one whose doing of  that act would, under the applicable
rules of  attribution, count as an act of  the company.’
97 eg the Indian Companies Act 2013 s 166 
98 Shepherd v Williamson or Re Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch)
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securing fair competition) over the financial interests of  members. At most, section 172 still turns
out to entail conscience based discretion. By stating directors must ‘pay regard’ to stakeholders, at
most  section  172  replicates  other  statutory  provisions,  such  as  the  duty  to  act  for  proper
purposes, the duty of  care, or a combination.  Despite its wording it  can do no more than a
minimum standard. 
A third view is that, whether section 172 is a soft shareholder value norm in marginal
cases  or  not,  whether  it  functions as  a  defence or  a  duty,99 what  really  drives  companies to
shareholder value is business culture. It can be agreed with some certainty, that a director would
be found in breach of  section 172, or a similar provision, if  evidence were found of  bad faith
attempts to damage a company’s success, and possibly the duty of  care is applicable in going
through the process of  showing regard to stakeholders. But it is extremely doubtful that the duty
can go much further. Shareholder value is a cultural norm,100 not a legal norm, and neither it, nor
a ‘stakeholder interest’ culture, can be written into law and enforced without impossibly constant
oversight and monitoring that would stretch even the most well resourced regulatory body. It
would require a regulator to substitute its decisions for the decisions of  every company board. 
A combination of  factors may produce a culture where shareholder value, stakeholder
welfare, the beneficiary’s interests, or the client’s interests, are promoted over other things. But if
this  happens,  the  style  of  legal  duties  will  only  be  one  thread  in  a  web  of  incentives  and
constraints. The construction of  the markets will also play a role, including the rules concerning
the  right  of  shareholders  to  sell  their  shares,  or  pre-empt  sales  and  buy  themselves. 101 But
arguably the most influential factor will be whose voice in an organisation is heard the most. 
(c) Participation rights
Participation rights are one kind of  term that can be negotiated, or mandated, in any consent-
based obligation involved in forming an organisation. The central tool of  participation is the
vote.  This  is  a  mechanism for  aggregating  the  preferences  of  multiple  persons  in  order  to
conclude an appropriate course of  conduct. This is what ‘voice’ usually means, albeit that voice
can be used in a looser sense where it may be ignored, rather than be listened to, or be advisory
rather  than binding.102 Participation  can  be  ‘direct’,  where  people  vote  on specific  issues,  or
‘representative’, where delegates are chosen to act on the voters’ behalf, and a representative vote
99 L Sealy and S Worthington, Sealy and Worthington’s Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn 2013) 341
100 See S Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of  Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 11
101 P Davies, ‘Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets Law: A British View’ in K Hopt and E Wymeersch (eds),
Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP 2012) 262
102 Hirschman (1970) follows this expansive definition.
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could involve positive election rights, a right to remove the representative, or both.
Participation  through  the  vote  to  select  representatives  has  a  unique  quality.103 The
irreducible core of  participation rights is that people act similarly to the interests of  those to
whom they owe their positions, no matter how independent, or duty bound, they may be. It is
true that representatives are usually in a position to follow their conscience rather than the mood
of  a crowd that might later vote them out, but over time the essential identity of  interest prevails.
Any vote carries with it positive information about preferences,104 and plainly this can be to a
higher  or  lower  degree  of  specificity.  A  vote  for  representatives  may  also  create  a  positive
motivational environment, which other legal rights cannot match. This is  because people will
often want  to  keep their  jobs in  future.  Negative outcomes are also possible:  living under  a
permanent threat of  losing one’s job can be destructive, and lead to irrational behaviour, because
statistically people tend to ‘choke’ under undue pressure.105 However if  terms are predictable, the
rules transparent, and the voters themselves not subject to irrational changes of  preference, these
issues can be minimised.
The drawbacks of  participation rights  lie  mainly  in  becoming overly  optimistic  about
what they might achieve. First, the concept of  participation can be configured in numerous ways
in  the  details,  which  may make representatives  more  or  less  responsive.  A direct  vote  for  a
representative,  for  example,  will  probably  lead  to  greater  responsiveness  than  a  vote  for
intermediate delegates, which in turn appoint representatives.  Second, voting mechanisms can
leave minorities vulnerable, where their interests diverge from the majorities. Unlike market rights
which allow the minority to leave,  a voting mechanism  per  se  does not resolve this difficulty.
Third, while participation rights can propel a representative to look out for the interests of  those
he or she represents, if  reality does not play out so well, removal is not a remedy to recoup the
potential losses, or strip the conflicted gains. Accountability through legally enforceable minimum
standards  is  needed  to  do  this.  Fourth,  in  a  similar  fashion  to  markets,  there  are  costs  of
organising collective action in using a voice. Fifth, because an organisation is made up of  people,
there is the possibility that organisations solidify around bad practices and cultures. However,
being ineffective or hard to operate or being open to human error does not mean participation
rights are useless.106 People still tend to follow the interests of  those to whom they owe their jobs.
103 cf  Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126, Lord Holt CJ, 954, ‘It would look very strange, when the commons of  England are so
fond of  their right of  sending representatives to Parliament, that it should be in the power of  a sheriff, or other officer, to
deprive them of  that right, and yet that they should have no remedy; it is a thing to be admired at by all mankind.’
104 eg J Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (OUP 1971) 233-234
105 See E McGaughey, ‘Behavioural economics and labour law’ (2014) LSE Working Paper Series 20/2014, pages 17-20
106 cf  MA Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of  Corporate Law’ (1989) 89 CLR 1461, 1479 and H Demsetz, ‘Information and Efficiency:
Another Viewpoint’ (1969) 12 Journal of  Law and Economics 1, on the nirvana fallacy. 
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No matter how many or few people participate, someone’s voice is heard.
Comparing the different mechanisms of  accountability, it seems clear that no single one
leads to all the answers. It also is conceivable that a contribution is separated from the right to sell
an asset (or that those rights are frustrated in any number of  ways), or that a legal system would
allow a contribution to be separated from any kind of  legal duty. These possibilities create their
own problems,  and are  also  worthy  of  independent  discussion.  But  like  the  relationship  of
control  to  ownership,  participation  has  an  independent,  and  unique  relevance  to  protect
contributions to enterprise.
(4) Conclusions
The separation of  contribution and participation  is  among the most important  problems in
modern  investment  chains.  While  ‘ownership  and  control’  have  been  historically  seen  as
important  concepts,  they  do not  necessarily  capture  the  breadth  of  today’s  issues.  Whatever
ownership structure a company has, there can be a similar functional outcome in who influences
corporate governance, and a similar functional outcome in terms of  agency costs of  institutional
shareholders. In developed countries, even those as diverse as the UK, Germany, and the US,
financial intermediaries tend to dominate corporate governance. This potentially creates welfare
damaging agency problems for non-adjusting investors. 
A functional understanding of  the contribution that a non-adjusting investor makes to
enterprise enables a more realistic conceptual analysis. It embraces the position of  trust-based or
contract-based pension beneficiaries, mutual fund or life insurance policyholders, whether or not
they retain ownership rights. Like contribution is to ownership, so participation is to control, but
this does not make participation the only accountability mechanism. It was conceded that rights
on the market,  and systems of  legal duties,  can complement and strengthen accountability in
corporate governance. However, they cannot reasonably be seen as substitutes. Differences in
bargaining power often negate the utility  of  markets,  and other legal rights are institutionally
incapable of  doing more than creating minimum standards. This leaves the irreducible fact that
people  tend  to  act  in  the  interests  of  those  to  whom  they  owe  their  jobs,  and  whoever
participates in choosing. Participation is uniquely important, and equally so is the question to
follow: why do some people participate more than others in corporate governance?
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3. TWO POSITIVE THESES: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF PARTICIPATION
Chapter 2 has set out the case for re-examining corporate governance through a new perspective:
the separation of  contribution and participation. A ‘contribution’ involved a relation lasting over
a period of  time where something of  value is given in expectation of  a return, especially by a
‘non-adjusting investor’.  ‘Participation’  meant sharing in decision making,  at  any level  on the
investment chain, in concert with others, and a central method was a vote for representatives.
However it was observed how asset managers and banks have assumed most voting rights in
large companies in the UK, Germany and the US. So why have the people who make the ultimate
contributions  to  enterprise  become  separated  from participation?  Chapter  2(1)  alluded  to  a
significant body of  law that regulates how far directors are (in some fashion) responsible through
the vote to shareholders. This raises a question itself: why did the law act to prevent a separation
between directors and shareholders? It was also seen that the law has (to a lesser extent) made
pension trustees accountable to beneficiaries.  But then, this seems to leave a gap, particularly
when the ultimate investor,  or a pension fund, delegates investment management to an asset
manager  or  a  bank.  What  explains  the  separation  between  shareholding  institutions  and the
ultimate beneficiaries?
This chapter proposes two positive theses for the political and economic development of
participation rights. These are that (1) progressive democratic movements consistently pushed for
the spread of  participation rights in law, but only incompletely compared to their social ideals,
and (2) where there was no particular law, participation rights mainly depended on the economic
actors’ bargaining power. This could grow the separation of  contribution and participation, or
narrow it.  Either way,  the evolution would be unprincipled.  The outcomes were not rational
because at root the actors were human, and people face constraints. It has been said there is a
need to integrate rational choice theories with contextual understanding of  human behaviour,
without it dissolving into ‘laundry list’ impressionism.1 We still ‘lack a science of  man.’2 What is
offered here may not meet this aspiration fully. But a positive, contextual understanding can draw
on  recent  advances  in  behavioural  psychology  that  foots  context  on  an  evidential  basis.
Contextual  complexity  is  evident  through  history.  And  history  is  the  awkward  antidote  to
ambitious theory. 
1 P Gourevitch and J Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Governance (2005) 93, discussed below at ch 3(1)(b)
2 F Kessler, ‘Natural Law, Justice and Democracy – Some Reflections on Three Types of  Thinking about Law and Justice’
(1944) 19 Tulane Law Review 32, 60
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(1) Politics: what shaped the law?
(a) Political theories
What have political theories already said about the development of  participation in corporate
governance? Contemporary theories begin with Mark Roe’s  Strong Managers, Weak Owners.  Roe
was less concerned with rules on director elections, shareholder voting, or beneficiaries’ voice per
se, than regulation of  financial institutions – banks,3 insurance companies,4 pension funds,5 and
mutual funds6 – and how this regulation had broken concentrated shareholdings in the US. Roe’s
thesis  was  that  the  ideology  of  ‘populist’  politics,  represented  by  Woodrow  Wilson,  Louis
Brandeis, and William O. Douglas, drove de-concentration of  institutional shareholding. Roe said
‘populists’ favoured laws that prevented financial institutions holding blocks of  shares. This had
gone so far that by 1990 two of  General Motors’ largest institutional shareholders could not even
require a meeting with the board about how to choose the new CEO because each owned under
1 per cent of  shares.7 Roe emphasised the behavioural anomalies of  political decision-making.
People tended to ‘anchor’ their opposition to the first manifestations of  impersonal power they
saw: namely financial institutions.8 People also have a  status quo  bias, and so legislators stuck to
familiar regulatory patterns (like the US inheriting UK banking laws) because the familiar shapes
perceptions of  the desirable.9  
Roe subsequently extended his explanations for ownership structures around the world,
based on degrees of  ‘social democracy’. In absence of  a clear ‘populist’ story outside the US, the
thesis in Political Determinants of  Corporate Governance was that stronger trade unions, with more job
security, necessitated that capital build its power in response by holding blocks of  shares. It did
not actually matter whether block shareholding or social democratic institutions came first. Once
3 M Roe,  Strong Managers,  Weak Owners (1994) chs 5 and 7. Major elements were the tradition inherited from the Bank of
England Act 1694 of  banks keeping out of  equity, the National Bank Act 1864 restricting powers of  non-state based banks,
and the Glass-Steagall  Banking Act 1933 segregating retail  and investment  banks.  Also the McFadden Act 1927 allowed
national banks to have state branches, but only in compliance with state law, and the Bank Holding Company Act 1956
restricted equity ownership by banks through holding companies. 
4 MJ Roe, ‘Foundations of  Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of  the Insurance Industry’ (1993) 93(3) Columbia Law
Review 639, and Roe (1994) ch 6. State insurance regulation was generally permitted by Paul v Virginia, 75 US 168 (1868) but
after the New York Armstrong Investigation of  1905, many states followed in banning insurance firms owning equities.
5 M Roe, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions: Insulating Management from Owners and from Accountability’
(1993-1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 75, and Roe (1994) ch 9, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 required
pension funds to diversify shareholdings. 
6 MJ Roe, ‘Political Elements in the Creation of  a Mutual Fund Industry’ (1991) 139 University of  Pennsylvania LR 1469, and
Roe (1994) ch 8, the Investment Company Act 1940, and subsequent Securities and Exchange Commission Rules required
mutual funds diversify their shareholdings.
7 Roe (1994) xiii-xv and compare ch 6(3)(b)
8 Roe (1994) 31, citing D Kahneman, P Slovic and A Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982)
9 Roe (1994) 48, citing W Samuelson and R Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1 Journal of  Risk and
Uncertainty 7.
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they existed, they locked each other in. The evidence for this thesis was said to lie in leximetric
indicators of  social democracy such as an OECD employment protection index, or a ‘political
index’ generated through a poll of  political scientists,10 which loosely correlated with the number
of  firms without a 20 per cent blockholder (as in Graph 6.1 below).11 There were also loose
correlations with the Gini coefficient, and GDP.12 
Roe’s later methodology had become very different to before. While Strong Managers was
emphatic  that  ‘history  matters’,13 Political  Determinants stressed  that  ‘focus  on  the  historical
sequence misses the point.’14 In place of  historical sequence was a logical construct based on the
rational incentives of  interest groups. This did not touch on the reasons for participation rights as
such, as its focus remained on ownership structure. However Roe’s frames of  reference – the
ideologies of  populism and, later, social democracy – held considerable explanatory power. 
The later Roe was critical of  the work
by  Raphael  La  Porta,  Florencio  Lopez  de
Silanes,  Andrei  Shleifer  and  Robert  Vishny
(collectively known as LLSV). They did have
an explanation  for  some participation  rights
on a seven point ‘anti-director rights’ index.15
This  index  included  (1)  one-share,  one-vote
rules, (2) rights to vote by proxies by mail, (3)
shares  not  being  blocked before  meetings,  (4)  cumulative  voting,  (5)  an  oppressed  minority
remedy, (6) pre-emption rights on new issues, (7) the percentage of  share capital needed to call a
meeting. Curiously, however, this anti-director rights index did not include anything on director
election rules. They argued the strength of  these rules in favour of  shareholders, and minority
shareholders,  was  largely  due to a  country’s  legal  origin.  Echoing Friedrich von Hayek,  they
thought common law judges, due to their close attention to factual circumstances in case law,
10 TR Cusack, ‘Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989’
(1997) 91 Public Choice 375, 383-4
11 Roe (2003) 51 (mid sized firms) and 57 (largest firms, and top 10)
12 Roe (2003) 52, 54 and 58 respectively.
13 Roe (1994) vii, ‘This history matters because corporate governance - the relationship among a firm’s shareholders, its board of
directors, and its senior manageres – matters.’ 
14 Roe (2003) 78
15 R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and RW Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of  Political Economy 1113,
1130, Table 2 and R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (1999)
54 Journal of  Finance 471, 478 
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progressed  the  law  in  ways  that  are  superior  to  elected  legislatures.16 The  common  law  is
efficient,17 and so it would develop superior minority shareholder protections. LLSV’s ultimate
goal was explaining ownership structure. They believed poor minority shareholder protections
mean rational  investors  do not  buy shares for  fear  of  expropriation.  Even blockholders  are
reluctant  to  have  small  stakes,  for  fear  of  expropriation  by  management.18 This  drives
concentration, but dispersed systems are usually preferable because fewer blockholders extract
private benefits of  control.19 
While Roe and LLSV had offered competing explanations for ownership structure based
on populism or social democracy, and legal origin, Gourevitch and Shinn added the elements of
legislative  structure  and  political  coalitions.  They  also  said  more  about  participation  rights.
Ultimately, a country’s legislative system, if  more ‘politically cohesive’ would determine which
coalitions  between  shareholders,  directors  and  workers  (or  ‘owners,  managers  and  workers’)
would prevail. Consensual political structures with more proportional representation were slightly
more  likely  to  produce  more pro-worker  and  fewer pro-shareholder  results  than  majoritarian
systems.20 Their  statistical  correlations  were  weak,21 and  the  rights  of  beneficiaries  behind
institutional shareholders did not feature among these factors. But this was because the angle of
their  lens  was  aimed  to  capture  a  general
picture:  ultimately  concentrating  on  the
multiple and complex drivers of  ownership
structure. Ownership structure came from a
whole  mix  of  a  country’s  ‘degrees  of
coordination’  and  minority  shareholder
protections,  which  in  turn  (as  Figure  4.2
shows  to  the  right)  partly  related  to
legislative systems. 
16 FA Hayek,  The Constitution of  Liberty  (1960). The strengths and weaknesses of  judicial over legislative decision making are
discussed by Brandeis J in New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932) and more recently by Lord Sumption, Limits of  the
Law: 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur (20 November 2013). For an intermediate position see Lord Hoffmann in
Matadeen v Pointu [1998] UKPC 9, [9]-[15] and Grape Bay Ltd v Attorney-General of  Bermuda [1999] UKPC 43, [32]-[33]
17 See also R Posner, Economic Analysis of  Law (1972) 99, ‘In searching for a reasonably objective and impartial standard, as the
traditions of  the bench require him to do, the judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was the product of  wasteful,
uneconomical resource use. In a culture of  scarcity, this is an urgent, an inescapable question. And at least an approximation
to the answer is in most cases reasonably accessible to intuition and common sense.’
18 La Porta et al (1998) 106 Journal of  Political Economy 1113, 1145 and (1999) 54 Journal of  Finance 471, 473 
19 eg MJ Barclay and CG Holderness,  ‘Private Benefits  of  Control  in Public  Corporations’  (1989)  25 Journal of  Financial
Economics 371 
20 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 69, ‘consensus systems reduce the impact of  vote shifts by giving leverage to a wide range of
players through coalitions, and thus have lesser swings of  policy.’ 
21 Gourevitch  and  Shinn  (2005)  75,  Figure  4.3,  showing  the  shareholder  protections  index  against  the  index  of  political
cohesion, and very little relationship, if  any.
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Gourevitch and Shinn’s open acknowledgement of  the loose correlations related to their
contextual understanding of  human behaviour. Thus, they were closer to the earlier Roe, and
further from the later Roe or LLSV. They rejected that legal incentives played no causal role, or
that everything was (as some economic sociologists suggested) ‘constructed’ or based on mere
‘impression’.22 They endorsed an ‘incentives-centred perspective’ and anchored their ‘inquiry in
debates  from  the  law-and-economics  tradition  concerned  with  the  “nexus  of  contracts,”
incomplete  contracting,  transaction  costs,  and  principal-agent  theories.’23 However,  they  also
emphasised most how historical ‘context makes for twists and turns that require something more
flexible  for causal  understanding.’24 For political  choice,  they said ‘scripts and ideology surely
matters’ and ‘in confusing situations, one’s “priors” are a guide to action’. It followed that ‘an
abstract concept of  optimum efficiency has substantial weaknesses as an explanation’.25 This said,
integrating alternative modes of  reasoning, between the overly contextual, avoiding ‘a collage or a
laundry list of  factors’, and the unwaveringly rational, ‘remains an open theme for the future’.26
Part of  the difficulty in the theses of  LLSV, Roe, and Gourevitch and Shinn was that
much of  their evidence relied on indices which coded the protectiveness of  various laws into
numbers. Unfortunately, these early leximetric tables contained many ‘coding errors’. This was
particularly true of  LLSV,27 as they themselves conceded in 2005.28 In a more rigorous study of
shareholder rights, Mathias Siems found that in 20 coded countries, there was little correlation
between legal origins and a comprehensive 60 variable list of  shareholder protections. In fact
countries were converging toward uniformly higher levels of  protection.29 Because Gourevitch
and Shinn used LLSV’s numbers, their correlations were also affected. On labour rights (though
not social security laws), Simon Deakin, Priya Lele and Mathias Siems traced 40 indicators in 5
countries. It was too early, with too few countries, to tell how big the differences would be with
the OECD figures that Roe used.30 For ownership structures, it has been suggested that dispersed
22 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 91, referring in turn to BG Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Time-Tested Strategy for
Successful Investing  (6th edn 1996) 103 and EJ Zajac and JD Westphal, ‘The Costs and Benefits of  Managerial Incentives and
Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When Is More Not Better?’ (1994) 15 Strategic Management Journal 121 and ‘The
Social Construction of  Market Value: Institutionalization and Learning Perspectives on Stock Market Reactions’ (2004) 69
American Sociological Review 433
23 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 27 and 11
24 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 12
25 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 92-93
26 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 93 
27 H Spaman, ‘On the Insignificance and/or Endogenity of  La Porta et al’s ‘Anti-Director Rights’ Index Under Consistent
Coding’ (2006) Harvard JMOCLEB Discussion Paper No 7, 61-62
28 S Djankov, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Law and Economics of  Self-Dealing’ (2005) NBER Working
Paper 11883, 5, saying the anti-director rights index was ‘based on an ad hoc collection of  variables’. To the extent that
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 47-51 make use of  LLSV codings, those conclusions must be regarded as unstable. 
29 M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection Around the World: “Leximetric II”’ (2008) 33 Delaware JCL 111
30 For preliminary findings, see S Deakin, Priya Lele and M Siems, ‘The Evolution of  Labor Law: Calibrating and Comparing
Regulatory Regimes’ (2007) 146 International Labour Review 133
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or blockholding systems are much more about the character of  a country’s state pension system
(income  linked,  or  minimum  safety-net),31 than  other  variables  in  company  or  labour  law.
Nevertheless, it can be said that the prisms of  political ideology and interest group action utilised
by Roe and Gourevitch and Shinn remain significant for understanding the development of  the
law. 
More recently, John Cioffi and Martin Höpner posited the thesis that ‘pro-shareholder
corporate governance reforms’ were largely being driven in the US, Germany, France and Italy by
‘center-left  political  parties’.32 ‘Pro-shareholder  laws’  were  taken to encompass issues  such as
making hostile  takeover bids easier,  one-share,  one-vote  regulation,  more protective fiduciary
duties,  disclosure  rules,  and  restraining  bank  power.33 Cioffi  and  Höpner  posed  this  as
superficially paradoxical. One might suppose that increasing shareholder power would naturally
conflict  with  centre-left  objectives  by  ‘shifting  income  and  wealth  from  wage  earners  to
shareholders.’34 Their study focused mainly on law reforms of  the last 30 or so years, where the
general explanation was that centre-left parties wished to ‘appeal to the middle-class core of  the
electorate  (which  now contains  much  of  the  working  class)  as  current  savers  and potential
investors’.35 While  Gourevitch  and  Shinn  emphasised  the  possibilities  of  coalitions  of
shareholders,  directors  and  workers  cutting  across  a  liberal/coordinated  market  economy
distinction, Cioffi  and Höpner emphasised how general political movements could cut across
shareholder, director and worker interests. 
The politics of  corporate governance became much more contentious after the global
financial crisis.36 This triggered significant changes to the law in the UK, Germany and the US.37
Using the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010 as an analytical example, John Coffee proposed that crises
typically  propelled  reform.38 During  a  crisis  interest  groups  would  coalesce  more  effectively
around the issues they saw because the costs of  inaction would appear to have been increased
compared to the costs of  taking collective action. This theory is inherently appealing because if
31 This connection was drawn by M Roth, ‘Employee Participation, Corporate Governance and the Firm: A Transatlantic View
Focused on Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 51, 56-
58. See also, BR Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (2008) ch 10, and 346-352 in particular.
32 J Cioffi and M Höpner, ‘The Political Paradox of  Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in
Corporate Governance Reform’ (2006) 34 Politics Society 463, 463-4
33 Cioffi and Höpner (2006) 34 Politics Society 463, nb there appears to be an error at 478, as it is said that the German one-
share, one-vote rule was introduced in 1998. In fact it was introduced by the Aktiengesetz 1937. See ch 5(2).
34 Cioffi and Höpner (2006) 34 Politics Society 463, 464
35 Cioffi and Höpner (2006) 34 Politics Society 463, 492
36 cf  PD Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (2011) positing that the ‘policy salience’
of  corporate law reform is usually low.  
37 See ch 7(2)(b)
38 JC Coffee,  ‘The  Political  Economy of  Dodd-Frank:  Why Financial  Reform Tends  to  be  Frustrated  and  Systemic  Risk
Perpetuated’ (2012) 97 Cornell LR 1019
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anything should motivate change, it should be a crisis.39 Coffee was, of  course, speaking in terms of
relative likelihood for large scale reform to take place. But this likelihood would hinge on the
responsiveness of  the legislature to the electorate, and the interference (if  any) of  the courts. 40 
It would be inaccurate to conclude, and Coffee did not conclude, that crises would always
impel positive reform, rather than lead to socially and economically damaging political changes,
or that a major crisis might not simply drag on for an indeterminate time. It  would also be
inaccurate to say that major changes could not be achieved without a crisis. History is full of
crises, so it is often possible to point to something that coincides with reform. However, it is also
possible to identify times of  massive social change (for instance from 1906 in the UK, 41 from
1964 in the US,42 or from 1972 in Germany43) when depressions and wars seemed more remote.
Whenever  reforms  took  place  a  set  of  ideas  had  to  be  available,  and  had  to  have  entered
mainstream political discourse. Yet Coffee must have been right that, given some certainty about
what to do, crises should make change more likely. 
Probably the most sustained account of  corporate law development which explicitly dealt
with  participation  rights  for  shareholders  at  some  length  is  Christopher  Bruner’s  Corporate
Governance  in  the  Common-Law  World.44 Bruner  highlighted  the  unwarranted  tendency  to  see
uniformity  in  common  law  countries  following  an  ‘Anglo-American  model’.  In  fact,  large
variations exist between the US on the one hand, and the UK, Australia and Canada on the other.
Bruner  put  his  finger  on  the  US/Commonwealth  divide,  which  seems  significant  as  the
Commonwealth as a whole still composes well over 2 billion people on a 7 billion planet, and
among the total number of  common law countries the US tends to be an outlier. Among the
developed  Commonwealth  countries  that  Bruner  examined,  company  law  can  accurately  be
described as shareholder-friendly, while there tends to be more employee protection, and a more
comprehensive welfare  state.  Bruner posited that  there  was a  symbiotic  relationship between
social welfare policy and shareholder rights.45 Political actors would be more reluctant to press for
greater shareholder rights as they could be used to damage the interests of  workers and other
stakeholders,  unless  there  were  stronger  welfare  protections.  Stronger  welfare  made  stronger
shareholder rights possible,  and the lack of  adequate welfare protection had stopped the US
39 P Davies, Introduction to Company Law (2010) ch 9, 289
40 Coffee (2012) 97 Cornell LR 1019, on ‘Lochner era’ ethic of  courts blocking SEC rule implementation. 
41 eg the Trade Disputes Act 1906, the Old Age Pensions Act 1908 and the National Insurance Act 1911
42 eg the Civil Rights Act 1964, the Voting Rights Act 1965, and Social Security Amendments Act 1965
43 eg  the  Betriebsverfassungsgesetz  1972  (Business  Constitution  Act  1972),  the  Betrieblichealtersfürsorgegesetz  1974
(Occupational Pensions Act 1974), and the Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 (Codetermination Act 1976). 
44 CM Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of  Shareholder Power (2013)
45 Bruner (2013) ch 5
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doing the same.46 
Bruner’s sophisticated account of  shareholder rights covered, notably, the right to elect or
remove a director, control over takeovers, the ability to change a company’s constitution, and
being the  focus of  fiduciary  duties.47 Chapter  2(3)(b)  has already suggested that  being owed
fiduciary duties, as under the UK Companies Act 2006 section 172, despite aspirational language,
is not effective to positively promote the shareholder’s interests in practice, and so it is difficult to
regard  directors’  duties  as  creating  shareholder  rights  per  se.  However  the  effective  right  of
enforcement of  other duties,  which ties into section 172 through the derivative claim, would
indeed make shareholders the foremost beneficiaries of  directors’ duties. This does only allow
members  to  sue  (unless  the  courts  open  derivative  claims  or  unfair  prejudice  petitions  to
stakeholder enforcement48). This aside, Bruner’s theory has an obvious attraction as it describes a
normatively sensible stance:  would it  not be unwise from the viewpoint of  most voters  and
worker coalitions to push for shareholder rights, when in absence of  employment protection and
social security those rights could take away labour’s share of  income? 
The question is, did matters actually play out as Bruner’s account suggested they  should
have done? Bruner focused on law reform in the UK from 1948 to today, largely on the post-
1960s reforms in the US, and on similar periods for Australia and Canada. It can be accurately
said  that  post-war  improvement  of  Commonwealth  welfare  states  coincided  with  post-war
reforms to company law, largely following the model initiated in the Companies Act 1947. A
potential inconsistency could be that in the US in the 1960s shareholder rights to remove the
board were in decline,49 and this is precisely when collective bargaining was strong and Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society was being built. By contrast, clear support for Bruner’s thesis does exist
when looking at the anti-takeover movement in the 1980s. But more generally it is just not that
clear that politicians in any country were in fact thinking, or sub-consciously behaving, in such a
rational manner, so as to consistently link corporate law reform to welfare considerations. 
Bruner’s  positive  theory  also  embodies  a  significant  normative  disagreement,  which
echoes the Berle-Dodd debates.  Is  it  true that  securing rights  for shareholders (especially  on
director  elections  and shareholder  voting  rules)  would negatively  affect  employees  and other
stakeholders? Why would improved shareholder rights not make directors (to some extent) more
46 Bruner (2013) ch 5, 143
47 Bruner (2013) ch 3, especially 29-52
48 The authorities suggest they already are:  Re Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348, per Briggs J,  BCE Inc v 1976 Debenture
Holders [2008] 3 SCR 560,  Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd [2007] UKPC 26, and J Cottrell,  ‘Indian Judicial
Activism, the Company and the Worker: A Note on National Textile Workers Union v Ramakrishnan’ (1990) 39(2) International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 433. 
49 See ch 4(3)
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careful in their work so as to benefit everyone? In absence of  shareholder rights, why would it
not be true that directors, or management appointees, simply acted as an autonomous interest
group to everyone’s detriment?50 The basic reply seems to be that people (and directors included)
do  not  always  act  rationally  on selfish  interests,  and  so  directors  who are  less  beholden to
shareholders  can  be inculcated  with  a  culture  of  social  responsibility.51 The  trouble  is,  first,
evidence supporting its presumption, or of  its success in prediction, appears scant. The danger is
not that most people are selfish, because they are clearly not.52 Instead the danger is that the
selfish drive the competition.53 Second, the enlightened director theory comes largely from a
special context. It may be more relevant to the US, as a theory of  ‘the second-best’, 54 in the sense
that hope of  social legislative reform has increasingly been shut down, when it has not been
elsewhere. 
Takeovers,  which  animate  Bruner’s  account,  present  different  issues  to  many  other
shareholder  rights,  including  participation  rights,  because  they  often  sharpen  the  conflicts
between stakeholders. For instance, the choice could be between an old management abiding by
implicit  understandings  to  maintain  living  wages,  job  security,  fair  trade  labelling,  or  local
community production,  and a new management that will  scrap them in order to redistribute
wealth to shareholders from employees, local communities and environmental protection.55 This
vividly  illustrates  the  point  that  not  all  shareholders  (eg  the  incumbents,  compared  to  new
bidders) act in the same way: different strategies can appear rational for different shareholders.
Without sharp changes among shareholders, the ordinary landscape of  participation rights do not
present  such  vivid  conflicts  because  mutual  trust  and  a  pattern  of  reciprocal,  long  term
commitments tend to dispel raw self-interest.
If  the  theory  of  social  welfare  depends  on  political  reformers  appreciating,  or
subconsciously acting with the effects of  employees and stakeholders in mind, would it not be an
equally, or even a more rational strategy to increase employee and stakeholder participation in
corporate  governance?  Why  not  improve  rights  of  other  stakeholders  against  shareholders,
instead of  limiting those rights for everyone? Alternatively, if  shareholder power still presents a
threat to other stakeholders, why would a rational political choice not be to reform the character
50 cf  L Bebchuk, ‘The case for increasing shareholder power’ (2005) 118(3) HLR 833, 912-913 and PL Davies,  Company Law
(2010) ch 9
51 M Blair and L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of  Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247, 315-319
52 See A Smith, The Theory of  Moral Sentiments (1759) 1 
53 See S Webb, ‘The Economic Theory of  a Legal Minimum Wage’ (1912) 20(10) The Journal of  Political Economy 973
54 Blair and Stout (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 247, 255 and 319
55 eg E Appelbaum, R Batt and I Clark, ‘Implications of  Financial Capitalism for Employment Relations Research: Evidence
from Breach of  Trust and Implicit Contracts in Private Equity Buyouts’ (2013) 51(3) BJIR 498, examining Mervyn’s, EMI,
Stuyvesant and Cadbury
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of  shareholders? These are essentially the same replies of  Berle to Dodd in 1932. 56 These issues
are taken up again in chapter 7. But for now there are just enough questions here to leave space
for another positive account. 
(b) A first positive thesis: political movements in context
So far the existing literature offers a mixture of  views about the development of  participation
rights  in  the  political  sphere.  None exactly  gives  a  sustained account  of  participation  rights,
leaving  room  for  a  targeted  focus,  and  none  quite  engages  with  what  goes  on  behind  the
shareholder. There are, however, elements of  truth in all accounts, including legal origin theories:
there  are  family  resemblances  in  legal  systems.  Political  ideology,  overlapping  coalitions,  the
legislative system, and the timing of  crises, all affect change. Social concerns are raised in any type
of  shareholder rights reform. 
A starting point ought to be that the very diversity of  theory is telling. Social science is
not as freely amenable as natural science is to isolating mono-causal patterns. This is eloquently
illustrated by a catch-phrase the literature has developed, namely what ‘matters’. For different
purposes, through the political discussion it has been said that ‘history matters’,57 that ‘legal origin
matters’,58 (indeed, ‘legal history matters’59) and that ‘political structure matters’.60 It is asked back:
‘Do  Norms  Matter?’61 ‘Does  Law  Matter?’62 And  anyway,  ‘What  Matters  in  Corporate
Governance?’63 The different emphases, and rhetorical questions highlight that good arguments
can be made  for  all  of  it  ‘mattering’  to  some extent.  But  also  causes  can  ebb and flow in
importance depending on their ontological context.64 
A larger point is that multi-causality stems from how human decisions are made through
political  and legal  institutions.  If  people  are the actors,  different people  have many different
reasons for action, and so in collective decision-making many things ‘matter’ because, to different
people,  they literally do. Historians,  tend to think that ‘comprehension of  the past...  changes
perpetually with the historian’s emphasis, interest, and point of  view’ so the ‘search is no longer
56 AA Berle, ‘For whom corporate managers are trustees: a note’ (1931-1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365, saying that the
preferable outcome would be that ‘corporate administration will  be held to a high degree of  required responsibility -  a
responsibility conceived not merely in terms of  stockholders’ rights, but in terms of  economic government satisfying the
respective needs of  investors, workers, customers, and the aggregated community.’ 
57 Roe (1994) vii
58 RL La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A Shleifer and ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of  Political Economy 1113, 1138
59 D Kershaw, ‘The Path of  Self-Dealing Law’ (2014) Forthcoming
60 Gourevitch and Shinn, 10
61 JC Coffee, ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross Country Evaluation (2000-2001) 149 U Pennsylvania LR 2151  
62 B Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of  Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 30(2) Journal of
Legal Studies 459
63 L Bebchuk, A Cohen and A Ferrell, ‘What Matters in Corporate Governance?’ (2009) 22(2) Review Financial Studies 783
64 To wit, see T Lawson, Reorienting Economics (2003) 221, under the heading ‘An indication that realism/ontology matters.’ 
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for a determination of  the course of  human events as ubiquitous and invariant as that of  the
course of  the planets.’65 History can be seen as valuable in itself, but it is also true that looking
into  the  past  is  most  useful  for  what  it  can  explain  about  problems today.  It  teaches,  said
Frederick Maitland, ‘that each generation has an enormous power of  shaping its own law... that
they have free hands.’66 Going further, the outcomes of  laws, especially regarding the distribution
of  any right ‘is a matter of  human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually
or collectively, can do with them as they like.’67 A Benthamite view that people might be bound to
a throne of  pleasure or pain,68 or a view from the Hegelian/Marxist tradition that people are
bound into a  long run dialectical  logic  of  development,69 has  rightly  lost  favour.  People  are
autonomous in each generation, at least so far as they have the capacity and consciousness to see
and choose among a range of  options. 
Because people are conscious yet imperfect actors, the most persuasive political theory,
and  the  first  positive  thesis,  is  that  a  progressive  democratic  movement  has  driven  the
development of  participation rights in corporate governance that were written into law, but in a
way that is  highly incomplete compared to its social ideals.  Participation rights have primarily
developed, not in rational response to particular institutions or other fields of  law, so much as
because of  conscious decisions – albeit with limits. This can be verified or falsified with reference
to history, and it  yields the prediction that political groups or coalitions who are progressive
democrats  will  continue  to  push  for  broadening  the  number  of  people  who  participate  in
corporate governance, at all necessary levels of  rules. 
The concept of  ‘democracy’, as used here, involves a basic Periclean desire to see that
‘administration is in the hands of  the many and not of  the few.’ 70 The desire is to socialise not
ownership, but power. There are, then, multiple conceptions or ‘models of  democracy’,71 that
build  on  this  basic  concept.  It  was  said  in  chapter  2(3)(c)  that  the  core  understanding  of
participation rights  here  involves  a  representative  vote.  Other  conceptions can involve direct
65 A Gerschenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ in BF Hoselitz (ed), The Progress of  Underdeveloped Areas
(Chicago 1952) and A Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of  Essays (1966) ch 1, 5
66 Letter of  Frederick William Maitland to Albert Venn Dicey (c. July 1896) in CHS Fifoot (ed), The Letters of  Frederick William
Maitland (Cambridge 1965) II, 116, and quoted in CHS Fifoot, Frederic William Maitland: A Life (1971) 143
67 JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book II, ch 1, §1 
68 J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation (1780)
69 See G Kitching, Marxism and Science: An Analysis of  an Obsession (1994) 
70 Thucydides, History of  the Peloponnesian War (ca 411 BC) Book 2, para 37, where Pericles said, ‘Our government does not copy
our neighbors, but is an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of
the many and not of  the few.’
71 eg D Held, Models of  Democracy (3rd edn 2006) giving a broad summary. David Held also prophetically stressed the key feature
while chairing a public lecture in 2010: ‘in any kind of  democracy, you do need mechanisms to change your leadership. I
mean, the art of  democracy is you no longer have to chop off  the heads of  your leaders because there are ways of  removing
them.’ See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CkYeKYtzZhA, at 1:06:00. 
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participation, a broader ‘social contract’ containing reciprocal rights and duties, 72 the integration
of  basic human rights and the rule of  law to make voting genuinely free and informed, 73 and
deliberative  debate  through  an  inclusive  process  of  social  communication.74 Whichever  the
conception, at the centre is a clear idealistic commitment to moral equality among people. 
The relationship of  democracy to equality was expressed admirably well by one of  its
historical opponents, who happened to be the ‘father of  modern company law’.75 Robert Lowe
MP fiercely opposed the Second Reform Act 1867, and in the Third Reading said this.76 
This principle of  equality which you have taken to worship, is a very jealous power; she
cannot be worshipped by halves, and like the Turk in this respect, she brooks no rival near
the throne. When you get a democratic basis for your institutions, you must remember
that you cannot look at that alone, but you must look at it in reference to all your other
institutions.  When  you  have  once  taught  the  people  to  entertain  the  notion  of  the
individual rights of  every citizen to share in the Government, and the doctrine of  popular
supremacy,  you  impose  on  yourselves  the  task  of  re-modelling  the  whole  of  your
institutions, in reference to the principles that you have set up...
The meaning of  ‘progressive’ democracy is also clearly expressed here by Lowe. Brooking no
rival, ‘progressive’ means the desire to increase the number of  fields in life, and particularly the
number of  social institutions, where power is in the hands of  the many, not the few. 
Where does progressive democracy sit among other kinds of  ideology? Between Roe’s
concepts of  ‘populism’ and ‘social democracy’, there is little difference. Roe had suggested that
‘populism’ differed to ‘social democracy’ in ‘the means and degree’,77 but this was a distinction he
was forced into by his view that this division explained dispersed or concentrated shareholdings. 78
He defined ‘populism’ as a desire to ensure ‘no institution acquire significant power’, and this was
identified with figures such as Woodrow Wilson and Louis Brandeis.79 ‘Social democracy’ was said
to mean commitment to private property, but favouring ‘employees over capital-owners when the
72 Plato, Crito (ca 350BC)
73 C Gearty, Civil Liberties (2007) 3
74 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996) ch 7
75 J Micklethwait and A Wooldridge, The company: A short history of  a revolutionary idea (2003) ch 3
76 HC Hansard Debs, Representation of  the People Bill, Third Reading (15 July 1867) col 1543. I should disclose that I write most of
what you find on Wikipedia, including this superb quote (so it is not me copying Wikipedia, but the reverse).  I became
acquainted with the colourful Robert Lowe, and read his Parliamentary speeches in Hansard for the first time, in my second
year of  undergraduate studies.  
77 MJ Roe, Political Determinants of  Corporate Governance (2003) ch 27, 199-200
78 On which, see the introductory remarks in ch 6
79 MJ Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of  American Corporate Fiannce (1994) ch 4, 28-32
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two conflict’.80 It is an unknown quality of  history how American social democracy would have
developed if  the judiciary had not strangled reform by its states (such as the eight hour day,
agency work regulation, promotion of  unions, progressive income tax, and so on) in the Lochner
era cradle. But if  Wilson and Brandeis were held up by Roe as proponents of  populism, then it
would seem that their records of  support for ‘employees over capital’ is indistinguishable from
social democracy,81 as indeed both concepts are from progressive democracy. 
Arguably a better taxonomy of  political ideology was suggested by Otto Kahn-Freund in
1931, and it remains important for the long run of  history.82 Kahn-Freund rejected categories like
being  ‘pro-employee’  or  ‘pro-employer’  because,  being  reduced  to  a  type  of  actor,  they  are
insufficiently complex, not least because it is usually debatable what being pro-employee, or pro-
anything,  really should entail.  Instead he suggested four categories,  defined in terms of  their
‘social  ideals’.  These  were,  (1)  liberalism,  which  ‘condemns  all  combinations  and  leaves  the
structuring  of  social  relations  to  the  free  play  of  social  and  economic  forces’,  (2)  social
conservatism,  which ‘places the existentially  isolated,  uncombined individuals  of  the working
class under the social protection of  the state’, (3) collectivism, which ‘leaves the structuring of
social relations to the conflict between the two classes which are party to the basic contradiction
in society’ - namely labour and capital, and (4) fascism, which is a hybrid: it shares liberalism’s
dislike of  state intervention, social conservatism’s embrace of  welfare provision for insiders, and
collectivism’s view that associations are key actors in class conflict.
Kahn-Freund’s  categories  were,  of  course,  stylised  to  fit  with  contemporary  German
politics (mirroring ‘ideal types’ of  bourgeoisie, Rheinland industrialists, socialist workers, fascists).
Progressive democracy  could probably cut across elements of  each,  except fascism. It  could
contain elements of  liberalism, but would not ‘condemn all  combinations’.  It  would approve
social conservatism’s social protection, but be committed to inclusion and not admit people were
‘existentially isolated’. It would endorse collectivism’s desire to leave groups to govern themselves,
but  not  accept  a  ‘basic  contradiction  in  society’.  Eighty  years  on,  people  with  progressive
democrat  views  also  fit  across  any  of  Gourevitch  and  Shinn’s  owner,  manager  and  worker
coalitions. The meaning of  Cioffi and Höpner’s ‘left’ and ‘right’ is highly contextual, though at
80 Roe (2003) ch 3, 24
81 No doubt such a statement could fuel an endless debate, but it is probably worth reflecting on LL Brandeis, The Fundamental
Cause of  Industrial Unrest (1916) in US Commission on Industrial Relations,  Final Report and Testimony  (Government Printing
Office 1915) vol 8:7659-7660 ‘The social justice for which we are striving is an incident of  our democracy, not its main end…
the end for which we must strive is the attainment of  rule by the people, and that involves industrial democracy as well as
political democracy.’ See Wilson’s post-war policy in RB Gregg, ‘The National War Labor Board’ (1919) 33(1) Harvard Law
Review 39.
82 O Kahn-Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of  the Reich Labour Court - A Critical Examination of  the Practice of  the Reich Labour
Court’  (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R Lewis and J Clark (ed)  Labour  Law and Politics in the  Weimar Republic (Social Science
Research Council 1981) ch 3, 108-161
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least in late 20th century politics, progressive democrats cut across both.  
In 21st century politics, groups seeking significant change which oppose the social ideal of
progressive  democracy  are  loosely  (and often pejoratively)  labelled  as  ‘neo-liberal’,  and ‘neo-
conservative’. The social ideal of  neo-liberalism views individuals as having the full capacity to
take rational decisions, except where they organise through the ‘coercive’ organs of  the state.83
Public sector administration, which is an important channel for collective action for progressive
democrats, should be reduced except to set minimal ‘rules of  the game’. Collective autonomy is
replaced by individuals and their families. The social ideal of  neo-conservatives views collective
organisations (including corporations)  as  acquiring  not just  legal  but also moral  personhood.
Whether or not legal personhood is a fiction, and whether or not the actions of  legal persons can
be dominated by internal interest groups, those persons are to be accorded fundamental rights on
the  same  plane  as  natural  persons.  Neo-conservatism  therefore  differs  from  neo-liberalism
because state power may be used to attain goals of  natural and legal persons alike for instance by
subsidising  corporations  through  regulation  or  tax.84 It  will  favour:  ‘Whoever  controls  the
corporation.’85 Both neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism can comfortably view the corporation
as a fiction and a nexus of  contracts.86 By contrast, the progressive democrat would conceive of
the corporation  as  an ‘institution’,  in  the  sense  that  people  positively  create  or  institute  it.87
Multiple constituencies contribute to making a corporation what it is, but these contributions are
shaped by relationships of  power that a progressive democrat must actively acknowledge as a
step towards more equal distribution of  power.
The vast majority of  people today – especially in the mainstream of  different democratic
parties – do not share either a neo-liberal or neo-conservative position. One of  the consequences
of  late 20th century individualism, and the stratification of  old class divides, is that people identify
with  a  broader  variety  of  personal  experiences  than  can  be  transplanted  into  overarching
ideologies.  Single  issue  political  parties  flourish  as  collective  identities  have  diminished.
Alternatively, many are removed from the political process altogether because they do not engage
or vote. Yet most people place their beliefs alongside existing institutions, and are cautious about
83 Represented by R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) 
84 Represented by the majority  decisions in  Citizens  United  v  Federal Election  Commission, 558 US 310 (2010)  and particularly
onwards from the text: ‘Despite the corporation-hating quotations the dissent has dredged up...’ 
85 Scalia J in oral argument of  Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 US _ (2014) at page 53 of  the transcript or 52.30 in the
recording. 
86 Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 US _ (2014) per Alito J, adopting a modified nexus of  contracts theory at page 18. 
87 F Neumann, Behemoth  (1941) 366-8, summarising the work of  G Renard, L’institution: fondement d’une renovation de l’ordre social
(1931).  F  Kessler,  ‘Book  Review:  Wirtschaftsfuhrertum  und  Vertragsethik  im  Neuen  Aktienrecht’  (1935)  83  University  of
Pennsylvania Law Review 393, 395. L Strine, ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared
Interests of  Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of  Corporate Governance’ (2007) 33 Journal of  Corporate Law
1, 4. S Deakin, ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business
Enterprise’ (2012) 37(2) Queen’s Law Journal 339, with difference of  emphasis, but arguably in the same tradition. 
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radical  change,  precisely  because  over  the  late  19th and 20th centuries,  progressive democracy
continually defeated its ideological competitors. No other political ideology has come close in
successfully  manifesting  its  social  ideals  in  the  law.  But  it  does  not  follow that  progressive
democrat ideals have been achieved fully. 
Given the  conclusions that  will  emerge over the coming chapters,  particularly  on the
growing  dominance  of  asset  managers  in  the  UK and  the  US  and  banks  in  Germany,  an
alternative to the first positive thesis must be pre-empted. By the end of  chapter 6(3), it may
seem tempting to conclude that a consistent political ideal was carried through, namely a fascist
one from the 1930s, and a neo-conservative one today. It could be thought, this drove the shape
of  participation in corporate governance, so that ‘democracy of  capital [was] to disappear as it
did in politics’  during Nazi Germany.88 People give up their rights to ‘the leadership’  of  any
association,89 or  to  ‘[w]hoever  controls  the  corporation’.90 Sporadic  evidential  support  could
certainly be found in the  Aktiengesetz 1937, but then perhaps also in the retention of  its main
provisions in  1965,  parts  of  the US pension reforms in 1974 or the Tax Reform Act 1986,
various court decisions, and maybe even the Stewardship Code, insofar as it mirrors norms from
the Aktiengesetz 1937. It could be thought that legislative and judicial policy contained a conscious
design to  propel  market  developments,  which  fall  within  the  second positive  thesis.  But  the
temptation to see a  conscious  political ideology at work should be resisted. Those ideologies are
‘contradictory and seemingly superficial’,91 with ‘no consistent picture... a series of  ever-changing
goals’.92 Precisely because of  this, it is best to not overestimate the ‘political self-awareness’ of
people who pursue political change ad hoc, and economic self-interest as convenience dictates.93
The influence of  both fascism and neo-conservatism has been too unconscious in the long run
to be credited within the scope of  this political thesis. 
To  what  extent  can  the  political  groups  who  consciously  seek  change  achieve  their
objectives, and where are the limits? One view is that interest groups rationally pursue their goals
to achieve collectively self-interested outcomes.94 If  this were true, then an immediate question
88 JCD Zahn,  Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht  or  Economic Leadership and Contractual Ethics in the New
Corporate Law (1934) 93, ‘Die Demokratie des Kapitals wird ebenso verschwinden wie die politische.’ See ch 4(2).
89 Scalia J, Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US _ (2010) page 8 of  concurrence.
90 Scalia J, again, in oral argument of  Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 US _ (2014) at page 53 of  the transcript or 52.30 in
the recording. 
91 Kessler (1935) 83 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 393, 395
92 Neumann (1941) 40
93 See O Kahn-Freund,  ‘Autobiographische Errinerungen an die Weimarer Republik. Ein Gespräch mit Wolfgang Luthardt’
[1978] Kritische Justiz 183, 194, ‘Ich habe in der Arbeit einen großer Fehler gemacht. Ich habe nämlich – um einmal Ihren
Ausdruck zu benutzen – das politische Selbstverständnis der Richter überschätzt.’ Kahn-Freund, speaking in 1978 of  his
famous 1931 article on the German courts’ pursuit of  a fascist social ideal, said, ‘I made a great mistake in that work. Namely
– to use one of  their expressions – I overestimated the political self-awareness of  the judges.’ 
94 GJ Stigler, ‘The Theory of  Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2(1) Bell Journal of  Economics and Management Science 3
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would surely arise as to why progressive democrats  had not already dominated entirely.  Why
would neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism not have been effectively eliminated in the same way
that social conservatism, fascism, or communism had been? By definition progressive democrats
represent the most numerous interest group: the many over the few. This surely constitutes an
advantage. It is true that political ideologies are transient forces, lasting only so long as the socio-
economic divisions which underpin them prevail. But achievement of  political aims will depend
upon the channels for taking collective action, and levels of  organisation. Assuming (and this is
an historically heroic assumption) there are representative channels for collective action, a small
organised group of  people (eg 5 out of  200) can dominate a large body of  disorganised people. 95
But  even  then  an  essential  precondition  for  any  kind  of  group,  ideological  movement,  or
coalition, to realise its objectives is to understand the issues and to have the capacity to act on
them.  In  short,  people  need  to  develop  a  collective  self-consciousness  of  their  interests  to
become a cohesive interest group. 
A  second  view from behavioural  psychology  suggests  some basic  reasons  why,  even
assuming there are good long run incentives to organise and take political action, people do not
act rationally in political affairs. Positive theories necessarily employ a model of  human behaviour
which can equally affect hypotheses about work,96 consumer decisions,97 or politics. This means
our ‘cognitive biases’ (many of  which were identified by Roe’s earlier work, and by Gourevitch
and  Shinn98)  have  practical  implications  for  all  positive  theories.  There  are  probably  over  a
hundred, depending on how they are grouped or enumerated. Three can be highlighted again.
First, people usually favour of  the status quo,99 which tends to compound the familiar concept of
‘rational  apathy’.100 In  politics  this  can  mean  it  takes  time  before  people  realise  their  ‘true’
preference for reform, or before people reinvent their institutions in line with contemporary
social needs.101 Second, and related, we tend to ‘anchor’ our choices to arbitrary ideas when we do
not think the issues through slowly.102 For instance, private actors will gravitate toward default or
model rules, unless there are strong counter-incentives. This might include default rules in Model
Articles  or  other  implied  terms  on  director  elections,  voting  rights,  or  election  of  pension
95 See VL Allen, Power in trade unions: a study of  their organisation in Great Britain (1954) 251
96 See E McGaughey, ‘Behavioural economics and labour law’ (2014) LSE Working Paper Series 20/2014 
97 See O Bar-Gill and E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 1
98 See ch 3(1)(b) 
99 For the first article, see W Samuelson and R Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1 Journal of  Risk and
Uncertainty 7, and for a summary see D Kahneman, JL Knetsch and RH Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of  Economic Perspectives 193. BC Madrian and DF Shea, ‘The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’ (2001) 116(4) Quarterly Journal of  Economics 1149 
100 eg JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book V, ch XI, §11
101 cf  OW Holmes, The Common Law (1890) 5-8
102 KE Jacowitz and D Kahneman, ‘Measures of  anchoring in estimation tasks’ (1995) 21 Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 1161, 1164, and recounted slightly differently in D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) 124-125
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trustees. In politics, reformers will always be conditioned in what they seek to do by the way
existing institutions function. Third, people’s motivation to work, invest effort and take action is
significantly related to how others react.103 If  collective action persistently  seems to come to
nothing, people become dejected and give up trying. Again, this accounts for collective action
being a slow process, if  the obstacles are very strong. 
All  this  said,  it  still  appears  difficult  to  view  models  of  rational  behaviour,  or  their
refinement by behavioural psychology, as adequate to give any complete long run account of  the
drivers  of  social  institutions.  The main reason is  that  cognitive  biases are identified  through
testing that confirm average tendencies in human behaviour (e.g. if  100 people can opt to have an
occupational pension, 49 will do it immediately, 83 within twenty years; but if  all have to opt out,
then only 14 will,104 roughly,  on average).  The criticism that one cannot or should not draw
analogies from tests in controlled experiments to the real world probably misses the mark,105
because behavioural psychology repeatedly shows how and why simplistic rational choice models
fail to make accurate predictions.106 But precisely because average tendencies are identified, the
possibility for ‘deviant’ behaviour tomorrow, creative dissent, innovation, and the reinvention of
a different consciousness always remains outside the realms of  what today’s behavioural scientists
might find.
Thus,  the  third  view  is  that  if  a  thesis  seeks  to  explain  the  development  of  social
institutions, it must be carefully qualified: general tendencies can be identified, but what matters
most is what people consciously choose to do. It cannot rely on people being rational reactors to
incentives, nor can it write a rulebook of  behaviour, and apply it. Theory must come with a large
dose  of  equitable  flexibility:  universal  norms  cannot  suit  all  particular  circumstances. 107 An
historically grounded thesis must suggest that in any country change would typically come from
something akin to the following: 108 
unseeing, market-driven, but convention-constrained experimentation, evolving routines
of  trust,  reciprocity and quality  certification which sometimes succeed and sometimes
fail, and accidental concatenations of  war, occupation, revolution or inflation that lurched
103 D Ariely, E Kamenica and D Prelec, ‘Man’s search for meaning: The case of  Legos’ (2008) 67 Journal of  Economic Behavior
& Organization 671
104 BC Madrian and DF Shea, ‘The Power of  Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’ (2001) 116(4)
Quarterly Journal of  Economics 1149, 1151
105 eg RA Posner, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1551
106 eg E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157(1) U Penn LR 1 and E McGaughey, ‘Behavioural Economics and Labour Law’
(2014) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 20/2014
107 cf  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ca 350 BC) Book V
108 L Hannah, ‘The ‘Divorce’ of  ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined global trends’ (2007) 49(4)
Business History 404, 426, speaking of  corporate ownership structure.
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into reverse financial systems which previously appeared to be working passably well.  
Thus, until we have a better science of  humanity, history is the awkward antidote for ambitious
theory. But also until then, we can probably say that the better theory is one which leaves room
for people being conceived as conscious actors. 
With  these  qualifications,  the  progressive  democratic  thesis  better  explains  the
development of  participation rights than previous theories. Bruner contended that shareholder
rights have gone along with social welfare development, but though this is a normatively logical
connection, it does not prove to be an inevitable one. Cioffi and Höpner posited that centre-left
parties had mostly pushed shareholder rights, although this view captures neither the particularity,
nor  the  generality  of  political  ideology,  especially  as  over  the  years  ‘left’  and  ‘right’  traded
ideological  territory.  Gourevitch  and Shinn suggested  shareholder  rights  related to  legislative
structure,  but  again  legislative  arrangements  do  not  appear  relevant.  LLSV  contended  that
shareholder rights followed legal origin, but this simply appears mistaken. What did matter was
the beliefs that people held themselves. If  Roe had focused on the law itself, rather than on the
secondary effects on ownership structure, if  he had looked at what people actually intended to
do, he would have found just how profoundly political ideals mattered. 
People  who  understood  themselves  as  pursuing  a  progressive  democratic  agenda
repeatedly  sought  to  spread  shareholder  participation  rights,  and  subsequently  the  right  to
participation  in  institutional  investments:  to  socialise,  not  ownership,  but  power.  The  long-run
political project has been to extend democracy from the political sphere to every level of  society,
including the economy. But the importance of  this positive thesis lies not so much in the general
tendency it  identifies.  Like the ‘populist’  thesis,  or the ‘centre-left’  thesis,  it  might even seem
obvious.  The importance lies in the light it  can shed on competing theories,  in the detail  of
development, and in how the detail can clarify the desirability of  reform. 
(c) Historical development: a summary
It is worth summarising now how the first positive thesis applies to the historical development of
participation rights, before the extensive treatment of  the evidence in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Again,
the first positive thesis is that compulsory participation rights in law spread because progressive
democratic movements pushed for them, but only incompletely compared to their social ideals. It
is  important  to  emphasise,  again,  that  progressive  democrats  belonged  to  all  major  modern
political  parties  –  Liberal,  Conservative,  Labour,  Christian  Democrat,  Social  Democrat,
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Republican, Democrat – although in some more than in others. This said, there were limits to the
manner in which democratic objectives were achieved, based on the way people thought about
the issues. The law did not evolve in a fully principled fashion. 
In the UK, first, the rules for director elections were initially set by default in common
law  cases  on  small  community  corporations,  like  churches  and  local  councils.  In  the  pre-
democratic years of  the 18th century, a progressive judiciary, notably Lord Hardwicke and Lord
Mansfield,  implied basic  standards  of  representative  accountability  in  company constitutions.
They promoted basic rights to dismiss corporate directors for a reason determined by the general
body of  members. The first modern Companies Acts, however, instead drew inspiration from the
mass chartered corporations with a different tradition, and envisaged only three-quarter votes to
remove directors, unless the articles said otherwise. Little changed until 1947, because the vast
majority of  corporations left the articles at a three-quarter vote for removal. Then the post-war
Labour government, directly inspired by Berle and Means’ work, legislated for today’s rule of
removal by ordinary resolution. This still left a number of  issues, such as payments for loss of
office, appointment processes, and what the common law default might be today. 
Second, rules on voting rights were, in the 18th century, set on a sloping scale to favour
small  investors,  encouraged by Pitt  the Elder’s  Public  Companies Act 1767,  which contained
measures  against  vote-splitting.  Larger  companies  wished  to  avoid  this,  and  erected  high
thresholds excluding small investors, although the default rule of  graduated voting remained in
Tables B and A until 1906. Graduated voting was undercut in 1877 by Lord Jessel MR in Pender v
Lushington, with a justification based on unimpeded use of  votes as property rights. Vote splitting
became allowed again, so as to make one-share, one-vote the norm. Deviation from this standard
did not become an issue until 1957, when institutional investors and the London Stock Exchange
announced their opposition to non-voting shares being issued in the course of  takeover bids.
From  the  Jenkins  Report  1962,  the  next  Labour  government  gave  express  backing  to  the
regulatory stance of  not listing non-voting shares. A combination of  legal defaults, institutional
and regulatory pressure meant that the one-share, one-vote norm prevailed. 
Third, behind institutional shareholders, people tended to have very few rights unless it
was in  pensions and won by collective agreements with  trade unions.  The first  express legal
regulation  was  proposed  in  1976  by  a  Labour  Party  that  was  committed  to  the  spread  of
industrial democracy. This never went into law, although by the early 1990s, the practice had
become sufficiently widespread for John Major’s Conservative government, following a report
authored by Roy Goode, to enact legal rights for beneficiaries to elect at least a third of  their
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pension trustees in the Pensions Act 1995. This was subject to an opt-out, and was peculiarly
wedded to  the  form of  non-state  retirement  saving  that  embodied  a  proprietary  right.  Life
insurance plans were untouched, and the technical voting rights of  mutual fund investors were
nugatory  because  an asset  manager  would  take over  governance  functions.  Nevertheless,  the
pension rules were extended and made compulsory by the Pensions Act 2004. In late 2013, under
the Coalition government, and under a Liberal-Democrat department, the question had become
how influence might extend into the use of  funds by asset managers, to whom retirement money
or long term savings in any form is frequently delegated. 
In Germany, first, director elections rules initially followed a company’s constitution. On
unification  in  1870,  there  was  a  requirement  for  a  supervisory  council  (Aufsichtsrat),  which
Prussian industrialists pushed for so as to make management beholden to major banks. The more
outward looking Hanseatic states, which did not previously have two-tier boards as a practice,
retained  the  flexibility  to  have  the  general  meeting  directly  elect  or  remove  the  executive
(Vorstand).  However,  over the years  till  1937,  more and more German companies interposed
supervisory councils between the general meeting and the executive, usually packed with bank
functionaries.  The  fascist  government  passed  the  Aktiengesetz  1937 to  make  the  supervisory
board’s  intermediating  role  mandatory.  The  executive  became  irremovable  by  the  general
meeting, and then only by the supervisory board with a good reason, as the  Fuhrerprinzip  was
spread to all organisations. In the Aktiengesetz 1965, this was turned back slightly, by counting an
ordinary resolution by the general meeting as a good reason for supervisory boards to remove
executives. But further reform of  the supervisory board by then was complicated by the goal of
Social Democrats to extend codetermination, given workers’ traditional place on the supervisory
board. 
Second, the distribution of  voting rights among shareholders was formally a matter of
choice in German company law, until  the hyperinflation crisis of  the early 1920s. A series of
court cases attempted to put a hold on the increasing use of  wild multiples on voting rights, while
in 1931 the still-democratic government proposed introducing a one-share, one-vote principle in
law. This was eventually enacted in the Aktiengesetz 1937, which by that time paradoxically suited
the fascist dictatorship, as it eliminated contenders for economic power who previously gathered
multiple voting rights. With regulation of  director elections, votes in German companies were
sidelined equally. The same regulation remained post-war, except that government discretion over
exemptions was removed. 
Third, German law’s enfranchisement of  the contributors of  capital behind institutional
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shareholding  remained  precarious.  The  tradition  of  codetermination  that  made  its  way  into
pensions came from the democratic revolutions of  1848. After the revolution was crushed, a
Paulskirche Parlament  representative named Carl Degenkolb put codetermination into practice in
his own factories. The same rights were eventually enacted by the Social Democrat government
with the  Betriebsrätegesetz 1920.  However occupational pensions were destined to remain a less
salient political issue because, with an income-linked state pension, people were less reliant on
occupational pensions. There were codetermination rights in some occupational saving schemes,
but sporadic court decisions, mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, restricted employee rights depending
on whether the form of  pensions savings constituted a ‘facility’. It was decided that insurance
schemes and employers self-investing their workers’ money did not carry codetermination rights.
Meanwhile, German banks gathered the voting rights in shares through standard form contracts.
The  Aktiengesetz  1937 codified the principle that  banks  could vote using  the rights of  all  its
shareholding depositors, and this principle more or less remains up to today. Banks merely have
the duty to vote in their depositors’ best interests: a so called duty which essentially cannot be
breached. Social Democrats and Greens had it in their political platform to abolish banker voting
rights over the 1980s and early 1990s. But when they won government, interest had dwindled.
The issue was partly pre-empted by some minor changes in the  Kontrolle und Transparenz Gesetz
1998 (Control and Transparency Act 1998) concerning banks’ (less relevant) direct shareholdings.
In the US, first, state legislation determined the position of  directors and election rules.
In the early 19th century there was a general practice, following the common law, that directors
would be elected and removed by the general meeting for any reason. This, however, became
complicated with experiments in cumulative voting: itself  initially seen as an innovation to give
the smaller investors some voice. Ironically, this led to courts developing the rule that directors
could not be removed without a good reason, so as to protect those minority directors. By 1932
Berle and Means, chief  architects of  the New Deal’s economic policies, were blaming the erosion
of  no-cause removal rights for diminishing director accountability. In the years following, many
states, like the UK, followed Berle and Means’ recommendations in revitalising no-cause removal.
However, particularly in Delaware between 1960 and 1974, the general position was confirmed
that companies could opt to have for-cause removal along with staggered boards. In the post-
crisis  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  2010,  a  right  for
shareholders to nominate board candidates was introduced, but implementation of  the rules by
the Securities and Exchange Commission was struck down by the DC Appellate Circuit court.
Second, shareholder voting rights, at the inception of  the republic, remained closer to the
55
old common law traditions of  graduated voting, or even one vote per person. The practice varied
between  company  types  and in  states,  but  by  the  early  twentieth  century,  this  had  changed.
Companies began issuing non-voting shares en masse. A popular outcry was led by William Ripley,
an economist closely associated with the progressive era and Woodrow Wilson. It put pressure on
President Coolidge and then the New York Stock Exchange to restrict non-voting or multiple
voting  shares.  The NYSE officially  adopted this  policy  in  1940,  and it  remained  until  1986.
During  the  Reagan  administration,  the  regulation  was  undone  with  increased  stock  listing
competition. When the Securities and Exchange Commission hurried to issue new rules, the DC
Appeals Circuit held the SEC had no power to mandate voting rules. Subsequent re-regulation
allowed multiple voting, unless it is disproportionate. 
Third, behind the shareholders, and post-Second World War, more and more Americans
were saving for retirement through occupational pensions. Trade unions had sought to administer
the pensions of  their members alone, but the Republican driven Taft-Hartley Act 1947 limited
union involvement to half  a pension trust’s board seats. This was vetoed by President Truman,
but the veto was overridden. There was never any express right to elect private sector pension
trustees, despite a number of  proposals by Democrat Congressmen from the 1980s. What existed
depended on collective agreements, or on the state laws establishing public sector pensions. State
legislation  created  rights  for  the  beneficiaries  of  schemes  to  exercise  increasing  influence,
particularly after the Uniform Management of  Public Employee Retirement Systems Act 1997
required public disclosure and easy accessibility of  the rules. This led to a diminished number of
employer or politically appointed representatives, and more pension board members elected by
beneficiaries. But union and public sector state pensions aside, the majority of  votes rested in
asset  managers’  hands.  No rights  existed among purchasers of  life insurance companies,  nor
among mutual investors. However, for people who bought shares through retail banks or other
brokers, the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 made the step of  banning those intermediary broker votes.
Overall, the tendency to increase the spread of  participation rights among more and more
people must be seen primarily as a progressive democratic cause. The primary opponents to the
extension of  participation have ranged from outright fascists (with the Aktiengesetz 1937), to the
post-war Republican party (the Taft-Hartley Act 1947), to courts of  various demeanours. The
times when the law on participation was developed, however, came from very different political
groups. In the UK, the chief  drivers were the Labour governments in 1947 on director elections,
in 1962 on shareholder voting rights, and in 1976 and 2004 on pension beneficiary voice. A
Conservative administration in 1957 and then in 1995 also played a significant role, because then
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the Conservative party was content to make modest reforms within the democratic mainstream.
In Germany, the still-democratic administration of  1931 proposed the one-share, one-vote rule,
the Christian Democrats made minor reforms in 1965 to the director election rules, while the
Social Democrats had proposed (but not implemented) bank voting reforms in the 1980s and
1990s. In the US, it was the progressives who lobbied for the one-share, one-vote rule in the
1920s, the New Dealers who, like Berle and Means proposed, hardened the regulatory backing
for  it,  and  inspired  the  (temporary)  state-based  spread  of  no-cause  removal  for  directors.
Similarly it was progressive Democrat interests, in union and state public pension funds, which
pushed over the late 20th and early 21st centuries for participatory corporate governance reforms:
seeking  to  eliminate  non-voting  or  multiple  vote  shares,  and  to  eliminate  staggered  boards.
Analysing the trend as a progressive democratic movement is accurate.
However, there are significant limitations to this account when ideals are compared to
outcomes. If  the UK Labour Party was interested in ensuring that people saving for retirement
could hold those managing their money to account, why was regulation only focused on pension
trusts? Essentially, there is no good reason for this form based limitation. There is, however an
explanation:  the  law  was  anchored  to  what  collective  agreements  were  doing  already,  and
beneficial ‘owners’ might superficially appear to have more of  a moral justification for a voice
than  someone  with  a  contract  pension  or  a  life  insurance  policy.  Such  is  the  seduction  of
ownership. Why were the German Social Democrats not acting on precisely the same issues, and
why did they forget  their  course of  proposed bank reforms from the 1990s? One reason is
simply that the political salience of  occupational pensions was not so great, and the other is that
bank law is obscure, misunderstood, and compared to health, education or labour rights, it could
be  regarded  as  boring.  Calls  for  corporate  reform  have  continually  focused  on  employee
codetermination  and  executive  pay.  This  is  not  unjustifiable,  but  it  does  mean  democratic
objectives  are  not  always  consistently  pursued.  Among American  Democrats,  the  position  is
admittedly more difficult. Between 1980 and 2014, there were just two years, despite having four
Presidential terms, where the Democrat party could legislate freely at Federal level. This was due
to its tripartite electoral system, and even then there has been hostile court intervention. But still,
it  can  legitimately  be  asked  why  (even  given regulatory  competition  issues)  reform was  not
pushed harder at state level, and why before 1980 legislation was not pursued to favour all kinds
of  retirement plan equally. 
This  is  not  an account which relates  to differences  among majoritarian or  consensus
based political systems, as Gourevitch and Shinn proposed, because there have been possibilities
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in  each  for  reform,  and  also  because  the  functional  outcomes  in  the  UK and  the  US  are
essentially  similar  to  Germany.  Financial  intermediaries,  whether  asset  managers  or  banks,
participate most in corporate governance. The political story is not dissimilar from Cioffi and
Höpner’s  ultimate  conclusions,  except  that  it  departs  from the distinction between ‘left’  and
‘right’.  Because it  focuses on participation rights,  rather  than the rules  on takeover bids and
directors’  duties,  there  is  some contrast  with  Bruner’s  thesis  that  shareholder  rights  are  not
generally increased unless there is growing social welfare protection: in the UK, most dismissal
protection, for example, emerged in the 1960s after shareholder rights were boosted, and the
story simply becomes complicated in terms of  timing for shareholder rights being undone in the
US. Again, genuinely different views might exist when focusing on takeover bids. Either way, the
political story could only be part of  the answer for why participation rights evolved in the way
that they did. This is about what shaped the law. But what happened when there were no specific
participation rights? Legal reforms begin with the environment that politicians inherit, and often
this starting point was set by the market.
(2) Economics: what shaped governance in the marketplace?
(a) Law and economics
What have existing theories said about how participation rights developed when they were left to
the market, when there were no specific participation rights written into law? Law and economics
theories appear to offer at least a preliminary view, as they model what should happen in an
idealised ‘free market’ state: voluntary interactions will generally lead to efficient outcomes. 
In discussing law and economics,  it  is  critical  at  the outset  to see how ‘positive’  and
‘normative’  theory  intertwine  in  the  standard  account.  In  ‘The  Methodology  of  Positive
Economics’, Milton Friedman famously argued that positive economic theory should construct a
model that will predict the consequences of  rules, policies or institutions. Friedman thought that
the process is like ‘an “objective” science,  in precisely the same sense as any of  the physical
sciences.’109 Hypotheses for how economic consequences will play out are founded on a set of
assumptions, and it does not necessarily matter whether those assumptions match the real world
or not. For instance, it is obviously untrue that all people act rationally all of  the time, or that all
shareholders seek to maximise private profits at  any social cost. But what is important, on this
109 M Friedman, ‘The Methodology of  Positive Economics’ in M Friedman,  Essays in Positive Economics (University of  Chicago
Press, 1953) ch 1, 4
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view, is the theory’s ‘predictive power’. So,110 
the only relevant test of  the validity of  a hypothesis is comparison of  its predictions with
experience. The hypothesis is rejected if  its predictions are contradicted (“frequently” or
more often than predictions from an alternative hypothesis)...
Empirical evidence can be used both ‘in constructing hypotheses and in testing their validity.’111
But  once  this  ‘positive’  enquiry  is  over,  normative  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  Any  policy
conclusion, said Friedman, ‘necessarily rests on a prediction about the consequences of  doing
one thing rather than another,  a prediction that must be based - implicitly  or explicitly  -  on
positive economics.’112 In  this  way,  economic models  are useful  because,  with  a  given set  of
assumptions,  they  make  predictions,  and  if  the  predictions  are  not  falsified  normative
implications can be drawn. 
However, while Friedman’s views can accurately be said to represent much of  modern
economics methodology, they do not embody the only approach. One of  the most influential
articles in the law and economics movement was Ronald Coase’s ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’,
and  here  the  methodology  contains  a  subtle  but  significant  difference.  Coase  came  to  the
dramatic conclusion that in a hypothetical world where transaction costs did not exist, people
could always trade resources or rights to maximise their economic value (and so reach both an
allocatively and productively efficient solution) no matter what the initial distribution of  rights was,
if  there was room for a bargain.113 In the examples Coase used, he posited that only the existence
of  transaction costs – the costs of  discovering transactional  partners,  informing,  negotiating,
drafting a contract, monitoring compliance114 – prevented an efficient result (both allocative and
110 Friedman (1953) 8-9
111 Friedman (1953) 12 
112 Friedman (1953) 5
113 RH Coase, ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of  Law and Economics 1, 5, ‘But as the payment would not be so
high as to  cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this  location and as it would not  vary with the size of  the herd,  such an
agreement would not affect the allocation of  resources but would merely alter the distribution of  income and wealth as
between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.’ 6, ‘Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself
rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if  the farmer was himself
renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of  production. Even when the farmer
is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term
phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease. The cattle-raiser will remain
in that location and the marginal cost of  meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the
allocation of  resources.’ 8, ‘It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since
without the establishment of  this initial delimitation of  rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine
them. But the ultimate result (which maximises the value of  production) is independent of  the legal position  if  the
pricing system is assumed to work without cost.’ 10, ‘With costless market transactions, the decision of  the courts concerning
liability  for  damage  would  be  without  effect  on the  allocation of  resources.’  15,  ‘It  is  always possible  to  modify by
transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of  rights. And, of  course, if  such market transactions are costless, such
a rearrangement of  rights will always take place if  it would lead to an increase in the value of  production.’ Emphasis added.
114 Coase (1960) 3 Journal of  Law and Economics 1, 15
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productive) being reached. 
The  difference  between  these  approaches  is  that  Friedman’s  method  starts  with
hypotheses and assumptions, but claims these can predict reality, while Coase’s predictions are
also hypothetical. The predictions of  efficient outcomes are only for a hypothetical world of  no
transaction costs. One way to view Coase’s axiom115 (that absent transaction costs, distribution of
rights is irrelevant, and transactions will always be efficient) is that it could never be disproven by
appeal to the real world. This might have the very unfortunate consequence of  Coase’s axiom
being unfalsifiable. A second view is that conditions might be found under which a transaction
cost free world is approximated, which could test the validity of  the claim. Could real markets,
that approximated zero transaction costs, be observed and how would they function in practice?
A third way is to say that Coase was merely describing a normative ideal, and that the model
could be refuted but only through appeal to logical argument. The purpose of  this would appear
to be to set up an ideal model of  ‘the market’ against which the efficiency of  interactions in the
real world could be measured. It serves to emphasise the importance of  transaction costs, and the
unimportance of  other considerations, in what might hamper market efficiency. Chapter 7(2)(c)
will return to this normative centre of  Coase’s work.
In  the  meantime,  Coase’s  axiom  carried  a  profound  influence  through  the  law  and
economics literature of  both the market and the firm116 – potentially including positive theories
of  how participation in corporate governance would develop. Of  course, the idea of  a ‘market’
(and a firm for that matter) is ambiguous because it has no objective, fixed character. All the rules
of  contract, property, trusts, tort, unjust enrichment and more determine basic issues such as
when bargains are enforceable. Is there an action for misrepresentation, or also for failure of
disclosure? Is there an action for duress, or also unconscionable conduct? A market’s nature also
changes  with  the  strength  of  the  remedies  that  are  available  for  breaches  of  obligations
(compensatory  damages,  specific  performance,  restitution,  priority  in  insolvency,  and so  on).
When people say ‘free market’, like ‘freedom of  contract’,117 they tend to mean something closer
to a position where transactions take place without fraud or duress, but they may remain sceptical
115 This is not to say the ‘Coase theorem’, developed by Richard Posner and others, which says that efficient results take place,
not just in a transaction cost free world, but in a world with very low transaction costs.  Coase disavowed this,  but this
nevertheless leaves the question of  whether Coase’s own contention was accurate: that transaction costs were the only reason
that prevented efficient bargains being made. 
116 RH Coase,  ‘The  Nature  of  the  Firm’  (1937)  4(16)  Economica  386,  also  posited that  transaction  costs  determined  the
boundaries between the firm and the market, and again excluded bargaining power from its analysis. 
117 cf  Lord Jessel MR, Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462, 465, ‘if  there is one thing which more than
another  public policy requires  it  is  that men of  full  age and competent  understanding shall  have the utmost  liberty  of
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by
Courts of  justice.’
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of  many more safeguards than that.118 
Each author’s preferred list of  market failures matters less than what is left off  all lists.
Everyone must admit some market ‘intervention’, even if  it is no more than the public policy of
prohibiting  exclusion clauses  for  the  use  of  fraud or  force.119 Thus  those  who favour  ‘free’
markets tacitly condone a limited set of  compulsory terms requiring damages in tort, or requiring
restitution for unjust enrichment.120 But with this aside, there is a relatively clear line of  thinking
on what a ‘free market’ is meant to achieve. The question would then be (at least in the Friedman
tradition), did any historical periods approximate a free market model, so as to test the claims?  
It  makes  sense  to  concentrate  on  three  representative  examples  from  differing
departmental backgrounds of  management, law, and economics. While there are differences of
emphasis, each had an affinity to the Coasean tradition: the starting presumption of  a limited
number of  issues that prevented economically efficient results. This came down to transaction
costs for Coase, and maybe other authors acknowledged additional constraints. But the critical
unifying theory was that distribution of  rights was not an issue in itself: if  distribution of  rights
made a difference, it was only because there were positive transaction costs. 
Within management literature, Michael Jensen and William Meckling were possibly the
first, and best known, contemporary authors to begin formulating a theory about how corporate
participation rights might, in a free market, be shared.121 Within the ‘nexus of  contracts’ that
made up a firm, they plainly acknowledged that there were already specific legal regulations. For
example, in 1976 they pointed to the US securities exchanges’ restrictions on non-voting shares, 122
but  wrote  (somewhat  cryptically)  that  otherwise  ‘forces  exist  to  determine  an  equilibrium
distribution of  outside ownership’. ‘Ownership’ in this context referred to equity claim holders
with voting rights, in ‘equilibrium’ with both nonvoting shareholders or the voting rights held by
a company’s inside managers.123 This fitted with their approach that ‘specification of  rights is
generally  effected through contracting’,  their  concern  with  ‘the  equilibrium contractual  form’
between managers and outside equity or debt, and their emphasis on the ‘essential contractual
118 eg F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1434, listing duress, fraud,
infancy or insanity, or negative external effects on third parties.
119 cf  Mill (1848) Book V, ch 1
120 This characterisation of  exclusion clauses, in effect conceptualised as compulsory terms, may not be widely accepted already.
However it is suggested that this is the appropriate way to see the issues because if  there can be an exclusion of  something,
there logically has to be a rule of  law that is operating like a term in any transaction. This therefore doubts what might be an
alternative  view of  seeing the ‘process’  of  transacting as entirely  distinct  from the  ‘substance’.  At  bottom the  rules  of
‘process’ resolve into protections against unfair  opting out of  the general law. cf  Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994]
UKHL 5, per Lord Goff, ‘the law of  tort is the general law, out of  which the parties can, if  they wish, contract’. 
121 MC Jensen and WH Meckling, ‘Theory of  the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976)
3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305. See 305-7, for indebtedness to Coase for property rights literature.
122 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305, 353, ‘Given that the securities exchanges prohibit the
use of  non-voting shares by listed firms...’
123 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305, 352
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nature of  firms’.124 In an article concerning labour participation,  they stated that if  a system
‘arises  out  of  voluntary  arrangements  among individuals’  it  will  be  more  ‘efficient  than the
alternatives’ because it must ‘grow up and survive in a competitive environment’.125 In another
example, Michael Jensen, writing with Eugene Fama, advanced the same presumption. ‘Absent
fiat,’ they said, ‘the form of  organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the
product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.’126 
As such, a general idea was forming in corporate governance that – in absence of  specific
regulation, or ‘fiat’ – evolution of  participation rights would be voluntary and efficient. Moreover,
it was said that there would be some kind of  ‘equilibrium’,127 a term which suggests that the
market clears where supply equals demand, and that unless there are significant changes in either
variable,  or  an  exogenous  shock,  that  there  is  relative  stability.  Jensen  himself  remained
ambivalent about a one-share, one-vote rule,128 and this was not a detailed explanation for the
evolution of  participation rights. But could it be regarded as containing a hypothesis? Was there a
prediction that could be empirically  verified if  (but only if)  points in history could be found
where conditions approximated a competitive environment, absent fiat? For example, absent fiat
would shareholders really  be enfranchised through voluntary interactions? Would there be an
equilibrium in shareholder voting rights, changes in supply and demand aside? And what would
happen to the rules on director elections? Without specific laws, what would happen to the voice,
if  any,  held  by  the  ultimate  beneficiaries  of  institutional  shareholders?  Would  voluntary
interactions also reach an equilibrium in those rules? 
Among legal scholars, and also working within the nexus of  contracts paradigm, Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel sought to explain the character of  legitimate compulsory legal
rules in corporate law by asking ‘what would the free market do?’ This account depended on their
logical construct of  what ideal markets should do. For instance, like Jensen and Meckling had,
they  acknowledged the  existence  of  the  one-share,  one-vote  regulation  in  the  US securities
markets.129 But  this  regulation  could  be  justified  precisely  because  it  copied  what  (in  their
assessment) the market would have done anyway. In their view, one-share, one-vote regulation
served a market-mimicking function, because the idea that ‘Voting flows with the residual interest
124 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305, 308, 310 and 309
125 MC  Jensen  and  WH  Meckling,  ‘Rights  and  Production  Functions:  An  Application  to  Labor-Managed  Firms  and
Codetermination’ (1979) 52(4) Journal of  Business 469, 473
126 EF Fama and MC Jensen, ‘Separation of  Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of  Law and Economics 301
127 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305, 351-2, ‘...we have assumed that all outside equity is
nonvoting.... Simply put, forces exist to determine an equilibrium distribution of  outside ownership.’ 
128 MC Jensen and JB Warner, ‘The Distribution of  Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors’ (1988) 20
Journal of  Financial Economics 3 
129 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 Journal of  Law and Economics 395
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in the firm... explains why there is so little nonvoting stock’. Of  course, to say that directors in
companies where there are many voteless shares ‘will not make optimal decisions’ and that this
‘explains why there is so little nonvoting stock’ leaves an ambiguity about whether they were
positing that markets actually would work in this way, or whether an ideal market would. In any
case, for Easterbrook and Fischel the market mimicking effect was, at the time, the ‘justification
for the New York Stock Exchange’s policy of  not listing firms with nonvoting issues.’ 130 
Easterbrook and Fischel  appeared to slide in  and out of  describing normative ideals,
while hinting at positive claims about how markets really worked. They wrote that shareholders
had voting rights because it was ‘part of  risk-bearing’,  or it was related to being the ‘residual
claimants to the firm’s income.’131 Here  there is  again an ambiguity,  because  one might be  a
residual claimant (for instance, an asset manager  qua registered shareholder) without being the
residual risk bearer (the pension beneficiary or life insurance policyholder). Assuming that the
essence of  the argument was based on economic risk,132 they regarded shareholders as acquiring
voting rights  due to their essential vulnerability  to risk. This vulnerability meant shareholders
would have the best incentive to use decision making power to maximise firm value, compared to
others with merely ‘fixed’ claims. They dismissed the possibility that bargaining power could be
relevant,  because  even  if  deals  were  ‘take  it  or  leave  it’  the  results  were  ‘contracting
nonetheless’.133 
Could Easterbrook and Fischel be regarded as making claims about how free markets
(absent  specific  participation  rights)  actually  worked?  For  instance,  would  shareholders  hold
voting rights  – indeed  any  voting rights  at all  – in absence of  stock exchange or other legal
regulation? Possibly the best  view is  that claims about what might hypothetically  be done in
absence of  positive legal enactment have ‘no empirical content’, and can only be retroactively
filled ‘by scholars on an artificial and counter-factual basis.’134 In this respect the theory appears
very similar to the classic, though now superseded, test of  business efficacy for implied contract
130 Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) 26 Journal of  Law and Economics 395, 409, ‘Voting flows with the residual interest in the
firm, and unless each element of  the residual interest carries an equal voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of
management. Those with disproportionate voting power will  not receive shares of  the residual gains or losses from new
endeavors and arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result they will not make optimal decisions. This also
explains why there is so little nonvoting stock and is a justification for the New York Stock Exchange’s policy of  not listing
firms with nonvoting issues.’
131 Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) 26 Journal of  Law and Economics 395, 403
132 See also FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1425. It seems
this must be the case, because if  the argument were based on someone being the residual claimant, then one legal right
(voting) would be attributable to holding another legal right (claiming the residual assets in winding up) but this would merely
beg the question, why should one party be the claimant? It seems most likely that Easterbrook and Fischel would have
approved (as their heading suggests) that that justification comes down to risk bearing.  
133 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1429-1430. 
134 M Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of  the State (2013) 247
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terms.135 However this could have the unfortunate consequence that Easterbrook and Fischel’s
claims were unfalsifiable through recourse to any evidence in the real world, only contestable in a
world of  logic: not Friedman, but Coase. 
 On the other hand, Easterbrook and Fischel’s claim that voting is ‘part of  risk bearing’
and suggestion that risk bearing logic ‘explains why there is so little nonvoting stock’ could be
taken on its face to embody the view that (unless there has been some regulatory impediment) in
free markets votes in corporations will go to the party who takes the risk of  business insolvency.
This idea would be flatly refuted by the actual development of  corporate participation rights.
Asset managers and banks hold the votes. They bear no residual risk. The risk stays with the
pension beneficiaries, or the life insurance policyholders.
Within  economics  literature,  the  nexus  of  contracts  view  was  shared  by  Oliver
Williamson. His central contention was that shareholders come to have participation rights, and
control of  the board of  directors through a process that ‘arises endogenously’.136 Speaking in
terms of  a stylised model, Williamson’s hypothesis was that:137 
... the equity suppliers initially offer to hold debt at a [relatively high] price of  p. Upon
realizing that this is a very inefficient result, the workers who are organizing the enterprise
thereupon invent a new general purpose safeguard, name it the board of  directors. Upon
recognizing that expropriation hazards are thereby reduced, the suppliers of  equity capital
lower  their  terms  of  participation  to  p^.  They  thus  become  the  “owners”  of  the
enterprise. Not by history but by logic does this result materialize.
While it  is  is plain that Williamson was not describing an actual pattern of  events – not ‘by
history but by logic’ – he suggests that, in absence of  intervention in the transactional process,
‘equity suppliers’ will control the board of  directors as a ‘safeguard’ through a process of  ‘logic’.
More specifically, the logic was that shareholders were always more vulnerable, and in need of
greater protection than other persons in the nexus of  contracts that made up a firm.138 Thus, they
needed a governance ‘safeguard’ to encourage their investment. In stating this claim, Williamson
135 The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, per Bowen LJ ‘what the law desires to effect by the implication is to give such business efficacy
to the transaction as must have been intended at all events by both parties who are business men’, now surpassed by AG of
Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, discussed at ch 4(1).  Belize Telecom Ltd foots implied terms on the ‘reasonable
expectations’ of  the parties, in an essentially similar manner to that suggested on the first page of  F Kessler, ‘Contracts of
Adhesion – Some Thoughts About  Freedom of  Contract’  (1943)  43(5) Columbia LR 629, which also bears remarkable
similarities to BGB §§133 and 157.
136 OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of  Capitalism (1985) 306
137 Williamson (1985) 323-324
138 Williamson (1985) 29. See also, OE Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1197, 1210
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had not in fact distinguished between different types of  shareholder (small retail shareholders or
institutional  shareholders)  nor  had  he  distinguished  different  kinds  of  ‘equity  suppliers’
(beneficiaries or institutional shareholders).
On the contrary, Williamson made it a ‘central thesis’ of  his work ‘that a common theory
of  contract applies to transactions of  all types’.139 In particular, the only relevant distinguishing
feature  among  different  kinds  of  contract  was  those  where  the  parties  made  asset  specific
investments, compared to those where they did not. Asset specific investments (meaning upon
termination of  the relation, a party risks loss of  the investment140) were the factor that created
vulnerability.  According to Williamson ‘suppliers of  finance bear a unique relationship to the
firm’ and this meant the ‘whole of  their investment in the firm is potentially placed at hazard.’141
Here was the logic: one of  relative vulnerability of  equity suppliers, based solely on making asset
specific investments. This justified shareholders acquiring control over the board of  directors. 
Was  Williamson like  Friedman or  Coase? Was he saying that  voting  rights  should be
distributed by market logic to ‘equity suppliers’ in lieu of  compulsory rules? If  so, beneficiaries of
institutional investors, not institutions themselves, should presumably hold votes for company
boards. If  Williamson’s theory was that those people making asset specific investments should
acquire voting rights, then surely this would be the ultimate contributor of  capital, rather than an
institutional intermediary. An uncharitable explanation is that Williamson simply had not thought
about the extent of  the investment chain at the time of  his writing, and so he confined himself
to an argument tailored to elevate the claim of  ‘the shareholder’ over the employee or other
stakeholders: this was his real concern. But if  so, this approach contained a basic flaw. It cannot
be simultaneously be claimed that shareholders (in an ideal market or a real one) have voting
rights over employees because they make asset specific investments, and at the same time deny
that institutional shareholders (who really hold the votes) need to make asset specific investments
themselves. 
An  alternative  explanation,  which  could  make  more  sense  and also  meet  the  similar
concerns raised in Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory, could be that the ultimate contributors of
capital  make  a  rational  choice,  motivated  by  a  desire  to  save  transaction  costs,  to  delegate
shareholder voting rights to institutional intermediaries. The logic of  collective action, it could be
said, makes such a strategy wise to resolve the problems of  rational apathy that are, if  anything,
more  exacerbated  among  beneficiaries  of  institutional  shareholders.  They  are  vastly  more
139 Williamson (1985) 241
140 Williamson (1985) 32-5
141 Williamson (1985) 304. Note, that among ‘suppliers of  finance’ Williamson remarks that some creditors could also make asset
specific investments, which left them vulnerable. 
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numerous than shareholders themselves, and many people simply have not been well informed
about  where  their  retirement  savings  go.  The  difficulty  here  is  that  while  delegation  of
participation  rights  to  financial  institutions  could  be  a  plausible  strategy,  under  Williamson’s
framework it would follow that, at the very least, those contributors would rationally still aim to
retain a  governance ‘safeguard’  against  the  potential  risks of  institutional  shareholder  agency
costs.  Why  would  shareholders  contract  for  a  governance  safeguard,  when  beneficiaries  of
shareholders did not? Surely the ultimate contributors of  capital are the true equity suppliers, and
the  actual  suppliers  of  the  ‘asset  specific  investment’.  Why  would  there  be  a  separation  of
contribution and participation?
The most plausible answer could actually be found in Williamson’s work itself, but it is
one which he dismissed. In his discussion of  workers, and why (without a law) they do not play
more  of  a  role  in  corporate  governance,  Williamson  took  pains  to  dismiss  the  concept  of
bargaining power. ‘Rarely is power defined,’ he wrote, or if  it was the ‘main problem with power
is that the concept is so poorly defined that power can be and is invoked to explain virtually
anything.’142 Obviously, Williamson was correct to seek proper definition, and when speaking of
markets, the focus must plainly be on bargaining power, rather than other forms of  organisational
authority,143 though these may themselves partly be a product of  market transactions. Power in
the bargaining context must mean the relative influence that people have in making transactions,
rather than the applicable rules within organisations, which begins with ‘non-transaction costs’.
If, after all, it was defined Williamson wrote that the pitfall of  ‘the power literature’ was to infer
power ‘by ascertaining which of  two contestants will win in an isolated confrontation.’ Previous
authors,  he  said,  had  merely  desired  a  different  distribution  of  wealth.  Yet  echoing  Coase,
Williamson stressed that ‘if  efficiency is driving organizational outcomes, modes that are efficient
under  one  distribution of  income will  normally  remain efficient  under  another...’144 It  might
indeed be that ‘the employer’s resources are much more extensive than are those of  the typical
employee’,  but  this  did  not  matter  because  ‘the  employer  is  dealing  with  suppliers  and has
continuing needs to hire workers’.145 This claim of  equal ‘continuing needs’ is highly doubtful in
relation to employers and workers, but more importantly Williamson did not consider that issues
of  bargaining power might arise among shareholders or beneficiaries saving for retirement, many
of  whom would be workers themselves. 
142 Williamson (1985) 237-238, ‘Such an undisciplined approach to the study of  complex social science phenomena is clearly
unsatisfactory.’ 
143 On which, see M Moore, Corporate governance in the shadow of  the state (2013) 17 ff, concerning the relations of  power that exist
under the terms of  a company’s constitution and statute, favouring director autonomy. 
144 Williamson (1985) 258 
145 Williamson (1985) 260-261
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Taking these cross-disciplinary examples in the law and economics literature it might be
possible, with a generous spirit, to forgive the average reader for thinking these authors were
seeking to develop models, within Friedman’s methodology, that would make predictions about
how real markets work. What would happen through market interactions when the law contained
no specific participation rights, particularly regarding the appointment and removal of  directors,
shareholder voting rights, and a voice for beneficiaries? On the other hand, it must be conceded
that perhaps predictions were never part of  the theory. Law and economics only sought to define
a normative ideal, which is returned to in chapter 7. In sum, there are ideal markets, and then
there are real  markets,  the two are different,  and Jensen, Meckling,  Easterbrook,  Fischel  and
Williamson were never modelling anything to do with the real world. 
What if  an officious bystander had enquired when they were writing? If  those theorists
would  testily  confirm that  they  are  outside  the  Friedman  methodology,  and  they  align  with
Coase’s hypothetical normativity, then they can be viewed as doing with economic theory what
Kahn-Freund and Sinzheimer, as seen in chapter 2(2)(a), had described bourgeois law as having
done.146 Their  work  extends  normative  ideals  from  appropriate  contexts  (ideal  markets)  to
inappropriate  contexts  (any  real-life  markets)  under  the  veil  of  abstraction.  They  can  have
nothing useful  to say about reality,  except by analogy.  But also,  this would mean there is an
important, unfilled space for a theory about how real markets will work, in absence of  specific
participation rules. If  there is a gap, an account is needed. So either as an alternative to law and
economics, or by entering new territory, this is the goal that the second positive thesis will fulfil. 
(b) A second positive thesis: non-transaction costs and rationality
Perhaps the most useful result to emerge from the law and economics discussion so far is that
there  are  at  least  three  very  different  conceptions  of  markets.  The  first,  represented  by
Easterbrook and Fischel,  holds that  in  absence of  force,  fraud,  infancy,  insanity,  or negative
effects on third parties, markets are a normatively defensible mechanism of  social organisation. 147
This includes markets for participation in corporate governance. Corporate law is no candidate
for redistributing rights, like in ‘poverty law’ fields such as employment,148 and so contracting
between equal and unequal parties is ‘contracting nonetheless’.149 
The difficulty with this first conception is that, at the very least, many ultimate investors
146 See above, ch 2(2)(a) and O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer 1875-1945’ in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (1981)
102
147 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1434
148 (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1434-1435
149 (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416, 1429-1430
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are in an employment relationship, and saving in occupational pensions. But then if  a ‘poverty
law’  exception is  to be made,  it  is  difficult to see why retail  shareholders,  or a mutual  fund
investors,  which  may be small  personal  savers  should be conceived in  a  qualitatively different
manner. The distinction of  poverty is one of  degree, not of  kind. Building binary distinctions on
top  of  graduated  differences  is  conceptually  unstable.  More  fundamentally,  if  one  party  is
incapable of  exercising any negotiating power over a contract’s terms, the justification of  private
autonomy to determine the balance of  the rights exchanged has dropped away. With this goes the
normative justification for the state to use its coercive power to enforce bargains at a cost to the
public.150 
The second conception of  markets, represented by Williamson, holds that asset specific
investments are a further, significant distinguishing feature of  economic transactions. The role of
the law is to prevent opportunistic behaviour and promote welfare, but this is not necessarily
assured  from the  fact  of  a  voluntary  undertaking  alone.  Particularly  as  contractual  relations
develop over time, people’s welfare becomes more interdependent when they cannot recoup their
expenses upon termination of  the relation. Shareholders make asset specific investments as their
capital is ‘always at hazard’, although it is unclear what status an ultimate beneficiary might have.
But the common reference point, the ‘common theory of  contract [applicable] to transactions of
all types’,151 is based upon the nature of  the exchange and how it develops in practice: not the
parties to the contract themselves. If  a choice has to be made, this second conception of  markets
is plainly preferable to the first because it  acknowledges at least one more major category of
situation (beyond force,  fraud,  infancy,  insanity,  and third party effects)  which has significant
consequences. 
The third conception views different markets, like different types of  contract, as distinct
based on the social context and identity of  the parties. Markets involve institutions, networks and
exchanges, where people have varying bargaining power. The normative justification for markets
and contracts turns on extent to which they serve the goal of  social justice, 152 and so private
autonomy is not an end in itself  but rather a means to that end. Bargaining power, which partly
flows  from the  relative  wealth  of  the  parties,  compounds  upon  asset  specificity,  and  other
transaction  failures.  This  conception  aligns  with  the  progressive  democratic  ideal,  because
identification  of  power  everywhere,  from  every  source,  in  every  social  institution,  is  a
150 cf  JS Mill,  Principles of  Political Economy (1909) Book V, chs 1 and 9, and note JS Mill,  On Liberty  (1859) Chapter V, para 4,
‘Trade is a social act.’ 
151 OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of  Capitalism (1985) 241
152 cf  F Kessler, ‘Some Thoughts on the Evolution of  the German Law of  Contracts – A Comparative Study: Part I’ (1975) 22
UCLA Law Review 1066, ‘The optimistic belief  that a contractual society safeguards its own stability and secures the highest
possible social justice has lost much of  its appeal’.
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precondition  to  ensure  its  distribution among the many,  and not  the  few.  While  Williamson
appears to have regarded bargaining power (if  it existed, or could be defined) as an issue relating
to  workers,  Easterbrook  and  Fischel  acknowledged  that  (although  normatively  irrelevant)  it
potentially relates to a broad range of  transactions. Easterbrook and Fischel are right, because the
concept  is  used  not  merely  in  labour  law,153 but  also  extensively  in  landlord  and  tenant
regulation,154 consumer protection laws,155 and regulation in favour of  small business,156 across
every developed country from the Commonwealth, to the EU, to the US. A unified theory of
contractual interactions, which Williamson desired for economics, had passed away in legal theory
long ago.157 This breadth of  use also suggests that bargaining power is not just a vague ‘slogan’
that makes the ‘liberal intelligentsia’ feel better about itself  while doing nothing of  substance.158 It
is simultaneously a reason for compulsory rights that infuse fairness into all economic affairs, and
justice into relations of  power and subordination. 
The  second positive  thesis  follows this  third conception of  markets,  to  explain  how
participation rights were distributed by markets in reality. It must reject the first two conceptions
on the grounds of  their oversimplification. Whether or not this was intended by Easterbrook,
Fischel, or Williamson, the first two conceptions of  markets could not work adequately to explain
how participation rights develop in the real world. Accordingly the second thesis holds that, when
left  to  the  free  market,  participation  in  corporate  governance  tends  to  reflect  the  relative
bargaining power of  the competing economic actors. Results depend on the degree to which
some are  ‘non-adjusting’  or  ‘adjusting’  investors,  which  depends on their  (1)  information (2)
collective  action  problems,  and  (3)  ‘non-transaction  costs’  or  relative  wealth.159 Patterns  of
participation  include  the  way  rules  on  director  election  rules  are  set,  in  direct  or  indirect
negotiations with shareholders (or other stakeholders), it includes shareholders of  different kinds
negotiating with the company or each other over the distribution of  voting rights that attach to
shares, and it includes the negotiations over whether participation rights are given to the ultimate
contributors of  capital. It includes ‘negotiations’ where there is in fact no negotiation, because
153 eg National Labor Relations Act 1935 §1
154 eg Attorney General of  Canada v Nav Canada (2008) FC 71, [19]
155 eg Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 93/13/EC recital 16
156 eg Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Sch 2(a)
157 F Kessler, ‘Contracts of  Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of  Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629, 636,
‘can the unity of  the law of  contracts be maintained in the face of  the increasing use of  contracts of  adhesion?’ 
158 D Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with special reference to compulsory terms and
unequal bargaining power’ (1982) 41(4) Maryland Law Review 563, 622. It might be noted that Kennedy appears to have
accepted the graphical caricature of  markets in his appendices at 655-657 from neo-classical economics which in fact leave no
room for bargaining power. In other words, his critique appears to have adopted a unified theory of  contracts. As noted
above,  the  original  graphical  representations  of  supply  and  demand were  thought  by  their  creator  to  be  applicable  to
commercial sales, but not, for example, to labour: F Jenkin,  The graphic representation of  the laws of  supply and demand and other
essays on political economy (1887, 1996 edn Routledge)
159 See ch 2(3)(a) 
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the market only offers take it or leave it deals. The way that participation rights developed simply
cannot be understood without bargaining power.
What  creates the elements of  bargaining power? In terms of  resource inequality,  the
economic development of  a country in its entirety: the rise of  an industrial workforce which is
capable of  taking collective action, the invention of  retirement, and the creation of  a middle
class.  All  the  laws  and  policies  of  the  welfare  state,  the  public  sector,  and  the  quality  of
progressive taxation affect the extent to which people have wealth and therefore basic economic
influence. Relevant to collective action problems are a state’s policies on the ease of  formation of
all forms of  economic associations (companies, trade unions, mutual funds, etc), the available
fiscal or regulatory subsidies, and the lawfulness of  collective action, including the ability to inflict
economic loss on competitors. Information advantages can often be a product of  organisational
size, but also the laws on disclosure of  material terms in any transaction. These rules too will be
part and parcel of  a jurisdiction’s political and economic development. Together these contextual
complexities account for the variety of  governance outcomes that, for instance, Gourevitch and
Shinn documented in their work.160 
In addition to bargaining power, the same limitations on rational  behaviour that were
discussed  for  politics  in  chapter  3(1)(b)  exist  for  exercising  choices  on  the  market.  When
economic actors decide a course of  individual or collective action, the same issues of  preferring
the status quo, anchoring our choices to the familiar, and the precariousness of  our willingness to
invest effort when it could amount to nothing, apply. No matter what their bargaining power,
people’s capacity to make objectively rational decisions is further constrained, particularly when
we speak of  natural  persons  as  opposed to large  corporations.  Behavioural  psychology does
suggest that some features of  irrational behaviour are less applicable for commercial parties, 161
which could be taken to include well advised pension trustees, asset managers, banks. This seems
to be because large organisations can put in place policies, thought through over a long space of
time, which amount to objectively rational economic choices. Another qualification, as before, is
that the results of  behavioural experiments give evidence of  average outcomes. As in politics,
individuals can break the standard human mould. The more careful and reasonable sides of  our
personalities can become instilled in economic interactions and institutional culture. 
Relative bargaining power and rational action can produce multiple results: it could mean
the spread of  participation rights, or it could mean their elimination, always depending on the
160 See ch 3(1)(a) 
161 eg D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) 284 and 294, ‘There is no loss aversion on either side of  routine commercial
exchanges.’ Similarly, human motivations plainly have less relevance in any kind of  commercial contractual bargaining. 
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context  of  the  economic  actors.  The  outcomes  could  maximise  welfare,  or  be  completely
arbitrary.  The  critical  point  is  that  not  all  voluntary  interactions,  not  all  contracts  are  alike,
because  people  are  different.  It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  changes  and  variations  in
corporate participation rights while being blind to the significance of  bargaining power, in the
abstract or in reality. 
(c) Historical development: a summary
How  does  the  second  positive  thesis  match  with  the  development  of  participation  rights?
Although, as it has been stressed, it is probably accurate to say that a market is never entirely
‘free’, there do indeed appear to be several historical ‘windows of  deregulation’, in the sense that
there were no compulsory participation rights. It means that if  law and economics theories make
predictions about what happens to participation on free markets, these can be verified, or it may
simply be theorised what real markets do. Before the detailed treatment in chapters 4, 5 and 6, a
short summary is offered. 
In terms of  director election rules, the windows of  deregulation could be regarded as
before the UK Companies Act 1947, generally before the German Aktiengesetz 1937, and to
some  degree  throughout  most  of  US  history.  At  those  times,  director  election  rules  were
(generally speaking) default rules. For shareholder voting rights, the historical windows could be
before regulatory pressure received government endorsement in 1962 in the UK, before 1937 in
Germany,  and  before  1926  and  to  some  extent  after  1986  in  the  US.  For  the  rights  of
contributors behind the shareholder, there have only been compulsory rights for UK pension
beneficiaries  since  2004,  and  even  then  participation  in  selecting  pension  trustees  is  form
dependent.  In Germany,  there have been codetermination rights  in  pensions since 1920,  but
again this  is  form dependent.  In  the  US,  there  is  similarly  no compulsory,  and effect  based
regulation outside of  state law on public pensions. With these ‘windows of  deregulation’ open
throughout history, it seems possible to compare theories with outcomes. But more importantly,
regardless of  the view that one may take on what law and economics theories aim to achieve, the
second positive  thesis  of  participation,  and  its  predictions,  may  itself be  compared  with  the
evidence. 
In the UK, first regarding director election rules,  it  was already summarised how the
common  law  set  a  default  standard  favouring  simple  majority  removal  rights,  while  larger
chartered  companies  tended  to  favour  three-quarter  majority  removal  rights.  Before  the
Companies  Act  1947,  a  three  quarter  removal  rule  was  the  default.  The  vast  majority  of
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companies simply followed this model: they stuck with the status quo, which conveniently meant it
was difficult to remove directors from office.
Second,  while  shareholder  voting  rights  were  unaffected  by  London  Stock  Exchange
policy, company constitutions underwent a shift from graduated voting to one-share, one-vote.
This was promoted by Lord Jessel MR in Pender v Lushington, but it is notable that the case law
remained  a  default  standard.  In  the  1950s  and  1960s  stock  markets  were  growing,  and the
influence of  institutional investors was too. Among themselves, institutions were able to use their
influence within companies to restrict boards of  directors issuing multiple or nonvoting shares, as
it was felt these often simply served the interests of  management. The influence of  boards was
quickly overcome by ascendant asset managers. 
Third,  behind  institutional  shareholders,  bargaining  power  was  key  to  patterns  of
participation. While proposals were made in 1976 to require half  elected pension trustees, there
was no such legal enactment. Before this, British trade unions had slowly been developing similar
arrangements through collective  bargaining,  and were able  to do so because in  the  post  war
period British trade unionism was at the peak of  its economic strength.  The 1976 proposals
exercised a galvanising and focusing effect – there was a new ‘anchor’ – as it was from this point
that a burst of  companies ‘voluntarily’ adopted pension schemes where beneficiaries, or the trade
union on their behalf, had a voice in selecting trustees. That trend continued over the 1980s,
albeit that by the end of  the decade the economic influence of  trade unions was being broken.
Nevertheless, the Pensions Act 1995 wrote the rights into law. Even if  employers might have had
the inclination or the power to resist codetermined pension trustees, they did not immediately do
so. The difficulty was that the law remained form dependant, so that even after the Pensions Act
2004, employers were capable of  redrafting pension plans to be in ‘contract’ form. Moreover,
pension trustees were frequently content to delegate investment functions to asset managers, who
through standard form contracts would appropriate shareholder voting rights. The position by
2014  looked  to  show  avenues  for  a  shift,  particularly  as  a  new  Association  of  Member
Nominated Trustees provided a similar alternative voice.  Greater self-organisation to increase
pension trustee bargaining power against asset managers had not yet transpired, although there
was potential for change. 
In Germany, as the first issue of  director election rights remained default up until 1937,
different default expectations and macro-economic instability propelled executives to consolidate
their  power  and  insulate  themselves  from  accountability.  The  successive  parts  of  the
Handelsgesetzbuch that dealt with public companies highlighted the option to choose a right for a
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company’s general meeting, or the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) alone, to appoint and remove
the  executive  (Vorstand).  This  appeared  to  benefit  two  groups:  first  the  banks  whose
representatives packed the supervisory boards, and thus acquired a more direct influence than
any  small  shareholder  could  hope  for.  Second,  it  benefited  an  Oberschicht of  autonomous
executives, provided they cuddled to the banks. While the interposition of  the supervisory board
started as a Prussian tradition, particularly after the First World War, more and more companies
interposed the supervisory board between the general meeting. In effect, this slide to making the
Aufsichtsrat a mandatory intermediary was what the fascist Aktiengesetz 1937 codified into law. 
Second, before the one-share, one-vote rule was mandated in 1937, there had been some
historical stability. But the stability was entirely lost after World War One. A frenzy of  fear about
foreign takeovers was used as a pretext by managements to issue masses of  multiple voting and
nonvoting  shares.  The  Versailles  Treaty  was  partly  to  blame.  Post-war,  there  could  be  no
restrictions on foreign investment, so incumbent insiders were keen to look for other ways to
protect their position. The courts placed some check on skewed votes between 1929 and 1931.
But by then it was rather too late because by 1925 most companies had issued so many multiple
voting shares that, according to one contemporary study, just one fortieth of  capital accounted
for 38.2 per cent of  voting rights. This example alone represents a large difficulty for the market
mimicking view of  shareholder voting rights: it is factually unsound to say that when the market
is left free shareholders will be enfranchised. Whatever ideal markets do, real markets do not do
the same, and so one wonders why the word ‘market’ is being used at all. The evidence suggests
that as corporations became more massive,  all  but a few shareholders were likely to become
completely disenfranchised.
Third, behind the shareholding institutions, the ultimate contributors of  capital became
highly separated from participation. Regulation on German pension beneficiaries followed the
codetermination laws, but these were form based: employers could choose to provide insurance
contract based pensions or reinvest their workers’ retirement money back into their own business,
rather than establish a pension fund where the courts ruled codetermination rights attached. It
seems  plain  that  trade  unions  could  have  been  significantly  more  active  in  preferring
codetermined forms of  pension, but equally plausible that they did not as their members (with an
income linked state pension) did not have as much as their British or American counterparts did
invested  in  them.  Across  shareholders  generally,  during  the  1920s,  banks  concentrated  their
power by establishing a common system of  share deposits. Through standard form contracts
they were able to appropriate all the voting rights on all depositors’ shares. Millions of  dispersed
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shareholders simply did not have the leverage to propose different terms. After this concentrated
market  pattern  was  codified  into  the  Aktiengesetz  1937,  it  remained theoretically  possible  for
shareholders to pass through voting instructions. But it did not change the basic position that
German banks would continue to cast most votes in most companies. 
In  the  US,  first,  director  election  rules  in  different  states  were  often similar  to  basic
common law standards of  accountability: no cause removal. It appears that over the course of
the 19th century, it was gradually eroded, not without the help of  courts which misinterpreted the
common  law  to  require  good  cause  for  removing  a  director,  usually  as  a  default  but  also
sometimes made mandatory. Despite a resurgence in state laws with no-cause removal after Berle
and Means,  represented in  the  Model  Business  Corporations Act,  corporations were  free  to
establish  in  different  states.  For  other  reasons,  Delaware  was  attracting  more  and  more
companies, so in the post-war years it mattered more. It allowed companies to choose between
no-cause  and  for-cause  removal  with  a  staggered  board.  Most  companies  chose  the  latter.
However, from the early 1990s, organised campaigns led by trade union and state public pension
funds were successfully pushing for amendments: their growing bargaining power translated into
reform of  more company rules, after initial public offerings.
Second, shareholder voting rights in a sizeable minority of  companies during the early
19th century  followed  a  graduated  model:  more  power  for  smaller  shareholders.  As  free
incorporation became more common, the practice of  one-share, one-vote spread, until a decisive
moment in the 1920s. The multiplication and dispersion of  shareholders reached a tipping point.
The bargaining power of  corporate insiders was greater than before, and with it came a burst of
non-voting share issues, exemplified by the Dodge Motor company after a takeover by a group of
investment bankers. The very real risk was that issues of  voteless shares would accelerate to the
degree they had in Germany. This is what propelled intervention, precisely because the market
did  not  mimic  a  one-share,  one-vote  pattern.  After  1985,  however,  when  the  rules  were
unravelled, the number of  multiple voting shares in companies increased speedily once more.
This pattern was only counteracted by the growing power of  those same institutional investor
interests which preferred accountable director election rules: pension funds pushed back with
charter  amendments  to  favour  the  one-share,  one-vote  standard.  By  2014,  however,  the
precarious position was that the US patterns on voting rights were far more unequal than in the
UK or Germany. 
Third, behind institutional shareholders, the ultimate contributors had won some voice,
but only when they had been sufficiently organised. Before World War Two an increasing number
74
of  trade unions had secured collective agreements where unions controlled the pension funds.
The Taft-Hartley Act 1947 had mandated that employers control at least half  a pension board.
But  ironically,  with  a  model  that  was  envisaged to restrict  union power,  codetermined Taft-
Hartley plans were spread using collective agreements. The turning point came gradually between
1974 and 1986, when multi-employer collectively bargain plans went into decline. This mirrored
the changes in the landscape that unions faced, as employers exercised their muscle to replace
collective pensions with individualised 401(k) pensions, if  indeed there was any pension at all.
Participation  in  state  pension  funds,  however,  persisted  and even strengthened as  rights  for
beneficiaries had been written into the law. Otherwise, just like asset managers in the UK, and
banks in Germany, US asset managers wrote standard form contracts to assume all voting rights
on the investments from pension, insurance or mutual fund money that they came to manage.
Brokers had done the same, until the ban in 2010, but as there was no similar regulation for other
kinds of  shareholder and beneficiary, the separation of  contribution and participation had grown.
On this summary it must be evident that an understanding of  the dynamics of  bargaining
power is necessary to explain the shifts in participation rights at particular historical moments.
Most notably, it explains the concentration of  power in German boards in the 1920s, the erosion
of  no-cause  removal  over  the  19th century  in  the  US,  but  also  its  reversal  in  the  2000s  as
institutional investors became both powerful and assertive. Shifts in bargaining power have clear
consequences for the distribution of  shareholder voting rights in Germany and the US in the
early  1920s,  in  the  US  during  the  late  1980s.  In  the  other  direction,  organised  institutional
interests stabilised the one-share, one-vote standard in the UK in the late 1950s, and in the US
was pushing the re-implementation of  one-share, one-vote standards especially from the 2000s.
Bargaining  power  is  decisive  for  asset  managers  and  banks  acquiring  voting  rights  through
standard form agreements in all countries, as are the changes in bargaining power in each place
among trade unions and other associations of  contributors in organising a voice among pension
beneficiaries: this is seen especially in the UK from the late 1970s, and the US from the 1950s. At
the very least, if  its predictions about the location of  participation rights are not simply false, law
and  economics  theory  would  prefer  to  describe  many  of  these  matters  as  resulting  from
voluntary interactions. But such a positive thesis cannot stand because it lacks predictive power.
The alternative to be preferred starts with bargaining power. 
But markets often move slowly, and economic actors do not always optimise a raw self
interest. Notably, in the UK before the Companies Act 1947, companies generally followed the
model set in Table A of  a 75 per cent vote to remove directors. Conceivably, shareholders might
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have  pushed  for  more  accountability,  or  directors  might  have  sought  greater  insulation,  but
instead the model was usually followed. In Germany, trade unions might logically have used their
collective bargaining power to demand codetermined pensions to a greater degree, but they have
not done so yet. In the US, codetermined trade union and state pension funds with large holdings
could have logically,  like other large investors had done before, decided to push to be issued
significant multiple voting rights on their shares, or to have been entirely agnostic.  As major
insiders, this could have benefited them, but instead the agenda they favoured was not one to
concentrate  power  for  themselves:  it  reflected  the  interests  of  a  more  open  corporate
governance,  consistent with  the more accountable procedures by which their  managers were
elected. What is in fact in any of  those groups’ self-interest could obviously be debated. This very
fact  highlights  the  strength  of  the  view that  there  are  multiple  rationalities:  that  choices  are
contextual, and that no single minded economic rationality exists. 
(3) Reflexivity and normativity
So far, the two positive theses have been presented as operating in separate systems, namely what
shaped the law on participation rights in corporations, and what happened in the market when
there was no specific law. They suggested that participation rights in law can be explained as part
of  an incomplete  programme of  progressive  democracy,  but  when matters  were  left  to the
market, bargaining power shaped participation rights. This makes sense of  today’s separation of
contribution and participation. Despite the utility of  isolating these two narratives, it must be
recognised that matters are not so neat in reality. Politics and economics interconnect, and to
some extent work in a reflexive causal pattern. 
The main point of  interconnection would seem to be that politics often works within the
mould of  existing institutions, particularly economic institutions. If  one thinks, for example, of
periods of  qualitative change in the structure of  the UK economy over the 20 th century, it can
probably  be  agreed  that  only  the  administrations  of  Thatcher,  Attlee,  and  Lloyd  George
represented decisive shifts. In Germany, after the post-World War One disarray, it was probably
Hitler and Adenauer, and in the US it was Roosevelt, and Reagan. Subsequent administrations
have remained within the same basic political consensus in the years following. Arguably, the UK,
Germany and US remain in an ideological frame – and with it an economic construct – shaped
by Thatcher, Adenauer and Reagan. 
Does economic power predetermine political action, and therefore legal rights, or does
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law determine the shape of  economic interactions? The answer must be ‘both’. Over the long
term causation is reflexive.  The ‘feedback loop’  that  Gourevitch and Shinn identified can be
either a virtuous or vicious circle. Economic interests, not least corporations that the law permits
to  make  unlimited  political  donations,  can  and  do  lobby  and  corrupt  democratic  political
institutions. Or other groups could win the upper hand, and politics can then be an instrument
for  gradual  improvement  of  the  economy.  At  other  times,  a  symbiotic  relationship  between
economics and politics can be undone. When people’s consciousness is raised, people can depart
from established practice as they collectively follow a different normative ideal. The course of
history is open to be shaped in whatever way people ultimately choose to shape it.  And the
evidence, to which Part II now turns, shows this has been done over and again before.
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PART II. EVIDENCE
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4. ELECTIONS FOR DIRECTORS
Part  I  conceptualised  the  separation  of  contribution  and  participation  as  one  of  the  most
pressing  issues  in  modern  corporate  law,  and  offered  two  positive  theses  to  explain  the
development of  participation rights. The first thesis is that compulsory rights in law were driven
by a progressive democratic movement which sought to vest power in the hands of  the many, not
the few. Its aims spread to all social institutions, including the corporation, but like all interest
groups it has acted incompletely. This chapter begins to address the evidence in detail, starting at
the apex of  the corporation. How did the progressive democratic ideology translate into election
rules for directors? When Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
and as Berle was writing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foundational speeches, 1 they identified erosion of
the ability to remove directors as a primary factor in corporate unaccountability before the Great
Depression.2 A host of  other norms are necessary to ensure that election rights are effective in
practice.3 But the principle of  representative accountability required an electoral process, whoever
held the voting rights. The corporate electoral process has continually preoccupied law reform. 
The second positive thesis is that, where rights regarding the electoral process did not
exist in law, the bargaining power of  economic actors shaped how participation evolved in the
marketplace.  Some elements of  bargaining power matter  more in some contexts,  and indeed
Berle and Means themselves initially  highlighted the issues of  collective action problems and
information, while being more muted on issues of  relative wealth.4 Nevertheless, this all follows
the conception of  markets as being normatively flawed where the parties are unequal. It was
precisely because of  their conception of  these imbalances, and the defective outcomes of  a free
market, that progressive democrats pursued their goals in law reform. 
1 Notably the Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California  (1932) on which see R
Eden, ‘On the Origins of  the Regime of  Pragmatic Liberalism: John Dewey, Adolf  A. Berle, and FDR’s Commonwealth Club
Address of  1932’ (1993) 7 Studies in American Political Development 74, 109 ff
2 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property  (2nd edn Transaction 1991) Book II, ch 1, 129-131 also
identified as key rights are voting by proxy, amending the constitution, delegation to voting trusts, and voteless shares. 
3 eg in the UK, see the Companies Act 2006 s 336 duty for annual general meeting, ss 303-305 members’ right to call meetings
with 100 supporters holding who have paid up £100 each or have 5% of  the votes, ss 314-316 members’ right to circulate
resolutions),  s  324  right  to  appoint  a  proxy.  In  Germany,  see  the Aktiengesetz  1965  §123(1)  one  month notice  before
meetings, §§126-7 shareholder right to submit a counter proposal to an item on a meeting’s agenda and suggest votes on
supervisory board members or auditors, §134(3) right to appoint a proxy, §135 duties of  depositor banks when acting as a
proxy. For the EU see also the Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC. In the US, see the Delaware General Corporation
Law §211 meetings of  stockholders, §§212 and 217 right to appoint a proxy for 3 years, and right of  fiduciaries to vote, §222
at least 10 days notice of  a meeting. Passed under the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Rule 14a-8 allows for shareholder proposals and SEC Rule 14a-11 would allow proposing of  candidates for the
board of  directors, but see below ch 4(3). 
4 Berle and Means (1932) 80, but also they drew clear analogies between shareholders and workers at 5 and 64.
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(1) United Kingdom: the textbook evolution
When modern UK company laws were first drafted, they offered reasonably strong protection
for directors against the wishes of  incorporators, a stark contrast to the old common law. In a
previous age, corporations were used mostly for local governments, charitable groups and the
church. The leading cases held that ‘a power of  amotion is incident to the corporation’.5 This was
a majoritarian concept, which saw a corporation’s members as sovereign, and it solidified over the
course of  the 18th century. In the words of  Lord Hardwicke LC, ‘wherever a certain number are
incorporated, a major part of  them may do any corporate act’.6 According to Lord Mansfield in
R v Richardson, if  a director was to be removed, ‘where the offence is merely against his duty as a
corporator, he can only be tried for it by the corporation.’ 7 The members of  the corporation
alone had the  collective  competence  to determine  what  counted  as  a  good reason both for
appointment and removals.
However in the early 19th century, commercial and legal practice shifted. Common law
principles were only the default, and statutory corporations did not need to follow. One study
shows that between 1720 to 1799, 69.9 per cent of  chartered company constitutions contained
express rights to remove directors, falling to 65.9 per cent in the 1810s, and then to just 37.7 per
cent for constitutions written between 1835 to 1839.8 The trends pointed ‘clearly in the direction
of  a move away from shareholder participation over time.’9 It was still said at common law that, if
a company’s articles were silent, its members could determine the meaning of  any ‘reasonable
cause’ for removal.10 But in practice, most directors were becoming entitled to serve out their full
terms.11 During these early  years,  the terms of  charters  were being bought from Parliament,
usually negotiated by those who would be directors. And the interests of  directors were slowly
prevailing over those who invested in companies. 
The first  modern,  consolidated companies  law,  the  Joint  Stock  Companies  Act  1856,
codified the position that this political quasi-market for corporate charters had reached. In the
5 Lord Bruce’s Case (1728) 2 Strange 819, 93 ER 870. See also, Baggs Case (1615) 1 Rolle 224, (1615) 81 ER 448.
6 Attorney General v Davy (1741) 26 ER 531. See also  Foss v Harbottle  (1843) 67 ER 189, ‘the majority of  the proprietors at a
special general meeting assembled, independently of  any general rules of  law upon the subject, by the very terms of  the
incorporation in the present case, has power to bind the whole body....’
7 (1758) 97 ER 426, (1758) 1 Burr 517, 539. Bailiffs of  the Corporation of  Ipswich purported to remove the elected portmen
from office, and then hold an election where another bailiff, Richardson, was appointed in their place. It was held there was
no power to remove the portmen, because the amotion was not effected by the corporation, and there was no good cause. See
ch 3(3) for discussion of  how this was misunderstood by US courts.
8 M Freeman, R Pearson and J Taylor, Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland before 1850 (2012) ch 4,
87-93 and ch 5, 129-137
9 Freeman, Pearson and Taylor (2012) 129
10 Inderwick v Snell (1850) 2 Macnaghten & Gordon 216, (1850) 42 ER 83, 85-87, per Lord Commissioner Langdale
11 cf Company Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 ss 83 and 88, which started with a presumption that directors would not be
removed in their terms of  office, and that they would rotate in thirds.
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first model company constitution, known then as ‘Table B’, article 62 stipulated that directors
could be removed only by a special resolution, a three quarter majority vote. By default there
would be a staggered board, so only a third of  directors would be put up for election at a time. 12
Under  the  Act,  the  company’s  articles  could  be  amended  through  a  three  quarter  majority
resolution. With that weight in numbers, determined shareholders could always oust directors
more quickly if  they were prepared to.13 But at the birth of  modern company law, majority rule
had vanished. The common law heritage of  representative accountability was lost in legislation. 14
In principle, companies could always change their articles of  association to stipulate a
lower threshold for removing a director: the Companies Acts still only set a default. However, the
case  law  suggests  that  corporate  practice  sought  to  implement  the  highest  thresholds  for
removable possible. The limit was in effect set by statute, with the three quarter vote for changing
the articles of  association. This probably reflected directors’ advantage in bargaining for terms of
corporate constitutions, given the difficulty for many shareholders to organise. Some courts were
active  in  construing  articles  to  facilitate  the  general  meeting’s  voice.15 But  still,  the  guiding
principle of  interpretation was to give effect to the constitution as the company constructed it,
even if  that meant a high threshold to remove a board.16 Even if  the balance of  power were
weighted heavily in favour of  a board, the court’s policy in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate
Co, Ltd v Cuninghame was to simply give effect to the ‘express contract, mutually stipulated’.17 The
general meeting was, as the Court of  Appeal might fondly repeat, entitled to refuse to re-elect
12 JSCA 1856, Table B, art 48. See also Companies Act 1862 (c 89) Table A arts 59 (staggered board) and 65 (removal by special
resolution). The same scheme existed in the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (c 69) s 13. Appointment occurred by
default through ordinary resolution and removal by a 75% vote remained the same as before, Sch 1, Table A para 86, ‘The
company may by extraordinary resolution remove any director before the expiration of  his period of  office, and may by an
ordinary resolution appoint another person in his stead; the person so appointed shall be subject to retirement at the same
time as if  he had become a director on the day on which the director in whose place he is appointed was last elected a
director.’ cf  K Pistor, Y Keinan, J Kleinheisterkamp and MD West, ‘The Evolution of  Corporate Law A Cross-Country
Comparison’ (2003) 23 University of  Pennsylvania Journal of  International Economic Law 791, 812, suggest mistakenly that
it was an ordinary resolution for removal.
13 CA 1862 s 50 (articles amendable by special resolution).
14 nb Sir  Nathaniel  Lindley,  The  Law of  Companies  Considered  as  a  Branch  of  the  Law of  Partnership  (5th edn  1889) 302,  had
reinterpreted the common law principle  set  by Lord Mansfield  and  Lord  Langdale  as meaning  members  could  remove
directors ‘if  they act fairly and in good faith.’ This addition would plainly put the question of  validity of  removal back in the
courts’  hands,  and so represented a break from the common law precedent.  The point,  however,  is  largely  moot,  since
legislation had erased the common law’s defaults.
15 eg  Isle of  Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 Ch D 320, held the right of  shareholders to call meetings for a
general (if  unspecific) purpose of  removing any directors was not to be lightly interfered with by directors or the courts.
16 See Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co, Blackpool v Hampson (1883) 23 Ch D 1, an ordinary resolution to remove directors could not
succeed because the articles allowed directors to remain in office for three years. Lord Jessel MR said, ‘it is suggested that
under clause 44 the company can by resolution remove two directors. In my opinion they cannot. They can only alter the
articles of  association. On the contrary, by the resolution which was passed, they left the articles alone. The articles remained,
prescribing the whole term of  office, three years, or whatever it might be.’
17 [1906] 2 Ch 34, Cozens-Hardy LJ held that where dismissing directors required a three quarter majority of  votes, and the
company’s management was vested in the board, any right to issue specific instructions could not reasonably be less than that
threshold. ‘It seems to me that the shareholders have by their express contract mutually stipulated that their common affairs
should be managed by certain directors to be appointed by the shareholders in the manner described by other articles, such
directors being liable to be removed only by special resolution.’
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directors ‘if  the opportunity arises under the articles’.18 But it was rare to find removal provisions
through ordinary  resolution.  It  raised the  question  of  whether  those  higher  thresholds  were
keeping up with the need for more accountability given the growth in mass business. 
Directors enjoyed a considerable  remedial  privilege in  dismissal  disputes  compared to
other  employees.  While  ordinary  employees  could  expect  damages  for  wrongful  dismissal  at
best,19 directors tended to remain in their office unless a dismissal was confirmed in court. If
nothing happened, or if  they won, they effectively had a remedy of  specific performance. In
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw,20 some of  this disparity was addressed. A new shareholder
bought up over three quarters of  an iron casting company’s shares. It changed the articles to
make Shirlaw,  the incumbent managing director with a  ten year contract,  dismissible.  Shirlaw
claimed damages, and got them. In Lord Wright’s view there could be no specific performance.
But Shirlaw’s employment contract meant the ‘company would not without good cause remove
him  from  his  directorship…  because  if  they  did  so  they  would  ipso  facto terminate  his
employment.’21 The  result  was  to  clearly  separate  control  over  a  company’s  board  from the
expectations created in the employment contract, albeit leaving the door open to substantial costs
in removing directors.
Why  did  Lord  Wright  in  Shirlaw,  in  contrast  to  the  other  Lordships,  repeat  the
qualification of  the company’s  right to remove a director with ‘good cause’?  For some time
demands  among  employees  had  been  growing  for  greater  job  security.22 The  UK  had  not
followed the continental European trend towards more dismissal protection yet, 23 except as it
emerged through collective bargaining. But if  Lord Wright was correct that directors at common
law should be removed only for a ‘good cause’,  two questions he never answered were what
‘good cause’ might actually mean, and who determined whether that standard was met.
After  Shirlaw,  directors may have become marginally  more accountable to the general
meeting, but the requisite super-majority for removal would still invariably be three quarters. This
standard became entrenched when in 1929, the London Stock Exchange codified it as a listing
18 John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113, 134, per Greer LJ.
19 eg Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488. See now Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [44] per Lord Hoffmann.
20 [1940] AC 701
21 [1940] AC 701, 723
22 EA Ross, ‘A Legal Dismissal Wage’ (1919) 9(1) American Economic Review 132; GT Schwenning, ‘Protection of  Employees
against Abrupt Discharge’ (1932) 30(5) Michigan Law Review 666. In Power and Savage v British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd
(1930) 36 Lloyds Law Reports 205 and Edmondson v Sir R Ropner & Co Ltd (1935) 53 Lloyds Law Reports 9, Wright J or Lord
Wright gave favourable mention to the rule of  reasonable notice before dismissal from Creen v Wright (1875-1876) LR 1 CPD
591.
23 Germany first  introduced the Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 (RGBl,  147)  with a  provision on ‘Widerruf  der  Kündigung’  that
stopped unjustified dismissals which would cause a worker ‘undue hardship’. Then the Kündigungsschutzgesetz 1926 (RGBl
I, 399) brought a requirement of  reasonable notice before dismissal for everyone, now found in BGB §622. The first modern
UK unfair dismissal legislation was not passed until the Industrial Relations Act 1971, following the recommendations of  the
Lord Donovan, Report of  the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (1968) Cmnd 3623.
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requirement,24 and given its wording it was hardly clear that a listed company could even lower its
removal thresholds. In 1935, the Financial Times had begun its first compilation of  30 companies
that it believed represented a cross-section of  British industry, a forerunner of  the FTSE100. 25 In
the period before 1947, among at least six FT30 companies there were no listed companies with
constitutions  which  allowed  more  relaxed  removal  rights  than  a  three  quarter  vote.  Every
company, except Woolworths, on this major index sought to erect obstacles against removing
directors as high as they would be legally tolerated.26 
However in the years after the Great Depression, the progressive democratic arguments
of  Berle and Means were being received in the UK. The wartime Chancellor of  the Exchequer,
Hugh Dalton, appointed Lord Cohen to chaired a company law reform report in 1945. 27 The
report’s authors faithfully recounted the basic problem of  large corporations.
The illusory nature of  the control theoretically exercised by shareholders over directors
has been accentuated by the dispersal of  capital among an increasing number of  small
shareholders who pay little attention to their investments so long as satisfactory dividends
are forthcoming, who lack sufficient time, money and experience to make full use of  their
rights  as  occasion arises  and who are,  in  many  cases,  too  numerous  and too  widely
dispersed to be able to organise themselves.28
One of  its  key recommendations was that investors ought, as a matter of  principle,  to have
broader control over the board of  directors.29 Then a new lecturer at the London School of
Economics, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the recommendation was not made cherishing ‘the
illusion that, at this time of  the day, anything like an effective control of  the shareholders over
the management  of  a  big company  can be re-established’  but  with  the  rather  more modest
objective  to  ‘check  some  abuses  so  as  to  make  shareholders’  meetings  and  the  election  of
24 Stock  Exchange  Rules  and  Regulations  (1  November  1929)  Appendix  35B,  ‘Articles  of  Association  should  contain  the
following provisions: - ... 9. That the Company in general meeting shall have power by Extraordinary Resolution to remove
any Director before the expiration of  his period of  office’
25 The FT30 itself  remains in use, but more as an historical artefact, than an important business indicator.
26 This comes from a search on the Companies House databases, where it proved very difficult to identify company names with
any certainty and find their constitutions at the appropriate date. Six out of  the thirty were certainly the right companies,
namely Fine Spinners and Doublers (art  115, reg no.  00236624), Harrods (art  77,  reg no.  00030209),  Imperial Chemical
Industries (art 102) Rolls-Royce (art 88) Vickers-Armstrongs (art 109, reg. no 00227013) and F. W. Woolworth & Co (arts 73
and 77, reg no. 00104206).
27 Cohen Committee, Report of  the Committee on Company Law Amendment  (1945) Cmd 6659. The review by EM Dodd (1945) 58
Harvard Law Review 1258, gives some background though it fails to concern itself  with the central issue of  director removal.
28 (1945) Cmd 6659, para 9
29 (1945) Cmd 6659, para 7, with the recommendation for directors’ removal by ordinary resolution in para 130, and summed up
on page 84.
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directors a little more of  a reality’.30 Cohen’s other recommendations followed the same trend: the
Board of  Trade should be given the  power to bring  representative actions for  shareholders;
payments  to  directors  for  loss  of  office  subjected  to  company  approval;  loans  to  directors
prohibited;  notice  periods  for  shareholder  meetings  lengthened;  the  right  to  use  company
channels to circulate draft resolutions; the right of  members to appoint proxies to vote and speak
on their behalf; and the right to demand a poll.31 Small, closely held companies, where directors
might  be  given  a  reasonably  reliable  assurance  from  other  investors  that  they  remain  in
management, were not the target for the proposals.32 It was the growing scale of  enterprise, the
factual separation of  management’s interests from those of  investors, and the powerlessness of
investors to help themselves that altered the equation, and called for compulsory regulation.
There can be little  doubt that  Lord Cohen’s  Report,  given its  reasoning and rhetoric,
reflected the growing conviction, systematised by Berle and Means, that accountability required
law. A new Companies Bill was drawn up and debated from 1946. During its passage through
Parliament the strongest sentiments expressed in the Lords (not not understandably) centred on
the recommendation for directors to compulsorily resign at age seventy. There was only a little
dissent over the proposal for removal by ordinary resolution.33 In the Second Reading in the
Commons, Sir Stafford Cripps as the President of  the Board of  Trade, was clear about the Bill’s
purpose.34
Perhaps  the  main  reason  why  amendment  is  now so  urgently  necessary  is  that  the
relationship  between  management  and  ownership  in  limited  liability  companies  has
tended progressively to be more and more shadowy. Even before the war, apprehension
was  expressed on this  point,  and  remedies  were  then  suggested,  and,  with  the  great
growth in the size of  companies, the old relationship, which really grew out of  the idea of
partnership,  where  individual  owners  were  closely  concerned  themselves  with  the
management,  has  largely  disappeared  in  modern  company  structure.  The  growth  of
groups or chains of  companies, which make the true economic entity rather than the
30 O Kahn Freund, ‘Company Law Reform: A Review of  the Report of  the Committee on Company Law Amendment’ (1946)
9(3) Modern Law Review 235, 245-246
31 (1945) Cmd 6659, respectively, paras 92, 94, 126, 128, 133 and 136; para 132 also recommended equal treatment for investors
in who receives proxy forms, to reverse the effect of  Wilson v London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1940] Ch 393.
32 (1945) Cmd 6659, para 130, ‘There is one case that requires special consideration, that of  a permanent director of  a private
company holding office as such under the articles. This right arose in substance as an agreed matter of  contract and we
consider that an exception should be made to protect a permanent director holding office in a private company at a fixed
date…’
33 See Hansard HL vol 144 col 999 (17 December 1946) Companies Bill, 2nd Reading, especially Lord Jowitt LC, col 1018, and
Viscount Maugham, col 1044.
34 Hansard HC vol 438 col 585 (6 June 1947) Companies Bill, 2nd Reading, Sir Stafford Cripps, 585-588.
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company itself, where we get a whole complex of  companies operating together—that
factor has still further divorced management from ownership. This now well-developed
tendency is, in fact, practically ignored by the company law as it exists today, and that is
another reason why amendment is required… 
Though there was not complete unanimity on every aspect,35 there was essentially cross party
consensus on the final draft.36 The Companies Act 1947 section 29 prescribed the compulsory
right of  a company to remove any board member by ordinary resolution. A director would have
four weeks’ notice and the chance to circulate her arguments for staying. 37 The role of  the court
became to determine whether a general meeting had enough time to deliberate upon the reasons
for a dismissal, but not to decide upon the merits of  the reasons themselves. Every director
therefore  became  entitled  to  reasonable  notice  before  a  fair  dismissal  and  the  guarantee  of
fairness  lay  in  procedural  integrity:  the  right  to  a  fair  hearing,  and of  the  general  meeting’s
deliberations on the substantive case. If  a director believed herself  to be treated arbitrarily by her
peers, there was a potential personal remedy in ex post judicial review. It was a faithful, textbook
evolution of  company law.
After 1947, there were perhaps four remaining issues. First, was the law effect based, and
did it  catch all kinds of  companies? The Companies Acts was framed for all companies, and
contextual reading might suggest voting rights should not be manipulated to circumvent the rule.
At first sight the decision in Bushell v Faith might have seemed to have left the law as an ‘empty
gesture’.38 A majority of  the House of  Lords allowed a small private company to stipulate that if
a director were to be removed his votes would carry triple weight.39 Even though the effect was
to  entrench  the  director,  the  decision  in  Bushell was  probably  in  line  with  Cohen’s
recommendations.  This  was  a  closely  held  private  company,  not  one  where  investors  and
directors were wholly different people.40 It was vanishingly improbable that the same would work
for a large company.41
35 eg the honourable member for Hendon, Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth apparently thought ‘recalcitrant and rebellious minorities’
could threaten ‘arbitrary resolutions for the removal of  the companies’ officers.’
36 See also Hansard HL vol 146 col  965 (1 April  1947) Companies Bill  Lords 3rd Reading,  Viscount Swinton. See also Sir
Stafford Cripps remarks above.
37 CA 1947 s 29 became CA 1948 s 184, which followed into CA 1985 s 303, and now CA 2006 s 168.
38 cf  D Prentice, ‘Removal of  Directors from Office’ (1969) 32(6) Modern Law Review 693, 695, on the Court of  Appeal
decision.
39 [1970] AC 1099. The fact that their Lordships in the majority mentioned neither the Cohen Report, nor Hansard, probably
reflected the still prevailing theories of  statutory construction, till Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 63 rather than their ignorance.
40 This view is shared by PL Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law (8th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 390-
391.
41 It  is also highly doubtful that  for listed companies such a practice would not be viewed to frustrate the London Stock
Exchange Rules and Regulations, Appendix 34, Sch VII, Part A, (ii) D.4, see CD Morley, Rules and Regulations of  the Stock Exchange
(3 January 1951) 
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Second, could the law be undermined by factual, financial fetters on director dismissal
through enormous breach of  contract claims? Here the main strategy was legislative limits on
long term service contracts.  The Companies Act 1985 required that  shareholder approval be
given for a director’s contract lasting over five years, reduced to two years after 2006.42 In 2010,
the Financial  Reporting Council appeared to take the idea further still,  as the UK Corporate
Governance Code 2010 required explanations if  FT350 companies did not have annual board re-
appointments.43 This  appeared  to  some  institutional  investors,  though  well  intentioned,  to
confuse  the  issues  of  contractual  limits  on  pay  and  requiring  a  permanent  election  cycle, 44
although in practice elections rarely took place. 
The third main issue, perhaps the most important was how were directors appointed?
The presumption of  Berle and Means, and the policy of  the Companies Act 1947, had been that
if  removal rules were mandated, appointments could be left to a company’s own constitution.
The Model Articles said either the general meeting, or the directors themselves, could carry out
the appointment,45 but the practice in large companies always gave the job to the board. In 1992
the  Cadbury  Report  tacitly  endorsed  this  by  formalising  the  appointments  committee’s
composition: there should be a majority of  non-executive directors.46 This was reiterated in 1998
by the Hampel Report,47 however by 2003 the Higgs Report revealed the outcome.48
Almost half  of  the non-executive directors surveyed for the Review were recruited to
their role through personal contacts or friendships. Only four per cent had had a formal
interview, and one per cent had obtained their job through answering an advertisement.
No mention was made of  shareholders ever proposing or electing among a choice of  candidates,
although this was probably partly because by this time the asset managers, who had appropriated
most voting rights, were content to the practice continue, and be codified in the UK Corporate
Governance  Code.49 Shareholders  could  always  propose  nominations,  and  use  their  removal
rights if  necessary to attain a choice of  candidate.50 But asset managers were not doing it. 
The fourth issue was what had the common law position become if  the articles were
42 CA 1985 s 319 and CA 2006 s 188. In between various corporate governance reports had a recommendation of  three years.
43 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 B.7.1.
44 See ‘UK: stewardship elusive  as pension funds  buck governance code’  (21 July  2010) Responsible  Investor.  Three  large
pensions, Hermes, Railpen and USS, stated they would be support companies not following the FRC’s recommendation.
45 See now, Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) art 17(1)
46 Cadbury Committee, Report of  the Committee on the Financial Aspects of  Corporate Governance (1 December 1992) 4.30
47 Hampel Committee, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (1998) 3.19
48 Higgs Committee, Review of  the role and effectiveness of  non-executive directors (2003) 10.5
49 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 B.2
50 CA 2006 s 292 ff, requiring 5% of  members to exercise the power to circulate a resolution.
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silent? For the UK, the legislative framework was unlikely to disappear, but for other common
law countries, including the US, the common law position could be instructive. One line of  cases
suggested that, probably because directors (unlike other employees) often have greater bargaining
power, there was no compulsory term requiring good faith in dismissal.51 But was it still true that
a court would merely enforce, as in Cuninghame, whatever was in the ‘express contract, mutually
stipulated’? 
In Attorney General of  Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd,52 the Privy Council had to decide whether
two directors in the recently privatised phone company should have jobs for life or not. Two
directors on Belize Telecom’s board were electable by the shareholder with both over 37.5 per
cent of  ‘C’ shares and a ‘special share’. The privatisation scheme failed when the buyer, who had
bought its stake of  ‘C’ shares and the special share with a government loan, went insolvent. The
loan’s terms meant the government could enforce a pledge on the ‘C’ shares, but the loan drafters
had forgotten  about  recouping the  special  share.  Nobody,  then,  held  both  shares needed to
replace two of  the directors. The directors argued they could not be removed. The Privy Council
advised that the directors could be removed anyway, despite the contradiction to the express
terms  of  the  articles.  A  company’s  articles  were  to  be  interpreted  in  their  context,  and
inconsistencies  could  effectively  be  scrapped.  Lord  Hoffmann  placed  heavy  reliance  on
construction  according  to  the  background  of  the  ‘reasonable  expectations  of  the  parties’, 53
although, aside from the parties’  intentions,  it  was not exactly  clear what would identify that
background.  It  seems,  however,  that  the  key  to  construction  in  the  context  of  corporate
governance, was that even express provisions must be construed in the light of  the requirement
that directors are accountable to the general meeting, or at least not just to themselves.  The
indication was that the  dictum of  Lord Mansfield from R v Richardson  in 1758 was acquiring the
character of  a compulsory rule.  Members of  a company must have a voice in the company
administration. They will not be deemed to have had the capacity to have ‘mutually stipulated’ the
constitution’s content, in large companies particularly, because power is unequal. The requirement
for good corporate governance does not give way to fictitious consent.
The result in UK law today is that directors’ positions, while clothed with a wide power to
51 Reda v Flag Ltd [2002] UKPC 38, properly undestood. It is increasingly apparent that, although the legislature is competent to
set limits on damages, the standardised implied term at common law is the reverse for employees who lack bargaining power:
Johnson v Unisys  Ltd  [2002] UKHL 13,  [44] per Lord Hoffmann.  An employer’s attempt to make an individual  employee
contract out of  the requirement of  good faith in dismissals would be regarded as a sham, Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC
41, [35]. It would appear that, most consistently with the common law’s tradition, an employee’s peers, who have no conflict
of  interest, are competent to decide whether a dismissal is fair, and that a Tribunal would give significant deference for their
determination. This view remains to be tested.
52 [2009] UKPC 10. The buyer involved in this case was Lord Ashcroft, a convicted criminal and Conservative party member.
53 [2009] UKPC 10, [23] referring to Lord Steyn’s decision in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408, 459.
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direct  the  enterprise  during  their  time  in  office,  are  shadowed  by  the  compulsory  right  of
participation by the general  meeting in election questions.  The UK’s path had represented a
quintessential  textbook  evolution  of  good  corporate  governance,  but  only  up  to  a  point.
Although  the  general  meeting  of  a  UK  company  did  not  usually  play  an  active  role  in
appointments, it had among the strongest rights in the world to do so. But as will be explored in
chapter 6,  evolution according to the  textbooks  may by itself  have been problematic,  if  the
landscape had changed, and a company’s constituents were not disposed to engage.
(2) Germany: the Faustian pact
The progression of  modern German company law on directors’ elections followed, if  anything,
the UK’s path in reverse.  The modern company laws originated with the  Allgemeines Deutsches
Handelsgesetzbuch  1861  (General  German  Commercial  Code  1861)  ten  years  before  Germany
formed  a  nation-state.54 On  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  Vorstand,  or  the  ‘executive’  (also
commonly translated as the ‘management board’), §227 set out the basic rule that its appointment
could be withdrawn at any time, without prejudice to compensation claims arising from existing
contracts.55 This was identical to UK law from Shirlaw,56 except it was only a default rule. Under
§209(2)  Nr 7  the  company’s  constitution  could  change  the  election  mechanism.  It  was  also
possible,  but  not  compulsory,  that  the  company  included  in  its  structure  an  Aufsichtsrat,  or
‘supervisory council’ (commonly, and perhaps nowadays appropriately, translated as a supervisory
‘board’).  Under  §225,  should  a  company  adopt  this  organ,  it  would  monitor  all  aspects  of
company administration, especially the accounts and finances. But crucially, a supervisory council
was not required to intervene in elections.
In the reforms of  1870, as restrictions on company registration were relaxed, §209 was
amended to require a supervisory council. States within the German confederation, particularly
the  Western  Hanseatic  states,  had  previously  allowed free  incorporation.  Others,  particularly
Prussia, had retained the concession system: the need for state permission to incorporate each
54 The ADHGB 1861 covered the  states  of  the  German Confederation,  which  included  the  states  of  modern  Germany,
Liechtenstein and the Austrian Empire. The Prussian state law, the Preussiche Aktiengesetz 1843 contained many analogous
rules but retained a state concession system. ADHGB 1861 §249 left it up to the German states to determine. For a highly
informative historical overview, see P Muchlinski, ‘The Development of  German Corporate Law Until 1990: An Historical
Reappraisal’ (2013) 14(2) German Law Journal 339. The main developments traced here relate to (1) the two-tier board, (2)
the duties of  directors (3) the role of  banks’ power (4) codetermination, and counters the claim that there is a simple division
of  liberal and coordinated economies, or insider and outsider systems of  corporate governance: the picture is more mixed.
55 See ADHGB 1861 §227
56 See above ch 3(1) per Lord Atkin and Lord Wright in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701 would adopt the
same rule.
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company. Prussia insisted on supervisory councils as a price for allowing free incorporation.57
They were generally thought to be a way for large shareholders to exert more influence over the
executive,58 an interest group to which one might suppose the Prussian state would be naturally
sympathetic. Yet under §236 it was still possible for the general meeting to elect the executive.
The  potential  for  direct,  not  intermediated  accountability  remained  the  rule  in  the  revised
Handelsgesetzbuch 1897 (Commercial Code 1897).59 Even following a thorough debate before the
draft reforms of  1931 this would have continued to be the case.60
While  the  law was  posed  in  default  terms,  how did  the  supervisory  council  actually
develop? There were certainly enough economic interest groups to fill seats: mostly industrialist
family  members,  bank  representatives,  interested  directors,  and  (to  a  lesser  extent)  small
shareholder  groups,  technical,  commercial  or  legal  experts,  friends  or  ‘decorative’  directors. 61
Walter Rathenau was a firm supporter. He was a liberal politician, who inherited his wealth from
his father’s electronic company, AEG. He served there as a supervisory council member. A few
years before he became foreign minister and was tragically assassinated, he wrote a tract called Of
Corporate Existence: A Business Meditation. Rathenau argued that companies should be seen as being
real entities with interests distinct from investors.62 He was adamant that ‘numerous’ people gave
‘all their spare time freely and without special claims’ to be supervisory directors. The purpose of
the  extra  council  was  apparently  like  the  British  Royal  Navy:  its  simple  existence  deterred
untoward behaviour by the executive.63 
Richard Passow, an academic lawyer working in Frankfurt, held a different view. He drew
attention to a study of  the numbers of  the banks’ supervisory council representatives, published
in the Deutschen Ökonomist.64 This showed, for example, that in 1906 the Deutschen Bank had 23
representatives who together held 139 seats on the supervisory council, the Norddeutschen Bank
57 W Schubert, ‘Die Abschaffung des Konzessionssystems durch die Aktienrechtsnovelle von 1870’ (1981) 10 Zeitschrift für
Unternehmens-  und Gesellschaftsrecht  285, 306, makes this  argument,  after  concurring with Passow’s earlier  study. The
Parliamentary debates are found in the Drucksache Nr 86/189, 22, and Nr 56/1870, 25.
58 R Passow, ‘Die Entstehung des Aufsichtsrats der Aktiengesellschaft’ (1909) 64 Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handelsrecht und
Konkursrecht 27, 27-28
59 HGB 1897 §182(2)
60 §6(2) Nr 4 E-1931. See T Schnorr, Historie und Recht des Aufsichtsrats Deutsche Erfahrungen als Beitrag zum Statut der Europäischen
Aktiengesellschaft 1991 (2000) 81.
61 See R Passow, Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft (1907) 157 ff
62 W Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen: eine geschäftlich Betrachtung (1919)
63 Rathenau (1917) 17. If  the analogy was intended to show how effective a supervisory board was at checking the executive, as
for instance the British navy was at defeating the enemy, it seems to have been quite unfortunate. AJP Taylor, The First World
War: An Illustrated History (1974) ‘Who won? The British lost more ships... But, at the decisive moment, the German fleet fled
from the British; and, in Jellicoe’s eyes, this was all that mattered. He did not suppose that he could win the war by destroying
the German fleet; he thought that he might lose it if  he did not preserve his own.... the following year Jellicoe was replaced by
the more aggressive Beatty. Once in command, Beatty, too, became cautious. He, too, recognized that the Grand Fleet must
remain in harbour unless the German fleet came out.’ If  supervisory councils were like the Royal Navy at that time, it would
follow that in practice they were too timid to act when needed for fear of  placing their own positions in danger.
64 Robert Franz (28 July 1906) Deutschen Ökonomist, Nr 1231 
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had 12 with 91 seats, the Dresdener Bank had 7 with 108 seats, and the Bank für Handel und
Industrie had 13 with 64 seats.65 This was a forum for the ‘representation of  the interests of  the
big players, hardly an organ of  control for the benefit of  all shareholders.’ 66 If  Rathenau was right
that the German company now had an autonomous interest, it seemed to identify more with the
powerful.
In practice the supervisory council was elevated by company constitutions to the status of
a controlling board that could not be circumvented.67 Its functions were inflated, and in particular
it took over the role of  electing the executive from the general meeting.68 Before 1937, the only
significant  legal  changes  to  company  boards  came  between  the  Betriebsrätegesetz  1920 (Work
Councils  Act  1920)  and  the  Aufsichtsratsgesetz  1922  (Supervisory  Council  Act  1922).  These
codified what could probably be regarded as the most important collective agreement in history, 69
to require that in companies with a supervisory board, one member had to be elected by the
workforce, or two members if  the board numbered over three.70 Companies could anaesthetise
any employee influence by simply inflating the numbers of  supervisory directors, a practice that
was in any case popular before the War.71 The legal minimum was three, but numbers inflated so
much that in a 1931 draft law, the Reichsjustizministerium (the Empire’s Justice Ministry) proposed
that board members should be limited to 30, and that directors could sit on a maximum of  20
boards.72 
It could fairly be said that the earlier Companies Acts ‘did not aim at a rigid basis which
should shape the legal character of  a company limited by shares… they were able to produce the
65 Passow (1907) 157-158
66 Passow (1907) 200, ‘Es ist eine Interessenvertretung der Hauptbeteiligten, kein Kontrollorgan im Dienste aller Aktionäre’.
67 ES Puchelt, Kommentar zum ADHGB (4th edn 1893) Band 1, Art 227, Anm 6, ‘Auch mit der Bestellung des Vorstandes
wurde er [der Aufsichtsrat] in der Praxis häufig betraut’, cited in M Lutter, ‘Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit’ in W Bayer
and M Habersack, Aktienrecht im Wandel (2007) 394. The fact that supervisory councils did so habitually select the executive
was mistaken by some to mean there was in fact a law mandating it before 1937, eg WC Kessler, ‘The German Corporation
Law of  1937’ (1938) 28(4) American Economic Review 653, 658, ‘As in the old law, the board of  managers is selected by the
board of  directors. The term of  office is five years and it is renewable (par. 75). Under the previous law the term was
indefinite. Members of  the board of  managers can be replaced for an “important reason” (wichtiger Grund). Such a reason
includes gross neglect of  duty and inability to attend to the ordinary transaction of  business.’
68 Passow (1907)  169-175,  sampling  the  constitutions  of  Dresdner  Bank (§15,  ‘Die  Mitglieder der  Direktion werden  vom
Aufsichtsrat  ernannt’),  Hamburg-Amerikanische  Paketfahrt  AG  (§11,  ‘Der  Vorstand  besteht  je  nach  Ermessen  des
Aufsichtsrats aus einem oder mehreren Mitgliedern, welche vom Aufsichtsrat gewählt werden.’), Gesellschaft für elektrische
Hoch- und Untergrundbahnen in Berlin (§18, the same), and Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken zu Berlin (§13a the
same).
69 Stinnes-Legien Abkomment 1918
70 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §70; Aufsichtsratsgesetz 1922 §§3-4.
71 Passow (1907) 154, noting the Deutschen Bank had a minimum of  9 in its constitution but 27 in practice, Dresdener Bank
18-36, but 33; Disontogesellschaft 15-30, Darmstädter Bank up to 18, AEG, minimum 12, and Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks
AG 12 to 26.
72 Entwurf  eines  Gesetzes  über  Aktiengesellschaften  und  Kommanditgesellschaften  auf  Aktien  sowie  Entwurf  eines
Einführungsgesetzes  nebst  erläuternden Bemerkungen,  Veröffentlicht  durch  das  Reichsjustizministerium,  1930,  S.  96.  O
Ehrenwerth, ‘Die Aufischtsräte nach der Aktienrechtsnovelle mit Rücksicht auf  die Betriebsratsabgesandten’ (1933) ZBlHR
196. P Fischer, Die Aktiengesellschaft in der nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaft (1936) PE 480, 100. Walter Rathenau had 35 seats, Carl
Fürstenburg 39 seats, and Luis Hagen 44 seats at once.
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legal frame of  a limited company which did not essentially differ from that adopted in other
countries…’73 But although formally  free to vary,  in  large corporations the  operation of  law
produced a position entrenching directors, as a numerous and autonomous interest group, as
much as if  it were mandated. While it was left to market interactions, directors had tended to use
their influence to make themselves less accountable.
After the Wall Street Crash, the German government declared a state of  emergency in
1931.  One  emergency  decree  contained  some  company  law  accountability  and  transparency
reforms.74 But by 1933 the Nazi party had seized control of  the German state. It renewed the
company  law  reform  agenda  in  a  different  direction.  Immediately  it  scrapped  worker
codetermination,75 but the larger question it pursued was how to remodel German company law
along  fascist  lines.  According  to  Ernst  Geßler,  who  led  the  reform,  the  most  influential
theoretical voice was Johannes Zahn’s, a researcher for the German Bankers’ Association who
had been studying at Harvard.76 
Zahn argued for Germany to ‘import’ what he supposed were two key principles of  US
law:  the  ‘leadership  principle’  and  the  idea  of  a  corporation  as  a  ‘bundle  of  contractual
relationships, between the corporation and the state, between directors and shareholders, between
the shareholders mutually.’77 The contractual notion was loosely based on the common law idea
of  the company constitution being a contract between the members  inter se,  but expanded to
include the state. It was a reaction to Rathenau’s view of  the  Unternehmen an sich,  which Zahn
described as essentially Marxist-Leninist doctrine.78 Zahn concluded that the leadership and the
nexus  of  contracts  approach  had  led  to  the  vitality  of  the  American  economy.  Weimar’s
economic weakness lay in its attachment (in Zahn’s assessment) to shareholder democracy – a
flaw the Americans had apparently recognised because they had developed the  Fuhrerprinzip.79
‘When a  genuine leader-follower  relationship  develops,’  wrote  Zahn,  referring to the  coming
changes in Germany, 
between the board and the shareholders, the voting rights of  shareholders will lose all
73 FA Mann,  ‘The  New German  Company Law  and  Its  Background’  (1937)  19  Journal  of  Comparative  Legislation  and
International Law 220, 223.
74 See FE Koch and P Auerbach, ‘The German Company Law of  1931’ (1932) 18(8) Virginia Law Review 850-874.
75 Arbeitsordnungsgesetz 1934 (RGBl I, 45) 
76 W Schubert, ‘Einleitung’ in W Schubert, W Schmid and J Regge (eds),  Akademie fur Deutsches Recht 1933-1945: Protokolle der
Ausschusse (1986) Band I (Ausschuss für Aktienrecht) xlvii. See also M Roth, ‘Private Altersvorsorge als Aspekt der Corporate
Governance’ [2011] 5 ZGR 516, 531-532 and M Roth, ‘Corporate Boards in Germany’ in P Davies et al (ed), Corporate Boards
in European Law: A Comparative Analysis (2013) 277-278
77 JCD Zahn, Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im neuen Aktienrecht (1934) 18-19. The quote is from the summary by F Kessler,
‘Book Review: Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht’ (1935) 83 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 393,
394
78 Zahn (1934) 39
79 Zahn (1934) 14-17. cf  ch 5(2) 
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practical  meaning.  In the first  place,  the  shareholder will  have much less  to  say than
before.  He  will  not,  however,  regard  himself  as  a  victim  because  he  will  trust  the
leadership.80
In fact, the case law on which Zahn relied to ground his views of  US law showed, quite to the
contrary, that American courts were intent to ensure no single major interest (such as a large
shareholder) could dominate the company’s organs.81 Furthermore, as he published the New Deal
reforms were in motion aimed precisely at reversing the dominance of  directors and banks.82 
Zahn’s work happened to be reviewed at the time by another German lawyer who had
come  to  the  US,  but  under  very  different  circumstances:  forced  out  by  Nazi  persecution.
Friedrich  Kessler  wrote  that,  although  his  work  would  hold  a  ‘worthy  place  among  the
comparative studies’ (in some form),  Zahn had ‘discovered what he had wished to discover’.
Zahn  made  no  reference  to  Berle  and  Means  major  work,  and  footed  his  narrative  on  a
‘contradictory and seemingly superficial philosophy’ that was wedded to an ‘emotional approach’
to scholarship.83 Nevertheless, Zahn’s principles were written into law.84
In its own words, the aim of  the Aktiengesetz 1937 (Public Companies Act 1937) was to
‘carry  into  effect  National  Socialist  principles  within  the  sphere  of  economics.’85 Nazi
totalitarianism sought to control the heads of  industry through a combination of  terror and
patronage,86 and this left little room for accountability of  those heads to anyone else. Because of
this,  the  Aktiengesetz  1937 wrought two hallmark changes to director election rules.  First,  the
election  of  the  executive  by  supervisory  councils  was  elevated  to  a  mandatory  feature  of
company law.87 Second, executives could only be removed for an ‘important’ reason and could
serve up to five years.88 An important reason included an order by the Reichsminister, and also a
withdrawal of  confidence from the general meeting. But this made little difference because the
supervisory board had a discretion, not a duty, to remove the executive. The supervisory board
80 Zahn (1934) 95, ‘Wenn sich zwischen Vorstand und Aktionären ein echtes Führer-Geführten-Verhältnis entwickelt, wird das
Stimmrecht des Aktionärs sehr an Bedeutung verlieren. Zunächst einmal wird der Aktionär viel weniger zu sagen haben, als
bisher. Er wird dies aber gar nicht als ein Opfer empfinden, da er der Führung vertraut.’
81 Zahn (1934) 95, giving the example of  Manson v Curtis, 223 NY 313, 119 NE 559 (1918) where quite contrary to Zahn’s
assessments, it was held that a dominant shareholder could not enforce an agreement with another shareholder to have a
powerless board. This case, however, is still relied on for much the same conclusions by S Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119(6) HLR 1735, 1746
82 See below at ch 4(3)
83 F Kessler, ‘Book Review: Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht’ (1935) 83 University of  Pennsylvania Law
Review 393
84 See particularly Zahn (1934) ch IV, 93-96
85 Official Reasons for the Aktiengesetz 1937, cited in Mann (1937) 19 JCLIL 220, 221.
86 eg K Robert (a pseudonym), Hitler’s Counterfeit Reich (1941) 38 and 57 and FL Neumann, Behemoth (1941) 227
87 Aktiengesetz 1937 §75(1), replacing HGB 1897 §182(2).
88 Aktiengesetz 1937 §75(3)
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itself  was only removable by default on a three quarter vote.89 
None of  this had been recommended by the company law committee in 1931.90 After all,
it was a hard argument to win, then as now, that what companies needed was more unrestricted
autonomy for directors.91 As Reichsminister Frank said when the law took effect it was clear that
the government, ‘did not confine itself  to individual technical improvements, but it aimed at and
reached a fundamental reform of  the law.’92 This represented the very opposite of  progressive
democratic ideals, like those that Berle and Means propounded.
How was the creeping and final emasculation of  executive accountability perceived by the
legal community at the time? Even before the Nazi seizure there was significant criticism. Hans
Reichel wrote in 1930 that Rathenau’s theory of  a company as real entity in itself  (die Unternehmen
an sich) was throughout the Weimar Republic used ‘to glorify the Fascist tyranny of  the board.’ 93 If
that were true, by 1937 the Nazi party gone far further, and had openly appropriated the theory
to justify compulsorily disenfranchising investors. Frederick Mann, an academic lawyer who had
come from Berlin to London,94 wrote that while ‘parliamentary rule within limited companies has
thus been severely curtailed, the position of  the Board has been materially strengthened.’ 95 There
were, naturally, supporters of  the new status quo in the legal academy. For instance, one Carl
Seydelmann coldly recited how a strong supervisory board was needed to take over elections
from the inexpert  mass of  shareholders with conflicting interests.96 The Nazi’s  reforms were
based on an ideological hostility to autonomous participation in any field of  social activity, and it
actively manipulated concepts of  communal good to enrich its sympathetic elites. 97 With reduced
89 Aktiengesetz 1937 §87(2). This replicated HGB 1897 §243(4).
90 cf  C  Windbichler,  Gesellschaftsrecht  (22nd edn  Beck  2009)  299-300,  who  contends  that  the  1937  reform  was  based  on
comprehensive prior research and did not principally serve Nazi ideology, but in light of  Zahn’s work this is simply mistaken.
91 For an overview of  the debates and reform proposals, see R Rosendorff, ‘The New German Company Law and the English
Companies Act, 1929 - I’ (1932) 14(1) JCLIL 94, followed by Parts II and III in (1933) 15(1) JCLIL 112 and (1933) 15(4)
JCLIL 242. 
92 FA Mann,  ‘The  New German  Company  Law  and  Its  Background’  (1937)  19  Journal  of  Comparative  Legislation  and
International Law 220, 222.
93 H  Reichel  (1930)  Juristische  Wochenschrift  1459.  ‘Erstaunlich  zu  sehen,  wie  im  Zeitalter  der  Demokratie  und  der
Volkssouveränität auf  eine Oligarchisierung des Aktienwesens hingearbeitet wird, welche die Aktionärschaft zur bloßen misera
contribuens  plebs  herabdrückt.  Sogar das abgegriffene Schlagwort  vom “Organismus” der  AktG mußte herhalten,  um eine
faschistische Vorstandstyrannei zu glorifizieren.’
94 FA Mann later  made a remarkable career in international  commercial  and economic law,  along with his  wife,  Eleonore
Ehrlich,  who left  Berlin with him in 1933, and established a legal advice clinic on the Portobello Road.  Lord Denning
described Mann in The Due Process of  Law (1980) as the most learned of  all his learned friends.
95 FA Mann (1937) 231.
96 C Seydelmann,  Die  Gestaltung  des  Aktienrechtes  in  Deutschland  und  England:  Ein  Beitrag  zur  Frage  der  Freiheit  oder  Bindung  im
Aktienrecht (1940) 86, ‘Gerade der Aufsichtsrat als bewußt zahlenmäßig begrenzt gehaltenes Gremium wird viel eher in der
Lage  sein  –  zumal  ihm in  der  Regel  bedeutendere  Persönlichkeiten  des  Wirtschaftslebens  anzugehören pflegen  –  nach
fachmännischen Gesichtspunkten die Wahl des Vorstandes richt treffen zu können, als die große Masse der Aktionäre mit
ihren vielseitig zersplitterten Interessen durch die Hauptversammlung.’
97 FA Mann (1937) 224-5, ‘it is an entirely different question in favour of  which interests individual rights are to be restricted.
The answer given by the theory of  the “enterprise as such” shows its kernel: according to it, the decisive factor is the interest
of  the enterprise. This answer practically involves supremacy of  the Board. Supremacy of  the Board had already become a
fact in the life of  German companies and it has now received its theoretical blessing. No doubt, according to the “enterprise
as such” theory the Board itself  is subject to the interest of  the company. But as it is the Board which, in view of  the
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accountability to any member of  the public, the executive was, among other things, to ‘lead the
company... as the good of  the Empire demands’.98 
After  the  Second World  War  the  immediate  changes  to  company  law were  primarily
concerned with reconstructing worker codetermination, initially in the Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz
1951 (Mining Codetermination Act 1951) and the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 (Work Constitution
Act  1952).  After  the  war,  the  allies  had  allowed  unions  and  employers  to  make  collective
agreements regarding company constitutions, and they did so, reintroducing and strengthening
work councils and board level codetermination. The Acts codified and spread those collective
agreements. The 1952 Act required that a third of  supervisory board members, rather than a set
number that could be crowded out, would be elected by employees. Later, the Mitbestimmungsgesetz
1976 (Codetermination Act 1976) increased the number of  employee or union representatives in
all companies with over 2000 to almost half  of  the supervisory board. There were no significant
changes to non-employee participation in company law until the Aktiengesetz 1965, and none after
that. The 1965 Act did overhaul the former law, but left the basic arrangements of  the two-tier
board system in place. Still the executive could be removed only by the supervisory board, and
only for a ‘good reason’. The supervisory board itself  could remain in office for four years, and
could still only be removed with a three quarter majority vote.99 It was true that a vote by the
shareholders could  count  as  a  ‘good reason’  to  remove the  executive,  but  the  choice  would
remain with the supervisory board. Contemporary commentators glossed over the relevance of
this continuity, if  they questioned it at all.100 
Why did neither the 1965 Act, nor subsequent reforms, reverse the measures that had
entrenched German directors to such a degree? Would this not have been the natural evolution
of  company law in a democracy? One view was that German company law was more efficient
this way. In 1980, the Ministry of  Justice published a report written by 29 company lawyers on
potential reforms, including the two-tiered board in German law.101 There was ‘almost unanimity’
in favour of  the two-tier  system, compared to the older Hanseatic one tier  system. Its main
justification was that the ‘functional separation between executive and supervisory board allows a
clear division of  responsibilities  and liabilities.’  Apparently not content with this tautology,  it
added  that  the  supervisory  board  was  the  ‘appropriate  forum  for  cooperative  criticism.’
necessarily reserved supervision by the courts determines the interests, it is in fact in control over them.’
98 Aktiengesetz 1937 §70(1) ‘Der Vorstand hat unter eigener Verantwortung die Gesellschaft so zu leiten, wie das Wohl des
Betriebs und seiner Gefolgschaft und der gemeine Nutzen von Volk und Reich es fordern.’
99 Aktiengesetz 1965 §§84 and 102-103
100 eg DF Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) 80 Harvard Law Review 23, 51,
exemplifies this passive acceptance, in an otherwise highly informative article.
101 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bericht uber die Verhandlungen der Unternehmensrechtskommission (1980) 
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Moreover, the ‘supervisory council can act more quickly than the general meeting, when it needs,
to correct obvious defects in the leadership.’102 
If  those were the Report’s only reasons, they were not very good. But there were also
‘codetermination reasons’ for maintaining two-tiers. With ‘heterogenous and plural composition
of  interests’  the  supervisory  board  would  be  ‘cumbersome,  and especially  if  there  is  parity
codetermination there would be a danger of  a deadlock.’ It followed that a system of  ‘separation
of  powers’  was  preferable  to  safeguard  ‘stability  and productivity’.  Quite  how the  executive
derived its productive vitality from these lower tiers of  ostensibly sluggish electorates was not
clear, and nor was it clear why another tier of  boards might not amplify this obvious source of
German corporate  dynamism further  still.  That  said,  the  Commission  appeared  to  view the
functional separation of  the boards as not having gone far enough. It acknowledged that before
the  Aktiengesetz 1937 there was more of  a one-tier board system. But those days, plainly, had
gone.103 In the next major report in 2006, the two-tier system was hardly questioned.104
The political reality, however, seems to point in a different direction than the efficiency
explanation. Underneath the euphemism, the 1980 Report’s authors appeared more concerned to
limit employee influence. After 1952 and 1976, if  not in 1919, employee codetermination had
become an irrevocable component of  the German economic landscape. Its place had rested for
now on the supervisory board. Reversing the reduction of  the executive’s accountability would
have meant tampering with this sensitive issue.105 Employee representatives had fought hard for
the little they had, and needed to hold on. Interests that identified with large shareholders were
content  with  this  settlement,  because  it  separated  employees  from direct  influence  over  the
executive. Major shareholders or banks could still dominate the electoral process.106 
But was the settlement really good for everyone? It became an article of  faith among
some  corporate  governance  circles,  from  the  1965  Act  on,  that  different  interests  between
shareholder  and  employee  representatives  meant  ‘objective  evaluation  and  supervision  of
102 Unternehmensrechtskommission (1980) 175-176
103 Unternehmensrechtskommission  (1980) 178, b) Mischsystem. At this point the Commission noted the argument that a ‘genuine’
dual system had not yet been attained, perhaps because of  codetermination, because the supervisory board could still have
positive input, rather than a purely a right of  objection. The Commission evidently did not see the separation as having gone
far as enough.
104 See K Biedenkopf, Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung: Bericht der wissenschaftlichen Mitglieder der
Kommssion (2006)
105 There  were  essentially  three  unattractive  options:  (1)  companies  could  have  been  permitted  to  sideline  or  abolish
codetermination by allowing the general meeting to bypass the supervisory council.  Employees would have objected. (2)
employees could have been permitted to instead hold the same proportion of  seats on the executive. Shareholders would have
objected, because clearly that would have led to more power. (3) some kind of  compromise may have been reached, but it is
not entirely clear what that could have been, because it is difficult to quantify how much influence an executive director is
worth, compared to one on the supervisory council.
106 See further ch 6(2)(e)
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management’ had become a more difficult task.107 It seems true enough that divergent interests
could be a source of  conflict over distribution of  a company’s joint product. However, it always
remained unexplained why shareholders and employees did  not  share a  compelling common
interest among themselves against executive directors. It was not codetermination that made the
executive less accountable, it was the remnants of  fascist corporate law. The reality was that the
German labour movement and German shareholders had bound themselves in a Faustian pact.
They  kept  things  the  way  they  were,  because  they  both  wanted  to  preserve  the  gains  they
perceived themselves to have. But the Faustian pact had a price. The executive had become less
accountable to everyone. 
(3) United States: an unfinished race
The United States’ experience differed from the UK’s and Germany’s, because there was little
federal  regulation  of  companies’  electoral  rules.  US  law  was  in  reality  the  product  of  fifty
laboratories  of  corporate  law,  sometimes  cooperating,  sometimes  competing,  sometimes
innovating, and sometimes inhibited either by federal law or market pressure. State law received
the English common law as it  was before 1776,  including the principles of  accountability  in
corporate elections and dismissals.108 The idea that directors of  companies could be removed at
will  was  written  into  New York’s  earliest  corporations  acts.109 Moreover  in  the  earlier  cases,
including one Illinois Supreme Court case in which a younger Abraham Lincoln was the losing
advocate, it continued to be held that the right to remove officials was a standard incident of  a
corporate body.110 
American  law  and  scholarship  tended  to  place  more  emphasis  on  the  positives  of
administering elections: their regularity, voting procedure and who was enfranchised.111 Perhaps it
was characteristic of  New World optimism and embedded democratic culture, that legislators and
legal  authors  focused  less  on  the  negative  topic  of  removal,  and  more  on  appointment. 112
107 DF Vagts (1967) 52-53. This has been reflected in H Hansmann,  The Ownership of  Enterprise  (1996); J Armour et al,  The
Anatomy of  Corporate Law (OUP 2009) 85, ‘We suspect (and we are not the first to do so) that the net effect of  Germany’s
closely-divided supervisory board is to enhance the power of  top managers - i.e., of  the management board - relative to that
of  shareholders.’
108 In particular, R v Richardson (1758) 1 Burr 517, (1758) 97 ER 426, above at fn 7.
109 New York, Laws of  1828, see 2 RS 462, chapter VIII, section 33 on the principle of  at will removal, cited by Berle and Means
(1991) 129. They further cite Taylor v Hutton, 24 Barbour 195 (NY 1864) and Cook, Corporations (8th edn 1923) vol III, section
624, for the change in the common law principle.
110 People ex rel. Stevenson v Higgins, 15 Ill 110 (1853) concerning trustees of  a hospital. Lincoln acted for Higgins. He lost on the
point of  who, precisely, was empowered by common law to exercise the right of  removal. Lincoln argued that it should only
be the legislature, the governor or the Supreme Court, but not the hospital’s trustees, but the court felt the trustees too could
exercise the power of  amotion.
111 See ch 5(3)
112 JW Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics 1791-1875 (1949) 302, ‘The amount of  attention that was given in
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Probably the most important 19th century debate centred upon having cumulative or majority
voting at elections. Cumulative voting, similar to proportional representation, meant that voters
would typically have as many votes as there were positions on the board. They could spread their
votes or cast them as a block, and so a minority might ensure it had at least one or two seats. By
contrast if  there were an election for every candidate in a majority vote, the minority of  voters
could lose every time precisely because they were every time a minority. In 1870 the House of
Representatives in Lincoln’s home state, Illinois, introduced cumulative voting, and while doing so
required cumulative voting in corporations.113 Other states followed suit, so by 1913 there were 20
states with mandatory cumulative voting, and a further 8 which permitted it.114 
For states with cumulative voting, the common law standard of  removal by a majority
vote that had been expressed by Lord Mansfield in  R v Richardson,115 became problematic. If  a
minority appointed some directors, the majority could hardly be permitted to then remove them.
This could explain why mid-19th century commentaries chose to read the pre-1776 common law
cases,  quite  erroneously,  to  require  a  court  supervised  cause  for  removing  directors.116 This
contrasted to the position thought to exist for ordinary employees, who somewhat dubiously
were said to be dismissible for any reason, any time.117 But commentaries were suggesting that
directors were not only different, but entitled to remain in office, perhaps even for their whole
term of  office.118 The true common law principle had said that when a director breached an
ordinary duty, he or she ‘can only be tried for it by the corporation.’119 But as the 19th century
went  on,  while  ordinary  employees  had no protection  in  dismissal,  directors  could  seek the
assistance of  a court. 
In the early 20th century, the New York courts began to formalise the requirement of
good cause for removing directors.120 New York had permitted cumulative voting in 1892. Then
nearly every special charter to the regulation of  the election of  directors bears testimony to the importance attached to the
election procedure.’ See also, EM Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860 (1954) 191.
113 W Campbell, ‘The Origin and Growth of  Cumulative Voting for Directors’ (1955) 10(3) Business Lawyer 3, 5-6
114 JN Gordon, ‘Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting’ (1994) 94(1) Columbia Law Review 124,
143-144.
115 See ch 4(1)
116 eg J Kent, Commentaries on American Law (10th edn 1860) 373-5, referring inter alia to R v Richardson (1758) 97 ER 426. Also JK
Angell and S Ames, Treatise on the law of  private corporations aggregate (1861) 412. These texts referred to Richardson for the idea
that the common law required cause for dismissal, but this was simply wrong.
117 HG Wood, A Treatise On The Law Of  Master And Servant (1877) §136. Wood’s contention was dubious not least because he
cited two cases which had held that the pay reference period determined when a dismissal could take effect: Tatterson v Suffolk
Mfg Co, 106 Mass 56, 59 (1870) and Franklin Mining Co v Harris, 24 Mich 115, 116 (1871). cf  Watson v Gugino, 204 NY 535, 98
NE 18 (1912). At that time, for example, Massachusetts, Michigan and New Jersey, followed the pay reference period for
determining when a dismissal could take effect. Plainly different judges in different common law jurisdictions disagreed about
what the default rule ought to be.
118 eg V Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of  Private Corporations (2nd edn Little, Brown & Co 1886) §648
119 R v Richardson (1758) 97 ER 426, (1758) 1 Burr 517, 539.
120 cf  the position for other employees, in  Watson v Gugino, 204 NY 535 (1912) Vann J explains that New York had adopted
Wood’s at-will policy in Martin v New York Life Ins Co, 42 NE 416 (1895). This was itself  a reversal of  New York’s policy from
just four years prior. Adams v Fitzpatrick, 125 NY 124, 26 NE 143 (1891)
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it was held that directors (who were certainly not ‘mere employés’) could be dismissed only for a
good reason, if  indeed at all before the expiry of  a term of  office.121 In slight contrast in 1930,
Walsh J held in Fox v Cody that directors could be dismissed by a majority of  shareholders for a
good cause, whether a corporate statute was silent or vocal.122 A justification for court oversight
was apparently that removal should not ‘be based on whim and caprice’.123 In some ways this was
an advance from an accountability perspective. The New York courts would now imply the right
to remove directors even if  a corporation’s bylaws allocated that right to the board. In a further
development, in Auer v Dressel, Desmond J held shareholders ‘have the inherent power to remove
[directors] for cause’, which meant removal was accompanied by ‘the service of  specific charges,
adequate notice and full opportunity of  meeting the accusations’.124 Yet the view seemed to be
that New York law invalidated the voters’ right to determine what a good cause was. 125 The view
developed widely, even among those who opposed it,126 that there was an inherent power of  the
court to second guess shareholders.127
In the little  state  of  Delaware cumulative voting had been permitted from 1917.  On
removal rights, its General Corporation Law was silent until 1974,128 though the case law was not.
In 1957, in Campbell v Loew’s Inc,129 the president circulated a notice for a meeting to propose that
two other directors be dismissed. He alleged they were harassing the president and damaging the
company’s  affairs.  The  Chancery  Court  held  there  was  an  implicit  right  of  shareholders  to
remove directors, so long as they had a fair hearing. This would be the case even if  directors,
ousted by a majority, were elected through a cumulative vote by a minority of  shareholders. The
decision was greeted coldly. On the one hand, from directors’ perspective, this was a positive
development because cumulative voting was already seen to threaten directors’ job security by
making takeover bids more likely.130 On the other hand, the decision plainly undermined the
121 People ex rel Manice v Powell, 201 NY 194, 94 NE 634 (1911)
122 Fox v Cody, 252 NYS 395 (1930) ‘Mistake or misunderstanding probably will not suffice. Substantial grounds showing breach
of  trust must be shown. The power of  removal of  directors inheres in every corporation.’
123 See also In re Koch, 257 NY 318 (1931) and Abberger v Kulp, 281 NYS 2d 373 (1935) (no without-cause removal allowed, even if
inserted through a bylaw).
124 306 NY 427,  118 NE 2d 590, 593 (1954).  Van Voorhis  J  dissented,  arguing that there was  no reason to imply such a
shareholder right. cf  AG of  Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 11.
125 nb NYBCL §706(b) now follows MBCA §8.08 in stipulating that a charter may allow for removal without cause.
126 eg AH Travers, ‘Removal of  the Corporate Director During His Term of  Office’ (1967-1968) 53 Iowa Law Review 389. Note
that Travers mistakes the meaning of  R v Richardson  in the same way as some previous authors, believing it to hold that a
corporation’s representatives could only be dismissed for a good reason. 
127 JH Choper, JC Coffee and RH Gilson,  Cases  and Materials on Corporations  (Aspen 2007) 617 ff  suggest that good reasons
include conviction of  a felony, insanity, bankruptcy, organising a competing company, harassing officers or employees, or a
director selling all one’s shares. The question, however, is whether a well deliberated decision by the general meeting also
counts as a good cause for removal.
128 See CH Nida, ‘Note: The New Delaware Corporation Law’ (1967-1968) 5 Harvard Journal on Legislation 413; SS Arscht and
LS Black, ‘The Delaware General Corporation Law: Recent Amendments’ (1974-1975) 30 Business Lawyer 1021. 
129 36 Del Ch 563, 134 A 2d 852 (Ch 1957)
130 Gordon (1994) 94(1) Columbia Law Review 124, 150. Also, CW Steadman and GD Gibson, ‘Should Cumulative Voting for
Directors Be Mandatory? A Debate’ (1955) 10 Business Lawyer 9, opposing cumulative voting on the basis that directors
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workability of  minority representation, and so calls were made for codifying removal only for
cause.131 In Essential Enterprises Corp v Automatic Steel Products, Inc the Chancery Court appeared to
change its mind.132 It held that a bylaw stipulating directors could be removed without cause was
invalid, because the charter and statute provided the board could be staggered for three year
terms. In 1974, the legislature responded by creating a new §141(k). The new Delaware rule was
that directors could be removed without cause,  unless the charter opted to create a classified
board,  or  the  company  employed  cumulative  voting.  It  approved  Essential and  overturned
Campbell. 
What happened in Delaware law was significant because during the later  20 th century,
company directors typically had the initiative in charter amendments, and were generally viewed
as having more influence than shareholders. On standards of  accountability there was, argued
William Cary, a ‘race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead’.133 Whether or not investors
priced corporate governance rules into their investment choices, and this was enough to sustain
an  argument  that  it  was  efficient,134 staggered  boards  did  become  widely  popular,135 and
cumulative voting dwindled to vanishing point.136 The concomitant in Delaware’s §141(k) for a
staggered board was removal for cause. But removal for cause became rare because there was
uncertainty. The prospect of  protracted litigation over what courts thought ‘good cause’ meant
made it more appealing to simply pay the director off, or wait till the next election. 137 
Other states followed Delaware’s standards before long. For example in 1955, the Illinois
Supreme  Court  had  held  in  Woolfson  v  Avery that  staggered  boards  were  unconstitutional.138
Moreover,  the  Model  Business  Corporation  Act  1955,  a  non-binding  statute  drafted  by  the
American Bar Association and the American Law Institute to restate its view of  best practice,
was updated to contain an optional §36A. It recommended removal of  directors without cause. 139
should have to represent all shareholders, not sectional interests, and that there should be harmony and mutual respect on
boards.
131 eg RE Yeazel, ‘Removal of  Directors for Cause’ (1958) 27 University of  Cincinnati Law Review 92, 102. Note that this article
misinterpreted, once again, the English common law generally, and R v Richardson in particular.
132 39 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288 (1960). Also Everett v Transnational Development Corp, 267 A 2d 627 (Del Ch 1970) held that a
bylaw can authorise removal without cause, in absence of  a statute.
133 W Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware’ (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal 663, 703. See ch 4(3) for the
origin of  this idea.
134 RK Winter, ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of  the Corporation’ (1977) 6 Journal of  Legal Studies 251
135 See JH Choper, JC Coffee and RH Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (Aspen 2007) 617.
136 Gordon (1994) 94(1) Columbia Law Review 124, 144-160
137 Choper, Coffee and Gilson (2007) 619, ‘removal for cause has been rare.’
138 Woolfson v Avery, 6 Ill 2d 78, 126 NE 2d 70, (1955), 69 HLR 380. See LCB Gower, ‘Some Contrasts between British and
American Corporation Law’ (1956) 69(8) HLR 1369, 1389-1390, given the very recent changes to UK law he wrote with a
tinge of  cheek: ‘To an English observer it  seems strange that in most states the stockholders have no power to remove
directors, in the absence of  misconduct, until the expiration of  their terms of  office.’
139 RW Jennings, ‘The Role of  the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection’ (1958) 23 Law & Contemporary
Problems 193 argued at the time that the MBCA should have not left the provision optional, though this would in any case
have been a pyrrhic victory, given the statute itself  is optional.
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Small states without mandatory cumulative voting followed that guideline.140 Indeed, in the late
1950s it became an academic assumption that a majority of  voters was always in charge. In 1958
AA Berle wrote confidently that ‘Fifty-one per cent of  ownership of  the voting stock in a single
hand or compact group constitutes absolute control.’141 The idea of  absolute control relied on the
notion that a general meeting could remove directors at will with an ordinary majority. However
by 1983, even Illinois had abandoned mandatory cumulative voting, and allowed the same choice
of  staggered  boards  as  Delaware.142 Similarly  the  revised  Model  Business  Corporation  Act
reverted so that companies in their constitutions (rather than the states) could elect whether to
have with or without cause removal.143 
By the end of  the 20th century, it might have appeared that the American director enjoyed,
in comparison to the UK or the German director (and probably directors in any Commonwealth,
EU or OECD country) an unparalleled position of  autonomy. It had not always been that way,
but  had  become  increasingly  so  from the  mid  1970s.  The  rarity  of  for  cause  removal  was
sharpened  by  an  absence  of  regulation  of  payments  for  loss  of  office.  Among the  most
prominent examples, and a contemporary analogue to  Shirlaw,  was  In re  Walt Disney Derivative
Litigation.144 Michael  Ovitz  was  able  to  contract  with  Disney  for  a  payout  if  the  company
terminated his contract before it ended. The board commissioned a report on his executive pay
package, which did in fact say that the deal for Ovitz was ‘low risk and high return’, but the
report was ignored.145 After one year Ovitz was dismissed and he received $140 million. The case
itself  turned on the negligence of  remuneration committee members, who were all absolved by
Chancellor Chandler on the basis their decisions fell within ‘business judgment’. 146 This meant
that  US  law  allowed  heavy  financial  penalties,  without  approval  by  the  general  meeting,  to
frustrate the rules on removal.
While removal rules were problematic, the position on appointments had the potential to
be revitalised after the financial crisis.  In the Dodd-Frank Wall  Street Reform and Consumer
140 See AH Travers Jr, ‘Removal of  the corporate director during his term of  office’ (1967-1968) 53 Iowa Law Review 389, 390,
fn 5, and 408, fn 107, where he cites Arkansas (1966), Colorado (1963), Massachusetts (1966), Minnesota (1945), Mississippi
(1964),  Nebraska  (1965),  Oregon (1965),  North Carolina  (1955),  North Dakota  (1965),  Ohio (1964),  Oklahoma (1964),
Pennsylvania (1966), South Carolina (1966), Utah (1965) and Virginia (1966). Hence fifteen, mostly small states,  and not
Delaware, New York, California, Florida, or Texas.
141 AA Berle, ‘“Control” in Corporate Law’ (1958) 58(8) Columbia Law Review 1212, 1213
142 Illinois Business Corporation Act 1983 article 8
143 RMBCA §8.08. The Official Comment, somewhat ironically, says the section ‘adopts the view that since the shareholders are
the owners of  the corporation, they should normally have the power to change the directors at will.’ See also, NYBCL §705(a)
allows without cause removal if  the bylaws allow it.
144 825 A 2d 275 (2003)
145 This factor may have made its treatment under UK law or German law quite different, cf  Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC
433, where directors who ignored a report on separating the Singapore front and back office were found unfit for their jobs. 
146 One can note, it appears more than a little disingenuous for a Nevada court to say, as in Shoen v AMERCO, 885 F Supp 1332,
1340 (D Nev 1994) ‘one of  the justifications for the business judgment rule’s insulation of  directors from liability for almost
all of  their decisions is that unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of  office.’
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Protection Act 2010 §971 gave the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to make rules
for shareholders to propose nominees to the board. However, §971 required that the SEC issue
rules  only ‘in  the interests of  shareholders and for the protection of  investors’  and consider
whether it ‘disporportionately burdens small issuers’. The terms and conditions for judging these
matters would in fact be set by the SEC itself. Accordingly, the SEC publicised that it would issue
the rules based on cost benefit analysis and efficiency. Having done such a report, it issued a new
SEC Rule  14a-11,  that  would  have allowed shareholders to nominate candidates  for  director
elections. But the Business Roundtable, the organisation representing the interests of  directors in
large  companies,  filed  for  an  injunction.  The  DC Appeals  Circuit  agreed  with  the  Business
Roundtable that the SEC had acted ‘arbitrarily and capriciously’ in issuing its rules because of
apparently faulty economic analysis, and so found that they were incompatible with the Dodd
Frank Act 2010.147 The SEC announced it was suspending its rule drafting effort. This seems
extremely peculiar, especially given that the SEC was never bound by the statute to perform any
economic analysis at all.
In  spite  of  all  this,  building  up since  the  1990s,  there  was  a  surprising  change.  The
incidence of  staggered boards went into retreat. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock reported that
out of  companies listed by the Standard & Poors 100, the use of  staggered boards declined from
44 companies in 2004 to 15 companies in 2009. However, 20 out of  26 companies that made an
initial public offering still had staggered boards. For cumulative voting, 90 companies in 2003
used it, but by 2009 it was only ten. Without staggered boards, the way was becoming more clear
in Delaware for without cause removal rights. If  one took the view that majority voting was
efficient, it would seem the US was ‘racing for the top’. If  one viewed the unparalleled autonomy
that American directors enjoyed as efficient, then this represented a race for the bottom. Either
way, it seemed that changes in shareholders’ composition and power was driving the race, and the
race was yet unfinished.
What led to the reversal of  the 20th century trend in director accountability? Kahan and
Rock identified a range of  factors,  but foremost  was  the  consistent activism of  institutional
investors, exploiting changes to SEC Rule 14a-3, introduced in 1992, that allowed more proxy
solicitation without filing statements with the SEC.148 More particularly, it appears that certain
types of  institutional shareholders – notably public pension and trade union funds – were using
their bargaining power on the market to change the rules. The ability of  the fund to put pressure
on directors for constitution changes was entirely dependent on their economic weight, and their
147 Business Roundtable v Securities and Exchange Commission, 647 F.3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011)
148 EB Rock and M Kahan, ‘Embattled CEOs’ (2010) 88(5) Texas Law Review 987.
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collective organisation. 
The lingering issue in US corporate law is what is included in the meaning of  ‘cause’ for
removing a director. None of  the leading cases has appeared to disclaim the old common law,
and indeed courts have repeatedly referenced the understanding of  commentaries, which in turn
lead back to R v Richardson. The key question is whether, if  directors receive reasonable notice and
a fair hearing, and then a vote is taken by shareholders, the decision of  the general meeting itself
counts as a good reason.149 On a proper reading, this seems to be the view that Auer v Dressel took
in New York.150 Because Campbell v Loew’s Inc followed Auer, this would represent Delaware law as
well. To reconcile  the difficulty met by §141(k),  ‘cause’ in a company with cumulative voting
would mean that a minority class of  members in the general meeting who could select directors
must be able to veto a dismissal.151 This does not mean that the court would have no role: its
function would be to supervise the two main elements of  the dismissal procedure: but it would
be the voters’ voice that actually mattered.
*****
Stepping back from the details, at least two key trends can be identified in the development of
election rules. The first and central trend is the one that Berle and Means were most responsible
for.  They  singled  out  the  erosion  of  the  traditional  common  law  principles  for  small
corporations,  allowing  simple  majority  removal  of  boards,  as  important  for  accountability.
Though their work looked at the US, its most obvious implementation in the law was found in
the UK’s Companies Act 1947. The UK underwent a textbook evolution, but was also followed
soon by many US jurisdictions and the Model Business Corporation Act, at least in the 1950s.
Second,  when  the  law  gave  options,  election  and  removal  rules  within  companies  changed
according to the bargaining power of  interest groups within companies. This was witnessed most
graphically on German supervisory boards over the 1920s, and (in the opposite manner) in US
149 R v Richardson (1758) 1 Burr 517, (1758) 97 ER 426. Lord Mansfield, 539, ‘It is necessary to the good order and government
of  corporate bodies, that there should be such a power [to dismiss], as much as the power to make bye-laws.... But where the
offence is merely against his duty as a corporator, he can only be tried for it by the corporation.’ Emphasis added.
150 Auer  v  Dressel,  306 NY 427 (1954)  At 432,  Desmond J  said,  ‘it  seems to be settled law that the  stockholders  who are
empowered to elect directors have the inherent power to remove them for cause... there must be the service of  specific
charges, adequate notice and full opportunity of  meeting the accusations, but there is no present showing of  any lack of  any
of  those in this instance.’ It follows that ‘for cause’ referred to the requirements of  notice and meetings, not to anything
additional. Given those, the decision of  shareholders constitutes sufficient cause.  At 434, Desmond J then says that arbitrary
treatment (which would be a matter of  a personal contractual dispute) would be separate from the question of  holding office.
‘Any director illegally removed can have his remedy in the courts (see People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194).’
151 See the MBCA 1959, §36A, ‘If  less than the entire board is to be removed, no one of  the directors may be removed if  the
votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if  then cumulatively voted at an election of  the entire board of
directors, or, if  there be classes of  directors, at an election of  the class of  directors of  which he is a part.’
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over  the  2000s  with  the  decrease  in  staggered  boards.  Bargaining  power  could  lead  in  any
direction:  directors  could  use  their  influence  to  insulate  themselves,  but  US  institutional
shareholders were showing they could break down the obstacles to accountability. 
The main conclusion, however, is that it seems very difficult to see either the political
developments  that  led  into  law,  or  the  developments  on  the  market,  as  ones  where  welfare
maximising objectives were relentlessly and successfully pursued. If  accountability was important,
why was there no legal  enactment concerning election rights  in  the  UK? The Higgs Report
showed it was plainly a concern. In the US, Business Rountable v SEC, where SEC Rule 14a-11 was
struck down, demonstrated the concern once more, albeit in a very different way. Market interest
groups were not pursuing their rational objectives relentlessly either. Why, for example, did UK
directors before 1947 rest contentedly with 75 per cent removal rights, when German directors
became  considerably  more  creative  in  implementing  obstacles  against  removal?  The  realistic
answer is surely that political and economic actors were content to stay with what they knew,
even if  another course of  action could be more profitable. Thus, according to the first positive
thesis,  progressive  democracy  has  driven  the  development  of  director  election  rules,  but
incompletely. Following the second positive thesis, when left to the market director election rules
changed with  the  bargaining  power  of  economic  actors,  but  the  outcomes could  be wholly
arbitrary. From any point of  view, both politically and economically, there was a lot to be desired. 
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5. SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS
Chapter  4  examined  one  part  of  the  equation  to  bring  progressive  democrat  ideology  into
corporate law. If  directors were not effectively accountable to any electorate, the distribution of
voting rights would be essentially irrelevant. But if  directors were accountable, vote distribution
became critical: who would have the loudest voice in electing or removing the board? The first
positive thesis suggests that progressive democrats would seek to regulate voting rights to achieve
greater equality. And indeed, Berle and Means had argued that the spread of  voteless ordinary
shares  diminished  of  accountability  before  the  Great  Depression.1 Total  shareholder
disenfranchisement seems obviously incompatible with a progressive democrat view, though it is
harder to identify a single democratic conception of  how votes should be distributed.2 
Historically, shareholder vote distribution ranged on a spectrum between three points: (1)
one-person,  all-the-votes,  (2)  one-share,  one-vote,  (3)  one-person,  one-vote.  Before  the  20 th
century, graduated voting (ceilings on voting rights for larger shareholders) were common, and
Colleen  Dunlavy  has  characterised  the  development  of  the  one-share,  one-vote  norm  as  a
descent into economic ‘plutocracy’.3 But by the 1920s progressive democrats had been prepared
to settle, because the more immediate threat was total disenfranchisement. Interestingly, modern
institutional  shareholding,  to  be  examined  in  chapter  6,  has  involved  a  novel  development,
because participation in retirement funds usually work on a one-person, one-vote basis. Thus,
while  a  one-share,  one-vote  standard  prevails  in  the  share  market,  and  if  disparities  in  the
holdings of  institutions are put aside, voting rights might appear to be becoming as egalitarian as
a one-person, one-vote standard was in the days of  direct shareholdings. An apparent paradox of
the legal development, seen explicitly in the 1937 German law reform, but also running as a
subtext in UK and US institutional investment, is that groups naturally opposed to progressive
democracy were content to see the one-share, one-vote norm prevail if  the ultimate contributor
was in any case separated from participation. 
The second positive thesis is that, left to the market, the bargaining power of  economic
actors would shape voting distribution, whether the outcome promoted accountability,  or was
wholly arbitrary. The historical reality differs drastically from the conception of  the market which
1 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (2nd edn Transaction 1991) Book II, ch 1, 129-131
2 There are also good reasons why not only capital investors should receive all votes, when other stakeholders, particularly
employees, make contributions to companies as non-adjusting investors. This is pursued elsewhere, e.g. E McGaughey, ‘British
codetermination and the Churchillian circle’ (2014) UCL Labour Rights Institute On-Line Working Papers – LRI WP 2/2014
3 C Dunlavy, ‘Social Conceptions of  the Corporation:  Insights from the History of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006) 63
Washington and Lee Law Review 1347, 1361-1365
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‘endogenously’ enfranchises shareholders, or the idea that a one-share, one-vote standard mimics
‘the market’.4 In the UK, indirect judicial and regulatory pressure has been more of  a theme than
black letter law, and the bargaining power of  institutional investors has effectively secured one
vote for every  ordinary share in  public  companies.  In Germany,  the very opposite occurred:
company boards, with banks, had issued so many voteless or multiple voting shares in the 1920s
that the mass of  investors were disenfranchised. This was only reversed by law in 1937. But
bargaining power in the US has pushed both ways. In the 1920s, market practice threatened total
disenfranchisement,  until  regulation  by  the  NYSE  and  SEC.  The  same  disenfranchisement
pattern recurred in the 1980s when regulation was briefly lifted, but more recently institutional
shareholders have adopted and have successfully been spreading a one-share, one-vote norm. If
one thing was clear, it was that the markets did not produce a pattern of  shareholding voting
rights that followed a consistent principle.
(1) United Kingdom: raising the regulatory brow
The UK’s earliest corporations employed voting practices, consistent with common law election
rules, that were generally egalitarian. In the realm of  politics, and particularly since the Bill of
Rights 1689, the Whig establishment viewed the vote with high regard. In  Ashby v White, Lord
Chief  Justice Holt took the view that votes in elections for Parliament were the same as rights of
‘property’. The vote was ‘a thing to be admired at by all mankind’, 5 and it would be an actionable
wrong for government officials to interfere. 
The earliest companies viewed matters similarly. Company meetings often voted with a
show of  hands, and if  a ballot was held, counted each shareholder as equal, regardless of  the size
of  their capital investment. The basic common law principle, spelled out by Lord Hardwicke CJ,
was that  when no law or custom said  otherwise,  people  stood ‘upon an equal  foot’.6 Other
companies did not treat shareholders equally as persons,  but placed limits  on the number of
votes that could be cast by the largest shareholders. Between 1720 and 1844, around four fifths of
chartered  companies  employed  a  graduated  voting  structure,  so  that  as  one’s  shareholding
increased,  one had fewer  votes on each share,  often with an overall  ceiling. 7 Early  company
4 See ch 3(2)(a) above, OE Williamson,  The Economic Institutions of  Capitalism (1985) 306 and F Easterbrook and D Fischel,
‘Voting in Corporate Law’(1983) 26 Journal of  Law and Economics 395, 409
5 Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126, 2 Ld Raym 938, 954, Lord Holt CJ was dissenting, but upheld by the House of  Lords.
6 Stoughton v Reynolds  (1735) 93 ER 1023, a case on a church corporation’s election. ‘Is the right of  adjourning in the church-
wardens? There is no case for that; though if  there was, this is found to be the act of  one only. We must therefore resort to
the common right, which is in the whole assembly, where all are upon an equal foot.’
7 M Freeman, R Pearson and J Taylor, Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland Before 1850 (2012) 147-
148
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constitutions were closer to one-person, one-vote than one-pound, one-vote.
Then again, larger companies like the East India Company,8 the Greenland Company,9
and  the  Bank  of  England,10 often  used  graduated  voting  to  disenfranchise  the  smallest
shareholders altogether.11 Moreover, if  there were voting ceilings large shareholders sought to
evade the rules by splitting the casting of  their votes among nominees. The Public Companies
Act 1767 attempted to end this practice by introducing a six month qualifying period before
members, and any nominees, could vote.12 Parliament’s reasons appealed to an egalitarian ethic,
however elitist its context. Vote splitting was,
subversive of  every Principle upon which the Establishment of  such General Courts [ie
company general meetings] is founded, and if  suffered to become general, would leave
the permanent Interest of  such Companies liable at all times to be sacrificed to the partial
and interested views of  a few, and those perhaps temporary Proprietors....
In this opposition to the ‘partial and interested views of  a few’ lay the embryonic democratic
ideal.
A rough attachment to equality persisted into the enactment of  the first modern company
laws.13 Unless a company’s articles  provided otherwise,  under the Joint Stock Companies Act
1856, Table B, article 38, members carried one vote for each of  their first ten shares, one vote for
each  five  shares  up  to  a  hundred,  and  beyond  that  one  vote  for  each  ten  shares. 14 The
presumption of  equality was also manifested in corporate finance.  Hutton v The Scarborough Cliff
Hotel Co Ltd held a company could not issue a new class of  shares with preferential dividends
without the consent of  all shareholders.15 Kindersley VC held that where the articles were silent,
this should be construed as the implied term because ‘every shareholder has a right to insist that
the original agreement between the parties was that all should stand on an equal footing so far as
relates to the receipt of  dividends’.16 However, an attachment to equality was about to change.
8 S Williston, ‘History of  the Law of  Business Corporations before 1800. II. (Concluded)’ (1898) 2(4) Harvard Law Review
149, 156, nb voting limits were eventually put in place in the East India Company, and the usual voting practice was a show of
hands.
9 Greenland Trade Act 1692 (4 Will & Mar, c 17) s 17, £500 of  stock bought one vote, £1000 bought two.
10 Bank of  England Act 1694 (5 & 6 Will & Mar, c 20) £500 of  stock bought one vote.
11 Freeman et al (2012) 151-153, ‘In every sector except railways, larger companies were more likely to exclude their smallest
shareholders from voting.’
12 Public Companies Act 1767 (7 Geo III, c 48)
13 The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 s 75, also envisaged graduated voting in statutory companies.
14 The same was found in the Companies Act 1862, Table A, art 44 
15 (1865) 62 ER 717. On its facts the decision was overturned by  Andrews v Gas Meter Company [1897] 1 Ch 361, Lindley LJ
allowing  preferential  shares  to  be  created  if  a  three  quarter  majority  existed to  change  the articles,  given that  it  was  a
mandatory rule under CA 1862 ss 50-51.
16 See also Birch v Cropper (1889) 14 App Cas 525
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Two decades after  the first  modern companies acts,  the  Court of  Appeal  in  Pender  v
Lushington effectively dismantled voting ceilings. Lord Jessel MR held that the directors of  the
Direct United States Cable Co Ltd, including Mr Lushington, could not refuse to count the votes
cast by the nominees of  John Pender, a major shareholder and competitor. Pender had split his
votes to avoid the constitutional maximum of  100 votes cast at a general meeting. Although this
rule was presumably in place to prevent any single member dominating the company, Lord Jessel
MR avowed a shareholder’s power to say the vote was ‘a right of  property belonging to my
interest in this company, and if  you refuse to record my vote I will institute legal proceedings
against you to compel you.’17 
This dicta plainly echoed Ashby v White in its rhetoric, but was very different in its effect.
From a modern corporate governance viewpoint, a positive effect could be that directors would
be unable  to rely on a company’s articles to disperse shareholder power,  and so to diminish
accountability.18 But at the same time, Pender swept aside limits on the influence money could buy
in company meetings, and transparently protected the nexus between capital investment and the
vote.19 After 1862, seventy per cent of  new companies were already eschewing graduated voting
structures, and by 1883 it appears that around 35 per cent of  companies used a one ordinary
share, one vote standard.20 In 1906, Table A was changed to make one ordinary share, one vote
the default standard.21 Though courts had not protected the right to vote directly, it was apparent
that they guarded votes for shareholders jealously where they existed. 
For  the  next  fifty  years,  UK law retained  its  rule  that  shares  with  any  voting  rights
attaching to them could be issued, in line with whatever the company’s articles stated. The only
serious look at the issue came as World War One wore to an end. Cases like  Daimler Co Ltd v
Continental  Tyre  and  Rubber  Co (Great  Britain)  Ltd,  where  German citizens  who held shares  in
British companies were prevented from exercising their rights, had raised the issue of  enemy
17 (1877) 6 Ch D 70. The argument that the court should look through the nominees to see the real beneficiaries was rejected
given that ‘no notice of  trust’ was to be entered on a company’s register. The registered shareholder is the shareholder.
18 Not long before, a somewhat weaker Court of  Appeal decided in Macdougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 1, that the right of  a
shareholder to have a poll taken at a meeting being denied was a mere internal irregularity. This decision was not clearly based
on any authority, was implicitly but firmly disapproved in Isle of  Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 Ch D 320. It
is now overridden by the Companies Acts. See also PL Davies,  Gower and Davies’  Principles of  Modern Company Law (8th edn
Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 72; RJ Smith (1978) 41 MLR 147. Rights in a constitution pertaining to the bare minima of  rules
necessary for effective participation are best seen as actionable personal rights.
19 See also Moffatt v Farquhar (1878) 7 Ch D 591, where Mallins VC held that directors of  the New British Iron Co could not
refuse to recognise the votes cast by the nominees of  shareholder who had split his votes, even though this was specifically to
circumvent the twenty vote limit in the articles.
20 G Campbell and JD Turner, ‘Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate Governance and Dividends in Victorian Britain’
(2011) 64 The Economic History Review 571, 574 and 579-580. Note, the authors say, at 579, that ‘shareholder voice is only
effective if  shareholders can costlessly monitor managerial behaviour’. But perhaps a more fitting proposition would be that
‘shareholder voice becomes less targeted as the costs of  monitoring managerial behaviour increase.’ 
21 Order of  the Board of  Trade Substituting a New Table A 1906 (SR&O 1906/596 L15)
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control  of  corporations.22 Should  UK  law  be  amended  to  stop  foreigners  taking  over  its
companies? The resulting Wrenbury Report 1918 found that in shipping, or other key industries,
a  simple  solution  could  be  full  disclosure  of  real  investors.  A  cap  could  be  imposed  on
shareholders with ‘enemy’ credentials. An alternative could be to mandate vote withdrawal, but
that  would require further consideration.23 It  was noteworthy that the drafters  of  the report
viewed bearer shares, popular with continental Europeans, to be inconsistent with a policy of
disclosure. Yet when administered through systems of  bank deposits, they said bearer shares were
transparent enough to remain, subject to a right to withdraw votes if  the Board of  Trade found it
necessary.24 In the years following, the issue of  voting did not seem to arise again, including in the
Cohen Report of  1945.25 In the courts, the rights attached to shares were simply viewed as a
matter of  construction.26
Distorted voting rights did became a public issue in 1953, during takeover battle between
the board of  the Savoy Hotel company group and a secret bidder. The bidder revealed himself  as
the owner of  Selfridges, but he then gave up in favour of  another bidder, the owner of  Land
Securities.  The  Land  Securities  owner  was  intent  on  reorganising  the  Berkeley  Hotel  in
Knightsbridge. The Savoy group’s managing director, Hugh Wontner transferred the Berkeley
Hotel to another company with all votes vested in six percent of  the company’s shares, controlled
by management. The remaining shares, which were nonvoting, were vested with the employee
pension scheme. Public announcements were made on the undesirability of  employee job losses,
though if  this was true, Wontner’s job was probably threatened most.27 The well known targets
brought media attention, and the tactics of  Wontner attracted heavy criticism. 28 The Economist was
at the forefront. It wrote that, while composing 7 per cent of  the market, ‘the nonvoting ordinary
share threatens to become too popular’.29 In 1956 the House of  Fraser stirred criticism again,
when it launched an initial public offering with shares carrying only 5 per cent of  ordinary voting
22 [1916] 2 AC 307, the House of  Lords overturned the majority of  the Court of  Appeal to approve the dissenting judgment of
Buckley LJ (and Mr Gore-Brown’s submissions as counsel) that a company with German shareholders should be treated as
having ‘enemy character’, even though incorporated in the UK. Buckley LJ subsequently became the Lord Wrenbury.
23 Report of  the Company Law Amendment Committee (HMSO 1918) Cd 9138, [26] and [31].
24 Wrenbury Report (1918) Cd 9138, [36]
25 See above ch 3(1)
26 Scottish Insurance Corp Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1949] AC 462, 488
27 See LCB Gower, ‘Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley’ (1955) 68(7) Harvard Law Review 1176-1194. Wontner
hung on for some time after that, becoming Lord Mayor of  London on the way, and with his skewed voting rights thwarting
another takeover bid this time by Trusthouse Forte Ltd in the 1980s, see Re Savoy Hotel Ltd [1981] Ch 351.
28 ‘The Business World: The Battle for the Savoy’ (12 December 1953) The Economist 831-833, ‘On grounds of  principle, it is
difficult to find condemnation too severe for what the Savoy Hotel board have done.... They have set a precedent which, if
extended, could divest shareholders in any company of  their legal interests, leaving them wholly at the mercy of  directors
over whom they would be powerless to exercise any control. They have carried to the limit the modern doctrines that “the
company” is something apart from the shareholders, that directors owe a primary duty to “the company” rather than to the
shareholders, and are justified in taking any steps, even to the disadvantage of  the shareholders, that they conceive to be in the
interests of  “the company.”’
29 ‘Shares Without a Say’ (14 April 1956) The Economist 167
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rights, and it used the shares to consummate a takeover bid a year later.30 The Association of
British Insurers advised its members to not purchase such shares any longer.31 On 19 August
1957, the London Stock Exchange reacted by announcing it would take steps to ensure buyers
were not misled into purchasing voteless shares.32 Public disapproval had risen, and with it, the
stern brow of  the regulator was raised.
The battle for Berkeley Hotel and the House of  Fraser’s dealings were large in the news,
though The City’s interests did appear firmly in control. After all, its trade associations could
adopt a common policy, and threaten to remove directors with an ordinary resolution. When the
Jenkins Report 1962 reviewed whether voteless shares should be abolished, it decided against.33
LCB Gower, Sir George Erskine and Leslie Brown filed a note of  dissent, arguing that because, 
managers are looking after other people’s money it is thought that they should not be
totally free from any control or supervision and the obvious persons to exercise some
control are the persons whose property is being managed. 
They argued that it was consistent with the Cohen Report’s policies to ensure management was
under effective control. The Jenkins Report itself, they said, was largely based on the idea that
increasing shareholder control was right. They warned that matters would deteriorate if  no action
was taken and noted that  exchanges  abroad had acted.34 They recommended voteless  shares
should not be listed and existing holders should be allowed to attend and speak at meetings. 35 But
the majority  concluded regulation was unnecessary.  The justifications for not regulating were
questionable: they said the law could be evaded by issuing multiple shares, that voteless shares
were  an  essentially  private  bargain  warranting  no  interference,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to
compensate  voting shares for  their  dilution in power.36 However  it  seems the central  reason
proffered for not amending the law was the majority’s resolve to recommend that the Board of
Trade cooperate with the London Stock Exchange to publicise the problems of  voteless shares. 37
30 Discussed further in B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (OUP 2008) 30-33 and 316-317
31 ‘The Price of  Votes’ (27 July 1957) The Economist, 328
32 The Birmingham Stock  Exchange  prohibited  non-voting  shares  altogether  in  companies  with  their  principal  market  in
Birmingham. See Cheffins (2008) 317, citing J Littlewood, The Stock Market: 50 Years of  Capitalism at Work (1998) 134
33 Report of  the Company Law Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749, ch 4, 46-49 and 207-210.
34 Jenkins Report (1962) Cmnd 1749, 207-210
35 RR Pennington, ‘The Report of  the Company Law Committee’ (1962) 25(6) Modern Law Review 703, 706, argued even this
was enough, noting at the time that ‘no other western Europe country and few of  the states of  the U.S.A. permit non-voting
ordinary shares…’
36 Jenkins Report (1962) Cmnd 1749, 46-49, [130]-[134]. In answer to these arguments, it could be said that multiple voting is
also unwarranted, that unaccountable directors harm everyone including voting shareholders with poor governance (even
when management becomes the only shareholder!), and no law needs to be retroactive.
37 Jenkins Report (1962) Cmnd 1749, 49, [140]
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There was no express law, but there was express public disapproval, and a second stern brow of
regulation had risen.
Over  the  next  fifty  years,  very  little  changed.  In  2007,  a  Report  for  the  Council  of
Ministers was produced on the proportionality of  voting rights to shares in the European Union.
This found that UK companies had essentially no distortions of  votes working in favour of  small
groups of  shareholders, or no ‘control enhancing mechanisms’.38 The deviating UK companies
either offered tiny minorities of  shares with preferential dividends, or voting ceilings being used
in  a  joint  venture.39 Paul  Davies  has  explained  this  as  resulting  from  institutional  investor
opposition, and states that the ‘solution to this problem, incomplete though it is, thus turned out
to be a market, rather than a legal, one in the United Kingdom.’40 This is certainly accurate in the
sense that UK institutional investors had used both their economic bargaining power, and social
influence  to  achieve  almost  complete  equality  for  ordinary  shares.  However,  the  law  and
regulation had slanted the playing field to favour shareholder enfranchisement on a one-share,
one-vote model.  UK shareholders had among the strongest election rights in the world. The
courts vigorously policed the right to vote where it existed. The London Stock Exchange brought
pressure to ensure investors had equal votes for ordinary shares. In this way, it  was a market
solution  when  institutions  had  significant  market  power,  backed  with  regulatory  support  –
something much more than a free market – that produced equality of  voting rights in the UK. A
consistent  policy  of  the  legislature,  the  judiciary  and  the  City  regulators  enfranchised  the
registered shareholder, whether or not this was the ultimate investor. 
(2) Germany: the paradox of  despotism
The  German  Companies  Acts  are,  on  the  question  of  shareholder  voting,  express  and
comprehensive  compared  to  the  UK  and  US,  at  least  in  black  letter  law.  Corporations  in
operation before Germany’s first unification were divided in a similar way to those in England.
Smaller companies, in the Hanseatic tradition, tended to be more egalitarian.41 Larger companies,
particularly in Prussia, were more hierarchical. The Prussian Bank, for example, from the time it
38 The term ‘control enhancing mechanism’ is said to cover any of  (1) Multiple voting right shares (2) Non-voting shares (3)
Non-voting preference shares (4) Pyramid structures (5) Priority shares (6) Depository certificates (7) Voting right ceilings (8)
Ownership  ceilings  (9)  Supermajority  provisions  (10)  Golden  shares  (11)  Partnerships  limited  by  shares  (12)  Cross-
shareholdings (13) Restrictive shareholder agreements. Conspicuously  not listed is a two-tier board system that mandates or
results  in intermediated voting. There is  no good reason to exclude this,  since it  eliminates direct accountability  of  the
executive to the voters, just as if  German citizens could only vote for their local council, which in turn elected the Bundestag.
39 Institutional  Shareholder  Services,  Shearman  &  Sterling  and  European  Corporate  Governance  Institute,  Report  on  the
Proportionality Principle in the European Union (12 June 2007) 77-79.
40 PL Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law (8th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 827.
41 See generally O Gierke, Das Genossenschaftsrecht Recht (1868)
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allowed public investment in the 1840s, had a policy of  one-person, one-vote, but only among
the largest 200 shareholders.42 
In  the  Allgemeine  Deutsche  Handelsgesetzbuch  1861  (General  German  Commercial  Code
1861) §209 Nr 9 stated that it was up to the company constitution to determine the conditions on
shareholder voting rights and the form in which they were exercisable.43 But the default position
under §224(2) was that every share would carry one vote.44 This was essentially the same as the
UK’s Table A, attached to the Companies Act 1862, except without the default presumption of
graduated voting, or other form of  Höchtstimmrecht (voting cap). However, in 1884 the code was
amended so that  in  §§221 and 190 the  option of  voting caps  was  expressly  available.45 The
Handelsgesetzbuch 1897, §252(1) again started with the rule that each share would hold a vote, but
said a company’s constitution could allow multiple votes, and that there could be voting ceilings.46
Voting ceilings had already been used in a number of  companies before the changes of  the HGB
1897, and continued at some modest level.47 
It does not appear that multiple voting rights on shares were widespread enough to raise
concern until  after  World War One.48 Then, just  as in  the UK, fear of  Überfremdung  (foreign
takeovers) spread even though international cross-investment had become increasingly common
before  the  war.49 Government  responded  less  to  the  Überfremdung scare  than  companies
themselves.  That said,  the  government never had the  choice  to respond in the way that  the
Wrenbury Report 1918 had said could be necessary (though never was) in the UK. The Treaty of
Versailles 1919 article 276(d) required that Germany impose no economic restrictions on Allied
nationals that did not exist before 1914, and this included the purchase of  its companies. 50 It is
not clear whether the reality justified any action, but a mania ensued.51 
The first step was to restrict  the transfer of  shares.52 Then, large shareholders issued
42 CA Dunlavy, ‘Corporate Governance in Late 19th- Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ in
KJ Hopt, H Kanda, MJ Roe, E Wymeersch and S Prigge, Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of  the Art and Emerging
Research (OUP 1998) ch 1, 5, 25
43 ADHGB 1869 §209 Nr 9
44 ADHGB 1869 §224
45 Amending the HGB 1869, the Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf  Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften.
Vom 18. Juli 1884, §221(2) and §190
46 HGB 1897 §252(1). See Reichsgesetzblatt (10 May 1897) 219-297.
47 W Auerbach, Das Aktienwesen (1873) 171-193
48 K Simon,  Die Überfremdungsgefahr der  deutschen  Aktiengesellschaften  und ihre  Abwehr (1921)  HD2860 K91.  For the subsequent
history, see  C Vogl-Mühlhaus,  Mehrfachstimmrechtsaktien:  historische  Entstehung, gegenwärtige Verbreitung und ökonomische Bedeutung
(1998) 133-219. 
49 eg  Gramophone and Typewriter Co Ltd v Stanley  [1908] 2 KB 89. An early joint venture between Englishmen and Germans,
between whom there was ‘friction and suspicion’ was in the Mines Royal, with a charter of  1568. There was four votes for
each of  the 24 shares, 14 owned by the English. See Select Charters of  Trading Companies 1530-1707 (Selden Society 1913)
14-15.
50 This led to a law restricting the sale of  colonial companies’ assets being unenforceable (RGBl 1918, 172).
51 E Jung, Maßnahmen der Aktiengesellschaft gegen Überfremdung (1921) gives anecdotal evidence.
52 HGB 1897 §222(1) ‘Auf  Namen lautende Aktien sind mit genauer Bezeichnung des Inhabers nach Namen, Wohnort und
Stand in das Aktienbuch der Gesellschaft einzutragen.’ (2) ‘Sie können, soweit nicht der Gesellschaftsvertrag ein Anderes
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Mehrstimmrechtsaktien  (shares with multiple votes),  Verwaltungsaktien (administrative shares) which
belonged  to  the  company  but  whose  rights  would  be  exercised  by  the  executive  alone,  or
Herrschaftsaktien (golden shares) which vested an overriding power of  veto in the lucky bearer.
Banks got special classes of  shares too. Typically, a new class of  shares would be issued with an
increase in capital, the new shares carrying the special voting rights.53 At first votes were issued
with modest multiples of  two or three. But as hyperinflation and hysteria accelerated, shares were
issued with a thousand votes each. When the scare subsided, multiple voting shares were simply
issued with the express intention of  benefiting one or a group of  influential shareholders. 54 
The  disenfranchisement  wrought  in  the  German  share  market  was  staggering.  By
September 1925, 860 out of  1595 listed companies had multiple voting. Those shares represented
just 1/40 of  capital, but accounted for an extraordinary 38.2 per cent of  the voting rights. 55 It
was clear that the drivers, and the beneficiaries, were those who Richard Passow had called the
‘big players’: industrialist families, who wished to turn public companies back into private wealth
funds, banks, and boards. They exercised their bargaining power on the market to entrench their
positions, and they took advantage of  the same anti-shareholder rhetoric discussed in chapter
4(2). Walter Rathenau’s theories offered respectability because he had characterised every small
shareholder  as  irresponsible,  and  their  rights  to  vote  as  questionable.56 The  diminution  of
executive  accountability  is  generally  acknowledged  as  having  led  to  faulty  accounts,  poor
reporting,  zealous  share  buyback  schemes,  and  supervisory  council  numbers  inflated  with
prestige-seeking friends of  the executive.57
These developments were effectively approved by a judiciary wedded to what it regarded
as  private  autonomy.  In  1925,  the  Reichsgericht (Empire  Court)  held  that  issuing  shares  with
multiple voting rights would be allowed if  it pursued a legitimate aim, and the measures were
proportionate toward that aim. The issue would contravene public policy under the Civil Code
§§138 and 826, but, a legitimate aim could include warding off  a foreign takeover. 58 There is no
indication  that  anyone  actually  policed  the  authenticity  of  companies’  actions.  In  1929,  the
Reichgericht  did also hold that a three quarter majority of  capital, not just votes, represented at a
general meeting, was necessary to increase capital.59 Despite directors’ conflict of  interest, there
bestimmt, ohne Zustimmung der Gesellschaft auf  Andere übertragen werden.’ So in subsection 2, shareholders can transfer
their shares, so long as the constitution does not say otherwise.
53 FA Mann,  ‘The  New German  Company  Law  and  Its  Background’  (1937)  19  Journal  of  Comparative  Legislation  and
International Law 220, 235
54 C Vogl-Mühlhaus, Mehrfachstimmrechtsaktien: historische Entstehung, gegenwärtige Verbreitung und ökonomische Bedeutung (1998) 166 ff.
55 R Müller-Erzbach, Die Entartung des deutschen Aktienwesens seit der Inflationszeit (1926) 11 ff
56 W Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen: eine geschäftliche Betrachtung (1919) 32-33
57 See C Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht (22nd edn Beck 2009) 299-300.
58 RGZ 108, 327 (1925). See also RGZ 132, 149, 159 (31 March 1931) saying the same for Schutzaktien (‘safety’ shares).
59 RGZ 125, 356 (24 September 1929)
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was no decision to require mandatory approval by a majority vote of  the general meeting, nor to
simply intervene on the basis of  the external effects on the market. The most that could be said
was that a measure of  judicial intervention came at a time when genuine concern over misleading
and coercive practices was present. But the efforts of  the Reichsgericht served more to legitimise
the disenfranchisement of  ordinary shareholders than to effectively restrict disenfranchisement. 
The  German  legal  academy  was  critical.  In  1931,  its  proposed  redrafting  of  the
companies chapter of  the  Handelsgesetzbuch recommended that all ordinary shares should have
votes.60 As  it  was  suggested  in  chapter  4(2)  the  law  reform  committee  still  operated  in  a
democratic climate. It might therefore be regarded as surprising that, following the Nazi triumph,
the one-share, one-vote recommendation was still implemented in the  Aktiengesetz 1937 (Public
Companies  Act  1937).  The  Official  Reasons  were  plainly  against  public  empowerment,  and
favoured executive autonomy. Echoing Rathenau again, it said,
that the Board in the course of  its administration depends to the extent hitherto known
on the mass of  irresponsible shareholders who mostly lack the necessary insight into the
position of  the business.61
But if  director election rules neutered accountability, then giving ‘irresponsible shareholders’ an
equal vote made perfect sense. As Johannes Zahn’s ‘leadership’ and ‘bundle of  contracts’ theory
in chapter 4(2) had suggested, all shareholders and stakeholders were to be regarded as equal.
Zahn favoured the one-share, one-vote rule.62 But shareholders were equal in their subordination,
in their fecklessness, and need of  leadership. The paradox of  despotism was that the equal worth
and  equal  rights  of  every  individual  would  be  proclaimed,  but  only  as  a  pretext  to  being
‘protected’. In reality, the leader would strip away any guarantee of  protection, or genuine rights.
But the facade was still necessary to split opposition.63 The Aktiengesetz 1937 §12(1) stated that
every share carried a right to vote, unless it was a lawfully issued preference share. Plural votes
were invalid, unless the Reich Ministry of  Economics made exceptions.64
60 FA Mann (1937) 222, fn 3
61 Official Reasons, or Amtliche Begründung, attached to the Act, cited and translated by FA Mann (1937) 229.
62 JCD  Zahn,  Wirtschaftsfuhrertum  und  Vertragsethik  im  neuen  Aktienrecht  (1934)  102-106,  ironically  being  inspired  by  Ripley,
discussed in ch 5(3).
63 It is also possible to view the Nazi regime as an incoherent mess of  baseless ideology: empty, corrupt, and ravenous for
power. See FL Neumann, Behemoth (1941). Yet its propaganda tactics were old ones. They were employed by the first Roman
Emperor, who laid republican government to rest. Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti (14 AD) ‘At the age of  nineteen, on my
own initiative and at my own expense, I raised an army by means of  which I restored liberty to the republic, which had been
oppressed by the tyranny of  a faction.’
64 Aktiengesetz 1937 §12(1) in Reichsgesetzblatt (30 January 1937) 29-165. nb FA Mann (1937) 235-236, ‘the Official Reasons,
speaking of  the “situation created by the maintenance of  shares with a plurality of  votes,” rather suggest that a liberal use will
be made of  that power.’
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In  the  post-war  reforms,  the  Aktiengesetz  1965 §12  followed  its  predecessor,  but
exemptions  were  effectively  ended:  up  till  1988,  only  19  authorisations  were  given  to  have
multiple voting shares out of  2373 public companies.65 The legality of  multiple voting and voting
ceilings was ended altogether by the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich 1998
(Control  and  Transparency  in  Enterprise  Act  1998)  §134  for  companies  listed  on  a  stock
exchange.66 There was little left to do on paper. In law, Germany had some of  the strongest
protection possible for voting rights. Preferential shares could have no votes, but by their nature
the financial disadvantages to issuers, and ordinary shareholders, would place an automatic check
on the number of  those issued.
So by 2007,  according to the  Report on the Proportionality  Principle  in  the European Union,
vanishingly few German companies had capital structures that removed votes from shareholders.
Only BMW, MAN, RWE and Volkswagen were found to have nonvoting preference shares, 77
per cent of  all German companies had no control enhancing mechanism at all, though 35 per
cent  of  large  companies  employed  one  to  three.67 This  said,  it  is  very  unclear  why the  EU
Report’s definition of  ‘control enhancing mechanism’ did not include the two-tier board system.
It  is  a control  enhancing mechanism.  If  you elect  someone directly,  he  or she will  be more
responsive to you than if  you elect someone who then votes for you. But the Report’s authors
probably did not wish to risk offending anyone. The irony is that mandatory removal rights for
the general meeting in the UK, combined with the organisation of  institutional  shareholders,
resulted in a more perfect guarantee of  equal votes in substance, than the German law which
guaranteed equal votes in form.
(3) United States: the federal dissolution
If  the  UK  reached  one-share,  one-vote  through  a  market  led  by  the  bargaining  power  of
institutional shareholders, and Germany reached it through law, the US exemplified a recurring
conflict between a market in disequilibrium and law reform. During the 20 th century, progressive
democrats continually sought legal regulation, while the market continually threatened to separate
65 OC Brändel, Großkommentar AG (4th edn 1992) §12, Rz 31. Like RWE there were, however, large and prominent exceptions.
66 KonTraG  Bundesgesetzblatt  (27  April  1998)  786-94.  See  M  Peltzer,  ‘Die  Abschaffung  von  Mehrstimmrechten  und
Stimmrechtsbeschränkungen im KonTraG-Entwurf ’ (1997) 42 Aktiengesetz Sonderheft 90-99.
67 ISS, Shearman & Sterling and ECGI, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union (12 June 2007) 47-49. 77% of
German companies have no CEM, with 35% of  large companies having one to three CEMs. Only four companies have
nonvoting preference shares, BMW, MAN, RWE (under 10%) and Volkswagen (27%). The Porsche and Piëch families own
50% of  VW’s cash flow rights. VW has a 20% voting ceiling, from the Volkswagen law. There is one cross holding, with
Allianz  holding  a  9.4% stake in Münchener  Rückversicherungs  which in turn has  a  5% stake in Allianz.  25% of  large
companies have a shareholder with over 20% of  shares, compared to 65% of  recently listed companies.
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shareholders from votes. 
In the republic’s earlier years, the democratic culture was strong enough that it appears no
significant companies required a threshold investment before members acquired a vote.68 While
the Bank of  England or the Prussian Bank excluded all small, private investors from a voice, the
debate over the Bank of  the United States  in 1790 was searching,  and representative of  US
opinion.  Larger investors were pressing for more of  a  voice,  but there was a  general  public
aversion  to  monied  dominance.  The  Treasury  Secretary,  Alexander  Hamilton,  argued  for  a
graduated voting system.
A vote for each share renders a combination between a few principal stockholders, to
monopolize  the  power  and  benefits  of  the  bank,  too  easy.  An  equal  vote  to  each
stockholder, however great or small his interest in the institution, allows not that degree
of  weight  to  large  stockholders  which  it  is  reasonable  they  should  have,  and which,
perhaps, their security and that of  the bank require. A prudent mean is to be preferred.69
If  the federal government was finding a ‘prudent mean’, the states’ practice varied widely. Merrick
Dodd’s study of  Massachusetts up till 1860 suggested that a general standard of  a ten vote limit
prevailed in most kinds of  company.70 John Cadman’s study of  New Jersey suggested that only 15
per cent of  companies between 1796 and 1867 deviated from a one-ordinary-share, one-vote
standard.71 This was so even though the New Jersey Supreme Court had set the default principle
as equal rights among shareholders.72 Joseph Blandi found more levelling in Maryland, with 40
per cent of  charters issued between 1849 and 1852 instituting voting ceilings.73 Alexander Dreier
found in Connecticut that 85 per cent of  charters between 1789 and 1856 adhered to a one-
ordinary-share, one-vote norm.74 In New York, the Manufacturing Corporation Law 1811 set the
one-ordinary-share, one-vote as its standard for free incorporations. 
As well as patterns within states, there were patterns within enterprise sectors. Colleen
Dunlavy  found  that  the  railways,  often  operating  across  state  boundaries,  had  more  voting
68 CA Dunlavy, ‘Corporate Governance in Late 19th- Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ in
KJ Hopt, H Kanda, MJ Roe, E Wymeersch and S Prigge, Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of  the Art and Emerging
Research (OUP 1998) ch 1, 5, 24, ‘no corporate charter in the antebellum United States, to my knowledge, ever failed to give
the smallest shareholder one vote.’
69 A Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, communicated to the House of  Representatives (14 December 1790) 
70 EM Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860 (1954) 203 ff
71 JW Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics 1791-1875 (1949) 309
72 Taylor v Griswold, 14 NJL 223, 27 Am Dec 33 (1834) per  Hornblower CJ, ‘Every corporator, every individual member of  a
body politic, whether public or private, is, prima facie, entitled to equal rights.’
73 JG Blandi, Maryland Business Corporations 1783-1852 (1934) 65-69
74 A Dreier, ‘Shareholder Voting Rules in 19th Century American Corporations: Law, Economics and Ideology’ (24 April 1995)
Yale Law School, Substantial Paper, at 20. This tiny summary does not do this excellent study justice. It is not yet published.
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ceilings,75 at least in the earlier years. Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler’s study divided its
analysis  between  turnpikes,  bridges,  canals,  railroads,  banks,  insurance  and  manufacturing
companies.  It  found that  infrastructure projects  tended to employ more restrictions,  while  in
manufacturing (probably following the New York law) they were almost absent. 76 Amidst the
variety, however, it is clear that by the end of  the 19 th century, like in the UK, the practice of  vote
restrictions had eroded almost entirely.77 Delaware’s first General Corporation Law in 1883 left it
up to a company’s bylaws, but its revision in 1897 provided for one-ordinary-share, one-vote.78
Why did voting limits exist at all, and why did their use diminish? Dunlavy viewed the
changes  as  symptomatic  of  a  democratic  society’s  descent  into  the  plutocratic  power  of
American capitalism.79 By contrast, Hansmann and Pargendler viewed the shift as responding to
consumer protection needs. In earlier times, consumer protection was sparse, and so shareholder
voting restrictions could be conceived as a way to ensure shareholder interests did not overpower
the users of  a service, who would often be the smaller investors. Modern consumer regulation
and competition law made voting restrictions less necessary.80 Dreier characterised the shift as
corresponding to the changes in the American public perception of  the corporation: going from
a  public  and  political  institution,  to  a  private  and  an  economic  one.  Although  the  risks  of
exploitation,  and  the  efficient  development  of  institutions,  were  also  probably  contributing
factors, to Dreier corporations were perceived more and more as private entities, and regulation
became more particularised to restrain the power of  corporate insiders.81 
All of  these views seem partially correct, but of  course the biggest change was that the
charters,  and their  terms,  were  simply  becoming less  of  a  political  business,  and more of  a
market.  While a state based affair,  the standard was closer to one-person,  one-vote,  and this
seemed natural, as Dreier or Hansmann and Pargendler implied, when corporations were carrying
out  quasi-public  functions  in  a  primitive  regulatory  environment.  But  as  free  incorporation
spread,  the  market  pushed  to  one-share,  one-vote  not  because  companies  stopped  fulfilling
public duties or the public’s perception shifted decisively. ‘Plutocracy’ may go too far, but by the
late 19th century there was an undeniable accumulation of  wealth, and with it bargaining power, in
75 Dunlavy, in Hopt et al (1998) ch 1, 5, 17-21
76 H Hansmann and M Pargendler, ‘The Evolution of  Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of  Ownership and Consumption’
(2013) EGCI Law Working Paper No 219/2013, 
77 Some companies would keep their graduated voting practices. In Providence & Worcester Co v Baker, 378 A 2d 121 (Del 1977)
the company’s graduated voting, meant that Penn Central held 28% of  shares but only 3% of  voting power. It was held valid
by the Delaware Supreme Court. This is an interesting contrast to Pender v Lushington.
78 Delaware General Corporation Law 1897, article 9, section 6
79 C Dunlavy, ‘Social Conceptions of  the Corporation:  Insights from the History of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006) 63
Washington and Lee Law Review 1347, 1361-1365
80 Hansmann and Pargendler (2013) 54
81 Dreier (1995) 52-54 and 77
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the hands of  boards and financiers. 
The detailed historical studies of  shareholder voting rights usually end in the 19 th century,
but the ‘democracy of  the dollar’ was anything but the end state.82 If  this was ‘plutocracy’, it was
about to get much worse. A common reference point is  that in 1898 the International Silver
Company  issued  ordinary  stock  that  would  have  no  votes  until  1902,  and  thereafter  only
restricted votes. By 1925, according to a study by WHS Stevens, there had been 16 issues of
nonvoting shares in 225 companies, sometimes with no votes, sometimes with the right to vote
limited to set questions.83 This gradual drift beyond plutocracy was jolted when the Dodge Motor
company, whose fraternal owners had recently deceased,84 was taken over by the investment bank,
Dillon Read & Co. Retaining the power in management, the bank made a massive $160m share
issue, every one of  them nonvoting, and they were bought.
There was a swift public outcry. But if  voteless shares were so bad, why were investors
buying them? The plain answer is that shareholders were offered terms they could either take, or
leave, but not negotiate. Small retail shareholders, who had multiplied significantly with post-war
prosperity, had no bargaining power. The eventuality of  bad governance would seem far away
compared to the prospect of  a quick boom-time buck. So people would buy voteless shares. It
was  clear,  therefore,  that  one-share,  one-vote  was  not  a  standard  that  could  be  accurately
described as market-mimicking.85 Without any influence in the marketplace, people’s objections
moved into politics. 
Those objections were best represented by William Ripley, in a speech to the New York
Academy of  Political Science on 28 October 1925.86 Actions like those of  Dillon, Read & Co
‘strike  at  the  very  tap-root  of  our  capitalistic  system’,  he  said,  where  ‘it  is  the  fundamental
principle, interwoven throughout all human relationships that power and responsibility must ever
be yoked together.’  The divorcing of  ownership and accountability,  together with the fact  of
diffused shareholding among ordinary employees and consumers led to the net result,87
82 C Rohrlich, ‘Corporate Voting: Majority Control’ (1932-1933) 7 St John’s Law Review 218
83 WHS Stevens,  ‘Stockholders'  Voting Rights and the Centralization of  Voting Control’  (1926) 40(3)  Quarterly  Journal  of
Economics 353, 355 and 361, where a table sets out the number of  companies and percentage of  shares in which those
companies are non voting.
84 The same Dodge brothers as appear in the notorious Dodge v Ford Motor, 204 Mich 459, 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919)
85 See ch 3(2)(a)
86 William Z Ripley (1867-1941) was a complicated figure, which probably accounts for him being less well known, despite the
resonance of  his work today. He was an overt xenophobe, viewing both black people and women as less than competent to
exercise political rights. After the Wall Street Crash, which many people credited him with predicting, Ripley suffered a series
of  nervous breakdowns, and retired in 1933.
87 WZ Ripley,  ‘Two Changes  in  the  Nature  and  Conduct  of  Corporations’  (1926)  11(4)  Trade  Associations  and  Business
Combinations 143-146; or Proceeding of  the Academy of  Political Science in the City of  New York 695. Reprinted in 7 Cong
Rec 7719.
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of  an absolute control by intermediaries - most commonly bankers, so-called - in place of
the  former  responsibility  for  direction  which,  theoretically  at  least,  rested  upon  the
shoulders of  the actual owners.
Ripley viewed dispersed shareholders as inert, content to give up power to boards. But the vote
was  still  critical  in  his  view  because  ‘at  worst,  they  might  always  be  stimulated  to  assert
themselves’.  A key objection appears  to have been that  shareholders were  being issued with
products that, although represented as shares, were in fact bonds.88 Ripley’s favoured plan was an
interim expansion of  the Federal Trade Commission’s jurisdiction, or general federal legislation.
Ripley was published in the New York Times, poems were written,89 and he was invited by Calvin
Coolidge to the White House. The shift in public opinion culminated with the New York Stock
Exchange making a policy statement on 27 January 1926. They would ‘give careful thought to the
matter of  voting control’.
Although  weak  by  itself,  the  NYSE’s  reaction  was  not  alone.  AA Berle  argued  that
collective action by shareholders was difficult, but having votes at all was necessary so that ‘there
is always a latent power which can be exercised whenever the majority chooses to act.’ 90 If  new
categories of  shareholders were becoming disenfranchised, and effectively morphed into hyper-
risk bearing bondholders, there ought to be more stringent duties accompanying the possession
of  ‘management shares’. They would owe duties analogous to trustees in relation to the cestui que
trust: the holders of  voteless shares, because they stood in charge of  other people’s money.91 
Ripley  himself  went  on  to  write  Main  Street  and  Wall  Street,  with  an  introduction  by
President Woodrow Wilson.92 Directors were said to fall under a personal responsibility for their
actions, to rehabilitate the individual to its voice and place in society. Ripley’s thesis traversed all
forms of  companies, railway networks to public utilities. He highlighted the destructive process
88 WHS Stevens,  ‘Stockholders’  Voting Rights  and the Centralization of  Voting Control’  (1926)  40(3) Quarterly  Journal of
Economics  353,  383  made the  objection that  while  bondholders  claims  to  interest  would  be  enforceable,  the  voteless
shareholder has no enforceable right.  
89 New York World, ‘On Waiting in Vain for the New Masses to Denounce Nonvoting Stocks’ (1926)
‘Then you who drive the fractious nail, 
And you who lay the heavy rail, 
And all who bear the dinner pail
And daily punch the clock - 
Shall it be said your hearts are stone?
They are your brethren and they groan! 
Oh, drop a tear for those who own… nonvoting corporate stock.’
Reprinted in WZ Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (1927) 127; also Trusts, Pools and Corporations (1916)
90 AA  Berle,  ‘Non-Voting  Stock  and  Bankers  Control’  (1925-1926)  39  Harvard  Law  Review  673.  See  also,  AA  Berle,
‘Participating Preferred Stock’ (1926) 26(3) Columbia Law Review 303.
91 Berle (1925-1926) 39 Harvard Law Review 673, 681, ‘It has been almost universally true, since development of  courts of
equity,  that  a  person  having  the  control  of  property,  the  beneficial  ownership of  which belonged  to  another,  was  not
permitted to exercise such control except for the benefit and with due regard to the interests of  the beneficial owner.’ 
92 WZ Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Little, Brown & Co 1927) 
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of  regulatory competition that was taking place in state corporation laws. As he soberly put it,
‘The little state of  Delaware has always been forward in this chartermongering business.’ 93 
The 1920s had changed the political discourse enough so that, when the Wall Street Crash
and the Great Depression unfolded, there was already a democratic consensus about the need for
federal regulation. The Securities Act 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 essentially
implemented Book III of  Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation and Private Property. This legislation
did not address shareholder voting rights directly, though the 1934 Act §14 addressed the proxy
process. Instead, under §19 the New York Stock Exchange was subjected to oversight by and the
veto power of  the Securities  and Exchange Commission in amending its  rules.  A responsive
regulator was seen as the federal solution. It provided backing for the one-share, one-vote policy.
So it was not state laws, but federal regulation that protected shareholders having votes.
The line of  the NYSE hardened on 7 May 1940 when in a ‘Statement of  Listing Requirements as
to Preferred Stock Voting Rights’ it confidently proclaimed: ‘Since 1926, The New York Stock
Exchange  has  refused  to  list  non-voting  common  stock.’  No  federal  legislation  was  passed
mandating  votes,  although  the  Investment  Company  Act  of  1940  §18  required  the  capital
structure in investment companies to be one-share, one-vote for common stock. For the next
forty years, the NYSE appeared to police voting rights. It made exceptions such as for the Ford
Motor Company in 1956, which gave class B family stock 40 per cent of  the votes, while holding
merely 5.1 per cent of  equity. Joel Seligman has criticised the NYSE’s record, because it never
fully made clear what its policy actually was, rather than merely reacting to a perceived threat of
legislation.94 
During  the  1970s,  a  concern  with  deviations  from  share  equality,  and  especially
disproportionate influence of  large shareholders went to the US Supreme Court.95 In Salyer Land
Co v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, it was argued that any weighted voting, in this case
toward  landowners,  violated  the  Thirteenth  Amendment’s  equal  protection  clause.96 Justices
Douglas,  Brennan  and  Marshall  supported  this  view,  because  it  was  a  water  company  that
performed ‘governmental functions’. ‘The weighting of  votes,’ wrote Douglas J, ‘according to
one’s wealth is hostile to our system of  government.’ But the majority did not agree, and so the
matter was suspended as a constitutional issue. 
The NYSE’s ability to regulate the internal governance of  listed companies was partly
93 Ripley (1927) 30.
94 J Seligman, ‘Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy’ (1986) 54
George Washington Law Review 687, 698.
95 DL Ratner, ‘The Government of  Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of  “One Share, One Vote”’ (1970-
1971) 56 Cornell Law Review 1, 7-10
96 410 US 719 (1973) 
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dependent on it exercising a de facto network monopoly on listing services. But in the early 1980s,
it was threatened with new competition from AMEX and NASDAQ. They did not require votes
attached  to  shares.  Beyond  the  exchanges  themselves,  companies  across  the  US  were  being
threatened by hostile takeover bidders. The jobs of  both the NYSE board, and the boards of
companies  were  at  stake.  Warding  off  takeovers  by  manipulating  votes  was  perceived  as
necessary. In 1985 the NYSE chair, John Phelan, testified before a Congressional subcommittee
on Energy and Commerce. ‘Philosophically,’  he began,  ‘the Exchange continues to believe in
“one share, one vote.”’ But, he said, his new competitors permitted listings on terms more to
some companies’ tastes. Stocks were shifting fast.97 In 1986, the NYSE sought formal approval
from the Securities and Exchange Commission to abandon one-ordinary-share, one-vote from its
rules, as required by the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 §19.98 In lieu of  formal amendment,
the NYSE communicated that  the  rule  ceased to be enforced.  Then General  Motors issued
shares with half  votes. By 1986, 170 of  the 4886 companies on Nasdaq and Amex had dual class
capital structures.99 In the next two years, 46 NYSE companies issued nonvoting shares. 
Federal  regulation  was  now  in  dissolution,  and  the  market  was  moving  toward
disenfranchisement. As German courts had in the 1920s, US courts did react, but with judgments
that  essentially  legitimised  voteless  shares  as  an  exercise  in  private  autonomy.  In  Unilever
Acquisition Corp v Richardson-Vicks, Inc, the US District Court in New York granted an injunction
when the management purported to create a super-voting class but no shareholder vote was
taken.100 In  Lacos Land Co v Arden Group, Inc,101 the CEO had proposed issuing ten vote shares
with reduced dividends. Every shareholder could exchange their present shares, but none did. In
response to the bidder filing a suit, Chancellor Allen held that while dual class capital structures
were not novel (as their popularity with management grew at the start of  the century),102 the plan
was ‘coercive’. It was underpinned by the threat to shareholders that the CEO would oppose
transactions  by the  company unless  it  was approved.  It  contained a  veiled  threat  to present
shareholders that they would be worse off  than they were before.103 But with procedural integrity,
97 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of  the House Committee on Energy and Commerce , 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
241 (1985) (testimony of  John Phelan, Chairman, NYSE)
98 Securities and Exchange Act 1934 §19(c) (15 USC 78s(c))
99 Seligman (1986) 707
100 16 F Supp 407 (1985)
101 517 A 2d 271 (Del Ch 1986)
102 Referring to General Investment Co v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 87 NJ Eq 234, 100 A 347 (NJ Ch 1917) ‘thanks to its potential as an
anti-takeover device, [dual class capital structures] recently emerged from the reaches of  the corporation law chorus to strut
its moment upon center stage where corporate drama is acted out.’
103 JH Choper, JC Coffee and RJ Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (7th edn Aspen 2007) 590. Arguably this interpretation
offered by the authors would be better if  it recognised that the most relevant factor to the coercion here, is the position of
vulnerability that a stockholder is in, relative to the management. For an analogous decision in the UK on actual undue
influence (which functions in the same way as duress, or the American ‘coercion’) see Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507,
regarding a threat to a trustee, who was an old lady, to reduce rent for the beneficiary or she would be taken to court.
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and duress aside, the courts did nothing to restrain the substantive misuse of  power that voteless
shares embodied. To deal with the matter, the courts would have had to presume the practice was
unfair, unless a shareholder could be regarded as having equal bargaining power with a board.
From the beginning, those like Joel Seligman argued that the issue of  disproportionate
voting  stock  was  like  price  fixing,  that  it  should  and  could  be  banned  by  the  SEC. 104
Unsurprisingly, this view was disputed.105 In 1988, the SEC attempted to re-regulate with a new
Rule 19c-4. This barred all exchanges from listing or authorising common stock ‘with the effect
of  nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of  an outstanding class
or classes of  common stock’, except when a corporation went public.106 
Immediately an injunction was sought, and in  The Business Roundtable v SEC,107 the DC
Appeal Circuit held it was  ultra vires  for the SEC to regulate voting rights. It characterised the
general purpose of  the securities legislation as regulating to ensure ‘investors secured enough
information’ and ‘not the fairness of  the issuers’ corporate structures’. This position of  the DC
Circuit judges seems extremely peculiar given that the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 §2 stated
its purpose as being to ‘insure the maintenance of  fair and honest markets’.108 The case might
have been the end,  but four years later,  shortly  after  a  change in government,  and with the
calming  of  the  takeover  climate,  the  SEC,  NYSE,  AMEX  and  NASDAQ  all  entered  an
agreement to implement  Rule  19c-4.  Coffee,  Choper  and Gilson suggest  that  the agreement
reflected  the  fact  that  the  competitor  exchanges  were  now  established,  dual  class  voting
structures  had become less  important  to managements,  and institutional  investors  were  now
actively resisting new changes.109
The agreement was, however, less demanding than the NYSE policy of  1926. Despite the
Listing  Manual’s  exhortation  in  §301  about  the  ‘Exchange’s  long-standing  commitment  to
encourage high standards of  corporate democracy’, according to its statement of  voting policy,
‘Voting rights of  existing shareholders of  publicly traded common stock registered under Section
12 of  the Exchange Act cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action
or issuance.’ The definition of  ‘disparately reduced’ allowed up to ten votes per share. In 2007,
104 Seligman (1986) 714-715.
105 eg GW Dent, ‘Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman’ (1985-1986) 54 George Washington Law Review 725
106 The latter exception came after a submission from Ronald Gilson. It is not clear why IPOs differed, if  the objection to
distorted voting rights was that it hindered the accountability of  directors.
107 905 F 2d 406 (DC Cir 1990) at 411-413, ‘In 1934 Congress acted on the premise that shareholder voting could work, so long
as investors secured enough information and, perhaps, the benefit of  other procedural protections. It did not seek to regulate
the stockholders’ choices.... [and] not the fairness of  the issuers’ corporate structures.’ It is not clear why the court took this
position, given that §2 of  the SEA 1934 states its purpose, among other things, ‘to insure the maintenance of  fair and honest
markets’.
108 15 USC §78b
109 JH Choper, JC Coffee and RJ Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (7th edn Aspen 2007) 585.
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the ISS and Shearman & Sterling Report found that 869 out of  4399 US companies had dual
class  shares,  while  24  used  voting  ceilings.  It  may  be  recalled  once  more  that  the  Report’s
definition of  ‘control enhancing mechanisms’ did not include a two-tier board and intermediated
removal rights. But this aside, by 2007 it appeared that US companies had moved in front of
those in  every  EU member state  for the ability  of  a  class  of  shareholders to enhance their
control.110 
There was one check on disenfranchisement.  Large institutional investors, notably the
public pension and trade union funds, had become active in pushing for the one-share, one-vote
standard.111 The timing and contrast to the UK is interesting because, as chapter 6(3)(b) will show,
it was only by 1997 that the proportion of  individual investors in the US share market dropped
below 50  per  cent.  The  UK had reached  this  point  in  1967  when the  Jenkins  Report  was
released.112 While boards and institutions might have previously sought to concentrate voting
power into fewer hands, to exclude the mass of  retail investors, they now held a majority interest.
It  could  probably  be  expected  that  institutions,  like  they  had  in  the  UK,  would  find  an
increasingly common position favouring voting equality, at least among themselves. 
*****
The evidence of  change in shareholder voting rights strongly supports the two positive theses.
First, progressive democrats, though incompletely by their own standards, drove legal reform.
Most notable were Wilson,  Ripley and Berle during the 1920s in the US, the German Legal
Academy in 1931, and (although the case was won through regulatory pressure, not statute) LCB
Gower in the minority of  the Jenkins Report. Second, when specific regulation was absent, it
seems plain that bargaining power became decisive, but this could lead to any outcome. In the
UK  it  allowed  institutional  shareholders  to  perfect  the  policy  of  one-share,  one-vote.  In
Germany,  banks’  bargaining power led a  disastrous concentration of  economic might in  the
hands of  insider shareholders during the 1920s. In the US, a similar result looked very likely in
the 1920s, though the meltdown was restrained by uneasy settlements among federal regulators.
All this said, overall, and with many qualifications (especially in the US), the results of  law reform
might be  regarded as reasonably  successful,  at  least  if  the  task had been to enfranchise the
registered shareholder alone.
110 ISS, Shearman & Sterling and ECGI, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union (12 June 2007) 81.
111 eg CalPERS, Global Principles of  Accountable Corporate Governance (2010) Principle A.4
112 See the charts at ch 6(1)(a) and 6(3)(b)
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But the goal of  voting rights regulation cannot be viewed in a 21 st century environment of
institutional shareholding in the same way as in 1920s or 1930s. Then, many small retail investors
bought shares directly.  The concern which underpinned the progressive democratic drive for
one-share, one-vote was always explicitly directed, in the words of  the Public Companies Act
1767, against the ‘few, and those perhaps temporary Proprietors’, against Passow’s ‘big players’,
and against, as Ripley put it, ‘intermediaries - most commonly bankers’. Now, asset managers and
banks  have  become the  beneficiaries  of  the  very  one-share,  one-vote  policies  that  originally
challenged their hegemony. This has fuelled the view (especially on the academic left, and not
without justification) that shareholder voting rights are dangerous and what can be done with
them should be limited.113 But now the issue cannot be confined to shareholder rights alone.
Were the true contributors of  capital, the ultimate investors being enfranchised as well? The two
positive theses both stress that no interest group can be said to have pursued its goals in a fully
rational manner. To understand just how true this is, to grasp the separation of  contribution and
participation in its modern form, it  is  necessary to look further than the shareholder,  and to
pierce more than the corporate veil. 
113 Notably in the last year, LE Strine, ‘Can we do better by ordinary investors? A pragmatic reaction to duelling ideological
mythologists  of  corporate  law’  (2014)  114  Columbia  LR  449  and  S  Deakin,  ‘Against  Shareholder  Empowerment’  in  J
Williamson, C Driver and P Kenway (eds), Beyond Shareholder Value (TUC 2014)
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6. PIERCING THE INSTITUTIONAL VEIL
By the late 1960s, regulation of  director elections and shareholder voting had genuinely mitigated
some central problems of  corporate accountability, but only if  people held shares directly. How
would a world of  institutional shareholders be shaped, if  the successes of  modern company law
were not to be undone? As a younger man, Adolf  Berle had believed that economic power could
be revolutionised, and ‘labour could control’, through a system of  employees owning the shares
of  their workplaces.1 At some point Berle must have realised that, because shareholders need to
diversify, employee share schemes per se were not his answer. His career’s formative work shifted
to  shareholding  generally,  opposing  ‘bankers’  control’,2 and  attacking,  as  a  third  plank  of
unaccountable corporations, intermediaries who ran ‘voting trusts’.3 As he reached retirement,
Berle saw at least two possibilities from the rise of  pension, insurance and mutual funds. First,
they might ‘remove the individual further still  from connection with or impact’  on corporate
management.4 But second, ‘the stockholder position, though having lost its ancient justification,
could  become  a  vehicle  for  rationalized  wealth  distribution’  serving  the  ‘ideal  of  a  just
civilization.’5 Perhaps retirement savings, promoted with collective bargaining and ‘tax policy or
some other  device’  contained seeds  of  the ‘revolution’  he  and progressive democrats  always
sought.6 But if  it became true that more people had a stake in the corporate economy than ever
before,  if  it  became  true  that  ordinary  people’s  retirement  savings  would  form the  primary
contributions to corporate equity, what would happen to participation in corporate governance?
Of  course, retirement savings are not the only source of  institutional investment. But
they have become the most important. A typical investment chain looks like this: 
Employees/Individuals Pension fund/Life insurance company/Mutual fund/Corporation  
Asset manager/Bank/Broker  Custodian/Nominee  Company director
The chain starts with employees and other individuals giving money to pension, insurance, and
mutual funds, or a (usually) corporate employer. Pensions are obviously for retirement, but other
institutions often are too. Insurance companies mostly invest life insurance money. Mutual fund
1 AA Berle, ‘How Labor Could Control’ (7 September 1921) The New Republic 37
2 AA Berle, ‘Non-Voting Stock and Bankers’ Control’ (1925-1926) 39 Harvard Law Review 673
3 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) Book II, ch 1, 129-131
4 AA Berle, ‘Property, Production and Revolution’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1, 18 and 14
5 Berle (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1, 18
6 Berle (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1, 9-10 and 17
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clients are often saving for old age, and are just more affluent, or they are pensions and life
insurance firms. Corporate shareholders, notably in Germany and other EU countries, mostly
have capital to invest because the law allows them to utilise the balance sheet surplus from self-
investing  their  workers’  pensions.7 The  causes  of  ownership  structure  have  been  intensively
debated for twenty years. But it does seem very likely, as at least one author has mentioned, 8 that
state and private pension policy is intimately connected with ownership structure overall. If  so, it
was largely the consequence of  a conscious policy to flood the market for shares with workers’
capital. 
But  regardless  of  ownership  structure,  how did  participation  rights  evolve?  The  first
positive thesis suggests progressive democrats would promote the participation rights of  ultimate
contributors,  albeit  incompletely.  In  practice,  the  incompleteness  dominates  because  the
underlying economic shifts are comparatively recent. Legal development is in its infancy. The first
development, though not wholly novel, is that financial institutions have assumed the mantle of
‘stewardship’,  codified  in  duties  about  their  use  of  shareholder  voting  rights.  A  second
development is the spread of  legal rights of  beneficiaries to vote (directly or through a union) for
pension trustees. However, because pension trusts frequently delegate investment oversight to
asset managers (like retail shareholders asking banks for custodial services) they give up voting to
their stewards. No country has a coherent model yet, and there is disarray across pension types
and economic sectors. Only recently,  a third set of  potential strategies has entered discussion
which could unify participatory accountability throughout the investment chain. Asset managers
and  banks  can  be  subjected  to  voting  instructions,  or  have  their  stewardship  role  removed
altogether, or be required to staff  governance departments with elected representatives. 
The second positive  thesis  is  that,  when left  to the  market,  the  bargaining power  of
economic actors shapes the outcomes, whether the results are beneficial or arbitrary. There can
be very little doubt about this. The appropriation of  economic power by asset managers and
banks has been achieved through standard form contracts. It is true that centralisation of  voting
power develops economies of  scale, which is probably positive in itself. But the accompanying
result, that people have been quietly disenfranchised to a staggering degree, is far more difficult
to rationalise.9 This market outcome is what has been codified in law under the guise of  the
7 See the charts  at  ch 6(1)(b),  6(2)(b)  and 6(3)b)  for the categories  used by the statistical  authorities.  In  the more minor
categories of  emergent shareholder, hedge funds are originally mutuals for very wealthy clients, but now often have pension
funds  or  other  asset  managers  as  clients.  ‘Sovereign  wealth  funds’,  when  they  are  not  the  natural  resource  hordes  of
authoritarian regimes, are often pensions, as in Norway or Japan.
8 M Roth,  ‘Employee Participation,  Corporate Governance and the Firm: A Transatlantic  View Focused on Occupational
Pensions and Co-Determination’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 51, 56-58
9 cf  F Kessler, ‘Contracts of  Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of  Contract’ (1943) 43(5) Columbia LR 629
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‘stewardship’ strategy. The only counterweight has been the gradual, but ever more conscious
organisation  of  ordinary  savers,  employees,  and  unions,  to  take  back  the  power  that  their
contributions  to  equity  create.  This  has  served  as  the  main  inspiration  for  the  progressive
democratic vision of  the future of  corporate law. 
(1) United Kingdom: conservative codetermination
The development of  participation rights  for the  ultimate contributor began in the  UK long
before asset managers became the stewards of  corporate governance. Today the UK has one of
the most collectivised shareholding structures in the world, with only around ten per cent of
individual share ownership.10 A century ago it  looked much like any other country.  Although
there was already significant dispersion among smaller investors,11 at the core it was dominated by
directors and old family interests, who held controlling blocks of  shares.12 Between 1900 and
1910, company directors probably owned over half  a typical company’s shares.13 Outside this
charmed circle, most people had no savings, let alone investments. A handful of  pensions had
existed in the  19th century  for  employees  in  the  civil  service,14 the waterways,15 the  railways,
shipping, banks and insurance companies.16 A trade union could also have set up a mutual benefit
scheme,17 but these were fewer than might be expected since agreements with unions tended to
be unenforceable.18 Pension money administered by employers was not always kept in a separate
fund,  risking  the  lot  in  insolvency.  Even  if  a  fund  was  separated,  a  perpetual  risk  of
mismanagement by the employer or the union remained.19 At the turn of  the century, only about
10 See below, ch 6(1)(b)
11 L Hannah, ‘The ‘Divorce’ of  Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Trends’ (2007)
49(4) Business History 404 
12 B Cheffins, ‘Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of  Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’
(2006) 63 Washington & Lee Law Review 1273, 1284-5. 
13 J Franks, C Mayer and S Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2009) 22(10) Review of  Financial Studies 4009, 4029-
4030 and 4041 show that from a sample of  40 companies incorporated in 1900, directors owned 92.76% of  shares, falling to
53.61% by 1910 and that 56% of  shareholders lived within 6 miles of  the city of  incorporation. Obviously, if  a business had
only just gone public in 1900, it would take some time before the prior owners sold off  their stakes.
14 Superannuation Act 1834 (c 24) eliminated the rights that civil servants had apparently acquired in their offices, to sell onto
successors, and substituted a pension claim against the Treasury, which came to be two thirds of  income. The Superannuation
Act 1859 (c 26) benefits were fixed at 1/60 of  salary per year, with up to 40 years of  contributions.
15 The waterways produced the first formal pensions in the private sector, for lock-keepers on the River Lee. Deductions of  2
shillings a week provided 10 shilling a week pensions, Hannah, infra (1986) 10, citing the Minutes of  the Committee of  Trustees of
the River Lee (8 January 1821) in PRO Rail 845/9. 
16 L Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The development of  occupational pensions in Britain (CUP 1986) 6-14
17 Report of  Lord Rothschild’s Committee  (1898) Cmnd 8911, 151-153, union pensions that existed were based on (a) years in the
union (b) 5s per week as a typical sum for those turning 55 or 60, but more for long members (c) could be contingent on the
society’s vote, or incapacity to work (d) some prohibited from working while getting their pension, except perhaps light work
(e) little, if  anything, was available for women. 
18 See Trade Union Act 1871 s 4. See also S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1920) Part II, ch 2, 154-155
19 The Great Western Railway Enginemen and Firemen’s Mutual Assurance, Sick, and Superannuation Society was established in
1865.  Enrolment  was  compulsory.  The  workers  ran  the  scheme  themselves,  but  by  1890  the  payouts  exceeded  the
contributions. The company was unwilling to bail out the scheme without taking more control. They employed an actuary,
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5 per cent of  the population had pensions.20 In 1905 around 25,000 out of  2.1 million people
aged over 65 received pensions.21 Old age  was impoverished,  and corporate  governance was
much more simple, because retirement did not yet exist.
(a) Inventing retirement22
Everything changed in a dozen years from the 1906 general election. The Old Age Pensions Act
1908 established the ‘first pillar’ of  the modern retirement system.23 The state pension allowed
those who had less than £31 and 10 shillings a year and were over 70 years old to collect five
shillings a week (or £13 a year) from the Post Office.24 The money that funded the state pension
was never set aside in a separate account of  Her Majesty’s Treasury, but was paid out of  general
tax  revenue.  This  meant  there  was  no  investment  money  that  might  matter  for  corporate
governance.25 The state pension was designed as a  means-tested minimum benefit.  Implicitly
people were expected to maintain their living standards (if  they lived to retire) in other ways. The
‘third pillar’  of  pensions had always existed: private savings, where a portion was destined to
reach the share market by direct purchase, or through a life insurance policy or mutual fund
which invested in shares on the saver’s behalf. In between was the ‘second pillar’ that became
crucial for most working people. This was occupational pensions, which were highly dependent
on the growing trade unions.
The Trade Disputes Act 1906 assured unions the freedom to take collective action for the
purpose of  a trade dispute, and so placed employees in a better position to bargain for old age
benefits. But initially unions distrusted occupational pensions. Employers controlled them and
threatened strikers with withdrawing benefits.26 A turning point came with the Trade Boards Act
1918. The Ministry of  Labour used its power to regulate wages to make employers agree with
unions to form Joint Industrial Councils, regional councils, and local work programmes. They
would  consult  upon  all  workplace  issues,  including  in  pensions.27 An  early  example  of
participation in pension plan management, which served as a model, appeared in a Birmingham
who found a £1,250,000 deficit. He recommended the company would retake control, but also that the level of  the benefits
be improved to ‘take the fire out of  the Socialist cause.’ This was agreed in 1901.
20 L Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The development of  occupational pensions in Britain (CUP 1986) 13
21 LCG Money, Riches and Poverty (1911) 266 and Old Age Pensions, Tables which have been prepared in Connexion with the Question of  Old
Age Pensions with a Preliminary Memorandum (1907) Cmnd 3618, 20
22 This heading is gratefully adopted from the leading work by L Hannah, Inventing Retirement (CUP 1986)
23 The ‘three pillar’ classification of  pensions is mirrored in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 s 1. I will call the state pension the
first pillar, occupational second, and personal third, because this is the order of  accessibility for most people and is in line
with the common parlance in the European Union. Sometimes the numbers are different, but ‘public, social, private’ is the
basic idea.
24 Old Age Pensions Act 1908 ss 1-2 and Sch 1. Those with over £21 a year had a reduced benefit.
25 A number of  contemporary ‘sovereign wealth funds’ do just this.
26 Hannah (1986) 26, giving the example of  pensions being withdrawn after the 1912 Port of  London strikes.
27 nb ‘Joint decision making’ translates into German as ‘Mitbestimmung’, and translates back into English as ‘codetermination’.
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chocolate factory.28
At  Bournville  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  the  century  Works  Committees  were
established whose duties were largely concerned with the promotion of  the employees’
welfare, and many measures were taken tentatively in extending a democratic policy which
enabled the worker to take a larger share in the control of  affairs. The administration of
pension funds by trustees representing both sides, the recognition of  the necessity  of
self-control  by  the  workers  of  the  various  clubs  and  works  societies,  and  the
establishment of  committees for frank consultation with employees in regard to new
measures affecting the works as a whole - all indicate the pursuit of  this policy.
Crucially, these pension funds were trusts. Equity would see workers as beneficial owners. This
made it more natural to think that workers had a right over the management of  ‘their’ money. A
competing model, particularly from the early 1930s, came from the insurance industry.29 Before,
individual insurance policies were sold in smaller numbers. But in 1927 the Metropolitan Life
Insurance  Company  of  New  York  entered  the  market,  selling  group  insurance  policies  to
employers.  Its  office windows at Bush House,  on London’s Aldwych, were emblazoned with
displays of  ‘Fear of  Old Age’. UK insurers copied the group plans and competed successfully. As
well as picking up more employer mandates, life insurance policies were sold door to door and
became very popular.30 
Insurance was a clean functional substitute for a pension trust. However, the formal legal
analysis  was that insurance was a  contract.31 Upon the payment of  policy instalments to the
insurance  company,  proprietary  title  to  the  funds  was  presumed to  pass.32 The  law did  not
support policyholders in pointing to the insurer’s accumulated funds and saying either wholly or
in part “that money is ours”. This was true even though in economic substance the policyholder
might  retain  identical  expectations  to  the  beneficiary  of  a  pension  trust.33 It  followed  that
participation in administration of  funds held by an insurance company could seem slightly more
problematic to the legal imagination. 
28 Bournville Works, A Works Council in Being (1922) LSE Archives, HD5/118. 
29 Hannah (1986) ch 3, ‘The insurance challenge (1927-1956)’
30 Hannah (1986) 33
31 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, per Lord Mansfield
32 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54, a widow was mistakenly overpaid under her late husband’s life insurance policy. She was not
entitled to it because the husband failed to pay a final premium instalment, so the insurance company could recover the
property in what is now recognised to be unjust enrichment.
33 cf  Equitable Life  Assurance Society v Hyman  [2000] UKHL 39, the House of  Lords held that terms would be implied into
contracts to fulfil the parties’ reasonable expectations, namely that the insurer’s management would not use its discretion to
reduce the bonuses of  guaranteed annuity rate policyholders to subsidise the income of  current annuity rate holders.
128
Pension funds organised as trusts were still more common. They were supported by the
Finance Act 1921, which gave tax exemptions to trust based schemes. 34 Actuarial advisers also
preferred  them.35 The  incidence  of  participation  in  trust  administration  by the  beneficiaries,
however, appeared to follow the fortunes of  the Ministry of  Labour. A strong union, and a Joint
Industrial Council helped. In 1931 the General Secretary of  the Transport and General Workers’
Union, Ernest Bevin, organised a plan for flour mill workers. It employed Prudential, but only to
insure the employer’s commitments, not to provide the benefits themselves.36 The pension asset
managers were appointed by the union and employer through the Joint Industrial Council.37 
In the 1930s union attitudes swayed in favour of  occupational pension plans. Between
1929 and 1931 unions failed to persuade the Labour government to improve the state pension,38
and  they  sought  an  independent  alternative.  By  1938,  the  numbers  of  people  covered  by
occupational pensions were still relatively low, at 1.6 million employees.39 After the Second World
War,  while  Ernest  Bevin  had  been in  the  Cabinet,  the  number  of  people  with  trade union
representation had grown significantly and so did occupational pensions, by around half  a million
a  year.40 By  1958,  there  were  4.3  million  people  with  pensions  working  for  private  sector
employers, and 3.8 million people with public sector or nationalised employers. 41 
Up to this point,  pensions had not really mattered for corporate governance. The old
view  prevailed  that  company  shares  were  financially  risky  investments.  To  comply  with  the
trustee’s duty of  care, the care ‘an ordinary prudent man would take if  he were minded to make
an investment for the benefit of  other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide,’ 42 it
might also be legally risky to invest in equities. The Trustee Act 1925 had listed the legitimate
investments by a trustee as including securities of  the British and Indian governments, and of
railway  companies,  but  little  else.43 Individual  trust  deeds  could  always  override  default  legal
expectations,44 but legislation shaped the market expectation that company shares were avoided.
As occupational pensions grew more,  the  Trustee  Investments Act 1961 changed the
34 Finance Act 1921 s 32(3)(a)
35 Hannah (1986) 37
36 Hannah (1986) 43
37 eg National Joint Industrial Council for the Flour Milling Industry,  Group Pension Scheme as Finally Approved by the Trustees  (1
January 1931) LSE Archives, HD9/225. article 3, ‘The Trustees for this Pension Scheme will be appointed by the National
Joint Industrial Council for the Flour Milling Industry, and will hold office during the pleasure of  the Council.’
38 Hannah (1986) 43
39 Ministry of  Labour, ‘Schemes for Providing for Pensions for Employees on Retirement from Work’ in The Ministry of  Labour
Gazette (HMSO 1938) 172-174
40 Watkinson Committee, National Advisory Committee on the Employment of  Older Men and Women, First Report (1952) Cmnd 9333
41 Government Actuary’s Department, Occupational Pension Schemes, A Survey by the Government Actuary (1958)
42 Re Whiteley (1886) LR 33 Ch D 347, per Lindley LJ
43 Trustee Act 1925 ss 1-11, trustees could also invest in bearer securities and deposit money in banks. 
44 Re Harari’s Settlement Trusts, Wordsworth v Fanshawe [1949] 1 All ER 430, a trust deed said the trustees could invest ‘in or upon
such investments as to them may seem fit’. Jenkins J held that a plain meaning interpretation ought to be given, despite the
ordinary rule that a strict construction should be given to investment clauses.
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practice by authorising up to half  a trust’s funds to be invested in equities. 45 With trade union
growth, this must be seen as one of  the two key reasons why, beginning in the 1960s the share of
wealth invested by pension funds in the London Stock Exchange began to boom.
UK share ownership 1963-2008
ONS, Share Ownership Survey (2008) Table A
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The Office for National Statistics’ share ownership figures depict three major shifts. First, by the
1960s, individual ownership of  UK shares was in terminal decline. Investment was becoming
collectivised. Second, the relative shares held by institutional investors was unstable. From the
1960s until 1982, the rate of  pension growth was marked. But growth was halted, and from 1993
pensions’ share went into decline relative to insurance companies and the various mutual fund
vehicles offered for private investment by the City.46 Third, represented in the sharp red line,
there was globalisation as the UK opened more to the European Union and the world. Changes
in share ownership were important because people who owned more might buy more power. But
ownership could also be quite irrelevant for who participated in corporate governance.
45 Trustee Investments Act 1961 s 1(1) and Sch 1. The Secretary of  State was able to increase the default share of  equity
investment to three quarters, but this was not done until The Trustee Investments (Division of  Trust Fund) Order 1996 (SI
1996/845)  r  2.  Restrictions  were  dropped  altogether  by  the  Trustee  Act  2000 s  3,  so  trustees  may  make  any  class  of
investments that they choose.
46 Unit trusts used to be a favoured vehicle, but grew less popular with the creation of  open ended investment companies, which
appear to fall under the ‘other financial institution’ category.
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(b) British codetermination
By the 1960s,  representation of  the ultimate contributor in  institutional  investment was in  a
parlous  state.  There  was  effectively  nothing  in  insurance,  or  mutuals,  and  pensions  were
dominated by employers.47 The number of  occupational pensions had continued to grow,48 but
the system operated informally, outside any statutory framework. From 1971, the Conservative
government became attracted to reform of  occupational pensions as a way to encourage the
growth of  private savings over public welfare.49 Under the Social Security Act 1973 it established
a  new  Occupational  Pensions  Board,  which  quickly  embarked  on  a  review  of  existing
regulations.50 Its report discussed ‘member nominated trustees’ in Britain and abroad,51 noting
that in Germany,  codetermination of  pension and provident funds was required,  but that in
insurance  based  retirement  schemes  participation  was  excluded.52 The  OPB  recommended
drafting a code of  best practice to endorse parity codetermination, but no legislation.
The successor Labour government returned to the question in 1976 with a White Paper
on  Occupation  Pension  Schemes:  The  Role  of  Members  in  the  Running  of  Schemes .53 It  forthrightly
endorsed  parity  employee  codetermination  of  pension  management,  and  recommended
legislation. The White Paper’s rhetoric, consistent with Labour’s commitment to union nominated
directors that would be found in the Bullock Report and another White Paper in the two years
following, was concerned primarily with the ethic of  industrial democracy.54 The justifications for
member nominated trustees were, first, the expertise that decision-makers within the workforce
could bring and, second, the educational benefits for workers taking part in financial decision
making.55 Corporate governance was not mentioned, but union executives, at least anecdotally,
47 L Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The Development of  Occupational Pensions in Britain (CUP 1986) 140, ‘While early pension schemes
often had up to half  of  the trustees representing the members, this soon became rare.’ Two publications, which cannot be
located, are cited: Tony Lynes, ‘Pensions in Secret’ (16 January 1969) New Society 88-89. T Lynes, ‘Talking About Pensions’
(June 1972) Industrial Society 7. Hannah goes on to say this. ‘De facto, the great bulk of  trustee boards and management
committees worked in the interests of  the employer. Since, as we have seen, they ultimately depended on the continuing
willingness of  the employer to fund the benefits, this change was perhaps natural, but that it sat uneasily with the trend to
increased democratization and participation in modern society was undeniable.’
48 Government Actuary’s Department, Occupational Pension Schemes: Third Survey by the Government Actuary (1967) 8, Table 3, peak
of  8.1m membership private, and 4.1m public, total 12.2m, so double private sector in 10 years, total income £1,745m pa,
65,000 private sector schemes.
49 cf  White Paper, Strategy for Pensions (1971) Cmnd 4755
50 SSA 1973 ss 66-68, later recast by the Pension Schemes Act 1993 Sch 1. The OPB was succeeded by the Occupational
Pensions Regulatory Agency, and then reconstituted as The Pensions Regulator under the Pensions Act 2004 ss 1-106.
51 Occupational  Pensions  Board,  Solvency,  Disclosure  of  Information and  Member  Participation  in  Occupational  Pension
Schemes (BPP24 1974-5) Cmnd 5904. 
52 (1974-5) Cmnd 5904, vol 3, 31.
53 White Paper, Occupation Pension Schemes: The Role of  Members in the Running of  Schemes (1976) Cmnd 6514
54 (1976) Cmnd 6514, para 25,  ‘It  is necessary at the outset to distinguish between matters proper to negotiation through
collective  bargaining  and  those  to  be  decided  by  participative  management… investment  policy  and  the  discretionary
allocation of  benefits within agreed guidelines to one individual rather than another, can be the responsibility of  participative
management. It must be emphasized that the development of  industrial democracy is complementary to collective bargaining
and not intended to replace or inhibit it in any way.’
55 (1976) Cmnd 6514, para 29, ‘Such a partnership gives members of  the scheme more confidence in it and a greater sense of
security. It can also be expected to give them a better appreciation of  the extent of  the claims on resources constituted by a
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appeared to appreciate the influence they might have if  they controlled the  assets  that  their
members’ money bought.56 The White Paper did not endorse direct employee votes, rather than a
single channel of  union nomination. In Leslie Hannah’s account, it ‘provoked an outcry, focused
particularly  on  the  proposed  requirement  that  trade  unions  should  control  the  selection  of
member representatives.’57 It was not carried through.
But  then,  curiously,  and  without  a  law,  major  pension  schemes  found  a  renewed
commitment to employee participation. Varying pension trust deeds,  or corporate trusts,  was
simple enough if  the administration was already wholly in the employer’s hands.58 The White
Paper had begun a discussion, and many employers had found no reason to not allow more equal
management  of  pensions.  A  survey  and  questionnaire  conducted  by  Tom Schuller  and  Jeff
Hyman,  released  in  1983,  found  that  in  their  sample  of  120  employers,  57  had  instituted
employee trustee schemes, 35 since 1976. Only 12 existed before 1970.59 
Why did codetermination of  pensions spread? Partly,  the rise between 1970 and 1976
suggests the positive effect that the OPB’s discussion and model. When Schuller and Hyman
asked whether pension codetermination was introduced in anticipation of  legislation, employers
rejected  the  suggestion  out  of  hand.  It  was  their  own  initiative,  said  84  per  cent. 60 Many
employers  may  have  genuinely  believed  themselves  to  have  acted  ‘voluntarily’,  but  this  is
doubtful. It is impossible to disentangle these developments from the fact that by 1979 union
membership peaked at just over 13 million people,  and many (though not all) favoured joint
management. Everything happened in the shadow of  trade union bargaining power. 
Pension  codetermination  signalled  a  remarkable  shift  in  the  culture  of  the  British
workplace and management. In 1983, Schuller and Hyman found that pension boards functioned
harmoniously, their views did not lead to conflict with advisers, and policy confrontations were
few. Although the employee trustees viewed investment and fund monitoring as among their
pension scheme. When it comes to difficult individual cases, such as exercising discretion to pay death benefit to one person
rather than another, member representatives may have special knowledge and be able to advise more surely than management
representatives.’
56 R Ellison, Private Occupational Pension Schemes (Oyez 1979) vol I, 3, in less than impartial viewpoint, ‘union leaders are seen to be
preoccupied more with the pressing concerns of  control of  the massive assets of  the funds and direction of  investments,
than with the safeguarding of  their members’ rights and the improvement of  benefits.’ Cites Whiteley, Builders May Strike
Over Pension Issue (11 February 1974) Guardian; Elliot, Co-op Bank Employees Strike over Pensions (16 April 1974) FT
57 L Hannah,  Inventing Retirement  (1986) 140. See further, CBI,  Who Should Manage Pension Schemes?  (1977) and see also CBI,
Participation by members in the management of  occupational pension schemes: a guide to good practice  (1977). These are available in the
National Libraries of  Scotland and Wales, and the West Yorkshire branch of  the British Library.
58 Variation of  Trusts Act 1958 s 1
59 T Schuller and J Hyman, ‘Pensions: The Voluntary Growth of  Participation’ (1983) 14(1) Industrial Relations Journal 70, 73.
At 74-75, of  those 57 schemes, there were 3 cases of  over 50% codetermination, 16 cases of  50%, 20 cases of  40-49% and
12  of  between  33-40%  and  6  of  under  33%.the  employee  trustees  were  nominated  14%  by  management,  12%  by
management after an employee election, 16% by trade unions, 28% by all scheme members and 21% by pensions committee
or consultative committee.
60 (1983) 14(1) Industrial Relations Journal 70, 76
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most important tasks, it  was here that trustees left detailed decisions to professional advisers
most.61 As they put it, 
Trustees operate in a highly consensual manner. This is, indeed, one of  the commonly
cited  reasons  why  extensive  employee  participation  is  possible  in  this  area:  once
contribution levels are settled, both company and employers have a mutual interest in
pursuing the best interests of  the members.62
By 1991, there were 3000 private sector schemes with trustees elected by employees, and 500 with
trade union nominated trustees.63 In 1993, of  large UK occupational schemes 65 per cent had
member nominated trustees, and the composition was half  each in a quarter of  the schemes.64 
By  the  early  1990s,  union  membership  was  in  steep  decline.  This  could  have  led  to
employers  abandoning  member  representation,  but  it  was  then  that  legislation  on  pension
participation came. In 1993 the Conservative government asked Professor Roy Goode to chair a
report  on  Pension  Law Reform.  After  various  scandals,  particularly  Robert  Maxwell  raiding the
Mirror News Group pension before falling off  a yacht,  it  was focused on funding,  fiduciary
duties and plan insurance. But the Goode Report also advocated legislation for participation of
scheme members.65 Trusts were, it said, a sound legal vehicle for ‘protecting the pension promise’.
Yet trust law historically gave a general freedom to design any rules for scheme administration.66
A  trust  document  could  allow  the  employer  to  nominate  every  trustee,  even  in  defined
contribution (or money purchase) schemes where no risks lay with the employer. So the ability of
employers to nominate every trustee appeared unsatisfactory in principle, because
members earn their benefits by their work and their contributions. It is their scheme in a
very real sense and they have a legitimate interest in its management.67 
61 T Schuller and J Hyman, ‘Trust Law and Trustees: Employee Representation in Pension Schemes’ (1983) 12 Industrial Law
Journal 84, 89
62 (1983) 12 Industrial Law Journal 84, 91-93
63 Pension Law Reform (1993) Cm 2342, para 4.5.23
64 G Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon 1996) 241. Stapledon also notes that in Australia, the
Occupational Superannuation Standards Act 1987 regs 13 and 15 had already required equal member nominated trustees, or
one member nominee in schemes with under 200 people. 
65 Pension Law Reform (1993) Cm 2342
66 cf  Armitage v Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279, which suggests the modern approach is that compulsory terms exist in trusts, and
that there is not a complete freedom to opt out of  every duty, particularly to act in the beneficiaries interests in good faith. It
seems that different kinds of  duties would be standard incidents to different categories of  trust.
67 (1993)  Cm 2342,  paras 4.5.15-4.5.18.  See also,  paras  4.5.19,  ‘But  however  scrupulous  the employer may be,  there is  no
substitute for the discipline of  another voice in the decision-making process, who can ensure that the employer-appointed
trustees do not allow themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to be unduly influenced by the wishes and concerns of  the
employer.’
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This  spoke  loudly  and  clearly  to  the  legal  imagination.  Worker  participation  was  legitimate
because the money, in law, was theirs.
The Goode Report was cautious about condoning trustees being answerable to different
classes  of  beneficiary,  such  as  present  contributors  and  pensioners,  as  representation  of
segregated  interests  could  weaken  a  board’s  unity.  However,  it  did  not  believe  the  conflict
concern went so far as to make member and employer nominated trustees unworkable. Many
schemes already operated well.68 Member nominated trustees would bring to pension trust boards
the discipline of  another viewpoint,  additional experience,  and hold beneficiaries’  interests in
constant  view.  Notably,  the  Report  rejected  the  idea  that  pensions  should  simply  maximise
financial returns, as trustees should safeguard the social interests of  beneficiaries as well. 69 They
would be better at receiving information of  employees’ views because their status would be equal,
and employees would ultimately be less suspicious or critical of  trustee board decisions if  they
were involved in the decision making process.70 
The Goode Report symbolised consensus within the democratic mainstream of  British
politics. It recommended employees elect at least one third of  pension boards in schemes with
over 50 beneficiaries generally, and if  the scheme was a money purchase scheme it favoured a
right to elect two thirds of  trustees.71 Employee trustees’ terms could be between three and six
years, only be removable by the unanimous decision of  other trustees, with notification to the
Pensions Regulator.72  In the Pensions Act 1995 sections 16 to 21, the Conservative government
made the revolutionary change. It was the first legislation of  its kind in a UK financial institution,
allowing employees as members to elect representatives to trust boards. 
It was not the Goode Report’s recommendations in full, particularly because an employer
could opt out of  the law if  it secured approval for an alternative from scheme members. This
stance reflected the Conservative government’s penchant for avoiding ‘one size fits all’ corporate
governance or regulation.73 Nevertheless, the expected position was that schemes with under 100
68 (1993) Cm 2342, para 4.5.20, ‘We do not find these arguments compelling. The fact that there are already so many schemes
with member trustees indicates that the fears expressed are exaggerated. Moreover, there is an obvious potential for conflict
and mistrust if  employers veto the appointment of  trustees selected by active members. If  we define the rights of  trustees
more clearly employers need not fear that trustees can impose extra costs on them.’
69 (1993) Cm 2342, paras 4.9.17-4.9.18. This was made plain in Harries v The Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241
by Donald Nicholls VC, ‘Trustees may, if  they wish, accommodate the views of  those who consider that on moral grounds a
particular investment would be in conflict with the objects of  the charity, so long as the trustees are satisfied that course
would not involve a risk of  significant financial detriment.’  So, for example, a trade union appointed trustee could have
refused to endorse investment in apartheid South Africa, where trade union rights were suppressed. Investment there would
have conflicted with the objects of  the union. 
70 (1993) Cm 2342, para 4.5.24
71 (1993) Cm 2342, para 4.5.40
72 (1993) Cm 2342, paras 4.5.46-4.5.49
73 See generally the Cadbury Report, Financial Aspects of  Corporate Governance (1992) the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act
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members would have at least one codetermined trustee, there would be two trustees schemes
over  100,  making  at  least  one third of  the  pension board’s  total.  The legislation  cut  across
different  forms  of  retirement  saving  to  some  extent,  applying  whether  the  pension  was
constituted as a trust or a trust corporation, but not touching insurance policies or individual
pensions. Nevertheless, it was the law: the Conservative party brought codetermination to Britain.
From this point, it was perhaps just a matter of  time before pension codetermination was
rolled  out  compulsorily,  although  the  legislative  process  was  halting.  In  the  Child  Support,
Pensions  and Social  Security  Act  2000,  the  Secretary  of  State  gained  the  power to end the
employer opt outs in the Pensions Act 1995.74 But although this power was gained, it was not
exercised. Instead, the legislation was simply amended by the Pensions Act 2004. Sections 241 to
243 now require all schemes to have a minimum of  one third member nominated trustees, or
directors  of  the  trustee  corporation.75 The  election  requirements  under  sections  241(2)  and
242(2) must include ‘a process which involves some or all of  the members’. That allowed either
direct  employee  elections  or  selection  through  a  trade  union  which  ‘adequately  represents’
members and pensioners. Under section 243 the Secretary of  State can either make exemptions,76
or increase the proportion of  member nominees to half. In 2007, the then Secretary of  State
Alan Johnson mooted such an extension. The Department of  Work and Pensions commissioned
a report on it in 2010, with the dramatic finding of  favour among employees and unions, and less
enthusiasm among employers.77 The power was not exercised yet.
(c) Voice through the investment chain
The importance for  corporate  governance of  member representation  in  pensions  was  partly
dependent on the size of  the pension fund. A long running example, that became one of  the
UK’s more active institutional investors, was the Universities Superannuation Scheme.78 USS was
re-established as a limited company in 1974 to manage pensions that could be taken by full time,
and some part time members of  staff  in UK higher education. In 2014 the board had twelve
people, four appointed by the universities’ management, Universities UK, three nominated by the
University  and College Union,  one by the Higher Education Funding Council,  and four ‘co-
opted’ members selected by the whole board. All were subject to a veto of  the Joint Negotiating
1994, and also one of  the most famous ‘opt outs’ negotiated in the Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC, or the social
chapter attached to the Treaty on European Union 1992. The latter ‘opt out’ was made redundant in 1997.
74 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 ss 43-44
75 Pensions Act 2004 ss 241-243
76 See Occupational Pension Schemes (Member-nominated Trustees and Directors) Regulations 2006 regs 2-3
77 B Hewitson, A Hunter, R Stockley and A Thomas,  Attitudes to increasing the proportion of  member-nominated trustees: a qualitative
study (Department of  Work and Pensions 2010) Research Report 670
78 For historical development, GR Macdonald, Fifty years of  the F.S.S.U. (1965) LSE Archives HD7/E217
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Committee which had five employer and union representatives each, plus an ‘independent’ chair
that had to be agreed upon by at least three members of  each side, or selected by the Minister. 79
This presumably fulfilled the Pensions Act 2004 section 242(2), because although only a quarter
of  trustee company directors are nominated by the union, one or two of  the co-opted directors
can probably be said to come from a process that ‘involves some or all of  the members’. UCU
would  probably  also  ‘adequately  represent’  beneficiaries,  given  that  over  half  were  union
members.80 In 2012 USS had £34.2 billion assets under management, giving it the capacity for
significant influence if  it chose to be active. Its internal London Investment Office managed 88
per cent of  its assets directly, although the task of  actually casting proxy votes was delegated to
JP Morgan as an administrative custodian.81
Other larger pensions, such as Railpen or the BT Pension Scheme, had a similar capacity
for voting on their shares in house.  However smaller  plans tended to hire a  manager for all
investment services. In practice this came to mean giving up voting rights, for no better reason
than it being part of  the standard form agreement. The manager would typically be an insurance
company, or mutual fund firm, or both, such as Legal & General, Prudential, BlackRock, UBS,
Schroders,  AXA,  Henderson,  Fidelity  and  so  on.82 All  were  subject  to  oversight  under  the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,83 but this had not yet been used to include a voice for
clients. If  these firms also conducted an insurance business, their policyholders would have, just
as in the 1930s, no clear right to a say in the way their money was used. 
If  the asset manager ran a mutual fund business, some kinds of  clients might fare better
on paper. Unit holders might pass resolutions, or three quarters by value might write to request a
manager’s removal, though neither resolutions nor requests would be binding.84 Since 1997 in
Open Ended Investment Companies, or ‘oiks’, ten per cent of  shareholders could by law call an
extraordinary meeting to remove the oik director.85 But the likelihood of  these rights being used
was  remote.  In  fact,  individual  shareholders  had  ended  in  the  same  position.  In  standard
contracts with High Street banks that provided broking services, the bank would take over the
role of  voting on a individual shareholder’s shares, and might even insist that it had not duty to
vote or take instructions.86 Asset managers and banks controlled almost all shareholder voting
79 New Rules of  Universities Superannuation Scheme (30 April 2009) arts 1 and 59-62.
80 USS,  Reports  & Accounts (2012)  7  and  39.  The  total  number  of  active  members  was  reported as  141,093,  with  52,910
pensioners and 93,591 deferred members (who have stopped contributing, for instance because of  leaving a job, but are not
retired). The University and College Union has around 120,000 members.
81 USS, Reports & Accounts (2012) 5 and 24-26
82 See for instance, the voting policy of  Fidelity in the UK, FIL Limited, Principles of  Ownership (February 2011)
83 See FSMA 2000 ss 19, 22, 23, 31, Part IV and Sch 2, Pt I, as well as the FSA Principles for Business, PRIN 2.1
84 FSMA 2000 s 251 and the FSA Handbook COLL 6.5.7
85 Open-Ended Investment Company Regulations 2001/1228 (amended by SI 2005/923) r 34A
86 eg Barclays Wealth Management and Investment, Barclays Terms: Your Agreement With Us (July 2012) Section B, Part 5, 7.15 and
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rights. 
Could pension trustees nevertheless instruct the asset managers, to whom they delegated
and entrusted the power to invest,  on how to vote their  shares? It  was clear as a matter  of
principle that asset managers owed pension trusts and their beneficiaries fiduciary duties, just as
they would owe fiduciary duties to contributors to a  collective  investment  portfolio.87 It  was
irrelevant that the money might be pooled in an asset manager’s accounts. 88 It followed that the
applicable equitable principle since 1929, after a case called  Kirby v Wilkins, was that beneficial
owners of  shares could  bind their delegates to vote in accordance with their instructions.89 As
Romer J put it where, 
a shareholder holds shares as a bare trustee for a third person, he is no doubt obliged to
exercise his voting power in the way that the cestui que trust desires.... He holds that voting
power upon trust. 
Subject to the terms on which property is entrusted, bare trustees must simply vote according to
the expressed wishes of  a beneficiary.90 This was the position assumed to exist by the City, as the
Hampel Report 1998 wrote that institutional shareholders should actively vote ‘according to their
own best judgement,  unless a client has given contrary instructions’.91 Only if  the agreement
between  an  intermediary  and  the  investor  had  been  able  to  exclude  the  duty  to  follow
instructions might matters be different.92 But even then, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
Part 7, 5.2, last accessed at https://www.barclaysstockbrokers.co.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/BW-Terms.pdf  on 15 August
2013
87 cf  Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22, per Dillon LJ, recounting the case worked on the presumption
that ‘the assets and moneys in question are trust moneys held on trust for all or some of  the would-be investors... who paid
moneys to BCI or associated bodies  for investment,  and are not general  assets  of  BCI.’  In this  case,  contributors to a
collective investment fund, where money was pooled, sought to determine by what proportion losses to the fund were to be
shared. Because the investments were so mixed, a simple pro rata division of  losses was ordered. Plainly the mixture created
no doubt about the certainty of  the trust.
88 See Barlow Clowes above. See also Hunter v Moss [1993] EWCA Civ 11, and Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v CRC Credit
Fund Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 917, [171]. Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636, 678, per Lord Denning,
‘The duty of  the court is to put a fair meaning on the terms used, and not, as was said in one case, to repose on the easy
pillow of  saying that the whole is void for uncertainty.’
89 Kirby v Wilkins [1929] 2 Ch 444, Romer J holding a bare trustee has a duty to follow instructions from an absolutely entitled
beneficiary, or vote in their best interests. Also, in Butt v Kelson [1952] Ch 197, Romer LJ held that beneficiaries can compel
one to vote, and the court could exercise a power if  beneficiaries were among themselves in disagreement.
90 cf  Companies Act 2006 ss 324-331 allows the shareholder to delegate proxies, and s 152 facilitates the splitting of  votes to be
cast.  Proxy voting was originally found in the Companies Act  1947 s 5, and before that left  up to a company’s articles.
Transfers are encouraged to be used for enfranchising beneficiaries in the EU Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC art
11. For some background discussion see Companies Bill, 2nd Reading, Sir Stafford Cripps (6 June 1947) HC vol 438 col 585-
671, 585-597, which led to the first reforms so that the rule that trust interests were not entered on a share register (now CA
2006 s 126) did not interfere with corporate transparency and accountability.  
91 Hampel Committee, Final Report (1998) para 5.7
92 RC Nolan, ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?’ (2003) 3(1) Journal of  Corporate Law Studies 73; J Payne,
‘Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK’ (2009)  SSRN, 14; and A Hainsworth, ‘The Shareholder Rights
Directive and the challenge of  re-enfranchising beneficial shareholders’ (2007) 1(1) Law and Financial Markets Review 11, 15. 
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would probably  prevent the exclusion of  fiduciary duties,  which ultimately benefited pension
beneficiaries, if  they had no bargaining power and were given ‘take it or leave it’ terms.93 
The legal position was less problematic than the factual circumstances of  most pension
funds. It was implausible to imagine that small pension fund boards, let alone their beneficiaries,
would cast votes upon the hundreds or thousands of  company issues. However, in 2010, for the
first time, a new Association of  Member Nominated Trustees was formed, to organise on issues
of  common concern.94 By 2013 its members were collectively entrusted with over £250bn worth
of  assets. Even then, an organisation the size of  the AMNT might not be able to monitor and
vote upon every issue, but there came a genuine possibility that consistent voting policies might
be devised, and that specific voting instructions could be agreed.
After all, in the typical asset management firm, corporate governance was being presided
over by a very small group of  people. Perhaps three or six people in each asset manager, for
instance, would have  ad hoc meetings to discuss voting instructions on issues arising from the
financial news. They might pass those instructions to their corporate governance department,
which even in the largest firms would regularly consist of  one or two people. Those corporate
governance  staff  were  not  overwhelmed  because  they  subcontracted  voting  to  a  firm  like
Institutional Shareholder Services. In 2013, ISS had a London staff  of  about 200 people, 50 of
whom would work on voting. Following its mandate, and with the research it did, ISS would tell
asset managers how they would want to vote on all their trillions of  pounds of  shares. And so the
modern economy was run. 
Was any of  this lawful? What entitled an asset manager to exercise the votes on shares,
bought with other people’s money? Back in 1929, Romer J took the view that, if  no instructions
were received, a trustee was entitled to cast votes ‘in the best interests of  his cestui que trust’. The
question, however, was whether that demanding requirement could be fulfilled without any other
form of  representative mechanism.95 In  Kirby  itself, the trustees were directors of  a company,
accountable through the vote to the shareholders, for whom they held another group of  shares
on trust. If  an asset manager was subject to no analogous representative mechanism, it appeared
very hard to see what positive guarantee there would be that votes were cast in the best interests
93 UCTA 1977 ss 3, 11 and Sch 2. Dicta to the contrary in Baker v JE Clark & Co (Transport) UK Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 464 are
wrong in principle, and probably wrong in law. Also, the role of  consent in the nature of  trusts is limited by the irreducible
minimum core content of  fiduciary obligations: see  Armitage v Nurse  [1997] EWCA Civ 1279. Arguably the duty to follow
instructions forms part of  this core, to show what is actually (not hypothetically) in the beneficiary’s best interests. 
94 M Cobley, ‘UK’s newest pensions group gets off  to a flying start’ (1 April 2011) efinancialnews.com
95 cf  A Hainsworth, ‘The Shareholder Rights Directive and the challenge of  re-enfranchising beneficial shareholders’ [2007] Law
and Financial Markets Review 11, 14, notes that while CA 2006 s 153 allows nominee shareholders to vote shares differently
to reflect different wishes of  beneficiaries, there is no requirement to find out what those wishes actually are. This seems to
be an overly restrictive interpretation of  both the common law duty of  care, and of  equity.
138
of  the  cestui que trust. On the contrary, the better view of  the law would seem to be that there
would  be  an  active  conflict  of  interest  whenever votes  were  used  to  support  a  corporate
management that bought any form of  retirement product from the asset manager.96 Conflicts of
interest could not be contracted out of. The alternative would permit self-dealing on a massive
scale. Just as there is a duty to actively use voting rights,97 the irreducible core of  fiduciary duty
arguably requires asset managers to gather the views of  clients, and follow them, or to not vote at
all.98 
(d) Public sector development
In  the  UK’s  public  sector  pensions,  and  quite  unlike  their  counterparts  across  the
Commonwealth99 or the United States,100 trustees had become heavily reliant on asset managers.
Most  public  pensions  had  been  constituted  by  a  Regulation  under  the  authority  of  the
Superannuation Act  1972  section  7.101 For example,  the  Local  Government  Pension Scheme
Regulations  1997 let  a  miscellany  of  officials  –  council  treasurers,  leaders,  scheme actuaries,
external  fund managers  or  property  advisers  –  form a  pension  plan’s  panel.102 In  2011,  the
Hutton Report found that 7 out of  89 local government funds allowed any voice for members. It
recommended that the Pensions Act 2004 apply to the whole public sector.103 
The Public Service Pensions Act 2013 followed, where section 1 allowed new Regulations
to be drafted but subject to the consent of  the Treasury under section 30(3). Under section 4,
Regulations  would  have  to  include  a  ‘scheme  manager’,  ordinarily  the  local  authority  or
government department. The relationship of  the manager to the requisite ‘pension board’ under
section 5 were not clear, other than to be ‘assisting the scheme manager’. Regulations could go
further and they would have to require ‘employer representatives and member representatives in
equal numbers’. Yet this did not stop further ‘independent’ board members sitting. These would
96 Keech v Sandford (1726) 25 ER 223 developed the strict application of  the no possibility of  conflict principle in the wake of  the
world’s first stock market crash, courtesy of  the South Sea Company. It should not be thought an exaggeration to say that it is
‘for the safety of  mankind’, per James LJ Parker v McKenna (1874) 10 Ch App 96. See further, J Getzler, ‘Rumford Market and
the Genesis of  Fiduciary Obligations’ in A Burrows and Lord Rodger of  Earlsferry (eds) Mapping the Law: Essays in Honour of
Peter Birks (OUP 2006) 586.
97 cf  Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 Ch 515
98 cf  Armitage v Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279
99 eg in Canada, Occupational Superannuation Standards Regulations (SR 1987 No 322) regs 13 and 15; Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System Act 2006 s 16; in India, Employees Provident Fund and Misc Prov Act 1952 s 5A; in South
Africa, Government Employees’ Pension Law 1996 s 6(3). See also Watson Wyatt, The World’s 300 Largest Pension Funds (2006).
100 See ch 6(3)(f)
101 Superannuation Act 1972 s 7
102 See Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/1612) r 73, arrangements for administration that existed
previously should remain in tact.  Under  SI 2007/1561 r 3,  a new s 73A was inserted to require that the ‘administering
authority’  had  to  publish  a  statement  of  how  their  scheme  was  administered,  including  how it  was  delegated  or  any
subcommittees involved, and to keep this updated and filed with the Secretary of  State. Accordingly, the default position
envisaged is that the local authority’s executive will determine the structure of  the pension scheme.
103 Lord Hutton et al, Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report (10 March 2011) paras 6.13-6.15
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presumably be political appointees. The details of  election rules, or the definition of  what was
‘representative’,  would also depend on the Regulations. Nothing in the Act explicitly required
schemes to merge,104 and so local government pensions remain disunited, and often without the
bargaining power to reduce asset management fees. Every scheme delegated investment services
and votes to the City. 
The lack of  consolidation was not present, however, across all of  the public sector. The
Pensions Act 2008 was passed to give the right to every worker or ‘jobholder’ to enrol in a basic
defined contribution pension.105 It also created a cheap public fund manager option, the National
Employment Savings  Trust.  The board of  NEST was initially  appointed by the Secretary of
State,  and then that board would make subsequent appointments.106 This arrangement existed
because the Secretary of  State suspended the requirement for member nominated trustees by
order under Schedule 1, paragraph 1(6).107 This meant that it was also possible, by an Order of
the Secretary of  State, to introduce member nominated trustees to NEST when the organisation
had been deemed to be up, running and settled.108 As automatic enrolment was scheduled to
phase in up till 2018,109 it was projected that up to 5 million members could join. Over time this
would make it comparable to many sovereign wealth funds in scale, with the legal option that the
people whose money was invested could elect those who managed it, and so participate more in
corporate governance.
(e) Conclusion
A little more than a century after modern retirement was created, the UK could be seen to be
moving slowly toward the democratisation of  capital. But in 2014, it was still true that no matter
what the source of  corporate equity, or who appeared on the share ownership statistics, asset
managers  and  banks  dominated  voting,  through  no  better  reason  than  their  exercise  of
bargaining power. All the work in UK law to reduce negligence and profusion, to ensure directors
were  removable,  and  shareholders  had voting  rights,  was  threatened because  it  was  not  just
directors, but also the shareholders who controlled other people’s money. A chimerical virtue was
that the UK was not so different to its  international  counterparts.  Then again, there was no
comprehensive model to learn from. Germany and the US showed better arrangements in some
104 Public Service Pensions Act 2013 s 1 and Sch 1 defined the sectors of  public service worker and responsible Secretaries of
State who would issue Regulations.
105 Pensions Act 2008 s 1, basic contributions of  3%.
106 Pensions Act 2008 Sch 1, para 1(1)
107 The National Employment Savings Trust (Consequential Provisions) Order 2010 (SI 2010/9) r 3
108 This suggestion was politely received by the Secretary of  State at the AMNT’s Summer Conference, as seen in E McGaughey,
‘MNTs and corporate governance’ (26 June 2013) 
109 Employers’ Duties (Implementation) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/4) reg 4, as amended.
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respects, but they were also grappling with the relatively new reality of  institutional shareholding.
(2) Germany: Bismarck and Bankenmacht
Behind the institutional veil, Germany differed from the UK and US for two main reasons. First,
the Bismarckian state pension was designed to replace a proportion of  the income a contributor
earned before  they  retired.110 The standard ‘replacement  ratio’  was  always over  two thirds,111
which meant most people did not have such an urgent need for larger occupational pensions, and
trade  unions  pressed  less  for  them.  The  consequence  was  that  by  2011  the  quantity  of
occupational pension money in Germany, though still enormous, stood at under a quarter of  that
in the UK.112 Just as important as structure, a social ideal accompanied the Bismarckian pension
system, which pierced the culture of  the courts that regulated the second pillar. 113 This was the
idea that pensions were there because people needed protecting. That paternalist ethic resulted in
the Germans being unusually far behind the British in the quality of  pension codetermination. 
Second, German banks became the custodians of  shares, originally because of  a quirk of
private law history. Shares had to be bearer shares and consequently they needed to be safely
deposited somewhere.  Banks offered the service. But then,  with standard form contracts (on
allgemeine Geschäftsbedigungen) banks appropriated the majority of  voting rights on shares. Though
there  were  different  legal  origins,  and  different  reasons  for  development,  Bankenmacht (bank
power) in Germany approximated the power of  asset managers in the UK or US.
(a) Protection or participation
Participation  in  German  pension  management  was  always  part  of  a  general  movement  for
economic  democracy.114 Culturally,  its  roots  were  in  the  proto-democratic  values  of  mutual
110 F Kübler, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: A German Perspective’ in T Baums et al,  Institutional Investors
and Corporate Governance  (Walter de Gruyter 1994) ch 20, 565-580 and M Hauck, ‘The Equity Market in Germany and its
Dependency on the System of  Old Age Provisions’ in T Baums et al (eds), Institutional investors and corporate governance (1994) ch
19, 555-564. 
111 Or in a real ratio, probably better said as 2:3. The Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Code) Book VI, §154 now lets the Bundestag set the
replacement rate, currently at 67% of  average net earnings. See W Lamping and FW Rüb, ‘From the Conservative welfare
state to an ‘uncertain something else’: German pension politics in comparative perspective’ (2004) 32(2) Policy & Politics 169,
171. The Social Code, Book VI was completed in 1989, while the other books were completed from 1976 to 2005.
112 European Federation for Retirement Provision,  Annual Report 2011  (2011) 48, state that in 2009, there was €430bn assets
under management from occupational pensions in Germany, compared to €1,869bn in the UK.
113 nb the discourse of  a three pillar pension system is sometimes viewed as having negative connotations, because it was first
publicised in the English speaking world by the World Bank,  Averting  the  Old Age Crisis  (1994),  a  rather hyperbolic,  and
politicised research report which, reflecting the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted a shift towards reliance on the
private sector for pension provision. Despite these negative connotations, the three pillar parlance had been common in
German speaking countries for some years before. 
114 This section duplicates text used for the common story on employee participation in corporate governance, found in E
McGaughey, ‘The codetermination bargains: the history of  German corporate and labour law’ (2015 LSE Law, Society and
Economy Working Papers 10/2015, part 3(1)
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solidarity that guilds and unions promoted since the middle ages.115 Legally, it began with the
Revolutions  of  March  1848,  as  social  instability  culminated  in  the  German  industrial
revolution.116 Mechanised production in urban factories had outcompeted old work traditions,
forcing people to search the cities for employment. Often work was scarce, and by 1847 food
shortages greeted the work shortages when over 200 riots broke out across the German Länder.
For example, three days of  rioting at potato stalls  and bakeries  near Berlin University’s  Law
Faculty had to be quelled by the military.117 In February 1848, Germans heard news that the
French  had  launched  a  revolt  and  in  March  they  followed,  demanding  a  common,  elected
Parliament in the Paulskirche of Frankfurt. The Fursten, princes and despots were startled enough
that they let the vote happen. 
Among the new members of  Parliament was a Saxon textile factory owner named Carl
Degenkolb. His business was printed cloth (Kattundruck) which used the sort of  machinery that
had acutely affected pre-mechanical craft work. His industry had been notable before the March
Revolution (or Vormärz) for the sprouts of  participatory social institutions at work, particularly
saving schemes or Kassen118 for sickness, death and occasionally old age.119 Degenkolb had come
to the view that workers, who otherwise had no property to make a living, needed to participate
in the functioning of  the economy as much as in political activities.120 Factories should not be
governed arbitrarily by an owner or employer, but by consent and law.121
Over the Frankfurt  Parliament’s  short  span,  Degenkolb allied himself  to the majority
liberal  faction.122 On  24  May  1848  it  convened  an  economic  committee  to  propose  a  new
business  law.  Degenkolb’s  ideas  did  not  win  majority  support,  but  he  and  a  minority  still
composed a draft, released on 12 January 1849. It would have required councils in every German
business district, with representatives chosen by factory committees. Among other things, they
would ‘design regulations of  the factory pension schemes and their administration’. 123 The factory
115 HJ Teuteberg,  Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung (1961) 118-119. Teuteberg’s work, a  History of  Industrial Codetermination,
remains the premiere historical treatment up to the year 1916.
116 EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of  Capital 1848-1875 (1975) ch 1 and EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of  Revolution 1789-1848 (1962) ch 16.
117 M Gailus, ‘Food Riots in Germany in the Late 1840s’ (1994) 145 Past & Present 164-167 and 184-185. The ‘potato revolution’
began at a stall in Gendarmenmarkt, after the lady who owned the stall raised her prices. She ran to seek refuge, around the
back of  the Berlin University’s Law Faculty, to a bakery at 44 Charlottenstrasse (now the site of  the Berlin State Library)
which was also subsequently attacked and demolished by the rioters.
118 My translation of  ‘Kasse’  as ‘scheme’ is not completely accurate. A literal translation is ‘cache’, but this hardly sits well in
English. A better word is simply ‘fund’, but in 2002 a vehicle called a Pensionsfond was created, and its legal distinction to a
Pensionskasse means that we cannot use the word ‘fund’ twice for different things.
119 Teuteberg (1961) 164-175
120 HJ Teuteberg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in Deutschland’ (1960) 11 Soziale
Welt 69-82
121 C Degenkolb, Entwurf  einer Fabrik-Gewerbe-Ordnung. Dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Ausschusse von seinem Mitgliede Degenkolb (1848) 10 ff.
This is found in CD Haßler,  Verhandlungen der deutschen verfassungsgebenden Reichsversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main (1848-1849)
Band 2, 921 ff, as it is reproduced by Teuteberg (1961) 109 
122 Known as the Casino-Fraktion. The name derived from the name of  their meeting hall, rather than any gambling tendencies.
123 Entwurf  einer Gewerbeordnung für das deutsche Reich 1849 §45 ‘Dem Fabrikrate stehen zu... 5. die Entwerfung der Statuten
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committees would be one-third elected by workers, and two-thirds the employer.124 This was part
of  a general plan for economic participation. Work councils were also to have powers over health
care schemes, working hours, notice periods for dismissals, regulation of  the number of  trainees,
and mediating  disputes  with  employers.  Everything  was  linked  to  a  system of  regional  and
national representation of  workers in the country’s economic affairs.125 Because they only held a
third of  votes,  workers would be outvoted on any issue,  and because voice was indirect  the
council would always be employer controlled. Nevertheless, this was the first law ever written for
economic participation in general, and participatory pensions in particular. 126
By the summer of  1849 the German aristocracy had seen the new constitution that the
Paulskirche  in Frankfurt wanted, with its displeasing guarantees of  civil and political rights.127 It
pulled parliamentary  representatives  back to the  Länder,  imprisoned or  executed troublesome
opponents, and had military troops break up the rest. Degenkolb returned quietly to his Saxon
business,  but  he  determined  to  implement  his  proposals  personally.  With  three  like  minded
industrialists in his area,128 Degenkolb agreed a business constitution, configured with only slight
differences  to  the  minority  draft,  which  included  worker  representation  in  pension
management.129 The  historian  Hans  Jürgen  Teuteberg,  in  his  foundational  study  of
codetermination,  found  no  archival  detail  beyond  the  statute  on  how  the  plan  played  out
practically,  but  believed  it  remained in  force  until  Degenkolb  passed  away  in  1862. 130 These
primeval roots of  participatory pensions were very isolated in a world where only the privileged
lived to retire, or have an old age pension. Many other industrialists cared for worker welfare, and
were improving. Some even sympathised with worker involvement.131 But the small, slow start
was  far  less  of  a  problem  for  the  world’s  first  general  codetermination  plan,  than  the
overwhelming challenge of  another ideal.
Alfred Krupp and his family best represented that challenge. The Kruppian philosophy
was to sincerely display a sense of  obligation to the workforce, and absolutely deny workers the
right  to  self-determination.  ‘No  other  great  industrialist,’  wrote  historian  Wolf  Schneider,
der Fabrikpensionskassen und deren Verwaltung.’ (Draft Business Ordinance for the German Empire 1849)
124 Entwurf  1848 §42
125 Teuteberg (1961) 109-111 and Teuteberg (1960) 11(1-2) Soziale Welt 69, 77-78
126 Teuteberg (1961) 111, ‘eines der bedeutendsten Dokumente in der Geschichte der deutschen Mitbestimmung’ or ‘one of  the
most significant documents in the history of  German codetermination.’
127 Paulskirchenverfassung or Verfassung des deutschen Reiches (28 March 1849) 
128 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 78, the four groups of  owners and businesses were Carl Degenkolb who owned Bodemer
& Co.; Adolph Michael and CF Mitscherlich and  Danneberg & Sohn; Gustav Ehrenberg and Carl Richter and  Ehrenberg &
Richter; and Jacob Bodemer Jr and Jacob Bodemer Jr.
129 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 79 extracts the relevant provisions.
130 Teuteberg (1960) 11 Soziale Welt 69, 82, footnote 15. Teuteberg (1961) 212-221.
131 Teuteberg (1961) 199, provides a list of  examples of  participatory plans from the later 19th century.
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‘esteemed the personal freedom of  his workers so little and their material well-being so highly.’ 132
Krupp had provided health care by 1836, aptly evidenced by a company account entry reading
‘26 Nov 1836,  2 Talers of  punishment money donated to the sickness scheme’.133 A revised
scheme for illness and death benefits ran from 1853, and did include worker voice of  a sort. The
statute  provided  that  there  would be six  worker  deputies  elected  (no doubt after  vetting)  to
manage the scheme, but that Krupp himself  had the same number of  votes as a third of  the
workers, and that Krupp would be the scheme president.134 He could do anything that he liked. 
In these years, immediately following the March Revolution’s failure, Prussian law had led
trade unions on with promises of  freedom of  association, but then prohibited it again in 1854. 135
While the  workforce could not  organise and take collective action,  the moral  case for social
welfare programmes was stronger. Krupp continued to introduce various schemes as his business
expanded, with a bakery in 1858, housing from 1870, and subsidies for buying life insurance in
1877.136 But any sign of  workforce dissent was punished. Already in 1848, the last of  Krupp’s
eight original workers had been dismissed for ‘signs of  insubordination’. The company libraries
prohibited literature of  the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (Social Democrat Workers Party) and
even the Zentrumspartei (Centre Party). When strikes took place on the Ruhr in 1872, Krupp said it
would be a personal affront if  anyone joined, and immediately dismissed anyone tainted with
social democracy.137 Everything he believed was summed up during a national election campaign
on 15 March 1877, when Krupp wrote the following to his workers.
Despite repeated warnings, the spirit of  social democracy seems to keep wanting to creep
into a number of  you. It is pernicious, and every reasonable person must attempt to fight
it,  the employee just as much as the employer…. That which has been earned by an
industrious,  thrifty  family,  that  which a  generation has  honestly  acquired,  is  what  the
indolent, the capricious are trying to snatch, to make the incompetent and the capable
equal… I must bear the losses of  the business alone, and so the profits are also rightfully
mine, because I have earned them with my strength and my diligence.138 
132 W  Schneider,  Essen  -  das  Abenteuer  einer  Stadt  (1963)  233,  British  Library  (1978)  233,  ‘Kein  anderer  Anführer  des
Industriezeitalters hat die persönliche Freiheit seiner Arbeiter so gering- und ihr leibliches Wohl so hochgeachtet.’
133 Teuteberg (1961) 192
134 Teuteberg (1961) 193
135 Federal Decision (13 July 1854)
136 EC McCreary, ‘Social Welfare and Business: The Krupp Welfare Program, 1860-191’  (1968)  42(1) The Business History
Review 24-49, 31-38
137 McCreary (1968) 42(1) The Business History Review 24, 47-48
138 Extracted by W Schneider, Essen - Abenteuer einer Stadt (Econ Verlag 1963, new edn 1978), 232, ‘Trotz wiederholter Warnung
scheint sich unter einem Theiler von Euch der Geist der Sozialdemokratie einschleichen zu wollen. Dieser Geist aber ist
verderblich, und jeder Verständige muß ihn bekämpfen, der Arbeiter so gut wie der Arbeitgeber… Was eine fleißige sparsame
Familie, was eine Generation ehrlich erworben hat, soll der Faule, Liederliche sich aneignen dürfen und der Unfähige dem
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Krupp thought that nobody had a right to participate in business management but the leader
because the owner ‘must bear the losses’. The losses that workers might suffer when dismissed
were irrelevant. Krupp’s risk and ‘diligence’ led him to believe that he alone ‘earned’ every mark
of  profit, and all control, absolutely. 
The Kruppian view had the upper hand while workers’ bargaining power was suppressed.
For example, when laws suppressing freedom of  association were briefly liberalised, there was a
wave of  strikes. Siemens & Halske was affected, and it responded by establishing a Pensionskasse
(pension  scheme)  in  1872.  The  administration  included  workforce  representatives,  though
Siemens  management  appointed  the  chairman  and  could  veto  decisions.139 Krupp  himself
established a separate company scheme for retirement and pensions from 1885. It was linked to
the  number  of  years  of  service,  and  to  income.140 But  Krupp  allowed no  more  scope  for
participation. Any pension money built up, under this tradition of  thought, was aligned with the
prevailing view of  contractual benefits: workers only had rights if  the employers allowed them. 
Krupp’s social conservatism was ‘tainted’ with some altruism, but there was considerable
self-interest in the power of  social plans and pensions to promote loyalty and sanction disloyalty.
Workers lost their benefits if  they left the business.141 The idea had caught the attention of  a
rising politician, who in 1864 scheduled a visit to Alfred’s factory. After that, Krupp and Otto
von  Bismarck  cultivated  a  personal  relationship.142 No  direct  evidence  exists  that  Bismarck
modelled the new welfare state after Krupp, but when put into action from 1883 with health
insurance, and from 1889 with old age and disability insurance, it bore remarkable similarities. 143
The Age and Invalidity Act 1889 linked the statutory pension’s income in retirement to income
during a contributor’s career. The amount that one received in old age was proportionate to the
contributions one had made.144 Unlike the UK’s later scheme the German state pension was never
a minimum safety net, but like an earnings related contract. 
Bismarck’s  political  objectives were even more similar.  Like Krupp’s,  Bismarck’s  social
Tüchtigen gleich gestellt werden… Wie ich den Verlust allein tragen muß, so ist auch der Gewinn mein von Rechtswegen,
denn ich habe ihn erworben mit meiner Kraft und meiner Sorge.’
139 See C Conrad, Erfolgsbeteiligung und Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer bei Siemens (1986) 99. E Reidegeld, Staatliche Sozialpolitik in
Deutschland: Von den Ursprungen bis zum Untergang des Kaiserreiches 1918 (2006) 178.
140 EC McCreary (1968) 33-34. Originally linked to disability benefits, it was linked to wages and years worked, financed with 1%
worker and 0.5% employer contributions. Office workers allowed in in 1890, and in 1895 it was available for any worker over
65 or with 40 years’ service.
141 However a court held that accrued pension benefits could not simply be cancelled after 1887. See N Muhlen, Incredible Krupps:
the rise, fall, and comeback of  Germany’s industrial family (1959) 66-67.
142 Bundesarchiv, Nachlass Bismarck, FC 2936-3052, (21) Alfred Krupp 
143 Gesetz betreffend die Alters- und Invaliditätsversicherung (24 May 1889) RGBl I S 97. By this time, Alfred Krupp had died
and so in 1887 the business had passed to his son Friedrich. 
144 Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung (1 January 1891) Contributions were originally 1.7% of  one’s salary.
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programme professed some concern  for  workers’  welfare.  But  an even weightier  reason for
reform was that Bismarck had fully backed the Sozialistengesetze (the Socialist Acts) from 1878 to
1888, continuing the Prussian bans on trade unions and social democratic publications. Social
programmes including pensions were useful  to outflank the SPD, and divide social  democrat
supporters. ‘Whoever has a pension for his old age,’ said Bismarck in 1881, 
is far more content and far easier to handle than one who has no such prospect. Look at
the difference between a private servant and a servant in the chancelery or at court; the
latter will put up with much more, because he has a pension to look forward to.145
The opportune moment to enact old age welfare reform came as repeal of  the Socialist Acts was
forced. The appeasement of  the working classes was necessary, said Bismarck in appeal to the
Conservative  Members  of  the  Reichstag,  to  prevent  their  organisation.  Taking  after  Krupp,
Bismarck  embodied  the  ethic  of  social  conservatism.  Otto  Kahn-Freund,  as  chapter  3(1)(b)
outlined, later described this ethic as placing ‘the existentially isolated, uncombined individuals of
the working class under the social protection of  the state’.146 But this was a state of  protection
without participation, where workers were seen but not heard. 
(b) Development of  occupational pensions
Bismarckian social conservatism – paternalist concern for material wellbeing, denial of  collective
action – persisted in the way companies provided pensions. Small employers usually gave a direct
promise (a Direktzusage) to workers that upon retirement a pension would be paid from company
funds. Employers still took contributions from workers, so that deductions showed up in people’s
pay slips. Perhaps the company built  up pension reserves (Pensionsruckstellungen) on its balance
sheet. If  so, employers used the money as if  it were theirs. German private law, at least as a
starting point,  appeared to endorse the practice, because it  gave no automatic recognition of
beneficial ownership.147 
After World War One, the Social Democrats emerged as political victors. Like in the UK
and the US, Germany began a programme to build industrial democracy. The inspiration came
from a mass-collective agreement, signed between the federation of  trade unions and the leading
145 Quoted in AJP Taylor, Bismarck: the man and the statesman (1955) 202-203
146 O Kahn Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of  the Reich Labour Court - A Critical Examination of  the Practice of  the Reich Labour
Court’  (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R Lewis and J Clark (ed)  Labour  Law and Politics in the  Weimar Republic  (Social Science
Research Council 1981) ch 3, 108-111
147 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1900 §§1008 ff  and 941 ff, for example, on fractions of  ownership and cooperative obligations for
its use, could achieve identical effects to a trust, but it was a very different thing for the institution to be familiar.
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employer association, known as the Stinnes-Legien Abkommen. But unlike the UK, which relied on
the Ministry of  Labour’s discretion, and the US, which similarly relied on the existence of  the
War  Labor  Board,  Germany  wrote  worker  participation  rights  into  legislation.  The  Weimar
Constitution 1919 enshrined the principle in article 165 that workers had a right to participate in
the  country’s  entire  field  of  economic  development.  Then,  the  Betriebsrätegesetz  1920  (Work
Councils Act 1920148) §66 required that worker elected councils participate in a host of  workplace
matters, including ‘in the administration of  Pensionskassen and housing as well as other company
welfare facilities’.149 
What was a welfare ‘facility’? Some academics, notably Hueck and Nipperdey, developed
the view that there was no ‘facility’ when a company made a direct promise, the Direktzusage, to
workers for their pensions, and kept the money for themselves. 150 This sat consistently with the
jurisprudence in the 1920s and early 1930s of  the Reichsarbeitsgericht (the Empire’s Labour Court)
that gradually hollowed out the effect of  codetermination laws.151 By contrast, Georg Flatow and
Otto Kahn-Freund wrote that the law’s purpose was to ‘constrain the one-sided distribution and
administration  rights  of  the  employer,  and  so  the  potential  for  arbitrary  conduct,  by  giving
employees the ability to participate.’152 The courts themselves continued to hold that pensions
could  be  revoked  by  employers  from workers  who  left  or  were  dismissed,153 approving  the
employer’s  power  to  compel  loyalty  to  the  company.  On the  other  hand,  the  courts passed
pathbreaking  decisions  holding  that  if  the  substance  of  a  contract  for  work  involved  a
relationship  of  dependency,  then  the  form  of  contract  was  irrelevant.154 This  purposive
commitment meant employment rights could not be avoided. In sum, in its regulation of  private
relations, the judiciary clutched to a paternalist tradition of  worker protection, and was ever more
hostile to collective voice. 
If  codetermination rights were only available for Pensionkassen and not when the employer
paid  pensions  directly,  the  regulatory  and  tax  framework  was  not  favourable.  After  the
148 This is often translated as the ‘Works Councils Act’, but in fact ‘works’ is a grammatically misguided translation, because the
‘s’ in ‘Betriebsrat’ denotes the genetive tense, rather than a plural of  ‘Betriebe’. Another accurate, but obviously less elegant,
translation could therefore be ‘Councils of  Work Act’.
149 Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 (RGBl S 147) §66 ‘Der Betriebsrat hat die Aufgabe:’ … nr 9, ‘an der Verwaltung von Pensionskassen
und Werkswohnungen sowie sonstiger Betriebswohlfahrtseinrichtungen mitzuwirken; bei letzteren jedoch nur, sofern nicht
bestehende, für die Verwaltung maßgebende Satzungen oder bestehende Verfügungen von Todes wegen entgegenstehen oder
eine anderweitige Vertretung der Arbeitnehmer vorsehen’.
150 A Hueck and HC Nipperdey, Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts (2nd edn 1930) Bd II, §66 Nr 9. 
151 O Kahn Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of  the Reich Labour Court - A Critical Examination of  the Practice of  the Reich Labour
Court’  (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R Lewis and J Clark (ed)  Labour  Law and Politics in the  Weimar Republic  (Social Science
Research Council 1981) ch 3, 108, 143-145. 
152 G Flatow and O Kahn-Freund, Betriebsrätegesetz (1931) 348, ‘Das Gesetz will bei allen Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen “das einseitige
und deshalb der Gefahr der Willkür ausgesetzte Verfügungs- und Verwaltungsrecht des Arbeitgebers durch Einräumung von
Mitverwaltungsbefugnissen an die Arbeitnehmer beschränken” (vgl. RAG v. 21.6.30, Bensh. Samml. Bd 9, 331).’ 
153 Reichsarbeitsgericht Entscheidung (25 November 1929) Bensheimer Sammlung, Band 8, Nr 71, S 352 
154 Reichsarbeitsgericht Entscheidung (15 Febraury 1930) Bensheimer Sammlung, Band 8, Nr 92, S 451
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Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 1901 (Insurance Supervision Act 1901) the  Pensionskassen  fell under the
Insurance  Supervision  Authority,  insofar  as  they created  legal  rights  for  the  contributing
member.155 The Act envisaged that a  Kasse  would be constituted as an  Aktiengesellschaft  (public
company) or a Versicherungsverein auf  Gegenseitigkeit (mutual assurance association) and it required
licensing and prudent funding. The rules were seen as onerous by employers,156 and in any event
they did little to prevent the post-war hyperinflation wiping away people’s savings. 
The incentive to establish a  Kasse  was temporarily increased by the Körperschaftsteuergesetz
1920  (Corporation Tax Act 1920) as §2 Nr 5 gave exemptions from corporate tax so long as
money was secured for the purpose of  the  Kasse.157 The object was to shift money out of  the
employer’s coffers, where it could be used to finance the employer, and into schemes that were
worker codetermined.  The policy was later halted by the  DM Bilanzgesetz 1949 (Deutschmark
Accounting  Act  1949).158 With  the  justification  of  encouraging  reconstruction,  this  allowed
employers to deduct tax from pension money that they saved up and used for their own ends.159
The regulatory and tax incentives switched to be against employers putting money into pension
schemes where workers’ had codetermination rights.
Meanwhile, the inter-war decades added a third and fouth pension type. The third came in
1928  when,  like  to  the  UK,  US  insurance  firms  imported  the  direct  insurance  contract
(Direktversicherung) made for employers who wanted a collective policy. It instantly received the
same tax privileges as other pension plans.160 The fourth was introduced by the government in
1934, apparently to limit a growing problem of  companies manipulating their profit figures when
they held onto pension money.  From the  Körperschaftssteuergesetz 1934  only schemes with legal
capacity,  separate  from  the  employer,  could  benefit  from  tax  exemptions. 161 The
Körperschaftsteuerdurchfuhrungsverordnung 1935 (Corporation Tax Implementation Order 1935) put
this  into  effect.162 However  the  Insurance  Supervisory  Authority  complained  that  it  lacked
155 Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 1901 (12 May 1901) RGBl S 139. See M Tigges, Geschichte und Entwicklung der Versicherungsaufsicht
(1985) 77-88.
156 H Kempkes, Die betrieblich Altersversorgung in Deutschland und in der Schweiz und ihre Bedeutung fur die Finanzierung von Unternehmungen
(Stehle 1964) 20
157 KStG 1920 (30 March 1920) RGBl I 1920, 393, §2 Nr 5, exempt were ‘rechtsfähige Pensions-, Witwen-, Waisen-, Sterbe-,
Unterstützungs- und sonstige Hilfskassen für Fälle der Not oder der Arbeitslosigkeit; das gleiche gilt für nicht rechtsfähige
Kassen dieser Art, wenn die dauernde Verwendung der Einkünfte für die Zwecke der Kassen gesichert ist’. Also KStG 1922
(12 May 1922) RGBl 1922, 472, §2 and KStG 1925 (10 August 1925) RGBl I 1925, 208, §9 Abs 1 Nr 10.A Weiß, ‘Begriff  und
Entwicklung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung’ in Handbuch der betrieblichen Altersversorgung (München 1955) 17.
158 DM-Bilanzgesetz 1949 §29(4). See now Einkommensteuergesetz 1934 §6a, first introduced by Steuerordnungsgesetz 1954
(BStBl I 1954, 575)
159 G Wiedemann, Die Historische Entwicklung der Betrieblichen Altersversorgung unter Besonderer Berucksichtigung des Arbeitsrechtes  (1990)
71-73
160 S Hubrich and T Tivig, Betriebsrenten im Altersversicherungssystem Deutschlands : eine Betrachtung aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht  (2006) 33,
fn 55, ‘Die DV kam 1928 aus den USA nach Deutschland und erhielt sofort steuerliche Anerkennung; ihre konrete gesetliche
Ausgestaltung erfolgte jedoch erst 1974 im BetrAVG.’
161 KStG 1934 §4 Abs 1 Nr 7 (16 October 1934) RGBl I 1934, 1031.
162 Körperschaftsteuerdurchführungsverordnung 1935, RGBl I 1935, 163, §§13-16.
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jurisdiction over schemes where pension rights were not guaranteed.163 The solution, avoiding
insurance  supervision,  was  that  in  fourth  kind  of  pension,  the  Unterstutzungskasse164 (support
scheme), an employer would guarantee payments to workers, rather than the scheme itself  being
the guarantor.165 A support scheme could be constituted as a civil  law association (eingetragene
Verein), a private company (GmbH) or a stipend (Stiftung). Without insurance supervision, it could
also invest all the money back into the employer. By 1934, however, for member participation this
had all become completely irrelevant. The Nazi dictatorship had taken over and its first act was to
demolish all forms of  worker voice. Pension participation and everything else was replaced with
the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF, the German Workers’ Front) the nationalised Nazi union. 
After  the  Second  World  War,  codetermination  was  successfully  reintroduced  but  the
Bismarckian  ethic  of  pension  management  persisted.  The  Betriebsverfassungsgesetz  1952  (Work
Constitution Act 1952) and its successor in 1972 retained the language of  the social ‘facility’.166
As occupational pensions slowly grew in size and importance, employers retained their previous
practices of  withdrawing pensions from resigning or dismissed employees. In principle this was
endorsed by a conservative  Bundesarbeitsgericht  (Federal Labour Court),167 now presided over by
Hans Carl Nipperdey.168 By the early 1970s, however, too many cases transpired where employers
had arbitrarily removed workers’ pension rights.169 The  Betriebsrentengesetz 1974 (Work Pensions
Act 1974) was passed to codify and improve the law, primarily by requiring that all pension rights
vested after a certain period of  service, and insuring against insolvent schemes. It also codified
the  four  existing  types  of  plan:  the  external  Pensionskasse  and  Unterstutzungskasse, and  the
contractual Direktzusage and Direkversicherung.170 
163 This is the interpretation of  events given by E Heißmann, Betriebliche Unterstutzungskassen (3rd edn 1966) 4
164 The word  Unterstutzungskasse  was commonly used before 1934, back to the earliest Prussian social schemes. Only with the
1934 Act did the term acquire a legal relevance.
165 See  H Kempkes,  Die  betrieblich  Altersversorgung  in  Deutschland  und  in  der  Schweiz  und  ihre  Bedeutung  fur  die  Finanzierung  von
Unternehmungen (Stehle 1964) 22, and S Hubrich and T Tivig, Betriebsrenten im Altersversicherungssystem Deutschlands: eine Betrachtung
aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht (2006) 58, Körperschaftssteuergesetz 1934 ‘bestimmte, dass betriebliche Unterstützungsfonds als
rechtlich  selbständige  Einheiten  aus  dem  Unternehmen  auszugliedern  seien.  Bis  1934  durften  Unternehmen  zur
Ausfinanzierung der BAV nichtrechtsfähige Unterstützungsfonds gründen, sodass die Beiträge im Unternehmen blieben, aber
stets vollständig als Betriebsausgaben steuerfrei geltend gemacht werden konnten. Als Folge des Gesetzes wird deshalb seit
1934 zwischen einer PK und einer U-Kasse unterschieden’.
166 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 §87 Nrs 8 and 10
167 BAGE 3, 332, 337 (14 December 1956) = 1 AZR 29/55 = DB 1957 S 192 = AP Nr 3 zu §611 BGB Fürsorgepflicht. This
held that employers could cancel pension benefits of  employees who left before retirement, as part of  freedom of  contract. It
involved a former Nazi Party member being dismissed.
168 One of  Nipperdey’s  lasting  contributions  to  labour  law has  been  the  horizontal  application  of  human rights.  He  had
supported Hans Kelsen against expulsion from Cologne University, but was also a member of  the Akademie fur Deutsches Recht
since its founding in 1933, and he expound Nazi labour law through further editions of  his commentaries, up to A Hueck,
HC Nipperdey and R Dietz, Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit, Kommentar (4th edn 1943). An example of  his unemotional
assent to human rights violations is his academic approval in RAG 21:191, for a case where an officer of  a dissolved trade
union was dismissed without notice because otherwise the Nazis could not realise their goals, RAG 44/34 (4 July 1934)
21:188-191 No. 37. 
169 BAGE (10 March 1972) 3 AZR 278/71 = BB 1972, S 1005 = DB 1972 S 1486. This reversed the previous case law to hold
that withdrawing pension benefits for long term workers would contravene the principle of  good faith under BGB §242.
170 Betriebsrentengesetz 1974 §§1-1b
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Immediately  after  the  1974 Act  the  Bundesarbeitsgericht,  now presided over by  Gerhard
Müller,  held that  the codetermination  right in  the 1972 Act,  §87(1)  Nr 8 did not  extend to
pension money taken by employers,  or  insurance policies.171 These pensions forms were  not
enough of  a ‘facility’,172 although the Kassen were.173 The court referred to two previous decisions
from Nipperdey’s court in the 1950s, which concerned canteens and food prices at work,174 which
effectively  endorsed  Nipperdey’s  own  1930s  commentary.  With  this,  Müller  managed  to
extrapolate a ‘consistent line of  precedent’ (ständige Rechtsprechung) that a facility requires ‘a certain
own  organisation...  organisation  which  renders  some  service  other  than  a  pure  payment’.
Curiously, the court referred to Flatow and Kahn-Freund’s commentary from 1931 for support,
but in the relevant pages Flatow and Kahn-Freund were clear there was no judgment yet on what
was a facility. They viewed a facility to require some independence, but not necessarily legal, so
that one off  payments did not count.175 To them the law’s purpose to constrain arbitrary conduct
by employers was the crucial factor,176 and so it is very doubtful that Müller’s interpretation of  the
law had supported the legislation’s aims. Whatever purpose the Federal Labour Court thought it
was  pursuing  in  1975,  it  concluded  that  the  Direktzusage  and  Direktversicherung were
codetermination free, even where reserves were built up.177 In effect it was continuing a weak
form of  the social conservative ideal.
Why  did  trade  unions  not  push  for  all  pensions  to  be  codetermined?  A  collective
agreement could always secure pensions in the Kasse form, and even greater participation rights.178
The  simple  answer  is  that  they  were  more  pre-occupied  with  improving  the  state  pension.
Working  under  a  relative  lack  of  scrutiny,  the  Bundesarbeitsgericht added  that  the  right  of
codetermination extended only to affairs concerning the savings of  workers’ own money, and not
to  money  belonging  to  other  beneficiaries.179 It  was  creatively  reasoned  that  if  retired
beneficiaries’ interests were at stake, the solution was not that those people would gain a voice,
171 The Direktzusage and Direktversicherung, or direct promise and insurance, methods fall under the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz
1972 §87(1) Nr 10, which confers a right to codetermine wages’ principles, but does not extend to the accumulated property
in the company.
172 The German word is ‘Einrichtung’ which literally means something that is ‘set up’.
173 BAGE 27, 194 (12 June 1975) 3 ABR 13/74, DB 1975, 1559 = AP Nr 1 zu §87.
174 BAG AP Nr 5 zu §56 BetrVG [Bl 2 R, 3]; AP Nr 3... BAG 15, 136 [139] = A{ Nr 6 .... BAG 17, 316 [318-319]
175 G Flatow and O Kahn-Freund, Betriebsrätegesetz (Springer 1931) 348, ‘Die “Einrichtung” setzt eine gewisse (nicht rechtliche)
Selbständigkeit  voraus:  ein  für  einen  einmaligen  vorübergehenden  Zweck,  z.B.  ein  Fest,  gestifteter  Betrag  ist  keine
“Einrichtung”.’
176 Flatow and Kahn-Freund (1931) 348, ‘Das Gesetz will  bei allen Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen “das einseitige und deshalb der
Gefahr  der  Willkür  ausgesetzte  Verfügungs-  und  Verwaltungsrecht  des  Arbeitgebers  durch  Einräumung  von
Mitverwaltungsbefugnissen an die Arbeitnehmer beschränken” (vgl. RAG v. 21.6.30, Bensh. Samml. Bd 9, 331).’ 
177 BAGE 27, 194 (12 June 1975) ‘Ruhegeldordnungen, deren Leistungen nicht über das Sondervermögen abgewickelt wurden,
betrachtete  man  als  mitbestimmungsfrei,  und  zwar  auch  dann,  wenn  für  sie  Rückstellungen  gebildet  oder
Rückdeckungsversicherungen abgeschlossen wurden...’
178 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 §87(1)
179 BAGE 60, 78 (25 October 1988) 3 AZR 483/86  
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but that current employees would lose theirs. Moreover it was said that if  a multi-employer plan
were established, the right to codetermination would disappear because codetermination rights
only extended to the affairs of  the employees’ own workplace.180 These issues could be avoided if
a Kasse were constituted as a mutual assurance association, where all contributing members would
by  default  have  a  vote.181 But  in  practice,  the  form  remained  dependent  on  negotiation  by
employers and a trade union. The court’s interpretation of  the 1972 Act stood in opposition to
the tradition that German legislation had forged. Somehow, Degenkolb’s textile factory workers
had more voice in their multi-employer plan of  1855 than the modern German worker in 1975.
By the late 1990s it became apparent that – although workers’ retirement savings could be
appropriated through a Direktzusage – German companies lacked access to the extensive domestic
share  markets  found in  the  Commonwealth  and the  US.  If  more  pension  money  could  be
allocated  into  equity,  then  it  was  thought  this  situation  would  change.182 The  first  group  of
proposals, supported by pension groups and an initial government report, involved reforming the
existing  four  occupational  pension  vehicles,  their  investment  rules,  or  their  structure.183 The
second group  of  proposals,  favoured  by  banks  and  investment  concerns,  was  to  encourage
massive expansion in individual savings accounts.184 This would have ultimately meant a reduction
of  voice,  because  managers  of  mutual  investment  companies  had  been  obliged  to  take  on
responsibility for voting themselves. More than that, under the applicable law, now found in the
Kapitalanlagesetzbuch  2013  (Capital  Investment  Code  2013)  §94,185 investment  companies  were
exempt from seeking authority from policy holders to vote on their behalf.
In the event, the ‘Riester-Rente’ reforms simply introduced a fifth pension vehicle called a
Pensionsfond, or pension fund.186 It would still be subject to insurance supervision.187 It could be
constituted  as  a  mutual  insurance  company  (VVaG),  an  Aktiengesellschaft (AG)  or,  indeed,  a
Societas Europaea (SE). Its hallmark would be complete freedom to invest in company shares. By
2011, 30 Pensionsfonds were established by the largest of  the German companies.188 Curiously, all
180 BAGE 32, 39 (21 June 1979) 3 ABR 3/78, AP VetrVG 1972 §87 Sozialeinrichtung Nr 1. 
181 VAG 1992 §20. The general meeting of  members, however, could be replaced by a representative meeting, §§ 29, 36, 53(2).
182 E Heißmann, P Ahrend, W Förster, N Rößler, Steuerrecht der betrieblichen Altersversorgung (2011) Band 2. Teil 5a, 1-2.
183 Bundesministerium der Finanzen,  Bericht des  Arbeitskreises  “Betriebliche  Pensionsfonds”:  im Auftrag des “Forums Finanzplatz beim
Bundesministerium der Finanzen.” (1998)
184 Bundesverband  deutscher  Banken,  Bundesverband  Deutscher  Investmentgesellschaften  und  Deutsche  Aktien-Institut,
Betriebs-Pensionsfonds - Neue Impulse fur die betriebliche Altersversorgung (1999)
185 Previously the Kapitalanlagegesetz 1986 §10 and the Investmentgesetz 2003 §32
186 For a thorough overview of  political negotiations over the course of  the early 21 st century reforms, see EM Immergut, KM
Anderson and I Schulze, West European Pension Politics (OUP 2007) ch 14, 660-710, 689. Walter Riester was the Social Minister
from 1998  to  2002  who led  through  the  reform of  Rente,  or  pensions,  a  member  of  the  Sozialdemokratische  Partei
Deutschlands, formerly deputy chair of  the union, IG Metall.
187 Betriebsrentengesetz 1974 §1b(3) and Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 1992 §§112-118
188 See BaFin, Gesamtliste aller zugelassenen Versicherungsunternehmen und Pensionsfonds mit Geschäftstätigkeit (18 November 2011) listing
Allianz, Alte Leipziger, Bosch, BVV, Chemie, Deutsche Post, Deutscher, DEVK, ERGO, Generali, HDI-Gerling, HVB Trust,
IBM, Lippische,  LVM, MAN, Nestle,  Nürnberger,  PostBank, R+V Group, R+V,  RWE, Siemens,  Sparkassen,  Swiss Life,
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had opted to constitute as an AG with member representation. The consequence was important
for the voice of  contributing members. The Bundesarbeitsgericht held in 1978 that under the 1972
Act §87(1)  Nr 8 codetermination rights  would extend to a fixed list  of  questions,  unless  an
agreement on organisational representation was reached.189 But if  organisational representation
was agreed, it was not required to be equal, or in the executive. In practice, it seemed the chairs of
Pensionsfonds’ supervisory boards were management representatives. So when a supervisory board
elected the executive, the voice of  beneficiaries were at risk of  exclusion. No new pension fund
utilised  the  SE  to  have  a  codetermined  one  tier  board.190 Employers  participated  most  in
investment choices about their workers’ money.
By 2008 the Direktzusage composed 57 per cent of  pension assets, Direktversicherung was 12
per cent, and the other schemes where there could be codetermination stood at just over 30 per
cent.191 Employers held onto pension money within the company through the Direktzusage system
when they could, built up money on their balance sheets, and used the resulting liquidity for their
own purposes. This risky, undiversified pension strategy had to be insured under the 1974 Act,
which boosted the insurance business, and in turn necessarily increased the costs to employees in
their pension savings. It all had consequences for share ownership statistics.
Telekom, VdW, VIFA, West, and WWK.
189 BAGE 31, 11 (13 July 1978) 3 ABR 108/77. NJW 1979, 2534.
190 See Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company  2157/2001 art 43 and Employee Involvement Directive
2001/86/EC, which lays down no fixed rules, but instead requries negotiation to take place on the transformation to an SE
between the union and the employer. nb, it seems there would be no issue under insurance law, VAG §7a, about qualifications
for the Geschäftsleiter, because the Vorstand in a collective in either an AG or an SE, cf  Aktiengesetz §77 Abs 1, Satz 1, and
compare the opinion in W Blomeyer, K Otto and C Rolfs, Betriebsrentengesetz (5th edn 2010) 372, rn 863.
191 European Federation for Retirement Provision, Annual Report 2011 (2011) 48
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At least three important features stood out, particularly compared to the UK and US figures. 192
First,  while a slow decline of  individually owned shares is apparent, non-financial  companies
(recorded as ‘other enterprises’) had long retained a dominant position, over 40 per cent of  share
ownership in 2004. Independent pension scheme investment (recorded as ‘insurance’) was far
less. Why would German companies have had such a significant propensity to buy into the share
market,193 when companies’ investment in the UK and US was negligible? One reason is that
German companies had access to additional liquidity from pension money, and so part of  the
explanation must be that this facilitated and financed purchase of  shares in other companies.194
This must be why, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the rate of  new equity issues correlated
closely to the increase in pension reserves.195 The impact on relative share ownership was only
further pronounced because of  the income linked state pension. This reduced the overall volume
of  retirement money, and so the German stock market too was smaller. 
The second evident trend, since the mid-1990s and after a decline that can be attributed
to unification, German share markets were globalising. Third, on the face of  it German banks
maintained  an  ownership  ratio  of  under  10  per  cent.  However  the  true  picture  of  banks’
participation in corporate governance is represented by the broken black line at the top of  the
192 At ch 6(1)(b) and ch 6(3)(e) respectively
193 cf  J Franks and C Mayer, ‘Ownership and control of  German corporations’ (2001) 14(4) The Review of  Financial Studies 943
194 H  Kempkes,  Die  betriebliche  Altersversorgung  in  Deutschland  und  in  der  Schweiz  und  ihre  Bedeutung  fur  die  Finanzierung  von
Unternehmungen (Stehle 1964) 
195 M Hauck, ‘The Equity Market in Germany and its Dependency on the System of  Old Age Provisions’ in T Baums et al (eds),
Institutional investors and corporate governance (1994) ch 19, 555, 556
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chart. It shows the proportion of  shares that are in securities deposits, with banks. This statistical
survey of  German share ownership was discontinued after 2004 for reasons that are unclear.
Nevertheless, banks were able to decisively influence corporate governance because unless voting
instructions were actively given they could appropriate the votes of  almost all other shareholders.
(c) Origins of  banks’ role in companies 
German  banks  acquired  their  role  in  corporate  governance  through  a  peculiar  interplay  of
stubborn legal doctrine, practical convenience and power. When company shares were first being
issued on a large scale in the 19th century, contract law was unprepared.196 Shares were originally
only transferable without the consent of  the issuing company if  the shares were in ‘name’ form
(Namensaktien). This meant the share certificate stated the holder’s name. When the holder wished
to assign the share to another person, people attached a note to the share certificate. After some
time,  it  became  apparent  that  it  would  be  simpler  for  companies  to  issue  ‘bearer’  shares
(Inhaberaktien) so that the possessor or bearer of  the share certificate would be the owner. 
However before unification in 1871, each German state had its own rules on assignment
of  intangible rights.  If  a share was sold to a person when the seller  lacked a good title (for
instance, because the share was stolen) then the recipient’s title could still be open to challenge.
There was no defence for the bona fide purchaser of  an intangible asset, as shares were originally
deemed to be. Prussia and other states had laws to protect the recipient, 197 but many states had
not.  To overcome the problem for  all  German speaking states,  the  legal  academic  Carl  von
Savigny suggested that shares simply be reconceptualised as tangible assets, for which in all states
a  bona  fide  purchaser  rule  applied.198 The  reasoning  was  simply  that  the  Wertpapier (share
certificate) was not just the share’s tangible manifestation but was the share itself  (rather than a
share being an intangible bundle of  rights, like entitlement to dividends or the vote). But if  the
share certificate itself  was the share, then owners needed to keep their shares safely deposited
somewhere. Banks offered this service. 
Once the banks began to collect people’s shares for safe keeping, the system developed a
logic of  its own. The hyperinflation that followed World War One led banks to pool all their
deposited shares with one another. While previously banks had kept their own separate deposit
facilities, and shifted share certificates at the end of  the week to reflect their customers’ trades,
196 E Micheler, ‘English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence’ (2007) 122 LQR 251, 272-277. See also
E Micheler, ‘The Legal Nature of  Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law’ in L Gullifer and J Payne,  Intermediated
Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart 2010) ch 5
197 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten 1794, Title 15, §§45-47
198 C Savigny, Das obligationenrecht als theil des heutigen römischen rechts (1853) see D Einsele, Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht (1995) 5; PU
1544 E 35.
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this paper pushing system simply became too cumbersome and costly given the wild monetary
depreciation.  In  1925,  the  Berlin  banks  led  the  way  in  seeking  their  clients’  approval  (and
regretfully  informing  that  charges  might  rise  otherwise)  for  shares  to  be  put  in  a  central
depository where trades would be effected simply  by changing the  banks’  own files.  Like in
Berlin, deposit centres were created in Dresden, Essen, Frankfurt and Stuttgart.  The system’s
legality was backed with the force of  a specially commissioned ‘expert’ opinion.199 Two solicitors,
Georg Opitz and Hans Schultz,  assured the banking community that even though the actual
owner’s share certificate had passed through the hands of, first, their bank, and second, their
bank’s  bank,  they  still  maintained  ‘constructive  possession’  of  the  share,  and  thus  were  still
covered by the bona fide purchaser rule applicable to ‘tangible’ share certificates.200 The result was
that while ‘bearer’ shares were still legally necessary, the share really needed to be borne by the
bank.
(d) Bankenmacht
By the mid 1920s, with most of  Germany’s shares under its supervision, the banks began to offer
voting services to their customers. If  their customers did not wish to vote at company meetings,
the banks would do it for them. They got authority for doing it in standard form contracts, with
standard business terms (allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen) when opening accounts. Up to this point,
the courts had held consistently that a shareholder could not contract away her voting rights,
primarily because it was thought that such shareholder agreements adversely affected the relative
rights of  other shareholders.201 But in 1923, the Reichsgericht had a sudden change of  heart. Just as
the banks were accumulating votes on an unprecedented scale it was held that a shareholder’s
position as a member of  a corporation did not impede their ‘freedom of  contract’ to make their
votes be governed exclusively by the law of  obligations: and that was so even if  the obligation
came in a standard form.202 
In  1925,  the  Reichsgericht went  further,  adding  that  only  damages,  and  not  specific
performance, could be awarded as a remedy for a breach of  a voting agreement.203 The banks did
199 Micheler (2007) 122 LQR 251, 279, ‘Rather than reverting to a reform of  the law of  assignment, which would have reflected
current market practice more accurately, the concept of  possession was stretched to accommodate change. As a result paper
documents were immobilised but not abolished.’
200 G Opitz and H Schultz (15 May 1925) 24 Bankarchiv, Special Issue, Nr 16
201 See the Reichsgericht Judgment (16 March 1904) RGZ 57, 205, 207, invalidated an agreement among the shareholders of  a
close GmbH because it was incompatible with public policy and the core functions of  a corporation. One could not restrict
freedom to vote stock through arbitrary contracts. Reichsgericht Judgment (7 June 1908) RGZ 69, 134, 137, it would restrict
his ability to freely exercise his judgment according to what was in the best interests of  the corporation.
202 RG Urteil (19 June 1923) RGZ 107, 67, 70. See also, RG Urteil (4 November 1927) RGZ 118, 330.
203 RG Urteil (20 November 1925) RGZ 112, 273, 279. See also, RG (10 January 1928) RGZ 119, 386, 390; RG (12 October
1940) RGZ 165, 68, 78. After the reforms in the Aktiengesetz 1965, the Bundesgerichtshof  liberalised the position, in line
with the ordinary law now in the UK or the US, that specific performance may be granted as a remedy. But the BGH began
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acknowledge potential public concern. In 1930 the central banking association publicised that
their members had promised each other they would consult their customers on the use of  votes
two weeks before a general meeting involving contentious issues.204 The legislature’s response was
to  codify  the  practice  of  the  banks.  Was  Johnannes  Zahn,  the  German  Banker  Association
prodigy (like the Doctor Strangelove of  corporate law) lurking in the background? Who knows.
But  the  Aktiengesetz  1937 (Public  Companies  Act  1937)  introduced  a  new §114,  stating  the
maximum period of  authority was fifteen months. Also, banks were not entitled to take authority
for voting through a composite standard form agreement. Authority had to be given separately. A
standard form maybe, but a separate standard form.
Unlike the rules on director elections and shareholder voting, these provisions of  the
Aktiengesetz 1937 reflected, not just the views of  Nazi apparatchiks like Zahn, but also a general
persuasion  of  that  era’s  German  legal  academy.  Subsidising  Bankenmacht was  thought  to  be
tolerable, wrote Frederick Mann, because although it facilitated, 
the evasion of  provisions aiming at a restriction or suspension of  the voting rights of  the
owner, and it gives the banks a predominant influence, it secures the representation of  a
great number of  shares which otherwise would not be represented and which in this
country are represented by proxy.205 
It was acknowledged that banks routinely supported management,206 though this could hardly be
surprising considering who was appointing the management. 
Later commentators have, as with the matter of  elections for directors and shareholder
voting rights, vocally disputed the notion that the  Aktiengesetz 1937 reflected Nazi ideology,207
maybe with an eye to defend the descendant provisions in today’s law. But on this issue, as with
director  elections,  it  seems  irrelevant  which  party  the  ideology  belonged  to.  Just  as  Walter
to authorise specific enforcement, BGH (29 May 1967) BGHZ 48, 163, 172, and BGH (20 January 1983) NJW [1983] 1910,
1911, BGH (27 October 1986) ZIP [1987] 293, 295. They could breach the constitution, but would be lawful as long as they
did not change the organisational structure of  the corporation.
204 Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes (1930) BankA 1930-31, 116, Beschluß ‘daß die Mitglieder unseres
Verbandes  einander  gegenüber  die  Verpflichtung  übernehmen,  an  die  Besitzer  bein  ihnen  hinterlegter  Aktien  eine
ausdrückliche  Anfrage  über  die  Art  der  Ausübung  des  Stimmrechts  zu  richten,  wenn  ihnen  von  einem  anderen
Verbandsmitglied zwei Wochen vor der Generalversammlung die Absicht einer Opposition bekanntgegeben worden war’.
205 FA Mann,  ‘The  New German  Company  Law  and  Its  Background’  (1937)  19  Journal  of  Comparative  Legislation  and
International Law 220, 236-237
206 W Bayer and S Engelke, ‘Die Revision des Aktienrechts durch das Aktiengesetz von 1937’ in W Bayer and M Habersack,
Aktienrecht im Wandel (Mohr Siebeck 2007) Band I, ch 15, rn 13, 629; C Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht (22nd edn Beck 2009) 299
207 eg B Kropff, ‘Reformbestrebung im Nachkriegsdeutschland und die Aktienrechtsreform von 1965’ in Bayer und Habersack,
Aktienrecht im Wandel (2007) ch 16, rn 56, ‘Allerdings spiegelte das AktG 1937, daran bestanden kaum Zweifel, jedenfalls nicht
in seiner Gesamtheit nationalsozialistisches Gedankengut wider. Ging es doch vielfach auf  Reformüberlegungen der Zeit vor
1933 zurück.’
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Rathenau had said shareholders were ignorant and so that supervisory councils were needed, it
had become a common view that bank power was desirable because banks brought prudence.208
Well informed people thought voting rights should be taken altogether from anyone who was not
a ‘responsible’ and ‘entrepreneurial’  shareholder.209 They just happened to be living in a time
when those views prevailed. And so even though the ideas was not cooked up in the cells of
Landsberg Prison, it did not dilute the rotten ideological flavour of  the age. The Aktiengesetz 1937
legitimised the practice that bankers got voting control in corporate governance,  and all  with
other people’s money.210
Following World War Two, the Allied Occupation’s policy had been to de-concentrate
economic power. It broke up the banks by region, so that a hostile government could not so
easily strangle a few heads of  industry, and again disrupt the peace. Once the Allies withdrew,
however,  the  separated  entities  quickly  recombined  to  create  by  September  1952  three  big
banking concerns: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank.211 Possibly to reassure
the public ahead of  this move, the banking association made an announcement in March 1952. It
promised to seek instructions from their depositors for votes on constitutional amendments, for
any qualified majority vote, or if  there was opposition to a vote two weeks before. Moreover if
instructions  were  not  given,  promised  the  banks,  they  would  exercise  the  votes  ‘in  the
shareholders’ best interests’.212 The German Legal Academy was sceptical, and in its discussions
on reforming company law it emphasised the danger of  conflicts of  interest.213 The government
also  appeared  interested  in  testing  alternatives,  and  so  in  the  Volkswagengesetz  1960,  which
governed the partly public car company, with many small investors, banks were prevented from
voting unless they had been given specific  instructions. This led to fewer votes being cast at
meetings,214 but it does not seem to have stopped the company’s global success and innovation.
When the Aktiengesetz 1965 recast company law, its practical changes were minimal. The
new law essentially enacted the voluntary undertakings of  banks from 1952. Under §128, now in
§135(2), banks were to vote in the shareholders’ “best interests”. Quite who would sue, and for
what remedy, to find out what this ‘duty’ actually means has not been answered. It probably
208 e.g. R Rosendorff, ‘The New German Company Law and the English Companies Act, 1929 - II’ (1933) 15(1) JCLIL 112, 113
209 R  Müller-Erzbach,  Umgestaltung  der  Aktiengesellschaft  zur  Kerngesellschaft  verantwortungsvoller  Großaktionäre  (Berlin  1929)  20,
proposed that voting stock should be reserved for “responsible” and entrepreneurial shareholders. Small shareholders should
only be given non-voting stock. Referenced by J Köndgen, ‘Duties of  Banks in Voting Their Clients’ Stock’ in T Baums et al,
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Walter de Gruyter 1994) ch 18, 531-555, 540.
210 Köndgen (1994) 552
211 T Horstmann, Die Alliierten und die deutschen Großbanken: Bankenpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Westdeutschland (Bouvier 1991)
ch 8, ‘Epilog: Die Großbanken kehren zurück’
212 Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Grundsätze uber die Ausubung des Depotstimmrechts (March 1952)
213 Bericht  der  Studienkommission  des  DJT,  Untersuchungen  zur  Reform  des  Unternehmensrechts (1955)  Teil  I,  73,  ‘daß  das
Depotstimmrecht… die Gefahr von Interessenkollisionen in sich birgt’.
214 Schröer, Munchener Kommentar (2nd edn 2004) §135, rn 10
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means nothing. Under §135, authority to vote should be renewed every 15 months, and banks
should seek instructions and disclose how they would vote, with a duty to vote according to its
clients’ wishes, if  expressed. Despite the new sections, public concern did not disappear. In 1978,
the Monopoly Commission’s third report found that in 56 companies where banks held over 5
per cent of  shares, they also controlled over 50 per cent of  the voting rights.215
The  next  major  review  came  in  1979,  chaired  by  Ernst  Geßler.  Coincidentally,  as  a
younger man,  Geßler worked on drafting the 1937 Act.  Geßler’s  report,  entitled  Fundamental
Questions of  the Financial System, was concerned with the general accumulation of  power by banks,
through a combination of  direct ownership of  shares, consequent representation on supervisory
boards,  and  further  acquisition  of  voting  rights  through  depository  services. 216 It  examined
proposals  going  as  far  as  bank  nationalisation,  or  de-concentration,217 and  it  specifically
considered alternatives to the depository vote. Five main options were to (a) limit banks owning
shares  (b)  prohibit  long term voting  authority  for  banks  with  large  stakes  in  companies  (c)
prevent banks voting on specific issues such as board elections, or ratifying breaches of  duty by a
bank nominated director (d) transferring responsibility for voting to a government body, and (e)
requiring that banks create voting advisory bodies, elected by the depositors. The last of  these
appeared to be the only option that would maintain the exercise of  voting power, but transfer it
to those who would be most interested, namely depositors. Specifically, the suggestion was that
Stimmrechtsbeiräte (voting advisory bodies) would have an ‘advisory influence on the exercise of
votes by the bank’,218 in a way that the UK’s proposed ‘Independent Governance Committees’
would.
Geßler’s proposals were not enacted, though studies continued to show banks’ decisive
exercise of  power.219 In 1998, the general practice of  board elections, under the banks’ influence,
was outlined by Friedrich Kübler.
Most shareholders give their proxy to a limited number of  nationally operating banks. For
215 Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 1976/1977: Fortschreitende Konzentration bei Großunternehmen (1978) QR 300 H374-2 (4th fl)
216 Geßler Commission, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft - Bericht der Studienkommission (1979)
217 For general summaries, see U Immenga, ‘Participatory Investments by Banks: A Structural Problem of  the Universal Banking
System in  Germany’  (1979)  2  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  and  Securities  Regulation  29-48  and  HJ  Krümmel,  ‘German
Universal Banking Scrutinized: Some Remarks Concerning the Gessler Report’ (1980) 4 Journal of  Banking and Finance 33-
55.
218 Gessler Commission (1979) 287, ‘Auf  eine Ergänzung unter Beibehaltung es bestehenden Systems zielen auch die Vorschläge
ab, Stimmrechtsbeiräte aus dem Kreise der Depotkunden zu bilden, die beratenden Einfluß auf  die Stimmrechtsausübung der
Kreditinstitute nehmen, sowie die Kreditinstitute zur weitergehenden Aktiengesellschaften zu verpflichten, etwa im Hinblick
auf  Beteiligungen oder gewährte Kredite.’
219 A Gottschalk,  ‘Der  Stimmrechtseinfluß  der  Banken  in  den  Aktionärsversammlung  von  Großunternehmen’  (1988)  WSI
Mitteilungen 294, in a 32 firm study, except in Volkswagen, an average of  64.5% of  votes were cast, and Deutsche, Dresdner
and Commerzbank held 45% of  votes.
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the  election  of  shareholders’  representatives  to  the  supervisory  board  of  the  public
corporation,  management  prepares  a  list  of  candidates  which,  although  open  to
discussion with the banks, are almost certain to be accepted. This list will  presumably
contain the names of  managers of  other large publicly  owned corporations including
financial institutions. Thus, if  there are large institutional shareholders (banks, insurance
companies or industrial firms), they will be offered proportionate representation; they will
delegate managers of  exactly the same type which we find on management’s list. For this
reason there will be very little or even no difference between the board of  a purely public
corporation and a company with one or several significant shareholders.220
This assessment was corroborated by statistical studies published the same year on votes actually
cast.221 
By 1989 the  Greens,222 and in  1992 the  Social  Democrats,223 had adopted policies  to
abolish all banks’ voting, unless they had received specific instructions sent by post. Both parties
were  elected in coalition in the  1998 general  election,  but curiously  the  issue  had been pre-
empted. Six months before, the Kontrolle und Transparenz Gesetz 1998 (Control and Transparency
Act 1998) was pushed through. Following an opinion by Peter Mülbert for the German Legal
Academy in 1996,224 the 1998 Act introduced a new §135(1)(iii) that forbade exercising deposit
voting rights, but only if  the bank’s own shares exceeded a 5 per cent block. A new §135(2)(v)
required banks to inform depositors about other forms of  representation, such as through a
shareholder association. The SPD and Green coalition seemed to forget their proposals, and left
Bankenmacht untouched. 
Did the 1998 Act significantly affect banks’ control of  corporate governance? Shortly
before its passage, Professor Assmann wrote that whoever might be hoping, on the basis of  a
negative assessment of  bank power, for effective constraint would be disappointed.225 But in 2010
Stefan Simon and Dirk Zetzsche argued that the control and transparency measures of  the 1998
220 F Kübler, ‘Comment: On Mark Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets’ (1998-1999) 5 Columbia
Journal European Law 213
221 M  Nibler,  Bank  Control  and  Corporate  Performance  in  Germany:  The  Evidence (Cambridge  University  PhD  1998)  cited  and
summarised  by  J  Franks  and  C Mayer,  ‘Ownership and  control  of  German corporations’  (2001)  14(4)  The Review of
Financial Studies 943, 954. See also J Edwards and M Nibler, ‘Corporate governance in Germany: the role of  banks and
ownership concentration’ (2000) 15(31) Economic Policy 239, 245 and 248. Nibler’s studies looked at what votes, from bank
deposits, were actually cast in company meetings, found that it was an average of  8.5% in a 156 company study. However, this
is not necessarily helpful, because votes could be controlled and not cast.
222 Die Grünen, Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft: Beschränkung der Bankenmacht (18 October 1989) Bundestag Drucksache 11/5401, 3
223 SPD Fraktion, Handelsblatt (16 June 1992) 6. Cited by Köndgen (1994) 539.
224 PO Mülbert, Gutachten E zum 61. Deutschen Juristentag (1996) E 91
225 HD  Assmann,  ‘Zur  Reform  des  Vollmachtsstimmrechts  der  Banken  nach  dem  Referentenentwurf  eines  Gesetzes  zur
Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG-E)’ (1997) 42 Aktiengesetz. Sonderheft 100, 108
159
Act had effectively ‘brought depository voting by banks to a standstill’. 226 They also noted that
more foreign investors, who are intolerant of  the system, have meant more shareholders opting
out of  the bankers’ vote system.227 The difficulty is that the evidence appears to contradict this
view.  Official  statistics  on  how  banks  actually  cast  the  votes  on  depositors’  shares  were
discontinued in 1994.228 However the statistics on banks having custody of  voting rights, which
did continue until 2004, six years after the Act, showed no signs of  ‘standstill’. Specifically, the
Bundesbank  statistics  recorded  that  banks  held  in  their  custody  62.2  per  cent  of  shares  in
German companies in 2004. Why would their voting practices have suddenly changed? But most
importantly, whatever the 1998 Act did, it did not introduce new reasons why banks should hold
any votes at all. 
In March 2013, the Swiss people came to a similar conclusion. Swiss banks had acquired
an identical role to German banks, controlling corporate governance by appropriating the votes
on share deposit account holders. From 2005 an independent politician named Thomas Minder
had been gathering signatures to stop what he delicately described as the ‘Abzockerei’, or ‘rip-off ’
culture in business. When the financial crisis hit, he reached the threshold of  100,000 signatures
to require Switzerland to hold a referendum. The public discussion focused on executive pay, and
72 per cent of  voters supported the reforms, the second highest result historically. 229 The law’s
content related to executive pay in that it required that voters in the general meeting would have
direct appointment rights over the directors on company remuneration committees. But most
significantly, it required that pension funds would actively cast their votes, and it prohibited banks
casting any votes at all. Klaus Hopt, a highly distinguished German academic lawyer, soon wrote
that it was ‘sheer populism’.230 But whether the surrounding rhetoric was populist or not, the
Swiss had achieved reform (mirrored by the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010 for brokers) while 80
years of  German dithering had not. It  suggested that the reform agenda in Germany would
probably be revived.
226 S Simon and D Zetzsche,  ‘Das Vollmachtstimmrecht  von Banken und geschäftsmäßigen Vertretern (§135 AktG nF) im
Spannungsfeld  von  Corporate  Governance,  Präsenzsicherung  und  prozeduraler  Effizienz  (2010)  5  Zeitschrift  für
Gesellschaftsrecht  918,  924,  ‘Das  Depotstimmrecht  ist  in  der  Folge  des  KonTraG  praktisch  vollständig  zum  Erliegen
gekommen. Dies ist wesentliches Motiv für die mit dem ARUG initiierte Deregulierung des Vollmachtstimmrechts.’ It is not
clear what evidence Simon and Zetzsche had in mind.
227 Simon and Zetzsche (2010) 5 ZGR 918, 925
228 M Becht and E Boehmer, ‘Voting control in German corporations’ (2003) 23 International Review of  Law and Economics 1,
noting Bundestag Drucksache 12/6679
229 Technically the vote was a ‘people’s initiative’, being proposed by citizens, rather than a referendum, put to the people by
Parliament.
230 KJ Hopt, ‘Conflict of  Interest, Secrecy and Insider Information of  Directors, A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 2 ECFR 167,
181
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(e) Conclusion
Behind  the  German  institutional  veil,  the  ultimate  beneficiaries  were  disenfranchised  to  an
inordinate extent. Germany was a pioneer in the experiments for a democratic economy, but
trade union organisation had not yet matched the coordination and bargaining power of  the
banks.  People’s  pension money had been routinely  used as a  source for employers’  personal
financing, and this freed up capital by which companies could buy shares in other companies. In
the remaining pension schemes, where beneficiaries could codetermine the use of  their savings,
their voice was more symbolic. Trade unions seemed to have pressed less urgently for change
because the state pension remained the foremost source of  retirement income for most workers.
Meanwhile,  banks  had  appropriated  most  voting  rights  on  shares  through  standard  form
contracts. And so where asset managers dominated in the UK, in Germany it was the banks.
(3) United States: laboratories of  democracy
The US investment system came to resemble the UK more than Germany, because when social
security was eventually implemented it was a minimum safety net, not an income linked pension.
This enabled the dominance, not of  banks, but asset managers. In 1862, Abraham Lincoln passed
‘An act to grant pensions’ for army personnel,231 but it remained limited to the disabled.232 In
1904,  Theodore  Roosevelt’s  progressive  era  administration  extended the  pension to all  army
veterans who reached age 65.233 But when state legislatures attempted to follow suit, or create
pensions for everyone, a judiciary hostile to socio-economic reform confronted them.234 In the
first  instance,  in  1914,  the Arizona Supreme Court  declared its  new state  pension law to be
unconstitutional because it was not means tested. Ross CJ said,235 
a citizen and taxpayer ought not to be made or required to help pay pensions to those
who have enough and to spare of  the world’s goods. I can think of  no principle of  law or
justice that could be invoked to sustain a law that required him to do so.
231 An act to grant pensions. July 14, 1862, ch 166 (12 Stat 566) section 1, army personnel who had since 4 March 1861 been
‘disabled by reason of  any wound received or disease contracted while in the service of  the United States....’ were entitled.
232 In his Second Inaugural Address (4 March 1865) Lincoln appeared to envisage an extension, but was assassinated just a
month later before anything took place. He had called ‘to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne
the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves
and with all nations.’
233 Executive Order No 78, extending the Disability Pension Act 1890 which had recast the previous 1862 law. See P Blanck,
‘Civil War Pensions and Disability’ (2001) 62 Ohio State Law Journal 109, 124-127
234 Signalled by Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) which in turn played out the consequences of  Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US
578 (1897)
235 State Board of  Control v Buckstegge, 158 Pac 837, 842 (1916)
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By 1923, public pension schemes had only survived in Montana, Nevada and Pennsylvania. The
Nevada law had to be reconfigured so that counties could choose whether or not to opt in. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down its  state pension,  because redistributing money for
‘benevolent’ purposes was found unconstitutional.236 By 1929, only Montana’s old age pension
remained. 
Yet many people were still becoming rapidly more affluent in the post World War One
economy. The absence of  any pension propelled their desire to save somehow privately. Direct
investment in the stock market must have looked attractive, and so came the great separation of
ownership and control from 1916 to 1919 described by Gardiner Means.237 Those many new
small investors, though, were left weak compared to the companies from whom they purchased
shares. As chapter 5(3) showed, they could be easily disenfranchised until the New York Stock
Exchange  stepped  in.  They  were  also  poorly  informed,  and  susceptible  to  aggressive  sales
practices. When the speculative bubble, and the Great Crash arrived,238 the courts undoubtedly
bore  much  responsibility.  As  Brandeis  J  wrote  in  1932  (and  with  even  more  truth  than he
intended)  the  courts  had  constrained  whether  ‘a  single  courageous  state  may,  if  its  citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of  the country.’239 
(a) The Slow Deal
If  state pensions were suppressed, and the stock market was on the road to ruin, what were the
other options to save for retirement, and who would run them? The life insurance industry was
one place to buy protection in old age, though it had acquired a record of  scandal. In 1905, after
Equitable  Life  had  funded  an  opulent  party  for  a  policyholder,  a  public  outcry  led  to  the
establishment of  the Armstrong Commission, with Charles Evans Hughes as chief  counsel. 240 It
uncovered patterns of  bribes, mismanagement and self-dealing. But the legislative response was
not to found a better old age programme, rather than limit to insurers’ rights to own shares,
control banks, or invest in securities. In Massachusetts, Louis Brandeis, then developing his name
236 Busser v Snyder, 282 Pa 440 (1925) noted, in the same vein of  sentiment, by IJ Williams (1927) 11 Constitutional Review 239.
cf, by the Republican Governor Gifford Pinchot, ‘Old Age Assistance in Pennsylvania: Righting the Neglects of  Yesterday’
(1924) 14 American Labor Legislation Review 288   
237 GC Means, ‘The Diffusion of  Stock Ownership in the United States’ (1930) 44(4) Quarterly Journal of  Economics 561 and
‘The Separation of  Ownership and Control in American Industry’ (1931) 46(1) Quarterly Journal of  Economics 68
238 See J Galbraith, The Great Crash (1954) ch 10. Note that explanations of  causes based on speculation can equally be taken to
identify the cause as ‘absence of  regulation to deter speculation’, e.g. duties of  disclosure enforced in all financial transactions. 
239 New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932)
240 MJ Roe, ‘Foundations of  Corporate Finance: the 1906 Pacification of  the Insurance Industry’ (1993) 93(3) Columbia Law
Review 639, 656-657.
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as  a  socially  minded  legal  partner,  attempted  a  different  initiative.241 While  condemning  the
insurance industry for ‘legalized robbery’,242 he promoted a voluntary, quasi-public option for
buying insurance. Brandeis optimistically argued this ‘social alternative’ avoided the ‘compulsory’
nature  of  the  German pension,  and unlike  National  Insurance in  the  UK,  the  need to buy
insurance individually would both make ‘workingmen independent’, and avoid ‘burdening general
taxation’.243 Sadly,  though  Brandeis  consulted  300  trade  unions,  the  scheme  failed  to  attract
subscribers. 
At the time of  the Massachusetts plan there were no official statistics on the extent of  old
age deprivation.244 Yet it is plain that occupational pensions were few, and the rights allowed by
employers were negligible. American Express, then engaged in rail and post, is usually thought to
have introduced the first occupational pension in 1875.245 Its aim was to compel worker loyalty,
and this was effective because the pension was said to be a gift, not a right that was earned. 246 The
courts backed this up, for instance in a New York case from 1898 where an employee, dismissed
without a reason, claimed the pension money in his name belonged to him. The court rejected
this  because  the  employer ‘voluntarily’  set  aside  ‘a  portion  of  its  profits  belonging  to
shareholders’ and nothing more.247 It was never the employee’s property, and the court refused to
recognise  a  trust.  Moreover,  employers  would  run the  fund.  For  instance,  the  Chicago  and
Northwestern Railway Company had five officials running its $200,000 fund, but all employer
appointed.248
The first exception to employer dominance coincided with the Commission on Industrial
Relations.  Louis  Brandeis  had  been a  witness,  and  urged  that  ‘rule  by  the  people...  involves
industrial democracy as well as political democracy’.249 Similarly the leading report, released in
241 For an interesting biographical  comparison,  see P Brickner,  ‘Different Styles and Similar Values:  the Reformer Roles  of
Charles Evans Hughes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis in Gas, Electric, and Insurance Regulation’ (2000) 33(3) Indiana Law
Review 893
242 LD Brandeis, Life Insurance: The Abuses and the Remedies. Address Delivered before the Commercial Club of  Boston (1905)
243 LD Brandeis,  ‘Massachusetts  Savings-Bank  Insurance  and  Pension  System’  (1909)  11(85)  Publications  of  the  American
Statistical Association 409
244 FS Baldwin, ‘The Work of  the Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions’ (1909) 85(11) Publications of  the American
Statistical Association 417
245 WC Greenough and FP King, Pension plans and public policy (1976) 27
246 S Sass, The Promise of  Private Pensions: The First 100 Years (HUP 1997) 22-24
247 A Federal court endorsed this in Menke v Thompson, 140 F2d 786 (8th Cir 1944). This view had expired by the time of  ERISA
1974, see Howell v United States, 775 F2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985).
248 eg GG Tunell, ‘The pension system in the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company’ (1901) 9(2) Journal of  Political
Economy 271-272
249 Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony (1916) vol 8, 7659-7660, LD Brandeis, The Fundamental Cause of
Industrial Unrest (1916) said the following. ‘The social justice for which we are striving is an incident of  our democracy, not its
main end… the end for which we must strive is the attainment of  rule by the people, and that involves industrial democracy
as well as political democracy. That means that the problem of  a trade should be no longer the problems of  the employer
alone… The union cannot  shift  upon the employer the responsibility  for conditions,  nor  can the employer insist  upon
determining, according to his will, the conditions which shall exist. The problems which exist are the problems of  the trade;
they are the problems of  employer and employee.’
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1915, recommended reforms to collective bargaining to that end.250 One of  the star guests was
undoubtedly Andrew Carnegie, the Scottish rail and steel magnate. Carnegie had always fashioned
himself  as a progressive capitalist, propounding his view that the ‘man who dies thus rich dies
disgraced’ and that ‘the millionaire will be but a trustee of  the poor’.251 His philanthropy had led
him to be a trustee of  Cornell University from 1890, but it  was directly after his appearance
before  the  Commission  that  he  acquired  a  particular  desire  to  improve  pensions. 252 In  his
testimony, he had agreed that workers should have more say in industry, and the way forward was
for workers to become shareholders, so that ‘workmen and capitalists’ were ‘pulling and owning
the same boat’.253 But as it happened, Carnegie found pensions – not employee share schemes –
to  be  his  vehicle.  During  1915,  he  asked  Dr  Henry  Pritchett,  president  of  the  Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of  Teaching, to create a new plan, and one that involved ‘some
form of  oversight’  by  the  policyholders.254 Carnegie  donated  the  start  up  capital  for a  new
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, members elected a quarter of  the 20 person board,
albeit from nominees screened by a committee.255 The first board was appointed by the Carnegie
Foundation, and member representation was implemented with one trustee a year from 1921 to
1926.256 
So  with  some  encouragement  by  a  federal  enquiry,  Carnegie  was  inspired  to  bring
member  nominated  trustees  to  the  US.  But  could  the  growth  of  occupational  pensions  be
encouraged? University teachers were a privileged group, while most people had nothing. Federal
tax policy had offered some help. The Tariff  Act 1913, which re-introduced progressive income
tax (but only after the Sixteenth Amendment, because the Supreme Court struck the tax down257),
allowed employers to deduct pension payments and deferred annuity  premiums as a business
expense. This meant a smaller figure of  profit would be taxable.258 The Revenue Act 1921 went
250 Commission on Industrial Relations,  Final Report and Testimony  (1915) vol 1, 92 ff  lists the extensive recommendations. The
key appears to be at 137, where it is suggested that the UK Trade Disputes Act 1906 be a model for US law. However, the
leading report did not win majority support. The favoured approach of  a majority was a system of  industrial arbitration.
251 A Carnegie, ‘Wealth’ (1889) 391 North American Review 653, 663-634
252 RL Hannah, ‘The control of  pensions: a brief  history and possibilities for the future’ (2000) 40(10) Management Decision
938, 939, notes also that Carnegie pre-funded his steel worker pensions, thus placing him at the progressive end.
253 Final Report  (1916) vol 9, 8288, Andrew Carnegie. ‘When workmen were made shareholders they were sold shares in the
company upon a very liberal basis and guarded against loss. I consider this the greatest of  all steps forward yet taken for
making workmen and capitalists fellow workmen indeed, pulling and owning the same boat. This cannot fail to prove highly
profitable to both.’
254 WC Greenough, It’s My Retirement Money - Take Good Care of  It: The TIAA-CREF Story (Irwin 1990) 33-37
255 WC Greenough, It’s My Retirement Money - Take Good Care of  It: The TIAA-CREF Story (Irwin 1990) 33-37 and 264-268
256 In 1952, the plan was extended to buy into shares, with the College Retirement Equity Fund, making TIAA-CREF. In 1988,
to register a new money market fund with the SEC, risked losing charitable status (previously exempt under the IRC, 26 USC
§501(c)(3)). So instead, CREF trustees were wholly elected by policyholders, according with Investment Company Act 1940
§16, 15 USC §80a–16. See also Greenough (1988) 360-362.
257 Pollock v Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 US 429 (1895) and Brushaber v Union Pacific Railroad, 240 US 1 (1916) 
258 Revenue Act 1918, further provided that employers who separately constituted funds could claim deductions. S Sass,  The
Promise of  Private Pensions: The First 100 Years (HUP 1997) 102-103
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further,259 exempting for any profit sharing or stock bonus trust used ‘for the exclusive benefit of
some or all employees’.260 The Internal Revenue Service then extended the exemption to pension
funds.261 When  companies  accumulated  pension  savings,  they  paid  no  tax  until  employees
received and spent the money. 
Tax  breaks  helped  a  little,  but  the  real  growth  in  occupational  pensions  came  with
collective bargains. Trade unions, however, took a long time to overcome their distrust, because
employers had repeatedly used withdrawal of  pensions as a weapon against union recruitment.262
This encouraged views like those of  Samuel Gompers, president of  American Federation of
Labor. 
Paternalism either in government or in industry is abhorrent. It takes away the initiative of
the workers who should themselves prepare for old age....  Until the Government itself
establishes an old age  pension system,  labor  will  insist  that  pension systems shall  be
controlled  by  the  workers  themselves,  without  any  connection  whatever  with  the
employers.263
This really left most people with nothing, because there were very few independent union plans.
Understandably,  questions of  basic  wages and hours preoccupied most union negotiations. 264
Furthermore, many union plans failed during the Depression.265 Overall, by 1929, just 3.7 million
US workers had pensions, around 10 per cent of  the non-agricultural labour force. In railways,
where unionisation was high, around 85 per cent of  people had pensions. But again, when Wall
Street crashed a substantial number were unilaterally reduced or closed.266 
The  economic catastrophe  crystallised  the  view that  compulsory  state  pensions  were
necessary,267 and  governments  began to  act,  regardless  of  what  courts  might  say.  California,
Wyoming, New York and Massachusetts introduced pensions by 1930, and almost half  the states
259 The Revenue Act 1921 was primarily a tax cut initiative, led by Andrew Mellon. Mellon had inherited his  father’s bank,
diversified into industry, acquired the position of  Secretary of  the Treasury, and became the third highest American taxpayer
by the mid 1920s.
260 Revenue Act 1921 §219(f)
261 This was followed in the updates of  the Revenue Act 1924 and 1926 § 219(f). The Revenue Act 1928 §165, as well as updates
in 1932, 1934 and 1936, further allowed deductions for past accumulations, but the deduction had to be spread over 10 years.
262 L Conant, A Critical Analysis of  Industrial Pension Systems (1922) 18-49
263 Quoted in Conant (1922) 22
264 MW Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems (1932) 8-9
265 S Sass, The Promise of  Private Pensions: The First 100 Years (HUP 1997) 125-7
266 D Schapiro, ‘Employee Pensions in Collective Bargaining’ (1950) 59(4) Yale Law Journal 678, 680. nb Mellon’s response to the
crash  in  November  1929,  according  to  Herbert  Hoover,  was  to  ‘liquidate  labor,  liquidate  stocks,  liquidate  the  farmers,
liquidate real estate. It will purge the rottenness out of  the system. High costs of  living and high living will come down.
People will  work harder,  live  a more moral  life.  Values will  be adjusted,  and enterprising people will  pick up from less
competent people.’
267 cf  JR Commons, Principles of  Labor Legislation (1916) 398-403
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had  followed  by  1933.268 Shortly  after  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt’s  election,  the  Railroad
Retirement Act 1934 created a compulsory contributory scheme for railway workers, vested in the
US Treasury and managed by a government board.  Railroad Retirement Board v Alton Railroad Co
struck it down,269 Roberts J holding that employers subsidising employees of  other companies
was ‘an unnecessarily  harsh and arbitrary imposition if  the plan is  to be what on its  face it
imports -- a joint adventure with mutuality of  obligation and benefit.’270 But the 1934 Act was
simply a prelude to the Social Security Act 1935, inventing retirement for everyone. The Supreme
Court continued to strike down previous parts of  the New Deal in a few more cases, until on 3
November 1936, Roosevelt won a second election with 60.8 per cent of  the vote, carrying every
state except Maine and Vermont. With Democrats prepared to pack the court with new judges, 271
Roberts J made the obviously principled decision to support the New Deal. 272 In Helvering v Davis,
a  shareholder  of  Edison  Electric  Illuminating  Co  brought  a  derivative  claim  to  injunct  the
company  from paying  social  security,  saying  it  exceeded  the  Federal  government’s  power.273
Cardozo J, now with a majority, explained that it was lawful for Congress to spend money for
‘general welfare’, and Congress had broad discretion to determine what that meant.
Social security created a minimum income in retirement, but the National Labor Relations
Act, passed on 6 July 1935, was the key to secure a fair income through collective bargaining. 274
Although  slow  to  come,  the  new  policies  worked  quickly.  Tax  was  reformed  again  by  the
Stabilization Act 1942 and the Revenue Act 1942.  Employers had been creating pensions that
were limited to top officials and thus claimed the payments were tax deductible because it was for
‘some or all  employees’.275 From 1942, tax exemptions could only be given if  70 per cent of
permanent employees were covered by a plan. Also, because of  the war, wage restraints had been
imposed, but pensions were exempt.276 Because they were among the limited fields where unions
268 A Epstein, ‘The American State Old Age Pension System in Operation’ (1933) 170 Annals of  the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 107-111. cf  DL Costa, The Evolution of  Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 (1998)
ch 2, 17.
269 295 US 330 (1935)
270 nb, at 295 US 330, 372 (1935) Hughes CJ, Brandeis J and Cardozo J dissented. The government argued that it fulfilled the
requirements of  due process because pensions promoted efficiency, due to their ability to improve morale and create loyalty
to the company. The reply was apparently that the removal of  the voluntary character of  pensions necessarily ‘will eliminate
all sense of  loyalty and gratitude to the employer’. 
271 Judicial Procedures Reform Bill 1937
272 This succeeded first with the approval of  Washington’s minimum wage legislation in West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379
(1937). The NLRA 1935 was approved in National Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 US 1 (1937)
273 301 US 619 (1937) 
274 National Labor Relations Act 1935 §8(a)(3)-(5) were crucial provisions, in freeing union members from discrimination, and
requiring bargaining by the employer.
275 GT Altman, ‘Pension Trusts for Key Men’ (1937) 15 Tax Magazine 324, and RE Paul, ‘The Background of  the Revenue Act
of  1937’ (1937) 5(1) University of  Chicago Law Review 41, 77
276 See Stabilization Act 1942 §10, 56 Stat 768 (1942) 50 USC §970 (1946) and Revenue Act 1942 §165(a), the latter allowing
exclusion for temporary, seasonal or under 5 year workers, and prohibiting discrimination in favour of  executives, except
insofar as benefits could be proportional to pay. Discussed in A Kent, ‘The Revenue Act of  1942’ (1943) 43(1) Columbia Law
Review 1, and LL Rice, ‘Employee Trusts under the Revenue Act of  1942’ (1942) 20 Taxes 721.
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could make progress through collective agreements, pensions grew fast.277 In Helvering, Cardozo J
had recorded that three out of  four people over 65 had been wholly or partly dependent on
others in old age.278 Social  security ended this,  and collective bargaining meant private sector
coverage rose from 15 per cent in 1940 to over 40 per cent by 1960.279 And initially,  unions
bargained for plans where they controlled the contributions completely. 
(b) From union to asset manager control
Post-World War Two, union membership stood around 35.5 per cent of  non-agricultural workers.
Then, employers reacted. In a wave of  strikes over 1945 and 1946, unions were accused of  using
pensions to compensate strikers and so having an unfair advantage. Employers challenged the
legal  right  to  collectively  bargain  over  pensions  altogether.280 Shareholders  were  bringing
derivative  claims,  arguing  payments  to  union  pensions  were  ultra  vires.281 These  were  mostly
unsuccessful,  but  the  1946 election had returned a Republican majority  to Congress.  A new
Labor Management Relations Act 1947 §302(c)(5)(B) stipulated that no that money could be paid
by an employer to any employee fund, unless it was jointly managed with an employer, with a
neutral  umpire  or  a  court  determining  disputes  in  case  of  deadlock.282 While  Carnegie  had
guaranteed American workers a  voice in the use of  their  pension money,  the new Congress
guaranteed a voice for employers. 
The  Act’s  main  proponent,  Senator  Robert  Taft,  had  in  fact  wanted  to  prohibit
involvement  of  employees  altogether.283 This  was  reflected in  the  House of  Representatives’
proposal.284 He singled out the United Mine Workers pension fund,285 where the union leader,
John Lewis, had been demanding a solely union administered fund from the government. 286 Taft
wanted to keep pensions for the use of  employers,287 while Lewis saw sole pension control as to
277 Editor, ‘Legal Status of  Private Industrial Plans’ (1940) 53 Harvard Law Review 1375
278 M Shearon and Social Security Board, Economic insecurity in old age: social and economic factors contributing to old-age dependency  (GPO
1937) 15
279 A Munnell and S Sass, Social Security and the Stock Market (Upjohn 2006) 32, depict a graph showing a high of  47% in 1982, and
declining to an unstead level around 43% by 2004.
280 Inland Steel Co. v NLRB, 77 NLRB 1, enforced, 170 F 2d 247 (7th Cir 1948), cert. denied, 336 US 960 (1949)
281 FH O’Neal, ‘Stockholder attacks on corporate pension systems’ (1948-1949) 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 351
282 Labor Management Relations Act 1947 §302(c)(5)(B) (29 USC §186)
283 Senate, Congressional Record, 80th Congress 1st Sess (1947) 4892-94.
284 See HR Rep No 245, 80th Cong, 1st Sess 29-30 (1947); Also, ‘House set to compromise on Labor Bill in order to obtain
measure on which veto could be beaten’ (10 May 1947) Wall Street Journal, 3
285 R Blodgett, ‘Union Pension Fund Asset Management’ in Abuse on Wall Street (Quorum 1980) 320, 321
286 This led to United States v United Mine Workers of  America, 330 US 258 (1947) where the US Supreme Court declared Truman’s
attempted nationalisation of  the mining industry unconstitutional. The union controlled, employer funded pension was a
post-strike settlement.
287 J Rifkin and R Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s (1978) 101-2, ‘Senator Claude Pepper of
Florida… suggest[ed] that Taft and his business friends, when they fretted over possible union abuses of  the funds, were
really fretting over the possibility that they might lose control of  the potential pool of  capital that pension funds represented.
Pepper was right, but despite the fact, or probably because of  it, the vote went against labor.’
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the advantage of  unions.288 The miners’ dispute itself  was resolved by the federal government
getting an agreement to jointly administer the fund. This collective agreement became the model
for §302. President Harry Truman used his veto twice, but enough Democrats supported the
Taft-Hartley Act 1947 measures for it to pass.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act 1947 limited employee involvement on its face, it tacitly
promoted the joint management model.289 As post war union membership remained strong the
number of  codetermined pensions, ironically named ‘Taft-Hartley’ plans, grew. On top of  the
single employer pensions, by 1960 multi-employer plans covered 3.3 million workers,290 rising to
9.7 million workers in 1988.291 Ever more, this money was invested into shares. But employers did
avoid employee involvement if  they could. Early on in 1950, and flaunted as a victory for both
sides,  General  Motors  initiated  a  sole-employer  pension  as  part  of  a  five  year  collective
agreement.292 The General Motors pension was confined to investing a maximum of  0.75 per
cent  in  any company’s  stock,  and managers  were  also  instructed to be inactive  in  corporate
governance.293 Here, as it happened, it was not Roe’s ‘populist’ politicians which limited pension
funds holding blocks – leading to his example, seen in chapter 3(1)(a), of  no shareholder having
more than 1 per cent of  General  Motors – but a strategy of  corporate boards like General
Motors itself. 
Aside  from the  lack  of  voice  for  contributors,  significant  problems  were  that,  first,
employees could not move pensions if  they moved jobs. Similarly many plans still did not vest, or
allow  the  worker  their  money  if  their  job  terminated.  Second,  while  the  employer  might
accumulate the savings on the company’s books, it did not actually set aside money. There were
no minimum funding requirements. Pensions crashed with employers. Following a popular NBC
documentary  entitled  Pensions:  The  Broken  Promise,294 Congress  acted  with  the  Employee
288 Louis Stark, ‘New strike looms,  coal official  says’ (12 February 1947) NY Times,  5, quoting the hostile view of  Forney
Johnston of  the National Coal Association, that the Union of  Mine Worker proposed funds ‘are now on the agenda of  every
central union in a program of  sweeping encroachment on the earnings and on the functions of  ownership and management,
with no limitation whatever except the consciences of  the union dynasty.’
289 R Cook, ‘The Case for Joint Trusteeship of  Pension Plans’ (2002) WorkingUSA 25
290 HR Bartell Jr and ET Simpson,  Pension Funds of  Multiemployer Industrial Groups, Unions, and Nonprofit Organizations , occasional
paper 105 (National Bureau of  Economic Research, 1968)
291 Rep. Peter Visclosky, 135 Congressional Record H5984–05, H6233 (1989) citing a study by the ME Segal consulting firm.
292 For a general outline of  the deal, see FH Harbison, ‘The General Motors-United Auto Workers Agreement of  1950’ (1950)
58(5) Journal of  Political 397-411
293 P Harbrecht, Pension Funds and Economic Power (1959) 8. PF Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to
America (1976) 7
294 NBC, Pensions: The Broken Promise (12 September 1972). The documentary won a Peabody Award, and sufficiently outraged the
Richard Nixon government to bring an action, through the Federal Communications Commission, for breaching the then
‘fairness doctrine’,  that programming had to be duly impartial. After the Nixon controlled FCC found that NBC was in
breach, the Federal Court of  Appeal overturned the ruling to find no breach in  National Broadcasting Company, Inc v Federal
Communications Commission, 516 F 2d 1101 (1974). The fairness doctrine was later abolished by the Reagan administration, so
that broadcasting needs not to make any semblance of  fairness, due impartiality or accuracy. Equivalent laws persist for all
television in the UK under the Communications Act 2003 s 319, and in Germany see the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2013 §11.
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Retirement Income Security Act 1974. 
ERISA 1974 required everybody be entitled to their pension money after one year’s work.
Defined benefit pensions needed to have minimum funding. This was insured through the state
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Trustee duties, including to take care, diversify, report,
and avoid conflicts, were codified and made mandatory. ERISA 1974 required no particular form
of  pension governance, but did encourage outsourcing to asset managers. Under §402(a) the plan
structure  had  to  be  outlined  in  a  written  instrument,  §403(a)  required  assets  to  be  held  by
trustees, and §408(c)(3) stated trustees could include the company’s own officers or employees.
§408(c)(3)  effectively  immunised the  employer  against  charges of  breach of  duty,  if  its  plan
management was tainted with its own interests rather than those of  its employees.295 Moreover,
§402(d)(1) precluded liability for negligence if  the trustee delegated investment to an external
manager, and §404(c)(1) immunised the sponsor from claims if  a plan permitted the beneficiary
to exercise control over the account assets. So if  the employer managed the pension, there could
be no liability for conflicts of  interest, but risk of  a negligence action. This meant the employer
had the incentive, if  they provided pensions at all, to give employees some token control (e.g. a
choice of  investment classes) and otherwise outsource asset management.
The  regulatory  incentives  of  ERISA 1974  encouraged  a  shift  toward  asset  manager
control  of  pension plans.  Tax provisions went  further,  encouraging individual  accounts  over
collectivised  entities.  Originally  the  Self-Employed  Individuals  Tax  Retirement  Act  1962  had
allowed self  employed people to establish tax deferred saving accounts, called Keogh plans, for
themselves or their workers. ERISA 1974 extended tax deferment to a maximum of  $2000 a year
in  Individual  Retirement  Accounts  (IRAs)  to  everyone,  including  those  covered  already  by
employer, union, government or Keogh plans. IRAs would often be held by banks. 
In  1978 there  was  still  demand  for  people  to  place  additional  funds  in  tax  deferred
accounts,  so  the  Internal  Revenue  Code  §401(k)  allowed  it.  Employers  often  matched
contributions.  As more employees were sent plan details,  the tax section became the popular
name for the pension type. In a ‘401(k)’, employers outsourced investment work to managers of
mutual  firms.  The  employee  would  choose  from among  a  range  of  funds  within  the  fund
family.296 Investment in 401(k) plans was essential for the growth in assets managed by mutual
funds, rising from just 2 per cent of  US household assets in 1979 to 21 per cent in 2009. 297 Under
295 M Roe, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions: Insulating Management from Owners and from Accountability’
(1993-1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 75, 91 ‘conflicts that benefit managers are tolerated.’
296 JS Taub, ‘Able but Not Willing: The Failure of  Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights’ (2009) 34(3) The
Journal of  Corporation Law 843, 876
297 Investment Company Institute, Investment Company Factbook: A Review of  Trends and Activity in the Investment Company Industry  (50th
edn 2010)
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the Tax Reform Act 1986, a cap was placed on tax deferment in IRAs, so more people were
encouraged to shift their assets to mutual funds altogether.298 This was the decisive step to change
the trends in share ownership.
US share ownership 1965-2009
Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds: Historical Data (2011) 
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In this chart,  derived from the Federal Reserve’s official corporate equity statistics,299 the first
important trend, like in the UK, is the ongoing collectivisation of  shareholding in institutions
since the 1960s. This is what Berle had identified in his later years. It was consistent with the
growth of  pensions achieved by collective bargaining. But, second, there was a very large change
in  the  fortunes  of  private  pensions  from 1986.  The  ‘private  pension’  figures  included both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans when they invested in shares, but only if  it was
managed independently or through a custodial bank. If  money was placed into an open-ended
investment company – run by an asset manager – it  would show up under the mutual  fund
figures.300 After 1986, employers forced the switch in pension type to individual accounts, and so
more contributions went under mutual fund heading: overtaking private pensions in 1996, and
fully replacing their position by 2009. 
298 ‘Mutual Funds, Brokers Taking A Bigger Slice of  the IRA Pie’ (10 March 1986) American Banker
299 The Federal Reserve’s statistical set (L.213) shows raw figures, from which the author has calculated percentages, and merged
some of  the categories.
300 Federal Reserve, Flow of  Funds Accounts of  the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings 2005-2010 (2011) 23 and 25 (in F.118
and F.121), which are the concepts used at 85 (L.213).
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How did the asset management takeover affect corporate governance? If  beneficiaries
had individual pension accounts collective action was already hard. But if  their money went to a
mutual  firm,  it  was  next  to  impossible.  Mutuals  would  be  regulated  under  the  Investment
Company Act 1940 §16. This required that policy holders would have a vote for the board of  the
investment company according to their stake. But nobody was told about the voting, or when it
took place. One account of  the voting process in mutuals in general from 1982 ran accordingly.
In a recent election for board members of  the Prudential,  four vacancies were to be
filled. Vying for these four spots were a total of  four candidates, nominated by the board
itself. Eligible to vote were 18.4 million policyholders. Of  these, 323 did - virtually all of
them employees of  Prudential.  Later in the same year, policyholders of  the Equitable
were called upon to choose among a field of  11 nominees to fill  11 board seats.  An
estimated 3,250,000 policyholders were eligible to vote but were not informed of  the
election;  6,400,  mostly  Equitable  employees,  voted  by mail.  Seven  showed up  at  the
election to vote in person.301
The investment companies, where a 401(k)’s assets were placed, would usually be established by
an investment adviser, working as part of  a large fund family. The adviser would be regulated by
the Investment Advisers Act 1940, but had no particular obligations in this respect. The adviser
would select the first board of  directors of  the investment company and then promptly delegate
the investment work back to the advisers.302 In the end, advisers from fund families assumed
control over voting in corporate governance. Any scope for collective or individual negotiation
had vanished. Invariably mutual firms would delegate the actual work of  voting, as in the UK, 303
to a proxy advice firm such as Institutional Shareholder Services.304 The priorities of  proxy advice
firms, their recommendations, and their voting, would be set by asset managers.
Why did progressive democrats not push to ensure that there was a voice for the ultimate
investor, and control over asset managers? The answer, though it is intensively unsatisfying, is
that  when ERISA 1974 was passed very  few people  had thought about it.  Of  course,  Taft-
Hartley pensions, and their governance, could still be collectively bargained with an employer by a
301 A Tobias, Invisible Bankers: Everything the Insurance Industry Never Wanted You to Know (Washington Square 1982) ch 3, 35-36
302 JS Taub, ‘Able but Not Willing: The Failure of  Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights’ (2009) 34(3) The
Journal of  Corporation Law 843, 849
303 See ch 6(1)(c)
304 See  generally  MC  Schouten,  ‘Do  Institutional  Investors  Follow  Proxy  Advice  Blindly’  (2012)  http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1978343 and S Choi, J Fisch and M Kahan, ‘The Power of  Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?’
(2010) 59 Emory Law Journal 869 
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union. But after 1980, union membership was falling sharply in the private sector, and so this
became more and more unlikely.  It  was then that the diminishing scope of  beneficiary voice
caught attention,  with a 1989 House of  Representatives Sub-committee hearing on leveraged
buyouts. Trustees of  single-employer pension plans were allegedly investing in junk bonds and
terminating plans prematurely to make takeovers more attractive.305 Moreover, company directors
were using votes on employees’ pension money to defend against takeovers of  friendly colleagues
on other boards,306 or  simply  pursuing a pro-management policies.307 In 1989,  Representative
Peter Visclosky introduced legislation to insert  a new §403(a)(2)  in ERISA 1974,  so that for
single-employer plans employee associations would have half  the seats on pension plan boards.308
It  was  rejected.  In  1999 another  bill  sponsored  by  Bernard  Sanders,  entitled  the  Workplace
Democracy Act 1999,309 was rejected. A further bill, sponsored again by Peter Visclosky entitled
the Employees’ Pension Security Act 2008, met the same fate.310 Unlike the UK or German laws,
which left the form of  employee representation as a matter of  choice,311 these Bills would have
required that trade union representatives took pension board seats. But it seems they would not
have affected pensions organised individually. Union and codetermined pensions were becoming
more active,312 but their declining numbers was leading their collective influence to dwindle.
(c) Broker votes
As mutual funds and asset managers dominated the stock market, they replaced banks, or broker
dealers. Given America’s extraordinarily high number of  household investors, banks might have
acquired  same role  as  German banks,  except  that  for  they  were  more  numerous  and more
disorganised. Roe’s regulatory analysis provides many reasons for US banks becoming smaller,313
but they were actually disabled in corporate governance for a different reason. On top of  the
campaign  against  ‘banker  control’  led  by Ripley,  if  banks  had wanted  to  use  standard form
305 Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of  the House Committee on Education and Labor, Oversight Hearings on the
Role of  Pension Funds in Corporate Takeovers (101st Congress, 1989) 
306 WM O’Barr and JM Conley, Fortune and Folly: the Wealth and Power of  Institutional Investing (1992) 182
307 M Roe, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions: Insulating Management from Owners and from Accountability’
(1993-1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 75, 91-94
308 Joint Trusteeship Bill 1989 HR 2664
309 Workplace Democracy Act of  1999 (HR 1277) this would have made substantial amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act 1935.
310 Employees’ Pension Security Act of  2008 (HR 5754)
311 As we have seen, in the UK the Pensions Act 2004 allows either unions or employees to serve as representatives, and this is
normally determined in negotiations with the union, if  any. In Germany, pension beneficiaries must have a direct vote for
board members, but may choose to grant their vote to the union.
312 MA  O’Connor,  ‘Organised  labor  as  shareholder  activist:  building  coalitions  to  promote  worker  capitalism’  (1997)  31
University of  Richmond LR 1345. SJ Schwab and RS Thomas, ‘Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by
Labor Unions’ (1998) 96(4) Michigan LR 1018. nb the SEC and courts ended social responsibility amendments, under Rule
14a-8.
313 MJ Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America’ [1993] Yale LJ 1936, 1936-1941
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contracts  to  get  the  vote,  they  had  been  constrained  after  1937.  Under  the  Securities  and
Exchange Act 1934 §14b, the Securities and Exchange Commission had power to regulate proxy
voting. It pressured the New York Stock Exchange to introduce Rule 452, whereby brokers could
not vote on their depositors’ shares without instructions either on mergers or when it  might
‘affect substantially the rights or privileges or privileges of  such stock’.314 This was materially
identical to the provisions of  the German Aktiengesetz 1937 regarding instructions, but it had also
included outright prohibitions.315 Yet the SEC had allowed voting upon certain ‘routine’ matters,
which included an uncontested election for the board of  directors. Authority for further rule
making by the SEC was given in 1964, but nothing was done immediately.316 Broker voting was
not so widespread, though when used it usually supported an incumbent management.317 
In 2006, the NYSE made a request to the SEC to change Rule 452,318 because of  a public
campaign against  Disney’s  Michael  Eisner. Following the negligence case surrounding Ovitz’s
$100m golden parachute that was described in chapter 4(3),  Eisner had been singled out for
dismissal.  Only broker support had allowed him to remain in office.319 Institutional investors
wanted a ban on broker voting,  and the SEC condoned the change in 2009.320 Brokers were
prohibited from voting on any election for directors, whether contested or not, unless they were
registered as advisers under the Investment Company Act.321 But soon, the Dodd-Frank  Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 went further. Under §957, a new §6(b)(10) was
inserted in the  Securities  Exchange Act  1934 to prohibit  brokers from exercising any voting
rights  attached to shares that the Commission determined to be ‘significant’  without express
instruction  from  their  customers.322 Conclusively  deemed  significant  were  votes  relating  to
director elections and executive compensation. What was said in Germany to not be possible, or
sheer populism, was done in the US for brokers. Banks could not vote with other people’s money,
though asset managers could.
314 R Maidman, ‘Voting Rights of  After-Record-Date Shareholders: A Skeleton in a Wall Street Closet’ (1962) 71(7) Yale Law
Journal 1205, 1215
315 DF Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) 80 Harvard Law Review 23, 57,
noting comparisons with the Aktiengesetz 1965 §135.
316 15 USC §78n(b) (Supp 1965)
317 See J Heard and H Sherman, Conflicts of  Interest in the Proxy Voting System (1987) 22 and HG Manne, ‘Some Theoretical Aspects
of  Share Voting’ (1964) 64(8) Columbia Law Review 1427, 1443. On the other, general aspects of  Manne’s work and its
contemporary reception, see AA Berle, ‘Modern Functions of  the Corporate System’ (1962) 62(3) Columbia Law Review 433-
449
318 The background is summarised briefly by EB Walter, ‘Regulating Broker–Dealers and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or
Harmonization?’ (2009) 35(1) Journal of  Corporation Law 1
319 Report and Recommendations of  the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange (5 June 2006) 9
320 SEC Release No. 34-60215; File No. SR-NYSE-2006-92. (1 July 2009)
321 NYSE Rule 452.11(19) Giving Proxies by Member Organization
322 Dodd-Frank Act 2010 §957
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(d) Public sector pensions
Although private pensions  had,  since  1974 become re-individualised and outsourced to asset
managers, public pension plans had not entirely. Originally pensions for public sector workers
followed the model set by the Civil Service Retirement Act 1920. By default, employers (in this
case governments)  would usually  choose the  pension trustees  just  like the private sector.  As
ERISA 1974 was passed, only a handful of  plans in Connecticut, California and Nebraska and
the Ohio Teachers plan had beneficiary representatives,323 and Ohio’s representation for teachers
began  in  1973.  The  Wisconsin  State  Teachers  Retirement  System,  unusually,  had  a  wholly
employee elected board,  although a separate  State  of  Wisconsin  Investment  Board managed
investments, and were appointed. The California Government Code required that the pension
board had beneficiary representation,324 and the 2010 version required seven members appointed
by the employer (i.e.  government), but six elected by beneficiaries.325 The composition of  the
board, however, aroused little interest until after 1967 when CalPERS was first able to invest up
to 25 per cent of  its assets in shares. In 1984, the limit was removed altogether. With other public
pension funds, their share of  votes in corporations climbed, and they made use of  it.
The  position  by 1993 was  that  45  from 50 states  had beneficiary  representatives  on
pension boards, but most were still appointed, rather than elected.326 By this time a succession of
scandals were tarnishing their reputation, as employers used pensions to plug budget deficits by
directing  them  to  buy  sub-prime  government  bonds.327 This  changed  with  the  Uniform
Management of  Public Employee Retirement Systems Act 1997 §17(c)(3). It did little more than
require  each  plan disclose  how its  trustees  were  selected.328 But  by  shining a  light  on good
practice, by 1998, out of  2670 public retirement systems there was an average of  36 per cent
elected trustees, 15 per cent ex officio trustees and 44 per cent appointed trustees.329
While reform took place in 1997, public pensions kept their outdated reputation among
some. For instance, in 2007, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, relied on a hostile article from
1993 by Roberta Romano,330 to assert that generally ‘trustees consist of  gubernatorial appointees,
323 LM Kohlmeier, ‘State and Local Pension Fund Asset Management’ in Abuse on Wall Street (Quorum 1980) 278
324 CJ Castaneda, Dedication, Vision, Heart: The CalPERS Story (2007)
325 California Government Code (1991) §20100-3, now found in (2011) § 20090
326 C Moore, Public Pension Plans: The State Regulatory Framework (National Council on Teacher Retirement 1993)
327 See generally, R Romano, ‘Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered’ (1993) 93(4) Columbia Law
Review 795-853, where the proposed solution was apparently to give employees  “more” control  by transforming public
pensions  into defined contribution plans,  with  guaranteed insurance  contracts  to  mimic  defined benefit  outcomes.  It  is
difficult, however, to detect how this alone would not simply place control in the hands of  fund management families.
328 For  detail  on  everything  else,  see  SL  Willborn,  ‘Public  Pensions  and  the  Uniform  Management  of  Public  Employee
Retirement Systems Act’ (1998) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=140787
329 D  Hess,  ‘Protecting  and  Politicizing  Public  Pension  Fund  Assets:  Empirical  Evidence  on  the  Effects  of  Governance
Structures and Practices’ (2005-2006) 39 UC Davis LR 187, 195
330 R Romano, ‘Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered’ (1993) 93 Columbia LR 795
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elected politicians who serve ex officio, officials elected by fund beneficiaries, or some combination
of  these groups’  and quickly concluded that it ‘should be evident, public pension fund trustees
lack significant financial incentives to maximize fund performance.’331 The contrasting view, also
represented in 1993 by Mark Roe was this:
The high activism of  public pension plans - pensions run for state employees - contrasts
sharply  with  the  relative  passivity  of  private  pensions.  Public  pensions  persistently
propose charter amendments, prod managers,  and establish lobbying groups.  Some of
their  actions may be political  posturing,  but I believe many are not.  They are acting,
roughly and imprecisely,  the way owners would tend to act.  They lack the managerial
command structure that private pensions have.332
Whatever the case in 1993, it seemed that public pensions remained no more dominated after
1997 by their employers’ values (whether pro-democratic or pro-corporate management) than
private pension funds. On the contrary, they were quite ahead, and far beyond the total absence
of  ‘financial incentives to maximize fund performance’ found among asset managers. 
Public  pensions’  size  meant  their  beneficiaries  could  take  collective  action,  and  the
increasing presence of  beneficiary voice ensured that they were leading in pushing for the classic
understanding  of  better  governance  standards.333 Precisely  because  of  their  challenge  to
incumbent  interests,  public  pensions  became  political  targets.  In  2005  Governor  Arnold
Schwarzenegger attempted to terminate the Californian plan and resurrect it as a form of  401(k)
operation, but the attempt was defeated by protests.334 It has since become a consistent strategy,
essentially among Republican governors, to individualise and outsource state employee retirement
funds. This is driven by the Supreme Court’s decisions on election finance,335 which increases the
political influence of  corporate boards. Public pensions funds are targetted precisely because they
have become responsive to their beneficiaries, and active. They are leading experimentation in the
laboratories of  corporate governance.
331 M  Kahan  and  EB  Rock,  ‘Hedge  Funds  in  Corporate  Governance  and  Corporate  Control’  (2007)  155  University  of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1021, ECGI Law Series 076/2006, 26-27
332 M Roe, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions: Insulating Management from Owners and from Accountability’
(1993-1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 75, 91-92
333 CalPERS Global Principles of  Accountable Corporate Governance (2010) requiring, for instance, under B6.1 removal of
directors without cause and under A4, one share one vote.
334 J Wasserman, ‘CA: Governor ousts CalSTRS appointees who oppose his pension plan’ (11 February 2005) Free Republic
335 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010) 
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(e) Conclusion
More than the UK or Germany, US corporate governance today is being pulled in two very
different directions. Its tradition of  worker and beneficiary codetermination in pensions is as long
any, and public pension funds were leaders in governance activism. But along with the temporal
decline in the American labour movement’s membership, ERISA 1974 and the 1986 tax changes
were remarkably successful at re-individualising pension investment. Mutual fund corporations
benefitted, and unlike the banks who brokered direct share purchases before, they had been left
free  to exercise  other  people’s  voting  rights  on their  own account.  Asset  managers  acquired
decisive influence, and all through standard form agreements. There was nothing rational about
this.  It  was the raw consequence of  unfettered bargaining power. Only public pension funds
could compete, but they were still at a disadvantage. The voice of  the ultimate contributor was
very precarious indeed. 
*****
Behind the institutional veil, three of  the most different systems of  modern corporate law begin
to look very similar. Asset managers dominate corporate governance in the UK and the US, while
banks dominate in Germany.  But although asset managers and banks acquire their economic
influence through different business channels, this does nothing to detract from the remarkable
functional convergence that has been achieved: the ultimate contributors to corporate equity have
been cut out, and financial institutions rule. Why has this happened?
The same themes remain consistent in institutional investment as they did for director
elections and shareholder voting. The evidence follows the first positive thesis, in that progressive
democrats have consistently  sought to expand the domain of  participation rights through all
institutions. In the UK, this came from the policies in the Trade Boards Act 1918 to spread Joint
Industrial  Councils,  the  trade unions during the  war  who preferred trust  to insurance based
schemes,  and  a  consensus  between  mainstream  Conservatives  and  Labour,  from  the
Occupational Pensions Board, to the Goode Report, to the Pensions Act 2004. In Germany, it
began with Degenkolb in the 1848 revolutions, it was continued by the Social Democrats in the
early Weimar Republic, but was met with stiff  resistance at all times from the social conservatives,
the courts,  and the fascists. The US forged the expansion of  voice through investment most
consciously, from the New Deal unions, to the Taft-Hartley plans, to modern state pension funds,
particularly after 1997. But this consistent pattern in the development of  participation rights has
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been left very incomplete. 
The economic patterns are even more clear. The second positive thesis emphasises the
irrationality of  power. Standard form contracts have the same character everywhere. They serve a
function of  administrative efficiency, but the gains mainly go to the party who writes them. Life
insurance was held back as an alternative to pensions by union bargaining power in the UK and
US during the 1930s and 1940s. But from the 1980s, asset managers succeeded in appropriating
voting rights, especially through the growth of  401(k) plans, with standard agreements. Without
an active push back by their unions, German workers lost the voice in most of  their pensions to
corporate employers and in life insurance forms of  pension. New regulation may come soon in
some form:  the cancellation of  banker voting is  more likely  than ever in  Germany after  the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Swiss referendum, while ‘Independent Governance Committees’ in the
UK, once established in principle, could lead to many innovations. But as matters stand, what
rationality  is  there  behind the  accumulation  of  power  by  asset  managers  and banks?  It  has
happened through private market transactions – markets involving parties of  unequal bargaining
power.  How can the outcomes be justified,  any more than the unaccountable assumption of
power by boards of  directors could be? 
These  questions  are  all  the  more
pressing  because  institutional  investment  is
global. Since the fall of  the Berlin Wall, in each
country,  the  proportion  of  foreign  share
ownership has risen dramatically (tripling in the
UK, doubling  in  Germany and the US),  and
will probably continue to do so. What happens
behind institutional  veils  abroad now matters
more than ever at home. If  a similar culture of
financial  institutions  controlling  companies  is
present  in  each  country,  it  has  global
consequences. 
The statistics  do not  yet  make clear  who ‘foreign ownership’  means.336 It  would also
include  a  few  percentage  points  for  foreign  governments’  wealth  funds.337 But  with  this
exception, a workable hypothesis is that the breakdown of  foreign investors would resemble the
336 The Office for National Statistics, the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve say they have no further information.
337 Sometimes  pension  funds  are  conflated  with  purely  government  controlled  savings  accounts.  The  lack  of  democratic
accountability  appears to be the appropriate  dividing line.  cf  RJ Gilson and CJ Milhaupt,  ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism’ (2007-2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1345 
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average composition of  domestic investors in each country. In the UK, countries in Europe and
the Americas counted for 92 per cent of  foreign direct investment in 2009.338 In the US, the top
sources for foreign direct investment were Canada with 22 per cent, Germany with 16 per cent,
France 15 percent, Switzerland 11 per cent, the UK 10 per cent, Netherlands 7 per cent, and the
rest of  the world 22 per cent.339 Direct investment differs from portfolio investment, but the
national  breakdown is  unlikely  to  differ  widely.  Regulation  of  financial  intermediaries  in  any
jurisdiction will have consequences – whether positive or negative – for its neighbours.
The promising fact, and a reason for hope, is that the evolution is still primitive. If  it were
true  that  the  functional  convergence  in  corporate  governance  had  reached  an  ‘end’,  with
shareholders  as  asset  managers  and  banks  becoming  supreme,  then  modern  corporate
governance, from the progressive democrat view, might be seen as a failure – a stupefying and
ruinous failure. Yet the cause for optimism, in the progressive democrat’s eyes, is still  strong.
There is no end. How might, and how should, corporate governance develop in future? It is to
this question that Part III turns. 
338 Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Foreign Direct Investment (2009) 4
339 Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (18 March 2010) 2
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PART III. IMPLICATIONS
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7. ONE NORMATIVE THESIS: SYMMETRY OF CONTRIBUTION AND PARTICIPATION
Part I posed the question, why do some people participate in corporate governance more than
others?  Chapter  2  contended  that  the  focus  should  shift  (and  maybe  it  already  has)  from
‘ownership and control’ to the separation of  contribution and participation. Chapter 3 elaborated
two positive theses, namely that participation rights in law have been driven by a progressive
democratic movement, but incompletely compared to its social ideas. When participation was left
to the market (when the law did not contain specific rights) the relative bargaining power of
different groups drove results. Neither the political, nor economic development of  participation
in  corporate  governance  can  be  regarded  as  principled  in  process,  or  outcome.  Part  II  has
provided the historical evidence to support these positive theses in the UK, Germany and the US,
and suggested that  alternative  political  and economic theories  are  not  as  convincing in  their
accounts of  the causal drivers of  participation rights. But if  all this is true, does it matter? 
This chapter makes the case that the separation of  contribution and participation is a
significant concern and it threatens to undo the successes of  modern corporate law. Sometimes it
is argued that legal history and tradition is irrelevant for justifying today’s institutions.1 Whether
or not this is true, legal history can certainly show why today’s institutions are unjustified. It can
prompt  us  to  say,  “if  that’s  how it  happened,  it  can’t  be  right.”  Precisely  because  political
developments have followed no principle fully, and because economic evolution has an arbitrary
tendency,  there is  a strong normative implication favouring reform. In short,  participation in
corporate governance is unprincipled, and it should change. 
Section (1) discusses the different ways of  looking at the goals of  corporate law, against
which  a  ‘good’  principle  might  be  judged.  Productive  efficiency  is  often  a  central  goal  in
corporate governance. It is argued that an economic focus is generally sound, because economic
productivity serves the larger aim of  social welfare and justice. If  the separation of  people who
make the ultimate contributions to corporations continues, or grows, economic productivity is
threatened because institutional intermediaries will tend to the ‘negligence and profusion’ that
Adam Smith feared from company directors.
Section (2) suggests the best way to ensure that corporations function productively is to
maintain  the  principle  of  a  symmetry  between  contribution  and  participation.  People  who
provide the ultimate contributions to equity should have a proportionate right to vote – direct or
1 See L Smith, ‘Fusion and Tradition’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (2005) 19, 20
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intermediated,  but  unbroken  through  the  investment  chain  –  over  whoever  uses  their
contributions. The tension between accountability and efficiency is often exaggerated, especially
since accountable management is one of  the guarantees of  expertise. The market mechanism
cannot  provide  the  necessary  accountability  alone  because  the  risks  of  inefficient  behaviour
remain  whenever  there  are  imbalances  in  bargaining  power.  This  would  be  true  even  in  a
hypothetical world without transaction costs. Legal duties can only create minimum standards.
Thus, the symmetry of  contribution and participation rights embodies an irreplaceable principle.
If  shareholding  institutions  can  become  accountable  they  will  be,  not  a  threat  to  systemic
stability, but a productive force for good. Section (3) proposes three policy options to carry the
symmetry principle into effect.
(1) Goals of  corporate law
One of  the difficulties of  normative argument is that, as people’s values and objectives differ, so
will  their  proposals.  In  democratic  discussion,  obfuscation  is  often  a  way  of  overcoming
disagreements.2 If  policies are framed at a higher level of  generality, then short term political
consensus is more likely, and the details can slowly play out later. The technique is deployed when
drafting bills of  rights, constitutions, international treaties, and in media discourse. In corporate
law,  values  such  as  economic  productivity,  social  responsibility,  social  efficiency,  democracy,
accountability, legitimacy, and expertise, are frequently used as overarching justifications for laws
or proposals, and rightly so. Precisely because they are general, many people can support them in
principle. Yet – and though it may seem obvious – it is historically profound that law should be
justified with reasons, even vague ones. Reasons serve a process of  social communication. They
open the law to critical reflection by people who frequently have opposing interests, but offer a
route  to  resolution.  They  allow  deliberative  discussion.  Human  institutions  can  be  shaped
through a  slow,  reflexive  dialogue,  which  may determine whether  the  means  being  used are
proportionate to pursue a stated goal. 
What should be the goal (if  any) that corporate law pursues? The trouble with those
general goals just listed is that none can be truly said to be ‘good’ in unlimited quantity all of  the
time. Like almost any pursuit, each can potentially be viewed as good or bad depending on the
2 cf  Lord Sumption,  ‘The Limits  of  Law’ (20 November 2013) 27 th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture,  Kuala Lumpur,  page 13,
referring to democratic discourse. Lord Sumption does appear to neglect that opaquely worded treaties or constitutional
documents can themselves be a product of  the same democratic deliberation. For the view that there is no single ‘right’
balance see Lord Hoffmann, Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, 109-113
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relation in which one stands.3 Productivity and thus increased wealth might be usually thought of
as good unless, to take one simple example, people found they preferred less work and more
leisure. Efficiency, whether economic or social, is properly speaking a means in pursuit of  a goal
(an efficient way to do what?)  and as such is not a substantive objective.4 But if  the goal is
maximisation of  production,  or some other  good,  then efficiency,  like productivity,  only  has
relative,  not  absolute  worth.  The  perception that  people  in  power  hold  legitimacy  is  plainly
important, unless despite the perception the reality is one of  exploitation. What might determine
objective legitimacy? Expertise could be important  unless,  for  example,  the  experts’  interests
diverge substantially from those they are meant to serve, and they further their own ends. And so
on. The philosophy of  relativity is not the only point of  view: it could be said that there are
objective goods, which are identifiable through introspective reflection.5 However, it seems more
plausible to admit that in almost all goods that one could identify, there must be exceptions and
trade-offs some of  the time and this negates any possibility to objectively identify a list of  goods.
Because this thesis centres upon participation rights, it is worth expanding on the goal of
‘democracy’ and its associate ‘accountability’. Democracy and accountability are usually important
values, but it is also true that ‘too much’ might lead to lack of  expedient decision-making, poor
decisions,  or  any  of  the  problems  discussed  in  chapter  2(3)(c).  Often  analogies  are  drawn
between voting in democratic politics, and in economic organisations like the corporation, and
from  this  analogy  it  is  concluded  that  corporations  ought  to  be  democratised. 6 Assuming
‘democratic corporations’ do conjure up a desirable image, it is not at all clear the analogy is
useful.7 The main reason seems to be that people make different contributions to corporations,
and so people are not  clearly justified in being on an equal foot. People might make different
investments, engage more or less, and so on. On the other hand, it might be argued that the
differences in contribution that people often make, for instance today through pension funds, are
usually so negligible that it would hardly be worthwhile to deviate from a one-person, one-vote
standard.  This  may  partly  explain  why  18th and  19th century  companies  employed  flatter
shareholder voting structures. The debate will probably continue today. Meanwhile, in political
entities  there  are  very  well  established  reasons  for  believing  everyone  should  count  equally,
3         B Spinoza, On the Improvement of  the Understanding (1677) §§1-10
4 cf  R Posner, Economic Analysis of  Law (2011) 37, ‘A second meaning of  justice, perhaps the most common, is – efficiency....
Even the principle of  unjust enrichment can be derived from the concept of  efficiency... And with a little reflection, it will
come as no surprise that in a world of  scarce resources waste should be regarded as immoral.’ Here it can be seen that Posner
has subtly redefined efficiency as maximisation of  resources. 
5 eg J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1974) chs 3-4
6 eg R Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985) 
7 eg HG Manne, ‘Some Theoretical Aspects of  Share Voting’ (1964) 64(8) CLR 1427, 1445, suggesting that in fact the issues
tend to be simpler in corporations. 
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regardless  of  wealth,  education,  gender,  race,  or  other  status,  because  we  tend  to  view  the
relevant  ‘contribution’  to  society  as  an  equal  human  potential.8 This  cannot  persuasively  be
multiplied or divided in an economic equation. But in the sphere of  economics itself, differential
inputs are generally seen as morally relevant, at least as matters stand today. It follows that in
relation  to  corporations,  the  values  of  democracy  and  accountability  cannot  be  regarded  as
absolute. Justifying a goal in corporate law cannot simply take a logical shortcut from existing
political structures, but must find justifications in its own terms.
This said, there is a consistent line of  thinking in post-enlightenment philosophy that
there is one goal that is indeed always a worthy objective in life. This has variously been described
as seeking, together with others, a better content of  our ‘character’,9 to bring forward everyone’s
‘capacity’,10 the ‘utmost possible development of  faculty in the individual human being’,11 or to
ensure that ‘the opportunity to develop individuality becomes fully actualized.’12 It is difficult to
conceive of  a reason why trying to improve ourselves as people, and build institutions to deliver
the same improvement socially, could not be regarded as something inherently good in itself. In
economic  thought,  John  Stuart  Mill  promoted  ‘utility’  in  a  very  similar  (and  possibly
indistinguishable)  manner,13 while  the  modern  economics  of  ‘welfare’,  ‘human  freedom’,  or
‘human development’ is viewed in the same way as key to the idea of  justice. 14 These can all be
regarded as different synonyms for ‘social justice’.15 Social justice is hardly an eternal moral value,
because it is hard to believe that such values exist outside of  the human society which shapes its
own morals.16 Instead it is an argument that depends on its persuasive power to be accepted.
8 For this view, see T Paine, The Rights of  Man (1792) Part II, ch 3
9 B Spinoza, On the Improvement of  the Understanding (1677) §§13-14, ‘man conceives a human character much more stable than
his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself  acquire such a character... This, then, is the end for which
I strive, to attain to such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to it with me. In other words, it is part of
my happiness to lend a helping hand...’
10 T Paine, The Rights of  Man (1792) Part II, ch 3, ‘There is existing in man, a mass of  sense lying in a dormant state, and which,
unless something excites it to action, will descend with him, in that condition, to the grave. As it is to the advantage of  society
that the whole of  its faculties should be employed, the construction of  government ought to be such as to bring forward, by a
quiet and regular operation, all that extent of  capacity which never fails to appear in revolutions.’
11 S Webb and B Webb,  Industrial  Democracy (9th edn 1926) Part IV,  ch 4,  847-849, ‘We ourselves understand by the words
“Liberty” or “Freedom,” not any quantum of  natural or inalienable rights, but such conditions of  existence in the community
as do, in practice, result in the utmost possible development of  faculty in the individual human being.... When the conditions
of  employment are deliberately regulated so as to secure adequate food, education, and leisure to every capable citizen, the
great mass of  the population will, for the first time, have any real chance of  expanding in friendship and family affection, and
of  satisfying the instinct for knowledge or beauty. It is an even more unique attribute of  democracy that it is always taking the
mind of  the individual off  his own narrow interests and immediate concerns, and forcing him to give his thought and leisure,
not to satisfying his own desires, but to considering the needs and desires of  his fellows.’
12 AA Berle, ‘Property, Production and Revolution’ (1965) 65(1) Columbia Law Review 1, 17
13 JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book V, ch XI, §6 and JS Mill, Utilitarianism (1863) ch 5
14 A Sen,  The  Idea  of  Justice  (2010)  228-230 and  J  Stiglitz,  ‘Employment,  social  justice  and  societal  well-being’  (2002)  141
International Labour Review 9
15 This is not to say that with a particular will, significant differences in emphasis cannot be found, and debated endlessly. 
16 It is not, therefore natural law. See F Kessler, ‘Natural Law, Justice and Democracy – Some Reflections on Three Types of
Thinking about Law and Justice’ (1944) 19 Tulane LR 32, 54-55
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Individual  justice  is  often said  to concern people getting  what they  are  due.17 If  the idea  is
persuasive that we owe a moral duty to ourselves to be better people, social justice means creating
the institutions to realise that duty for each other. Rather than people’s goals and free will being
subordinated to society,18 the role of  all social institutions is to be subordinated to the purpose of
serving people. Social justice is the true aim toward which all law and human institutions, inside
corporate governance and out, should strive.19 
Matching  this  higher  abstraction  with  real  law  presents  the  challenge  of  arranging
hierarchies and sub-categories of  objective. Economic productivity and efficiency is certainly one
of  the most important sub-categories of  the general objective of  social justice. This is because
with  economic  growth  and efficiency,  people  in  society  have  more  resources.  It  means  that
individually and collectively they may hold more property.20 In turn, the best justification for
property is that it represents one method for people to express and develop their personalities. 21
A useful  proxy to measure a country’s success in social improvement is  the United Nations’
inequality-adjusted  Human  Development  Index.22 It  aggregates  countries’  gross  domestic
product, years in education, and life expectancy, and adjusts the outcome according to how many
people substantially share the average position. Although it is an incomplete measure, 23 and is yet
to be defined more precisely,  it  gives a  rough indication of  social  justice  at  a national  level.
Because money, property, and GDP are part of  the larger social aim, it follows that ‘economic’
aims may sometimes have to concede to the general social goal. However the reverse cannot be
true: social goals must never concede to the economic. 
All  this  means  that  most  of  the  time,  corporate  law  can  indeed  focus  on  goals  of
economic development, productivity,  and efficiency,  unless there is an obvious clash with the
general  values  of  social  justice.  Such  a  clash  might  arise,  for  example,  when  corporations
17 eg Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ca 330 BC) Book V, Parts 3 and 4. On the tautological nature of  this statement, see H Kelsen,
What is Justice? (1957) 125-136  
18 cf  Plato, The Republic (ca 350 BC)
19 For a different system of  thought, see FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973) vol II, ch 3, and cf  D Eggen, ‘Bush Warns
of  Aggressive Economic Regulation. On Wall St., He Defends Bailout’ (14 November 2008) Washington Post
20 nb the term property is being used here in the same sense as used by Berle (1965) 65(1) Columbia Law Review 1, with
reference to passive, rather than productive assets. 
21 GWF Hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right (1820) §41
22 This human development index measures gross national income, with a deduction for inequality, life expectancy and years in
education. See United Nations Development Programme,  Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition. The Real
Wealth of  Nations: Pathways to Human Development (2010). 
23 cf  RF Kennedy, Remarks at the University of  Kansas (18 March 1968) ‘... that Gross National Product counts air pollution and
cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of  carnage.  It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for
the people who break them.  It counts the destruction of  the redwood and the loss of  our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl.
It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in our cities.  It counts
Whitman's rifle and Speck's knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children.  Yet
the gross national product does not allow for the health of  our children, the quality of  their education or the joy of  their play.
It does not include the beauty of  our poetry or the strength of  our marriages, the intelligence of  our public debate or the
integrity of  our public officials.  It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither
our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile.’
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perpetuate social exclusion of  under-represented groups or harm the environment. This invites
public regulation to confine how otherwise autonomous associations could act, perhaps in spite
of  foreseeably negative economic outcomes: and ultimately to ‘let justice be done whatever be
the consequence’.24 Otherwise, institutional structures must be justified economically. It could be
argued that emphasis on economic considerations is often excessive, but it should also be seen
why such a charge cannot stand if  the economic focus serves the social objective. The most
difficult debate when it comes to participation rights concerns, not just their direct social value,
but their economic value – and without understanding this, the social merits will always remain
inconclusive. So do the benefits of  the separation of  contribution and participation outweigh the
costs? To answer, the arguments may rightly speak in terms of  economic consequences. 
(2) From separation to symmetry
(a) Expertise and shareholding
Does the separation of  contribution and participation matter? The first potential answer is to see
the results of  the present law, and developments on the market to be largely justifiable. It could
be rejected that there is any market ‘failure’ as such, even if  it is admitted that the results come
largely from unequal bargaining power of  financial institutions. To the extent that corporate laws
underwrite votes for shareholders, and some ability to elect or remove directors, but go little
further, this could be viewed as a way of  maintaining economic stability and dynamism. The best
possible reason that could be offered would seem to be one based on expertise and the division
of  labour.  Asset  managers and banks  do have unequal bargaining power,  but they are given
money  precisely  because  they  offer  a  specialist’s  service.  Those  which  maintain  the  larger
corporate  governance  departments  are  able  to  combine  their  unique  knowledge  and macro-
oversight  of  the  markets  with  their  governance  functions,  or  they  can  pay  other  specialists,
particularly proxy advice organisations, to make the right governance recommendations.
Moreover, this argument could go, specialisation means the average person saving for
retirement  does  not  need  to  become  an  expert  in  the  complex  technicalities  of  economic
management. Such a person certainly has little time to do so. But he or she may still enjoy the
advantages of  secure investments. One does not have to be impressed with the proto-fascist
arguments deployed in 1920 and 1930s Germany about the ‘irresponsibility’ of  small investors,25
and should not be repelled by the fascist heritage of  director primacy theory and the ‘nexus of
24 Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499, 509, per Lord Mansfield. This case affirmed slavery was unlawful at common law.
25 See chs 4(2) and 5(2)
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contracts’,26 before seeing that the present state of  affairs  represents a wise balance between
securing expertise and accountability.27 As Jensen and Meckling wrote, it is reasonable to presume
that when all parties have made voluntary choices – and fundamentally (if  by nothing else then by
choosing their job) people do choose their retirement plans, their life insurance policies, managed
fund investments, or whether to directly buy shares – the results will be economically efficient.
Delegation of  voting rights to asset managers and banks is rational. The alternative, to intervene
and engineer some ‘socially optimal’ outcome would probably have unintended consequences for
the stability of  corporate governance. Here the same arguments go for spreading participation
rights among the ultimate contributors as they go for shareholder rights. Indeed it is arguable that
some countries’ laws on shareholder rights have already gone too far. It may also be that some
institutions  are  over-protected,  particularly  German  banks,28 because  market  penetration  and
competition  from  asset  managers  is  hindered.  All  active  shareholders  divert  attention  and
resources  from the  business  of  management.  At  worst,  spreading participation  in  corporate
governance could, this view might suggest, lead to special interest groups such as trade unions
and ‘political entrepreneurs’ devaluing and stagnating the economy. This would risk damaging
security in retirement for the very people who were supposedly meant to be ‘protected’.
One difficulty with such an argument is that while it can be agreed that expertise is an
important goal, it does not follow that financial institutions have it where they are unaccountable.
It  is  plain  that  directors,  asset  managers  or  bankers  mostly  have  their  jobs  because  of  a
demonstrated aptitude for results in their way of  enterprise, but it is also true that nobody has a
monopoly on expertise. So far as agency costs go in terms of  negligence, centralisation of  authority
carries with it a concomitant concentration of  risk of  poor decision making. This means that the
idea  of  an  antonymous  trade-off  between  expertise  and  accountability  through  the  vote  is
misplaced, because representative voting is itself  part of  the guarantee of  expertise, and has no
‘substitute’.29 The more people who ultimately have a vote for representatives, the less risk of
persistently socially detrimental decision making. Representative voting (not direct participation)
is a mechanism for aggregating the preferences of  many people efficiently, and thus the risk of
any single person making a poor appointment is diversified because those who vote usually have
an advantage in knowing what is best for them. This is not  always  true, but it probably is true
26 See F Kessler, ‘Book Review: Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht’ (1935) 83 University of  Pennsylvania
Law Review 393, 394, and the discussion about Johannes Zahn at ch 4(2) above.
27 Or ‘authority and responsibility’ as put in different circumstances by K Arrow, The Limits of  Organization (1974) 
28 See SM Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Rights’ (2005-2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 601, with the notable
conclusion that ‘The director primacy-based system of  U.S. corporate governance has served investors and society well. John
Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, for example, recently opined that the company is “the basis of  the prosperity of  the
West and the best hope for the future of  the rest of  the world.”’
29 cf  SM Bainbridge, ‘Participatory Management a Theory of  the Firm’ (1996) 21 Journal of  Corporate Law 657, 672-673
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most of  the time that accountability through the vote instils a culture of  professionalism and
better practice. Moreover, when the issue is the risk of  profusion, it takes very little specialist or
expert knowledge to see that an agent is paying itself  excessively. Just because negligence and
profusion can both be called agency costs, it does not follow that expertise will counteract both. 
A further significant difficulty is that the evidence which usually is called on to support
the ‘director-centered Delaware way’ was the supposed vitality of  the American economy.30 But
no sooner than this triumph of  logic was revealed, the global economy was crashed, again. It is
true that (no matter how much one may wish to never waste a good crisis) the insolvencies of
Northern  Rock,  Bear  Stearns,  and  Lehman Brothers,  were  not  directly  related  to  corporate
participation rights.31 The direct causes were different.32 They included the absence of  regulation
for unfair contract terms in the US mortgage market, rating agencies being paid by the businesses
whose products they rated, and no enforcement of  disclosure obligations in vast swathes of  the
derivatives that monetised people’s homes.33 Zealous triumphalism, and likewise condemnation,
of  one country’s economic institutions in fleeting moments of  history is unwise. But it can be
said  that  the  latest  economic catastrophe  took  place  on the  watch of  a  system where  asset
managers and banks dominated.34 The centralisation of  authority, and concentration of  risk that
accountability mechanisms failed was an exacerbating factor. 
Since the financial crisis unfolded, a series of  studies have suggested that a shareholder
oriented model of  corporate governance was a factor contributing to the collapse. 35 This position
ought  to  be  taken  seriously  as  it  has  been  found,  to take  just  one  example,  that  there  is  a
significant positive correlation between the banks taking less money from the Troubled Asset
Relief  Programme in the US, and its managements being more insulated from shareholders. 36
The basic responses to this charge – that shareholder empowerment links with systemic risk –
range from, first, saying that shareholder rights ought to be limited. Here some of  those who can
fairly be described as being on the political left of  corporate law, and on its political right, find a
30 eg M Lipton and W Savitt, ‘The Many Myths of  Lucian Bebchuk’ (May 2007) 93(3) Virginia Law Review 733
31 eg B Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of  the S&P 500’
(2009) 65(1) Business Lawyer 1
32 See generally JC Coffee, ‘What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of  the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 9(1)
Journal of  Corporation Law Studies 1
33 See J Taub,  Other People’s Houses: How Decades of  Bailouts, Captive Regulators, and Toxic Bankers Made Home Mortgages a Thrilling
Business (2014) 
34 For example, the major shareholders of  Bear Stearns in December 2007 were Barrow Hanley Mewhinney & Strauss – 9.73%,
Joseph C. Lewis – 9.36%. Morgan Stanley – 5.37%, James Cayne – 4.94%, Legg Mason Capital Management – 4.84%, Private
Capital Management – 4.49%, Barclays Global Investors – 3.10%, State Street 3.01%, Vanguard Group – 2.67%, Janus Capital
Management – 2.34%. 
35 See S Deakin, ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business
Enterprise’ (2012) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 339, 342, fn 5
36 D Ferreira, D Kershaw, T Kirchmaier and E Schuster, ‘Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts’ (2012) ECGI - Finance
Working Paper No. 345/2013 
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way to shake hands. Those on the left see a diminution of  shareholder rights as being desirable,
because it is thought that this will lead to a space where other stakeholders can be protected by
enlightened directors. Those on the right see increasing managerial authority as a value in itself. 37
A second response is to suggest that bank governance does, and ought to differ from the general
patterns  of  corporate  governance  because  the  public  interest  is  uniquely  engaged,38 possibly
drawing an analogy to network enterprises or other natural monopolies like water, electricity or
railways. The answer, however, lies in closer regulatory control, including more intrusive public
oversight  of  capital  maintenance,  not  least  through  the  (invariably  public)  central  banking
authorities. 
A third approach could acknowledge that shareholder power is not inevitably positive,
and  that  bank  governance  does  and  plainly  ought  to  differ  from the  general  regulation  of
enterprise. But instead of  limiting shareholder rights, or leaving shareholders alone, the better
approach is to look at who shareholders actually are. Shareholder voice is not the problem per se,
if  shareholders  can  be converted  into,  not  a  destructive,39 but  a  positive  force  in  corporate
governance.
(b) Making shareholders safe for corporate governance?
A second potential  answer  to  the  main  question  is  that  the  separation  of  contribution and
participation is a concern and should be addressed. It  embodies a defective system of  social
organisation, but with a particular view of  the extent of  the defects. Transaction costs and the
costs  of  taking  collective  action  could  be  seen  as  the  issues  which  make  the  market  for
institutional  investment,  like  corporate  governance,  sub-optimal.  In  principle,  markets  work
unless shown otherwise,  so deviation from  laissez  faire is  justifiable but only to the extent of
resolving the particular market failures.40 Here, Ronald Coase’s axiom, as discussed in chapter 3(2)
(a), points the way. We may presume that in a world without transaction costs, including the costs
of  taking collective action,  the ultimate contributors to companies,  like  smaller  shareholders,
would be capable of  organising to ensure that their interests are properly represented. But in the
real world, such costs prevent an optimal outcome.41 So it is legitimate for the law to achieve what
people themselves would want to do.
37 eg S Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119 HLR 1735
38 eg K Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance of  Banks after the Financial Crisis’ in E Wymeersch, KJ Hopt, G Ferrarini (eds) Financial
Regulation and Supervision, A post-crisis analysis (OUP 2012) 337
39 cf  S Deakin, ‘Against Shareholder Empowerment’ in J Williamson, Ciaran Driver and P Kenway (eds), Beyond Shareholder Value
(TUC 2014)
40 This was the famous presumption of  JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (1848) Book V, Ch XI
41 R Coase, ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE 1, 40
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The problem so defined, different policy solutions could follow, with the  caveat that the
task is  to interfere only as strictly  necessary to make the markets  work like the hypothetical
model. The most prominent attempt recently is embodied by the UK Stewardship Code, which
has inspired many similar proposals, including revisions to the EU Shareholder Rights Directive.42
The essence of  this approach is to place some form of  legal duty on institutional shareholders to
do what it is presumed the market does not do already: with varying degrees of  specificity, this is
to act in the best interests of  the ultimate contributor. This resembles the fiduciary duties of  a
trustee to beneficiaries, which also, incidentally, may resemble the direction of  development of
implied terms in insurance agreements in the UK, namely to live up to the parties’ ‘reasonable
expectations’.43 In form, it  resembles the duties of  a director to promote the success of  the
company, or to act in shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests. As chapter 6(2)(d) explained, a
similar  regime was  essentially  developed by German banks  in  the  1920s  in  relation to  their
depositors, and codified from the Aktiengesetz 1937 up to today. In the UK Lord Myners himself
took direct inspiration for the stewardship initiative from the US Department of  Labor rules
regarding pension funds,44 which  was  mirrored  by the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission
regarding mutual funds. The innovation, and the difference to the German law (though probably
not to the modern English law of  trusts45) is that minimum standards of  voting activism and
engagement are made explicit, as part of  the umbrella notion of  acting in the client’s interests. 
The positive aspect of  the stewardship model is that all asset managers have now been
recognised as owing the same duties to all clients,46 and thus the formalist distinction between
proprietary and personal  transactions  has been abandoned.  We are now past  ownership,  and
focused on contribution. Asset managers holding pension money, insurance money and mutual
fund money are all being treated alike. The risk, however, is that the stewardship movement may
tacitly recognise not merely responsibilities, but also presume a right of  asset managers to vote
using other people’s money. Moreover, it seems that reforms based on legal duties underestimate
the issue’s nature. If  the quantity of  activism were really the issue, legal duties can indeed effect
minimum  standards.  Either  a  soft-law  system  (as  in  the  UK  or  the  EU  proposals)  or  a
compulsory system (as in the US or Germany) will probably work, at least in terms of  votes cast
(and leaving the issues of  international enforcement aside47). 
42 Proposed Directive COM(2014) 213 final, articles 3f  and 3g. Note the ambiguity of  article 3c, facilitating indirect shareholder
rights. 
43 Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2000] UKHL 39
44 Lord Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2001) 14 and 92
45 eg Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 Ch 515
46 Stewardship Code 2012, Principle 1, ‘The policy should disclose how the institutional investor applies stewardship with the
aim of  enhancing and protecting the value for the ultimate beneficiary or client.’
47 B Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel’ (2010) 73(6) MLR 985
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But the issue is not the quantity,  rather than the quality of  activism. The stewardship
model is anything but new: it is a soft law replication of  the duties of  German banks to vote on
their clients’ behalf  that was first codified by the Aktiengesetz 1937. As chapter 2(3)(b) explained,
legal  duties  are  best  viewed  as  functionally  incapable  of  doing  more  than  make  minimum
standards. The most active, well resourced judiciary or regulator cannot feasibly substitute its
judgment for the judgment of  the bearer of  the duty on a continuing basis. Such duties carry no
guarantee of  qualitative change by financial institutions to act in anything but their own private
definition of  their clients’ interests. 
A different way of  responding to collective action problems might be for government to
attempt to better organise the market at the bottom end, for instance by consolidating retirement
saving plans,  or even promoting the collective organisation of  the workforce.  There is  some
evidence in the UK of  this strategy, notably in proposals to merge local government pensions. 48
It  does seem,  however,  and among other  sources  of  opposition,  that  the  asset  management
industry is less than enthusiastic if  this meant a single local government pension fund could take
investment management in house. If  the issue were one of  the path to rational legal reform, then
it would seem an obvious cost saving measure to achieve economies of  scale. A consolidated UK
Local Government Pension Service would rival CalPERS, which as chapter 6(3)(f) described, was
almost terminated and turned into individual accounts by the Schwarzenegger administration in
2005.  The  interests  behind  Schwarzenegger’s  proposals  probably  explain  the  absence  of
enthusiasm to promote multi-employer collectively bargained pension schemes generally.  This
suggests that relying on government to collectively organise social partners is vulnerable to the
varying motives of  those in government. The nature of  the obstacles suggests that viewing the
issue purely as one of  collective action problems is not enough.49 
(c) Addressing market incapacity
In chapter 2(3)(a) the general concept of  bargaining power was seen to include the problems of
information, taking collective action, and at its most basic,  inequality in wealth and resources.
This last element delivered the ability to hold out longer in negotiations so that general inequality
will persist into inequality of  transaction terms, though for some economic actors inequality will
matter less than information and collective action. The second positive thesis made bargaining
48 Department  for Communities and Local  Government,  LGPS Structure  Analysis  (March 2014) and S Johnson, ‘Local  UK
pensions driven into ‘blind alley’’ (4 May 2014) Financial Times. 
49 It is fair to mention that the conclusion of  the argument about to be made on the basis of  unequal bargaining power could be
derived from viewing the relevant problem as one of  collective action. However it is suggested that this basis nevertheless
leaves too much ambiguity.
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power  central  to  understanding  the  development  of  participation  rights.  Actors  who  were
relatively  well  organised  could  win  participation  in  absence  of  compulsory  legal  rights.  But
generally, and otherwise, the separation of  contribution and participation tended to grow. As a
positive issue, then, bargaining power had to be regarded as relevant for the way that participation
rights developed. But did unequal bargaining power have any efficiency consequences, so as to be
normatively relevant? At the heart of  the matter is whether Coase’s axiom can be defended: that
absent transaction costs people come to efficient agreements regardless of  the distribution of
legal rights. Does the distribution of  legal rights per se have no effect on economic efficiency?
The third potential answer to whether the separation of  contribution and participation is
detrimental is both that it is, and that it cannot be resolved just through a minimalist imposition
of  legal  duties,  or  by  encouraging  better  collective  action  on  the  market.  This  is  because
inequality of  bargaining power, especially where it flows from inequality of  wealth, always leaves
the  weaker  parties  one  step  behind.  It  precludes  market  transactions  as  tools  for  economic
efficiency,  and so merely tackling the issues of  transaction costs  is  not enough. This  can be
logically demonstrated even in a transaction cost free world that lay at the heart of  the Coasean
construct that law and economics theory has followed since. Coase often spoke of  economically
efficient results in general terms, but it is clear he was concerned both with allocative and productive
efficiency. 
It  was  probably  already  shown  in  1990  that  Coase’s  axiom  was  both  logically  and
evidentially unsound in regard to allocative efficiency. Would people trade rights to the party who
would  value  them  the  most  in  a  transaction  cost  free  world?  In  just  one  example,  Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler set up a simple experiment where students were
either given tokens or Cornell University mugs, and were then asked to trade.50 It was found that
when people were given things, like the mugs, they were more inclined to hold onto them than
they were the money. In essence people become attached to the things they are initially ‘endowed’
with. This endowment effect is pervasive throughout human interactions, and it stops efficient
allocation of  resources. It follows that it is simply inaccurate to say that people will always trade
rights to the person that values them the most in a world without transaction costs. The evidence
sits at odds with Coase’s argument. When the issue is participation rights, those who hold them at
the moment are likely to ask for an inefficient premium before they give them up. There is more
to market failure than transaction costs. It makes it unlikely that economic power can be easily or
efficiently bought.
50 D Kahneman, JL Knetsch and RH Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of  the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’ (1990)
98(6) Journal of  Political Economy 1325
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What about  productive efficiency? In a transaction cost free world, are people inclined to
maximise their productive capacities regardless of  the initial distribution of  rights? The answer
must be a clear ‘no’ because distribution of  rights affects the human motivation to work. To take
one example, a study from 2011 by Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, Benedikt Hermann and Frédéric
Schneider  looked at  the  effect  on wage changes  among 96  temporary  workers,  handing out
nightclub  entry  cards  on  a  German  high  street.51 Working  in  pairs,  their  productivity  was
measured according to how many cards they sold for €5, or alternatively how many they gave out
for free in return for the customer’s personal information. A first group of  worker pairs was paid
consistently at €12 per hour. The second group of  worker pairs was, shortly into their first shift,
told their wage would be cut to €9 per hour, pursuant to a contractual flexibility clause. The third
group of  workers, shortly into their first shift, was told this: ‘Worker 1 continues to earn €12 per
hour while worker 2 receives €9 instead of  €12 per hour. This was the manager’s decision.’ 
The  results  were  that,  compared  to  the  first  group,  the  second  group  of  workers’
productivity dropped by 30 per cent (15 per cent for each worker on average). But in the third
group, the average productivity drop was 34 per cent, all attributable to the drop of  worker 2. In
other words, it was even more damaging to have unfair pay with an overall €3 pay cut, than it was
to have an overall €6 pay cut that was equal. The conclusion of  the authors was that the social
comparisons that people make cause changes in effort and thus productivity.  In this way the
distribution of  rights is relevant for productive efficiency. Again, Coase was mistaken that the
most efficient result would ‘always’ transpire in absence of  transaction costs.52 Again, this simply
sits at odds with the evidence. But the idea that Coase’s axiom might be unsound can hardly be
regarded as surprising because this is what Alfred Marshall in 1890,53 and Adam Smith in 1776,54
had already found. Distribution affects motivation to work, and thus productive efficiency.
For corporate law, the question goes further. Is the reverse of  the  German nightclub card
studies’ findings true? Being underpaid demotivates and damages productive efficiency, but does it
harm productive efficiency if  people are overpaid? There do not seem to be empirical studies yet,
but quintessential corporate governance suggests it does. Profusion, unjust enrichment, is half
the sum of  agency costs. As Berle and Means wrote, if  left unaccountable, company directors
could ‘serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of  the company than by making
51 A Cohn, E Fehr, B Herrmann and F Schneider, ‘Social Comparison in the Workplace: Evidence from a Field Experiment’
(2014) 12(4) Journal of  the European Economic Association 877 
52 For further discussion, see E McGaughey, ‘Behavioural economics and labour law’ (2014) LSE Working Paper Series No.
20/2014 
53 A Marshall, Principles of  Economics (3rd edn 1895) Book VI, ch 4, 649
54 Smith (1776) Book I, ch 8, §§43 and 47 
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profits for it.’55 If  this hypothesis is sound this means that, if  inequality of  bargaining power
perpetuates a mal-distribution of  participation rights, and if  in turn this leads to directors or
institutional  intermediaries  being able  to unjustly  profit  from their  office  at  others’  expense,
productive efficiency will  be damaged. Directors,  asset managers and banks spend more time
lining their own pockets than working. 
If  inequality of  bargaining power tends to preclude an economically productive system of
participation rights, then stronger reforms are needed to resolve the problems of  institutional
shareholding, than if  only transaction costs and collective action problems are identified as issues.
Because it begins with inequality in wealth, it follows that a different distribution of  resources, or
rights, is a necessary remedy. One method to do this would be to redistribute ownership of  assets
or money. Socialisation of  the means of  production may be necessary in specific enterprises, but
after the last century of  nationalisations and privatisations, it is doubtful that a unified theory of
enterprise can prevail, any more than it has in contract. If  instead wealth were re-distributed, for
instance through the tax system, the difficulty would be that it could lack sustainability: periodical
redistribution drives could become necessary if  wealth has a tendency to concentrate. Wealth
inequality is an underlying cause of  unequal bargaining power,56 but it is also symptomatic of  the
deeper cause: inequality of  power within the corporation. 
When people  form associations,  as  chapter 2(3)(c)  urged,  those  in  power will  usually
follow the interests of  those to whom they owe their jobs. Asset managers, banks and directors
can  disregard  the  interests  of  the  people  whose  contributions  create  their  positions  if  the
ultimate contributor has no right to participation. If  the goal is productive social organisation,
the most logical remedy is to ensure people have the right to vote for representatives who decide
how their investments are used: a symmetry between contribution and participation. Throughout
the investment chain, there must also be an unbroken voting chain, from the ultimate contributor
up to the board of  directors. The ‘symmetry principle’ might not be sufficient to ensure perfect
accountability, but it is necessary. Representatives on corporate boards, and financial institutions
that use other people’s contributions, if  ultimately subject to votes of  those whose contributions
they use,  will  be more impelled to act  according to the contributors’  interests,  less  prone to
negligence and profusion. This will protect economic productivity, as a route to social justice.  
55 AA Berle and GC Means,  The Modern Corporation and Private Property  (1932) 114, ‘the owners most emphatically will not be
served by a profit-seeking controlling group. In the operation of  the corporation the controlling group even if  they own a
large block of  stock, can serve their own pockets better by profiting at the expense of  the company than by making profits
for it.’
56 On which, now famously, T Piketty,  Capital  in the Twenty-First  Century  (2014) ch 10, discussing capital  ownership, though
lacking in specifics. It contrasts to this thesis in its focus on ownership, not power. 
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(3) Principles and policy options
So far, section (2) has established the reasons for the symmetry thesis. The principle of  symmetry
is necessary to achieve the goal of  efficient production, as a path to social justice. It does this by
ensuring that people’s contributions are not used in a way that is unaccountable, and allowing
‘negligence and profusion’. In a world of  unequal wealth, market mechanisms cannot be a full
answer.  But if  the principle of  symmetry between contribution and participation is accepted,
there is no necessary ‘right’ way to achieve it. Within reason, there could be legitimately different
views on the relative value of  a ‘contribution’ (one-person, one-vote, as in pension trusts? Or
one-pound, one-vote, as with shares?).  Within reason, there can also be legitimately different
views on the desirability of  intermediated participation (are unitary boards so much better than
two-tier boards? Is trade union nomination of  pension trustees worse than direct elections?).
Also, while the symmetry principle requires that people have participation rights throughout the
investment chain, there can be legitimately different views about implementation methods. Three
will  be  offered as illustrations,  namely  a  ‘self-organisation’  model,  a  ‘disability’  model,  and a
‘positive rights’ model, and how they would apply in the UK, Germany and the US.
(a) The self-organisation model
First, it is conceivably possible for people to reorganise corporate governance, even as matters
stand today, with barely any legal reform. Regarding directors and shareholders, it is conceivable
that in the US the drive continues toward dismantling staggered boards, and spreading the one-
share,  one-vote  standard,  on  the  (perhaps  optimistic)  assumption that  political  action  is  not
successful in dismantling those pension funds. The public and union pension funds which have
pushed the reform so far could produce a system which does through bargaining what the UK
did through law and regulation in 1947 and 1962, coupled with the power of  its own institutional
shareholders.  In  Germany,  there  are  different  views  about  the  supervisory  board,  and some
people  will  probably  continue to value  it  because  they  regard it  as  having unique merits.  If,
however, the German supervisory board’s purpose is seen again in a more historically accurate
light – as an outlet for Prussian authoritarianism and banker dominance over small shareholders
– then perceptions might shift. There is no particular reason why large companies might not
convert to a Societas Europea, and dismantle supervisory boards on the grounds that they serve
an  unwarranted  management  insulation  function.  The  challenge  here  would  be  to  reach  a
sufficient accommodation with trade unions about a  post-supervisory board codetermination
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model. It could be suggested that somewhere between one-third and one-half  of  a unitary board
could achieve the same or better result from a worker viewpoint.57 
What about asset managers? In the UK, developments in 2013-2014 suggested that highly
significant changes could be in motion, partly as a result of  an ongoing regulatory discourse.
Concern about excessive fees being charged to pension funds, and the threat of  regulation, led
the Association of  British Insurers to propose an agreement with the Office of  Fair Trading to
institute  ‘Independent  Governance  Committees’  in  asset  managers.58 The  most  recent
Department for Work and Pensions consultation paper envisaged that the IGCs would have a list
of  functions  relating  to  oversight  of  investment  policy,  and  would  be  partly  composed  of
representatives elected by the asset manager’s clients or beneficiaries.59 The issue of  control over
governance policy has not been proposed, but this would nevertheless represent a logical next
step, once IGCs are in place. Participation in the way votes are cast would, in effect, be an avenue
for the genesis of  the proposal in the Geßler Report for German banks in 1979 to have elected
governance committees controlling the votes on deposited shares. There is a distinct possibility
that self-organisation of  pension funds could achieve such an objective simply through applying
market pressure as clients. This said, the other side of  the industry was consolidating in 2014, as
the Association of  British Insurers  merged with  the  Investment  Management  Association to
make the ‘Investment Association’. US pension funds which had the same habit of  delegating
investment management to investment advisers could attempt the same strategy. If  it worked, if
elected governance committees were in place, the voting function of  investment management
could be decoupled from the registered shareholder, and re-coupled with the ultimate investor. 
For German banks, the situation is complicated by the nature of  the retirement savings
legislation. Trade unions would need to push for a switch in types of  pension plan, away from
direct promise and insured pensions toward the codetermined models. Those funds could then
conceivably  bargain  with  banks  to  implement  the  Geßler  proposals.  The  difficulty  is  that
employers have strong incentives to maintain direct promise pensions, because they can use the
balance sheet surplus to self-invest. Because direct promise pensions have to be insured against
the risk of  the employer’s insolvency, the insurance industry also has a strong incentive to use its
influence to maintain that  option.  Insurance companies,  like Allianz,  can use their  weight as
shareholders  to  do  this.  To the  extent  that  major  shareholders  in  Allianz  or  other  German
57 It may be noted that Swedish employee representatives holding a third of  the seats on a unitary board seem to have more
influence, and success, than their German counterparts, although much also depends on labour law more generally.
58 Otto Thoresen, Director General of  the Association of  British Insurers, Letter to Clive Maxwell, Chief  Executive, Office of  Fair
Trading (30 August 2013) 
59 DWP, Better workplace pensions: Further measures for savers (March 2014) Cm 8840, 104, Annex B
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insurers are banks,60 this means that banks have a strong incentive also to use the voting rights
they hold to forestall a different result. Employers, insurers, and banks thus have incentives to
maintain a mutually reinforcing profit structure, even when their interests deviate from people
who save for retirement. In the UK and the US, there are analogous problems but the difference
is  the  relatively  low concentration of  the  asset  management  sector,  compared to Germany’s
banks and insurance corporations. It is certainly not impossible, but it is questionable whether the
German system is so easily shifted, in absence of  an open social discussion. A social discussion
would, in any case, probably supersede self-organisation with legal reform.
If  all asset managers and banks had to have governance committees that were elected
(either completely or substantially) by the ultimate contributors, there would be a very significant
new control on agency costs. Asset managers would no longer be able to deploy voting power
within companies to influence the kinds of  retirement contracts that companies bought from
them, it is doubtful that the tendency for supporting rising director remuneration packages would
continue,  and it  is  probable  that  a  host  of  other  issues  regarding  social  and  environmental
responsibility would adjust in line with the preferences of  the median retirement saver. However,
in  order  for  this  self-organisation  model  to  work,  clients  of  financial  institutions  who have
bargaining  power  (essentially  large  codetermined  pension  funds)  must  necessarily  strike
agreements which have ‘positive externalities’ in favour of  all ultimate contributors: including the
isolated holders of  life insurance policies, or mutual fund investors that could otherwise be left
vulnerable.  Ultimately  the  organisation  of  retirement  savings  connects  with  the  solidarity  of
larger social movements, which includes trade unions, and their solidarity with the interests of  all
people saving through the investment system. 
(b) The disability model
A second way  to  achieve  symmetry  between contribution  and participation  is  to  follow the
‘disability’ model. As seen in chapter 6, this is what has already been deployed in the US Dodd-
Frank  Act  2010 for  brokers,  and  more  comprehensively  in  Switzerland for  banks.  Here  the
strategy is to remove the influence of  the institutional intermediary altogether from corporate
governance, because it is seen as illegitimate, giving way to the ultimate contributor to exercise its
voice  independently.  Chapter 6(2)(d) showed how such ideas have been debated in Germany
since the 1930s, but opinion has been divided because it is feared that very few votes will be cast
60 Major shareholders are disclosed under the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 1994 §§25-26 when changes above or below certain
thresholds are made. In 2014, for example, Commerzbank held a fluctuating block of  up to 8% of  Allianz’s equity, while
other major holders included JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and Société Générale. Disclosures are on allianz.com 
196
in  company  meetings.  Switzerland’s  implementation  of  the  plan  could  indicate  whether  this
concern is real or not. More fully, the concern is that when institutional intermediaries cease to
vote, a tiny number of  potentially erratic voters (the stereotypical activist who causes a fuss at
Annual General Meetings) will be in the corporate governance driving seat. Of  course, the Swiss
initiative  took  measures  against  this  possibility  by  placing  a  duty  (somewhat  like  the  UK
Stewardship Code, or the US Department of  Labor interpretive bulletin) on pension funds to be
active in casting their votes. The potential drawback is that a form dependent system is created:
banks can be banned from voting, but pension funds might still delegate investments to a new
class of  asset managers, and a pension funds’ management, or indeed insurance companies and
mutual funds, may not be effectively accountable to its ultimate contributors.
The disability model, in order to meet its critics, is therefore necessarily accompanied by
avenues to ensure that after institutional intermediaries are eliminated from the voting equation,
other parties are capable of  taking up the engagement slack. In this respect, UK law is illustrative.
Chapter 6(1)(c) outlined how equity recognises a right, through any fiduciary relationship, to give
instructions over the exercise of  voting power, or in lieu of  instructions for the fiduciary to cast
votes in  the  beneficiaries’  best  interests.  It  is  no doubt  open to litigation,  but the weight of
authority suggests that every asset manager stands in a fiduciary relation to its clients, whether
money is mixed in a pooled fund or not,61 and indeed this principle has been codified in the
Stewardship Code. It suggests pension trustees can pass through voting instructions, and asset
managers are obliged to follow them by default.62 
The  developing  view  of  fiduciary  duties,  although  the  precise  conceptualisation  is
contested,63 is that they function in the same way as terms that are implied in contracts: they are
construed  to  reflect  the  reasonable  expectations  of  the  parties.64 There  is  very  little  reason
against, and there is legal authority for, saying that when the functional relationship of  an asset
manager to a client is the same, the duties which arise regarding voting for purchasers of  pension
or mutual fund services are the same toward insurance policyholders.65 This can be explained
within the terms of  precedent through the language of  fiduciary duty in equity, or through the
language of  the reasonable expectations of  the parties at common law. Both can do the same
work. It would follow that a basic right would be available to pass instructions to an institutional
61 See Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan [1991] EWCA Civ 11, Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 and In re Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6
62 It would then be questionable whether an exclusion or limitation clause on this equitable default is possible under the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977 s 3(2)(b). Schedule 2 requires that the relative bargaining power of  the parties is taken into account.
63 J  Edelman,  ‘When  do  fiduciary  duties  arise?’  (2010)  126  LQR  302  and  M  Conaglen,  ‘Fiduciary  duties  and  voluntary
undertakings’ (2013) 7 Journal of  Equity 105 
64 Attorney General of  Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10
65 cf  Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2000] UKHL 39
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intermediary to cast votes in respect of  the particular share. An objection that this would create
technical difficulties is probably unsound, though facilitation of  online voting fora, a public good,
could be desirable from a government’s viewpoint.66 
(c) The positive rights model
A third  option  in  pursuit  of  the  symmetry  principle  is  to  follow a  ‘positive  rights’  model:
participation rights written into law from the bottom to the top of  the investment chain. In the
UK,  immediate  reforms  could  be  made  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  by  issuing  a  statutory
instrument to increase the number of  member nominated trustees from one-third to one-half,
and to remove the exception to require MNTs in the National Employment Savings Trust.67 The
local government pension schemes could be consolidated into a single plan, and the managers
could be majority elected, and hold full control over investment policy, so as to subtract the risk
of  political interference by the government employers. The proposals for IGCs could make clear
that  a  majority  of  representatives  are  elected  by  their  ultimate  clients  (all  clients,  including
insurance policyholders and mutual fund investors), that they are not merely consultative bodies
but make binding decisions over the voting rights held by the asset manager, and those rights
could be written into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. To give an example from the
typical pension scenario, this would mean that the beneficiary voted for (1) the pension trustee,68
which in turn elects (2) the IGC representative, which then (3) exercises shareholder rights over
company boards.  In  principle  a  multi-level  voting  structure  is  undesirable,  because  it  can be
appreciated that with every step the representative’s representative becomes a little more distant
from the ultimate contributor.  The solution would be to acknowledge that  a  contributor has
direct voting rights for his or her aliquot share of  an investment pool (a matter of  long division,
not outside the boundaries of  standard investment software) but in recognition of  the advantages
of  coordination, by default the voting right is delegated to the relevant representative. 
In Germany, a positive rights model would begin by considering reform of  the board
structure. One option would view intermediated election and removal of  directors as generally
benign, maybe even useful to separate management and oversight, and leave it  untouched. A
second option would  simply  be  to  eliminate  the  Vorstand,  on  the  ground that  a  division  of
competences among directors does not require division of  accountability between boards. This
would see the argument for retaining two-tier boards as largely undermined by other countries’
66 eg E Micheler, ‘Facilitating Investor Engagement and Stewardship’ (2013) 14(1) European Business Organization Law Review
29
67 Pensions Act 2004 s 243
68 Many pension trustees are also intermediated by the staff ’s trade union, as for instance, with the Universities’ Superannuation
Scheme. 
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systems (with and without codetermination) working amicably in practice, and by its origins: two-
tier  boards  were  not  put  in  place  to  promote  accountability  or  expertise,  but  to  create  a
managerial class beholden to Prussian banks. A third option is to retain the supervisory board,
but to restore the pre-fascist position where the company general meeting is given direct removal
rights  over the  Vorstand,  not intermediated by the supervisory board.  To be compatible with
codetermination some share of  votes in the general meeting, for instance one-third to one-half,
would need to be allocated to employees. Furthermore, a positive rights model would implement
reforms along the lines of  the Geßler Commission’s  proposals,  and have elected governance
committees in banks. It would extend that same model to all financial intermediaries, particularly
insurance concerns, as an effects based law. It would overturn the problematic jurisprudence that
precludes codetermination rights for direct promise and insurance based pension funds.  This
would mean German workers’ retirement savings could not be used to subsidise the insurance
industry or fund a system of  interlocking corporate block ownership.
In the US, a positive rights model could best be pursued at state level (where legislation is
possible), rather than the federal government (where political ossification may continue). It would
seem that  neither  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security  Act  1974,  nor  the  Investment
Companies Act 1940, the Investment Advisers Act 1940, nor the Securities and Exchange Act
1934 pre-empt state laws providing more protective rights than the minimum federal standards,
especially  since  participatory  investment  already runs  in  Taft-Hartley  multi-employer  pension
plans.  It is  open for states  to adapt the Democrat proposals explained in chapter 6(3)(d) for
private pension plan representation in their  own states.  Mutual  funds in  each state  could be
required to have elected Independent Governance Committees. Naturally, if  reforms are seen as
desirable regarding director or shareholder rights, the state of  incorporation must also make the
relevant changes. The essential standard is merely to do what union and public pension funds
have already been pushing: abolition of  non-voting or multiple voting shares, and retrenchment
of  for-cause  removal  boards.  It  is  not  entirely  clear  that  the  governing  Democrats  in
Massachusetts, or Delaware, or elsewhere, would be naturally opposed to reform, and it may be
emphasised that there is no single ‘correct’ model of  rules. States would need to test whatever
works for them, and again become the laboratories of  democracy. 
Whichever set of  options might be taken, whether that is something closer to the ‘self-
organisation’, ‘disability’, or ‘positive rights’ model, or a combination, or something else, reform
will recognise the principle of  symmetry of  contribution and participation. This is a principle
that will create a more productive and just system of  corporate law. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS
Over the last seven chapters, there have been three main theses, two positive and one normative.
The first positive thesis is that a progressive democratic movement has spread participation rights
in law, regarding who elects the board,  which shareholders have votes, and for accountability
through the vote behind shareholding institutions. But the social ideal of  the movement has not
been pursued to an optimal extent. The second positive thesis is that where participation rights
are not fixed by law, the resulting patterns of  participation tend to reflect the bargaining power of
different actors. Power has an arbitrary tendency, and the people who made the contributions to
company  investments  became  separated  from  participation  in  corporate  governance  for  no
ultimately justifiable reason. The third, and one normative thesis, was that particularly given the
absence of  a  principled framework for participation in corporate  governance,  reform should
pursue  a  way  for  the  ultimate  contributors  to  equity  to  vote  for  representatives  down  the
investment chain: a symmetry of  contribution and participation. This will ensure the successes of
modern corporate law are not undone. Establishing the principle of  symmetry is necessary to
forestall negligence and profusion among directors, asset managers and banks, and so promote a
productive and just system of  corporate governance. 
The two positive theses were substantiated primarily through an appeal to the historical
evidence of  corporate development in the UK, Germany and the US. It  was suggested that
alternative theories, particularly ones which looked to rational choice and incentives for answers,
were not as good at  explaining the unfolding of  history as a contextual  form of  reasoning.
People are conscious decision makers, not incentive-driven automatons. In politics, it has been a
conscious plan (but not one fully pursued) from Wilson and Brandeis, to Berle and Means, to the
post-war Labour Party, the mainstream of  the Conservative Party, German Social, Christian and
Free Democrats and Greens, to 21st century American Democrats, to push for the dispersal of
participation  rights  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  corporate  governance.  They  sought  to
socialise, not ownership, but power, and sought to extend democracy from the political sphere to
the economy.  In  the  economy,  the  relative  bargaining power  of  small  shareholders,  financial
institutions, occupational pension trustees, life insurance policy holders, and trade unions, have all
shaped the direction of  participation rights when there was an absence of  specific regulation.
However,  there  remains  a  significant  risk  that  the  interests  which  wished  to  see  a  growing
separation of  contribution and participation will succeed.
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Where  should  corporate  governance  go  in  the  next  ten  or  twenty  years?  If  its
development so far is not seen as the outcome of  a politically or economically rational strategy,
then this implies that there is room for reform. There is increasingly little doubt about the need
for a change among those people who saw the effects of  the global financial crisis up close. For
those people there are constantly painful reminders of  social fragility, and instability, which make
it impossible to be agnostic about the salient issues in corporate governance. It is hard to think of
a more salient issue than the economic pre-eminence of  asset  managers and banks,  and the
economic disenfranchisement of  ordinary people. Ironically,  many financial institutions would
seem to be all  too glad to rid themselves of  the responsibility for stewardship. Their lack of
engagement could very well indicate that they are much more content to concentrate on their
specialism of  trading. 
Another less  charitable  view that  is  developing is  that  corporate and financial  power,
which has wrecked the global economy twice and, while being bailed out, is continuing to wreck
developed society, needs to be broken before it compromises humanity’s future. As this view
persists and becomes more vocal, in outspoken protests like the Occupy Movement, it could be
perceived by some financial and corporate interests that, to maintain their position, democratic
government needs to be ‘shutdown’ first, or perhaps undergo ‘structural adjustment’. The more
extreme the situation becomes, the more fear there is, the more likely that radical, and potentially
dangerous answers meet the perceptions of  danger. A modest path of  reform is available and
waiting: to build on the better side of  corporate governance, evident throughout modern history.
This is the side that would favour the principle of  symmetry of  contribution and participation, in
a corporate law that is more sustainable and just. 
201
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(a) Literature
 
(b) Legislation
(i) United Kingdom (ii) Germany (iii) United States (iv) European Union (v) International and other 
(c) Case law
(i) United Kingdom (ii) Germany (iii) United States
(d) Government or other reports
(i) United Kingdom (ii) Germany (iii) United States (iv) European
(e) Parliamentary or Congressional materials 
(i) United Kingdom (ii) Germany (iii) United States (iv) International and other
(f) Media
(a) Literature
VL Allen, Power in trade unions: a study of  their organisation in Great Britain (1954)
GT Altman, ‘Pension Trusts for Key Men’ (1937) 15 Tax Magazine 324
JK Angell and S Ames, Treatise on the law of  private corporations aggregate (1861)
E Appelbaum,  R  Batt  and  I  Clark,  ‘Implications  of  Financial  Capitalism  for  Employment  Relations  Research:
Evidence from Breach of  Trust and Implicit Contracts in Private Equity Buyouts’ (2013) 51(3) BJIR 498
D Ariely, E Kamenica and D Prelec, ‘Man’s search for meaning: The case of  Legos’ (2008) 67 Journal of  Economic
Behavior & Organization 671
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ca 350 BC) Book V
K Arrow, The Limits of  Organization (1974)
SS Arscht and LS Black, ‘The Delaware General Corporation Law: Recent Amendments’ (1974-1975) 30 Business
Lawyer 1021
HD Assmann, ‘Zur Reform des Vollmachtsstimmrechts der Banken nach dem Referentenentwurf  eines Gesetzes
zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG-E)’ (1997) 42 Aktiengesetz. Sonderheft 100
W Auerbach, Das Aktienwesen (1873)
Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti (14 AD)
D Awrey, W Blair and D Kershaw, ‘Between Law and Markets: Is There A Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial
Regulation’ (2013) 38(1) Delaware Journal of  Corporate Law 191
F Baader, Über den Mißverhältnis der Vermögenslosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Classen der Societät (1835)
SM Bainbridge, ‘Participatory Management a Theory of  the Firm’ (1996) 21 Journal of  Corporate Law 657
SM Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Rights’ (2005-2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 601
SM Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119(6) HLR 1735
FS Baldwin, ‘The Work of  the Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions’ (1909) 85(11) Publications of  the
American Statistical Association 417
O Bar-Gill and E Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of  Pennsylvania Law Review 1
MJ Barclay and CG Holderness, ‘Private Benefits of  Control in Public Corporations’ (1989) 25 Journal of  Financial
Economics 371
HR Bartell Jr  and ET Simpson,  Pension Funds of  Multiemployer  Industrial Groups,  Unions,  and Nonprofit  Organizations,
occasional paper 105 (National Bureau of  Economic Research, 1968)
W Bayer  and S Engelke,  ‘Die Revision des Aktienrechts  durch das Aktiengesetz von 1937’  in W Bayer  and M
Habersack, Aktienrecht im Wandel (Mohr Siebeck 2007) Band I, ch 15, rn 13, 629
LA Bebchuk and JM Freid, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of  Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ
857
L Bebchuk, ‘The case for increasing shareholder power’ (2005) 118(3) HLR 833
L Bebchuk, A Cohen and A Ferrell, ‘What Matters in Corporate Governance?’ (2009) 22(2) Review Financial Studies
783
M Becht and E Boehmer, ‘Voting control in German corporations’ (2003) 23 International Review of  Law and
202
Economics 1
D Beckmann, L Menkhoff, M Suto, ‘Does culture influence asset managers’ views and behavior?’ (2008) 67 Journal
of  Economic Behavior & Organization 624
J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation (1780)
AA Berle, ‘How Labor Could Control’ (7 September 1921) The New Republic 37
AA Berle, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365
AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt 1991)
AA Berle, ‘Non-Voting Stock and Bankers Control’ (1925-1926) 39 Harvard Law Review 673
AA Berle, ‘Participating Preferred Stock’ (1926) 26(3) Columbia Law Review 303
AA Berle, ‘“Control” in Corporate Law’ (1958) 58(8) Columbia Law Review 1212
AA Berle, ‘Modern Functions of  the Corporate System’ (1962) 62(3) Columbia Law Review 433
AA Berle, ‘Property, Production and Revolution’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1
M Blair and L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of  Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 VLR 247
P Blanck, ‘Civil War Pensions and Disability’ (2001) 62 Ohio State Law Journal 109, 124
JG Blandi, Maryland Business Corporations 1783-1852 (1934)
R Blodgett, ‘Union Pension Fund Asset Management’ in Abuse on Wall Street (Quorum 1980)
W Blomeyer, K Otto and C Rolfs, Betriebsrentengesetz (5th edn 2010)
D Boaz, The Politics of  Freedom: Taking on the Left, the Right, and Threats to Our Liberties (Cato Institute 2008) 
LD Brandeis, Life Insurance: The Abuses and the Remedies. Address Delivered before the Commercial Club of  Boston (1905)
LD  Brandeis,  ‘Massachusetts  Savings-Bank  Insurance  and  Pension  System’  (1909)  11(85)  Publications  of  the
American Statistical Association 409
LL Brandeis, The Fundamental Cause of  Industrial Unrest (1916)
OC Brändel, Großkommentar AG (4th edn 1992)
SD Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 (1976)
H Brick, Transcending Capitalism: Visions of  a New Society in Modern American Thought (2006) ch 2
P Brickner, ‘Different Styles and Similar Values: the Reformer Roles of  Charles Evans Hughes and Louis Dembitz
Brandeis in Gas, Electric, and Insurance Regulation’ (2000) 33(3) Indiana Law Review 893
CM Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of  Shareholder Power (2013)
Bundesarchiv, Nachlass Bismarck, FC  2936-3052, (21) Alfred Krupp
Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of  the Board of  Directors of  the Large Publicly Owned Corporation  (1978) 33
Business Law 2083
JW Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics 1791-1875 (1949)
W Campbell, ‘The Origin and Growth of  Cumulative Voting for Directors’ (1955) 10(3) Business Lawyer 3
G Campbell and JD Turner, ‘Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate Governance and Dividends in Victorian
Britain’ (2011) 64 The Economic History Review 571
BN Cardozo, The Nature of  the Judicial Process (1921)
A Carnegie, ‘Wealth’ (1889) 391 North American Review 653
W Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware’ (1974) 83(4) Yale Law Journal 663
CJ Castaneda, Dedication, Vision, Heart: The CalPERS Story (2007)
CBI, Who Should Manage Pension Schemes? (1977) 
CBI, Participation by members in the management of  occupational pension schemes: a guide to good practice (1977)
B Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of  Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom’ (2001) 30(2)
Journal of  Legal Studies 459
B Cheffins, ‘Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of  Ownership and Control in the United
Kingdom’ (2006) 63 Washington & Lee Law Review 1273 
B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (OUP 2008)
B Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of  the S&P 500’
(2009) 65(1) Business Lawyer 1
B Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel’ (2010) 73(6) MLR 985
S Choi, J Fisch and M Kahan, ‘The Power of  Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?’ (2010) 59 Emory Law Journal 869 
JH Choper, JC Coffee and RH Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (Aspen 2007)
J Cioffi and M Höpner, ‘The Political Paradox of  Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party
Politics in Corporate Governance Reform’ (2006) 34 Politics Society 463
RC Clark, Corporate Law (Aspen 1986) 
RC Clark, ‘Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of  Corporate Law’ (1989) 89(7) CLR 1703
RC Clark, ‘The Four Stages of  Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law
Review 561
RH Coase, ‘The Nature of  the Firm’ (1937) 4(16) Economica 386
203
RH Coase, ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’ (1960) 3 JLE 1
JC Coffee, ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 Columbia
LR 1618-1691
JC Coffee, ‘Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (1984) 52
George Washington Law Review 789
JC Coffee, ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross Country Evaluation (2000-2001) 149 U Pennsylvania LR 2151  
JC Coffee, ‘What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of  the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of
Corporation Law Studies 1
JC Coffee, ‘The Political Economy of  Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk
Perpetuated’ (2012) 97 Cornell LR 1019
MR Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell LQ 8
FS Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35(6) Columbia Law Review 809
A Cohn, E Fehr,  B Herrmann and F Schneider, ‘Social  Comparison in the Workplace:  Evidence from a Field
Experiment’ (2014) 12(4) Journal of  the European Economic Association 877 
JR Commons and JB Andrews, Principles of  Labor Legislation (Harper 1916)
JR Commons, Principles of  Labor Legislation (1916)
JR Commons, ‘Institutional Economics’ (1931) 21 American Economic Review 648
M Conaglen, ‘Fiduciary duties and voluntary undertakings’ (2013) 7 Journal of  Equity 105
L Conant, A Critical Analysis of  Industrial Pension Systems (1922)
C Conrad, Erfolgsbeteiligung und Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer bei Siemens (1986) 99
WW Cook, Corporations (8th edn 1923)
R Cook, ‘The Case for Joint Trusteeship of  Pension Plans’ (2002) WorkingUSA 25
DL Costa, The Evolution of  Retirement: An American Economic History, 1880-1990 (1998)
J Cottrell,  ‘Indian Judicial  Activism, the Company and the Worker:  A Note on  National Textile  Workers  Union v
Ramakrishnan’ (1990) 39(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 433
PD Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (2011) 
TR Cusack, ‘Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies,
1955-1989’ (1997) 91 Public Choice 375
R Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985)
PL Davies and M Freedland, Labour Law: Text and Materials (1984)
PL Davies and M Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Clarendon 1993)
PL Davies, ‘Workers on the Board of  the European Company?’ (2003) 32(2) ILJ 75
PL Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law (8th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2008)
PL Davies, Company Law (Clarendon 2010) 
PL Davies,  ‘Shareholder  Value,  Company Law,  and Securities  Markets  Law: A British View’ in K Hopt and E
Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (OUP 2012)
S Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of  Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13(1) Corporate Governance 11
S Deakin, Priya Lele and M Siems, ‘The Evolution of  Labor Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes’
(2007) 146 International Labour Review 133
S  Deakin,  ‘The  Corporation  as  Commons:  Rethinking  Property  Rights,  Governance  and  Sustainability  in  the
Business Enterprise’ (2012) 37(2) Queen’s Law Journal 339
S Deakin, ‘Against Shareholder Empowerment’ in J Williamson, C Driver and P Kenway (eds),  Beyond Shareholder
Value (TUC 2014)
C Degenkolb,  Entwurf  einer Fabrik-Gewerbe-Ordnung. Dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Ausschusse von seinem Mitgliede Degenkolb
(1848) 10 ff
H Demsetz, ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’ (1969) 12 Journal of  Law and Economics 1
Lord Denning, The Due Process of  Law (1980)
GW Dent, ‘Dual  Class Capitalization:  A Reply to Professor Seligman’  (1985-1986) 54 George  Washington Law
Review 725
B Disraeli, Sybil, or The Two Nations (1845)
S Djankov, R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘The Law and Economics of  Self-Dealing’ (2005) NBER
Working Paper 11883
EM Dodd (1945) 58 Harvard Law Review 1258
EM Dodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860 (1954)
A Dreier, ‘Shareholder Voting Rules in 19th Century American Corporations: Law, Economics and Ideology’ (24
April 1995) Yale Law School, Substantial Paper, at 20
PF Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America (1976)
CA Dunlavy, ‘Corporate Governance in Late 19th- Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of  Shareholder Voting
204
Rights’ in KJ Hopt, H Kanda, MJ Roe, E Wymeersch and S Prigge, Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of
the Art and Emerging Research (OUP 1998)
C Dunlavy, ‘Social Conceptions of  the Corporation: Insights from the History of  Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006)
63 Washington and Lee Law Review 1347
F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 Journal of  Law and Economics 395
FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416
J Edelman, ‘When do fiduciary duties arise?’ (2010) 126 LQR 302
R  Eden,  ‘On  the  Origins  of  the  Regime  of  Pragmatic  Liberalism:  John  Dewey,  Adolf  A.  Berle,  and  FDR’s
Commonwealth Club Address of  1932’ (1993) 7 Studies in American Political Development 74
Editor, ‘Legal Status of  Private Industrial Plans’ (1940) 53 Harvard Law Review 1375
J Edwards and M Nibler, ‘Corporate governance in Germany: the role of  banks and ownership concentration’ (2000)
15(31) Economic Policy 239
O Ehrenwerth,  ‘Die Aufischtsräte nach der  Aktienrechtsnovelle  mit  Rücksicht  auf  die  Betriebsrats-abgesandten’
(1933) ZBlHR 196
H Eidenmüller, ‘Contracting Employee Involvement: An Analysis of  Bargaining over Employee Involvement Rules
for a Societas Europaea’ [2012] JCLS 201
D Einsele, Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht (1995)
MA Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of  Corporation Law’ (1989) 89(7) CLR 1461
R Ellison, Private Occupational Pension Schemes (Oyez 1979)
A Epstein,  ‘The  American  State  Old  Age  Pension  System in  Operation’  (1933)  170  Annals  of  the  American
Academy of  Political and Social Science 107
RA Epstein, ‘In Defense of  the Contract at Will’ (1984) 51(4) University of  Chicago Law Review 947
GF Eppstein (ed), Furst Bismarcks Entlassung (1920)
T  Eschenburg,  ‘Streiflichter  zur  Geschichte  der  Wahlen  im  Dritten  Reich’  (1955)  3  Vierteljahrshefte  für
Zeitgeschichte 311 
EF Fama and MC Jensen, ‘Separation of  Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of  Law and Economics 301
GD Feldman, ‘Big Business and the Kapp Putsch’ (1971) 4(2) Central European History 99
D Ferreira, D Kershaw, T Kirchmaier and E Schuster, ‘Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts’ (2012) ECGI
- Finance Working Paper No. 345/2013
J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1974)
P Fischer, Die Aktiengesellschaft in der nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaft (1936)
G Flatow and O Kahn-Freund, Betriebsrätegesetz (Springer 1931)
RH Frank,  T Gilovich and DT Regan,  ‘Does Studying Economics Inhibit  Cooperation?’ (1993) 7(2) Journal  of
Economic Perspectives 159
J Franks and C Mayer, ‘Ownership and control of  German corporations’ (2001) 14(4) The Review of  Financial
Studies 943 
J Franks, C Mayer and S Rossi, ‘Ownership: Evolution and Regulation’ (2009) 22(10) Review of  Financial Studies
4009
R Franz (28 July 1906) Deutschen Ökonomist, Nr 1231
M Freeman, R Pearson and J Taylor,  Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland Before 1850
(2012)
M Friedman, ‘The Methodology of  Positive Economics’ in M Friedman,  Essays in Positive Economics (University of
Chicago Press, 1953)
DM Friz and G Mann, Die Stahlgiganten: Alfried Krupp und Berthold Beitz (1990)
M Gailus, ‘Food Riots in Germany in the Late 1840s’ (1994) 145 Past & Present 164
C Gearty, Civil Liberties (2007)
A  Gerschenkron,  ‘Economic  Backwardness  in  Historical  Perspective’  in  BF  Hoselitz  (ed),  The  Progress  of
Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago 1952) 
A Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of  Essays (1966) ch 1
O Gierke, Das Genossenschaftsrecht Recht (1868)
O Gierke, Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (1889)
RJ Gilson and CJ Milhaupt, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the
New Mercantilism’ (2007-2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1345 
RJ Gilson and JN Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of  Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights’ (2013) 113(4) Columbia LR 863
R Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency (2005)
205
JN Gordon, ‘Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting’ (1994) 94(1) Columbia Law
Review 124
A Gottschalk, ‘Der Stimmrechtseinfluß der Banken in den Aktionärsversammlung von Großunternehmen’ (1988)
WSI Mitteilungen 294
P Gourevitch and J Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Governance (2005) 
LCB Gower, ‘Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley’ (1955) 68(7) Harvard Law Review 1176
LCB Gower, ‘Some Contrasts between British and American Corporation Law’ (1956) 69(8) HLR 1369
K Gray and S Gray, ‘The Idea of  Property in Land’ in S Bright and JK Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives
(1998)
WC Greenough, It’s My Retirement Money - Take Good Care of  It: The TIAA-CREF Story (Irwin 1990)
WC Greenough and FP King, Pension plans and public policy (1976)
RB Gregg, ‘The National War Labor Board’ (1919) 33(1) Harvard Law Review 39 
SJ Grossman and JE Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of  Informationally Efficient Markets’ (1980) 70(3) American
Economic Review 393
J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996) ch 7
A Hainsworth,  ‘The Shareholder  Rights  Directive  and the challenge of  re-enfranchising beneficial  shareholders’
(2007) 1(1) Law and Financial Markets Review 11
PA Hall and DW Soskice (eds), Varieties of  Capitalism: the institutional foundations of  comparative advantage (2001)
B Hamer, ‘Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of  Directors’ (1981) 81(3) Columbia
Law Review 639 
A Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, communicated to the House of  Representatives (14 December 1790)
L Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The development of  occupational pensions in Britain (CUP 1986) 
L Hannah, ‘The ‘Divorce’ of  ownership from control from 1900 onwards: Re-calibrating imagined global trends’
(2007) 49(4) Business History 404
RL Hannah, ‘The control of  pensions: a brief  history and possibilities for the future’ (2000) 40(10) Management
Decision 938
H Hansmann, The Ownership of  Enterprise (1996)
H Hansmann and R Kraakman, ‘The End of  History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439
H Hansmann and M Pargendler,  ‘The Evolution of  Shareholder  Voting  Rights:  Separation  of  Ownership  and
Consumption’ (2013) EGCI Law Working Paper No 219/2013
FH Harbison, ‘The General Motors-United Auto Workers Agreement of  1950’ (1950) 58(5) Journal of  Political 397
P Harbrecht, Pension Funds and Economic Power (1959)
CD Haßler, Verhandlungen der deutschen verfassungsgebenden Reichsversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main (1848-1849) Band 2
M Hauck, ‘The Equity Market in Germany and its Dependency on the System of  Old Age Provisions’ in T Baums et
al (eds), Institutional investors and corporate governance (1994) ch 19
FA Hayek, The Constitution of  Liberty (1960)
FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973) vol II 
J Heard and H Sherman, Conflicts of  Interest in the Proxy Voting System (1987)
GWF Hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right (1820)
E Heißmann, Betriebliche Unterstutzungskassen (3rd edn 1966)
E Heißmann, P Ahrend, W Förster, N Rößler, Steuerrecht der betrieblichen Altersversorgung (2011) Band 2
D Held, Models of  Democracy (3rd edn 2006)
D Hess, ‘Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of  Governance
Structures and Practices’ (2005-2006) 39 UC Davis LR 187
B Hewitson, A Hunter, R Stockley and A Thomas,  Attitudes to increasing the proportion of  member-nominated trustees: a
qualitative study (Department of  Work and Pensions 2010) Research Report 670
AO Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) 
EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of  Capital 1848-1875 (1975) 
EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of  Revolution 1789-1848 (1962)
OW Holmes, The Common Law (1890)
AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) ch V
K Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance of  Banks after the Financial Crisis’ in E Wymeersch, KJ Hopt, G Ferrarini (eds)
Financial Regulation and Supervision, A post-crisis analysis (OUP 2012)
KJ Hopt, ‘Secrecy and Insider Information of  Directors’ (2013) 2 ECFR 167
T Horstmann,  Die Alliierten  und die  deutschen Großbanken:  Bankenpolitik  nach dem Zweiten  Weltkrieg  in  Westdeutschland
(Bouvier 1991) ch 8
S Hubrich and T Tivig, Betriebsrenten im Altersversicherungssystem Deutschlands: eine Betrachtung aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht
(2006)
206
O Hue, Die Bergarbeiter (1913) Band 2
A Hueck and HC Nipperdey, Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts (2nd edn 1930)
A Hueck, HC Nipperdey and R Dietz, Gesetz zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit, Kommentar (4th edn 1943)
U  Immenga,  ‘Participatory  Investments  by  Banks:  A  Structural  Problem  of  the  Universal  Banking  System  in
Germany’ (1979) 2 Journal of  Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 29
EM Immergut, KM Anderson and I Schulze, West European Pension Politics (OUP 2007)
S Issacharoff, ‘Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1861
KE Jacowitz  and  D Kahneman,  ‘Measures  of  anchoring  in  estimation  tasks’  (1995)  21  Personality  and  Social
Psychology Bulletin 1161
F Jenkin,  The graphic representation of  the laws of  supply and demand and other essays on political economy  (1887, 1996 edn
Routledge)
RW  Jennings,  ‘The  Role  of  the  States  in  Corporate  Regulation  and  Investor  Protection’  (1958)  23  Law  &
Contemporary Problems 193
MC Jensen and W Meckling, ‘Theory of  the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
(1976) 3(4) Journal of  Financial Economics 305 
MC Jensen and W Meckling,  ‘Rights  and Production  Functions:  An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and
Codetermination’ (1979) 52(4) Journal of  Business 469
MC Jensen and JB Warner, ‘The Distribution of  Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors’
(1988) 20 Journal of  Financial Economics 3
WS Jevons, Theory of  Political Economy (3rd edn London 1888)
E Jung, Maßnahmen der Aktiengesellschaft gegen Überfremdung (1921) 
M Kahan and E Rock, ‘Embattled CEOs’ (2010) 88(5) Texas Law Review 987
M Kahan and EB Rock, ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’ (2007) 155 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1021, ECGI Law Series 076/2006
O Kahn-Freund, ‘The Social Ideal of  the Reich Labour Court - A Critical Examination of  the Practice of  the Reich
Labour Court’ (1931) in O Kahn-Freund, R Lewis and J Clark (ed) Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic
(Social Science Research Council 1981) ch 3
O Kahn-Freund, ‘Letter to Clemens Nörpel’ (21 February 1931) Appendix 5, translated in R Lewis and J Clark (ed)
Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Social Science Research Council 1981)
O  Kahn-Freund,  ‘Company  Law  Reform:  A  Review  of  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Company  Law
Amendment’ (1946) 9(3) Modern Law Review 235
O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer 1875-1945’ in Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic (1981)
O Kahn-Freund, ‘Autobiographische Erinnerungen an die Weimarer Republik. Ein Gespräch mit Wolfgang Luthardt’
[1981] Kritische Justiz 183
D Kahneman, P Slovic and A Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982)
D Kahneman, JL Knetsch and RH Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of  the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
(1990) 98(6) Journal of  Political Economy 1325
D Kahneman, JL Knetsch and RH Thaler, ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’
(1991) 5(1) Journal of  Economic Perspectives 193
D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) 
H Kelsen, What is Justice? (1957) 
H Kempkes,  Die betrieblich Altersversorgung in Deutschland und in der Schweiz und ihre Bedeutung fur die Finanzierung von
Unternehmungen (Stehle 1964)
D Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with special reference to compulsory
terms and unequal bargaining power’ (1982) 41(4) Maryland Law Review 563
RF Kennedy, Remarks at the University of  Kansas (18 March 1968)
A Kent, ‘The Revenue Act of  1942’ (1943) 43(1) Columbia Law Review 1
J Kent, Commentaries on American Law (10th edn 1860)
D Kershaw, ‘The Path of  Self-Dealing Law’ (2014) Forthcoming
F Kessler, ‘Contracts of  Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of  Contract’ (1943) 43(5) Columbia LR 629
F Kessler, ‘Natural Law, Justice and Democracy – Some Reflections on Three Types of  Thinking about Law and
Justice’ (1944) 19 Tulane Law Review 32
F  Kessler,  ‘Book  Review:  Wirtschaftsfuhrertum  und  Vertragsethik  im  Neuen  Aktienrecht’  (1935)  83  University  of
Pennsylvania Law Review 393
WC Kessler, ‘The German Corporation Law of  1937’ (1938) 28(4) American Economic Review 653
JM Keynes, The Economic Consequences of  the Peace (1919)
207
G Kitching, Marxism and Science: An Analysis of  an Obsession (1994) 
FE Koch and P Auerbach, ‘The German Company Law of  1931’ (1932) 18(8) Virginia Law Review 850-874
TA Kochan and SA Rubinstein, ‘Toward a Stakeholder Theory of  the Firm: The Saturn Partnership’ (2000) 11(4)
Organizational Science 367
LM Kohlmeier, ‘State and Local Pension Fund Asset Management’ in Abuse on Wall Street (Quorum 1980) 
J Köndgen, ‘Duties of  Banks in Voting Their Clients’ Stock’ in T Baums et al,  Institutional Investors and Corporate
Governance (Walter de Gruyter 1994) ch 18
R Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of  Corporate Law (2009)
B Kropff, ‘Reformbestrebung im Nachkriegsdeutschland und die Aktienrechtsreform von 1965’ in Bayer and M
Habersack, Aktienrecht im Wandel (2007) ch 16
HJ Krümmel, ‘German Universal Banking Scrutinized: Some Remarks Concerning the Gessler Report’  (1980) 4
Journal of  Banking and Finance 33
F Kübler, ‘Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: A German Perspective’ in T Baums et al, Institutional
Investors and Corporate Governance (Walter de Gruyter 1994) ch 20, 565-580 
F Kübler,  ‘Comment:  On Mark  Roe,  German Codetermination and German Securities  Markets’  (1998-1999)  5
Columbia Journal European Law 213
R La Porta,  F Lopez-de-Silanes,  A Shleifer  and RW Vishny,  ‘Law and Finance’  (1998)  106 Journal  of  Political
Economy 1113
R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (1999) 54
Journal of  Finance 471
JH Langbein, SJ Stabile and BA Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law (4th edn Foundation 2006)
W Lamping and FW Rüb, ‘From the Conservative welfare state to an ‘uncertain something else’: German pension
politics in comparative perspective’ (2004) 32(2) Policy & Politics 169
MW Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems (1932)
T Lawson, Reorienting Economics (2003)
A Lincoln, Speech in Acceptance of  Nomination as United States Senator, Made at the Close of  the Republican State Convention,
Springfield, Illinois (16 June 1858)
N Lindley, The Law of  Companies Considered as a Branch of  the Law of  Partnership (5th edn 1889)
M Lipton, ‘Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom’ (1979) 35 Business Lawyer 101
M Lipton and W Savitt, ‘The Many Myths of  Lucian Bebchuk’ (2007) 93(3) Virginia Law Review 733
J Littlewood, The Stock Market: 50 Years of  Capitalism at Work (1998)
M Lutter, ‘Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit’ in W Bayer and M Habersack, Aktienrecht im Wandel (2007)
T Lynes, ‘Pensions in Secret’ (16 January 1969) New Society 88
T Lynes, ‘Talking About Pensions’ (June 1972) Industrial Society 7
GR Macdonald, Fifty years of  the F.S.S.U. (1965) LSE Archives HD7/E217
BC Madrian and DF Shea, ‘The Power of  Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’ (2001)
116(4) Quarterly Journal of  Economics 1149
R Maidman, ‘Voting Rights of  After-Record-Date Shareholders: A Skeleton in a Wall Street Closet’ (1962) 71(7) Yale
Law Journal 1205
Frederick William Maitland, Letter to Albert Venn Dicey (c. July 1896) in CHS Fifoot (ed),  The Letters of  Frederick
William Maitland (Cambridge 1965) II
HG Manne, ‘Some Theoretical Aspects of  Share Voting’ (1964) 64(8) Columbia Law Review 1427
FA Mann, ‘The New German Company Law and Its Background’ (1937) 19 Journal of  Comparative Legislation and
International Law 220
A Marshall, Principles of  Economics (3rd edn 1895) Book VI,
K Marx, Das Kapital (1894) vol 3
EC McCreary, ‘Social Welfare and Business:  The Krupp Welfare Program, 1860-191’ (1968) 42(1) The Business
History Review 24
E McGaughey, ‘Behavioural economics and labour law’ (2014) LSE Working Paper Series 20/2014
GC Means, ‘The Separation of  Ownership and Control in American Industry’ (1931) 46(1) The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 68
E Micheler, ‘English and German securities law: a thesis in doctrinal path dependence’ (2007) 122 LQR 251
E Micheler,  ‘The  Legal  Nature  of  Securities:  Inspirations  from  Comparative  Law’  in  L  Gullifer  and  J  Payne,
Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart 2010) ch 5
E Micheler, ‘Facilitating Investor Engagement and Stewardship’ (2013) 14(1) European Business Organization Law
Review 29
J Micklethwait and A Wooldridge, The company: A short history of  a revolutionary idea (2003) ch 3
208
JS Mill, On Liberty (1859)
JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (7th edn 1909)
LCG Money, Riches and Poverty (1911)
C Moore, Public Pension Plans: The State Regulatory Framework (National Council on Teacher Retirement 1993)
M Moore, Corporate governance in the shadow of  the state (2013)
V Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of  Private Corporations (2nd edn Little, Brown & Co 1886)
CD Morley, Rules and Regulations of  the Stock Exchange (3 January 1951)
P Muchlinski, ‘The Development of  German Corporate Law Until 1990: An Historical Reappraisal’ (2013) 14(2)
German Law Journal  339
N Muhlen, Incredible Krupps: the rise, fall, and comeback of  Germany’s industrial family (1959)
PO Mülbert, Gutachten E zum 61. Deutschen Juristentag (1996) E 91
R Müller-Erzbach, Die Entartung des deutschen Aktienwesens seit der Inflationszeit (1926)
R Müller-Erzbach, Umgestaltung der Aktiengesellschaft zur Kerngesellschaft verantwortungsvoller Großaktionäre (Berlin 1929)
A Munnell and S Sass, Social Security and the Stock Market (Upjohn 2006)
FL Neumann, Behemoth (1941)
M Nibler, Bank Control and Corporate Performance in Germany: The Evidence (Cambridge University PhD 1998)
CH Nida, ‘Note: The New Delaware Corporation Law’ (1967-1968) 5 Harvard Journal on Legislation 413
RC Nolan, ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?’ (2003) 3(1) Journal of  Corporate Law Studies 73
R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) 
WM O’Barr and JM Conley, Fortune and Folly: the Wealth and Power of  Institutional Investing (1992)
MA O’Connor, ‘Organised labor as shareholder activist: building coalitions to promote worker capitalism’ (1997) 31
University of  Richmond LR 1345
FH O’Neal, ‘Stockholder attacks on corporate pension systems’ (1948-1949) 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 351
G Opitz and H Schultz (15 May 1925) 24 Bankarchiv, Special Issue, Nr 16
T Paine, The Rights of  Man (1792) Part II, ch 3
JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (1994) 
R  Passow,  ‘Die  Entstehung  des  Aufsichtsrats  der  Aktiengesellschaft’  (1909)  64  Zeitschrift  für  das  Gesamte
Handelsrecht und Konkursrecht 27
R Passow, Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft (1907)
RE Paul, ‘The Background of  the Revenue Act of  1937’ (1937) 5(1) University of  Chicago Law Review 41
J Payne, ‘Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK’ (2009) SSRN 
M  Peltzer,  ‘Die  Abschaffung  von  Mehrstimmrechten  und  Stimmrechtsbeschränkungen  im  KonTraG-Entwurf ’
(1997) 42 Aktiengesetz Sonderheft 90
RR Pennington, ‘The Report of  the Company Law Committee’ (1962) 25(6) Modern Law Review 703
T Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) ch 10
G Pinchot, ‘Old Age Assistance in Pennsylvania: Righting the Neglects of  Yesterday’ (1924) 14 American Labor
Legislation Review 288   
K  Pistor,  Y  Keinan,  J  Kleinheisterkamp  and  MD  West,  ‘The  Evolution  of  Corporate  Law  A  Cross-Country
Comparison’ (2003) 23 University of  Pennsylvania Journal of  International Economic Law 791
Plato, Crito (ca 350BC)
Plato, The Republic (ca 350 BC)
RA Posner, ‘Reflections on Consumerism’ (1973) 20 University of  Chicago Law School Record 19
R Posner, Economic Analysis of  Law (1972)
RA Posner, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1551
D Prentice, ‘Removal of  Directors from Office’ (1969) 32(6) Modern Law Review 693
ES Puchelt, Kommentar zum ADHGB (4th edn 1893)
PJ Purcell,  ‘The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans’ (11 March 2002) CRS Report for
Congress
W Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen: eine geschäftliche Betrachtung (1919)
DL Ratner, ‘The Government of  Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of  “One Share, One Vote”’
(1970-1971) 56 Cornell Law Review 1
J Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (OUP 1971)
H Reichel (1930) Juristische Wochenschrift 1459
E Reidegeld, Staatliche Sozialpolitik in Deutschland: Von den Ursprungen bis zum Untergang des Kaiserreiches 1918 (2006)
G Renard, L’institution: fondement d’une renovation de l’ordre social (1931)
209
LL Rice, ‘Employee Trusts under the Revenue Act of  1942’ (1942) 20 Taxes 721
J Rifkin and R Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s (1978)
WZ Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Little, Brown & Co 1927) 
WZ Ripley,  ‘Two  Changes  in  the  Nature  and  Conduct  of  Corporations’  (1926)  11(4)  Trade  Associations  and
Business Combinations 143
K Robert (a pseudonym), Hitler’s Counterfeit Reich (1941)
J Robinson, The Economics of  Imperfect Competition (1933) Book IX
EB Rock and M Kahan, ‘Embattled CEOs’ (2010) 88(5) Texas Law Review 987
MJ Roe, ‘Political Elements in the Creation of  a Mutual Fund Industry’ (1991) 139 University of  Pennsylvania LR
1469
MK  Roe,  ‘Foundations  of  Corporate  Finance:  the  1906  Pacification  of  the  Insurance  Industry’  (1993)  93(3)
Columbia Law Review 639 
MJ Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America’ [1993] Yale LJ 1936
MJ  Roe,  ‘The  Modern  Corporation  and  Private  Pensions:  Insulating  Management  from  Owners  and  from
Accountability’ (1993-1994) 41 UCLA Law Review 75
MJ Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994) 
MJ Roe, Political Determinants of  Corporate Governance (2003) 
C Rohrlich, ‘Corporate Voting: Majority Control’ (1932-1933) 7 St John’s Law Review 218
R Romano, ‘Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered’ (1993)  93(4) Columbia Law
Review 795
FD Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California (1932) 
R Rosendorff, ‘The New German Company Law and the English Companies Act, 1929 - I’ (1932) 14(1) JCLIL 94,
(1933) 15(1) JCLIL 112 and (1933) 15(4) JCLIL 242
EA Ross, ‘A Legal Dismissal Wage’ (1919) 9(1) American Economic Review 132
SA Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of  Agency: The Principal’s Problem (1973) 63 American Economic Review 134
M  Roth,  ‘Employee  Participation,  Corporate  Governance  and  the  Firm:  A  Transatlantic  View  Focused  on
Occupational Pensions and Co-Determination’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 51
M Roth, ‘Private Altersvorsorge als Aspekt der Corporate Governance’ [2011] 5 ZGR 516
M Roth, ‘Corporate Boards in Germany’ in P Davies et al (ed),  Corporate Boards in European Law: A Comparative
Analysis (2013) 277-278
W Samuelson and R Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1 Journal of  Risk and Uncertainty 7
S Sass, The Promise of  Private Pensions: The First 100 Years (HUP 1997)
C Savigny, Das obligationenrecht als theil des heutigen römischen rechts (1853) 
D Schapiro, ‘Employee Pensions in Collective Bargaining’ (1950) 59(4) Yale Law Journal 678 
DF Schloss, Methods of  Industrial Remuneration (3rd edn 1898)
W Schneider, Essen - Abenteuer einer Stadt (Econ Verlag 1963, new edn 1978)
T Schnorr, Historie und Recht des Aufsichtsrats Deutsche Erfahrungen als Beitrag zum Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft
1991 (2000) 81
MC Schouten, ‘Do Institutional Investors Follow Proxy Advice Blindly’ (2012) SSRN
H Schröer (ed), Munchener Kommentar (2nd edn 2004)
W  Schubert,  ‘Die  Abschaffung  des  Konzessionssystems  durch  die  Aktienrechtsnovelle  von  1870’  (1981)  10
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 285
T Schuller and J Hyman, ‘Pensions: The Voluntary Growth of  Participation’ (1983) 14(1) Industrial Relations Journal
70
T Schuller  and  J  Hyman,  ‘Trust  Law and  Trustees:  Employee  Representation  in  Pension  Schemes’  (1983)  12
Industrial Law Journal 84
W Schubert,  ‘Einleitung’  in W Schubert,  W Schmid and J  Regge (eds),  Akademie  fur  Deutsches  Recht  1933-1945:
Protokolle der Ausschusse (1986) Band I (Ausschuss für Aktienrecht) 
SJ Schwab, ‘The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation’ in BE Kaufman (ed) Government Regulation
of  the Employment Relationship (IRRA 1997)
SJ Schwab and RS Thomas, ‘Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions’ (1998) 96(4)
Michigan LR 1018
JA Schwarz, Liberal: Adolf  A. Berle and the Vision of  an American Era (1987)
GT Schwenning, ‘Protection of  Employees against Abrupt Discharge’ (1932) 30(5) Michigan Law Review 666
L Sealy and S Worthington, Sealy and Worthington’s Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn 2013)
Selden Society, Select Charters of  Trading Companies 1530-1707 (1913)
J Seligman, ‘Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy’ (1986)
54 George Washington Law Review 687
210
A Sen, The Idea of  Justice (2010) 
C Seydelmann, Die Gestaltung des Aktienrechtes in Deutschland und England: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Freiheit oder Bindung im
Aktienrecht (1940)
M Shearon and Social Security Board, Economic insecurity in old age: social and economic factors contributing to old-age dependency
(GPO 1937) 
M Siems, ‘Shareholder Protection Around the World: “Leximetric II”’ (2008) 33 Delaware JCL 111
K Simon, Die Überfremdungsgefahr der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften und ihre Abwehr (1921)
S Simon and D Zetzsche, ‘Das Vollmachtstimmrecht von Banken und geschäftsmäßigen Vertretern (§135 AktG nF)
im Spannungsfeld von Corporate Governance, Präsenzsicherung und prozeduraler Effizienz (2010) 5 Zeitschrift
für Gesellschaftsrecht 918
H Sinzheimer, Grundzuge des Arbeitsrechts (2nd edn 1927) 
A Smith, The Wealth of  Nations (1776) 
A Smith, The Theory of  Moral Sentiments (1759)
L Smith, ‘Fusion and Tradition’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (2005)
RJ Smith (1978) 41 MLR 147
H Spaman,  ‘On  the  Insignificance  and/or  Endogenity  of  La  Porta  et  al’s  ‘Anti-Director  Rights’  Index  Under
Consistent Coding’ (2006) Harvard JMOCLEB Discussion Paper No 7
B Spinoza, On the Improvement of  the Understanding (1677) 
G Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon 1996)
CW Steadman and GD Gibson, ‘Should Cumulative Voting for  Directors  Be Mandatory? A Debate’ (1955) 10
Business Lawyer 9
WHS Stevens, ‘Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of  Voting Control’ (1926) 40(3) Quarterly Journal
of  Economics 353
GJ Stigler, ‘The Theory of  Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2(1) Bell Journal of  Economics and Management Science 3
J Stiglitz, ‘Employment, social justice and societal well-being’ (2002) 141 International Labour Review 9
LA Stout, ‘Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford’ (2007) UCLA School of  Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No.
07-11 
LE Strine, ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of  Managers and
Labor in a More Rational System of  Corporate Governance’ (2007) 33 Journal of  Corporate Law 1
LE Strine, ‘Can we do better by ordinary investors? A pragmatic reaction to duelling ideological mythologists of
corporate law’ (2014) 114 Columbia LR 449
Lord Sumption, Limits of  the Law: 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur (20 November 2013)
P Sweezy, ‘Marx on the Significance of  Corporations’ (1939) 3 Science & Society 238
JS Taub, ‘Able but Not Willing: The Failure of  Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights’ (2009)
34(3) The Journal of  Corporation Law 843
J Taub, Other People’s Houses: How Decades of  Bailouts, Captive Regulators, and Toxic Bankers Made Home Mortgages a Thrilling
Business (2014)
AJP Taylor, Bismarck: the man and the statesman (1955)
HJ Teuteberg, Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung (1961)
HJ Teuteberg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten betrieblichen Arbeitervertretungen in Deutschland’ (1960) 11
Soziale Welt 69
Otto Thoresen, Director General of  the Association of  British Insurers, Letter to Clive Maxwell, Chief  Executive, Office
of  Fair Trading (30 August 2013) 
Thucydides, History of  the Peloponnesian War (ca 411 BC) Book 2
M Tigges, Geschichte und Entwicklung der Versicherungsaufsicht (1985) 
A Tobias, Invisible Bankers: Everything the Insurance Industry Never Wanted You to Know (Washington Square 1982)
AH Travers Jr, ‘Removal of  the corporate director during his term of  office’ (1967-1968) 53 Iowa Law Review 389
MJ Trebilcock, ‘An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of  Unconscionability’ in BJ Reiter and J Swan (eds) Studies
in Contract (1980)
L Trewhitt, ‘Employee Buyouts and Employee Involvement: A Case Study of  Investigation of  Employee Attitudes’
(2000) 31(5) Industrial Relations Journal 451
TUC, Industrial Democracy (1973)
GG Tunell,  ‘The  pension  system in  the  Chicago  and  Northwestern  Railway  Company’  (1901)  9(2)  Journal  of
Political Economy 271
DF Vagts, ‘Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German’ (1966) 80 Harvard Law Review
23, 51
C Vogl-Mühlhaus, Mehrfachstimmrechtsaktien: historische Entstehung, gegenwärtige Verbreitung und ökonomische Bedeutung (1998)
211
EB Walter,  ‘Regulating Broker–Dealers and Investment Advisers:  Demarcation or  Harmonization?’  (2009) 35(1)
Journal of  Corporation Law 1
E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of  Chicago Law Review 775 
J Wasserman, ‘CA: Governor ousts CalSTRS appointees who oppose his pension plan’ (11 February 2005)  Free
Republic
S Webb, ‘The Economic Theory of  a Legal Minimum Wage’ (1912) 20(10) The Journal of  Political Economy 973
S Webb and B Webb, A History of  Trade Unionism (Longmans 1920)
S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1926)
M Weber, The Theory of  Social and Economic Organization (1915, translated 1947)
A Weiß, ‘Begriff  und Entwicklung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung’ in  Handbuch der betrieblichen Altersversorgung
(München 1955)
G Wiedemann, Die Historische Entwicklung der Betrieblichen Altersversorgung unter Besonderer Berucksichtigung des Arbeitsrechtes
(1990)
SL Willborn, ‘Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of  Public Employee Retirement Systems Act’ (1998)
SSRN
IJ Williams (1927) 11 Constitutional Review 239
OE Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1197
OE Williamson, The Economic Institutions of  Capitalism (1985)
OE Williamson,  ‘Strategizing,  Economizing,  and  Economic  Organization’  (1991)  12(S2)  Strategic  Management
Journal 75
S Williston, ‘History of  the Law of  Business Corporations before 1800. II. (Concluded)’ (1898) 2(4) Harvard Law
Review 149
C Windbichler, Gesellschaftsrecht (22nd edn Beck 2009)
RK Winter, ‘State Law, Shareholder  Protection,  and the Theory of  the Corporation’  (1977) 6 Journal  of  Legal
Studies 251
EE Witte, ‘Early American Labor Cases’ (1926) 35(7) Yale Law Journal 825
RE Yeazel, ‘Removal of  Directors for Cause’ (1958) 27 University of  Cincinnati Law Review 92
JCD Zahn, Wirtschaftsfuhrertum und Vertragsethik im Neuen Aktienrecht or Economic Leadership and Contractual Ethics in the
New Corporate Law (1934)
(b) Legislation
(i) United Kingdom
Bill of  Rights 1689
Greenland Trade Act 1692 (4 Will & Mar, c 17) s 17
Bank of  England Act 1694 (5 & 6 Will & Mar, c 20) 
Public Companies Act 1767 (7 Geo III, c 48)
Great Reform Act 1832 (2&3 Will IV, c 45)
Superannuation Act 1834 (c 24)
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 s 75
Company Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 ss 83 and 88
Limited Liability Act 1855 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, Table B, arts 38 and 48
Superannuation Act 1859 (c 26)
Companies Act 1862 (c 89) s 50 and Table A arts 59 and 65 
Representation of  the People Act 1867 ss 4-6
Trade Disputes Act 1906
Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (c 69) s 13 Sch 1, Table A para 86
Old Age Pensions Act 1908 ss 1-2 and Sch 1
National Insurance Act 1911
Naval and Military War Pensions Act 1915 s 2(2)
Trade Boards Act 1918 sections 1(2) and 4(6)
Trustee Act 1925 ss 1-11
Companies Act 1947 ss 5 and 29
212
Companies Act 1948 s 184
Variation of  Trusts Act 1958 s 1
Trustee Investments Act 1961 s 1(1) and Sch 1
Superannuation Act 1972 s 7
Social Security Act 1973 ss 66-68
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 s 2
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s 3(2)(b) and Sch 2
Companies Act 1980 s 46
Employment Act 1980 
Companies Act 1985 ss 303, 309 and 319
Employment Act 1988
Pension Schemes Act 1993 s 1 and Sch 1
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994
Pensions Act 1995 ss 16 to 21
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ss 19, 22, 23, 31, 251, Part IV and Sch 2, Pt I
Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 ss 43-44
Trustee Act 2000 s 3
Communications Act 2003 s 319
Pensions Act 2004 ss 1-106, 241-243
Companies Act 2006 ss 126, 152, 153, 168, 172, 188, 247, 324-331
Pensions Act 2008 s 1 and Sch 1, para 1(1)
Health and Social Care Act 2012
Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013
Public Service Pensions Act 2013 ss 1, 4-5, 30(3) and Sch 1
Order of  the Board of  Trade Substituting a New Table A 1906 (SR&O 1906/596 L15)
Trustee Investments (Division of  Trust Fund) Order 1996 (SI 1996/845) r 2
Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/1612) r 73
Open-Ended Investment Company Regulations 2001/1228 (amended by SI 2005/923) r 34A
Occupational Pension Schemes (Member-nominated Trustees and Directors) Regulations 2006 regs 2-3
SI 2007/1561 r 3, a new s 73A
Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) art 17(1) and 20(b)
National Employment Savings Trust (Consequential Provisions) Order 2010 (SI 2010/9) r 3
Employers’ Duties (Implementation) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/4) reg 4
UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 B.7.1
UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 B.2
Stewardship Code 2012
Stock Exchange Rules and Regulations (1 November 1929) Appendix 35B
London Stock Exchange Rules and Regulations, Appendix 34, Sch VII, Part A, (ii) D.4
FSA Principles for Business, PRIN 2.1
FSA Handbook COLL 6.5.7
(ii) Germany
Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten 1794, Title 15, §§45-47
Gesetzessammlung 1845 article 182
Paulskirchenverfassung or Verfassung des deutschen Reiches 1849 §§59 and 161-162
Entwurf  einer Gewerbeordnung für das deutsche Reich 1849 §45
Vereinsgesetz 1850 art 134 and 182
Federal Decision (13 July 1854)
Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch 1861 §209(2) Nr 7, 225-227, 236, 249
Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch 1869 §209 Nr 9, 224
Gewerbeordnung 1869 §§152-153
Gesetz, betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf  Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften 1884
Sozialistengesetz (19 October 1878)
Gewerbeordnung 1883
213
Krankenversicherungsgesetz 1883 §§34, 38 and 59-68
Gesetz betreffend die Alters- und Invaliditätsversicherung 1889
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung (1 January 1891)
Arbeiterschutzgesetz 1891 §134b-h
Preussische Berggesetz 1892
Handelsgesetzbuch 1897 §§182(2), 222(1), 252(1)
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1900 §§242, 941, 950 and 1008
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 1901 §7a
Stinnes-Legien Abkommen 1918 §1 
Tarifvertragsverordnung 1918
Betriebsrätegesetz 1920 §§1, 66, 70, 84-87
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1920 §2 Nr 5
Aufsichtsratsgesetz 1922 §§1 and 3-4
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1922 (12 May 1922) RGBl 1922, 472, §2 
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1925 (10 August 1925) RGBl I 1925, 208, §9 Abs 1 Nr 10
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1934 §4 Abs 1 Nr 7 (16 October 1934) RGBl I 1934, 1031
Kündigungsschutzgesetz 1926
Ermächtigungsgesetz 1933
Arbeitsordnungsgesetz 1934 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront Verordnung 1934 §7
Einkommensteuergesetz 1934 §6a
Körperschaftsteuerdurchführungsverordnung 1935, RGBl I 1935, 163, §§13-16
Aktiengesetz 1937 §12(1), 70(1), 75, 87(2)
Gesetz der Alliierten Hohen Kommission Nr. 27
DM-Bilanzgesetz 1949 §29(4)
Grundgesetz 1949 arts 9, 12, 14(2), 20, 79(3)
Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz 1951 §§4 and 8 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 
Steuerordnungsgesetz 1954 (BStBl I 1954, 575)
Aktiengesetz 1965 §§12, 77, 84 and 102-103, 123(1), 126-128, 134(3), 135 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972 §§1 and 87, 99 and 111-112
Betriebsrentengesetz 1974 §1-1b(3)
Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976 §§1, 18, 25, 27, 29, 31
Kapitalanlagegesetz 1986 §10
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz 1992 §§20, 29, 36, 53(2), 112-118
Sozialgesetzbuch 1992 Book VI, §154
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 1994 §§25-26
Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich 1998 §134 
Investmentgesetz 2003 §32
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 2004 §4
Kapitalanlagesetzbuch 2013 §94
Rundfunkstaatsvertrag 2013 §11
German Corporate Governance Code (2010) 4.1.1
Draft Reforms 1931 §6(2) Nr 4 E-1931
(iii) United States
An act to grant pensions. July 14, 1862, ch 166 (12 Stat 566) section 1 
National Bank Act 1864
Disability Pension Act 1890
Revenue Act 1921 §219(f)
Revenue Act 1928 §165
McFadden Act 1927
Smoot-Hawley Tariff  Act 1930
Glass-Steagall Banking Act 1933
214
National Industrial Recovery Act 1933 
Securities and Exchange Act 1934 §§2, 6(b)(10), 14 and 19
Railroad Retirement Act 1934
National Labor Relations Act 1935 §§1, 7, 8, 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3)-(5)
Investment Company Act of  1940 §§16 and 18
Investment Companies Act 1940 §80a–16
Stabilization Act 1942 §10
Revenue Act 1942 §165(a)
Labor Management Relations Act 1947 §§8 and 302(c)(5)(B)
Bank Holding Company Act 1956
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 1959
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act 1962 
Civil Rights Act 1964
Voting Rights Act 1965
Social Security Amendments Act 1965
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 §§402(a), (d)(1), 403(a), 404(a)(2), (c)(1), 407(d)(6), and 408(c)(3)
Internal Revenue Code 1986 §§401(k), 501(c)(3) and 4975(e)(7)
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 §971
New York Manufacturing Corporation Law 1811
New York, Laws of  1828, see 2 RS 462, chapter VIII, section 33
Delaware General Corporation Law 1897, article 9, section 6
Model Business Corporation Act 1955 §36A
Illinois Business Corporation Act 1983 article 8
California Government Code (1991) §20100-3, now found in (2011) §20090
Delaware General Corporation Law §§141(k), 211, 212, 217 and 222
Model Business Corporation Act §8.08
New York Business Corporation Law §705(a), 706(b) 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Rules 14a-8, 14a-11
SEC Release No. 34-60215; File No. SR-NYSE-2006-92. (1 July 2009)
New York Stock Exchange, Rule 452.11(19)
Joint Trusteeship Bill 1989 HR 2664 
Workplace Democracy Act of  1999 (HR 1277) 
Employees’ Pension Security Act of  2008 (HR 5754)
(iv) European Union
Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company 2157/2001 art 43 
European Company Regulation 2157/2001/EC 
Employee Involvement Directive 2001/86/EC
Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/36/EC
Proposed Directive COM(2014) 213 final, articles 3f  and 3g.
(v) International and other
Treaty of  Versailles 1919 art 276(d)
Canada, Occupational Superannuation Standards Regulations (SR 1987 No 322) regs 13 and 15
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Act 2006 s 16
India, Employees Provident Fund and Misc Prov Act 1952 s 5A
South Africa, Government Employees’ Pension Law 1996 s 6(3)
Indian Companies Act 2013 s 166 
(c) Case law
(i) United Kingdom
Baggs Case (1615) 1 Rolle 224, (1615) 81 ER 448
Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126, 2 Ld Raym 938
Lord Bruce’s Case (1728) 2 Strange 819, 93 ER 870
215
Stoughton v Reynolds (1735) 93 ER 1023
Attorney General v Davy (1741) 26 ER 531
R v Richardson (1758) 1 Burr 517, (1758) 97 ER 426
Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905
Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499
Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189
Inderwick v Snell (1850) 2 Macnaghten & Gordon 216, (1850) 42 ER 83
Hutton v The Scarborough Cliff  Hotel Co Ltd (1865) 62 ER 717
Springhead Spinning Co v Riley (1868) LR 5 Eq 551
Macdougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 1
Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462
Creen v Wright (1875-1876) LR 1 CPD 591
Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70
Moffatt v Farquhar (1878) 7 Ch D 591
Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co, Blackpool v Hampson (1883) 23 Ch D 1
Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654
Isle of  Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 Ch D 320
Re Whiteley (1886) LR 33 Ch D 347
The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co, Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34
Gramophone and Typewriter Co Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89
Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488
Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd [1916] 2 AC 307
National Provincial Bank v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431
Kirby v Wilkins [1929] 2 Ch 444
Power and Savage v British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd (1930) 36 Lloyds Law Reports 205 
John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113
Edmondson v Sir R Ropner & Co Ltd (1935) 53 Lloyds Law Reports 9
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] AC 701
Wilson v London Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1940] Ch 393
Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304
Re Harari’s Settlement Trusts, Wordsworth v Fanshawe [1949] 1 All ER 430
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286
Butt v Kelson [1952] Ch 197
Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison v MacDonald & Evans [1952] 1 TLR 101
Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636
Boulting v ACTAT [1963] 2 QB 606
Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099
Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 1 Ch 515
Re Savoy Hotel Ltd [1981] Ch 351
Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 63
Harries v The Church Commissioners for England [1992] 1 WLR 1241
Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan [1991] EWCA Civ 11
Hunter v Moss [1993] EWCA Civ 11, [1994] 1 WLR 452 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] UKHL 5
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500
Armitage v Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279
Matadeen v Pointu [1998] UKPC 9
Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433
Grape Bay Ltd v Attorney-General of  Bermuda [1999] UKPC 43
Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2000] UKHL 39, [2002] 1 AC 408
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13
Reda v Flag Ltd [2002] UKPC 38
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2002] UKHL 13
Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507
216
Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd [2007] UKPC 26
Attorney General of  Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10
Shepherd v Williamson or Re Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch)
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 917
Gisda Cyf  v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41
In re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2012] UKSC 6
Re Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348
(ii) Germany
Reichsgericht (16 March 1904) RGZ 57, 205
Reichsgericht (7 June 1908) RGZ 69, 134
RG (19 June 1923) RGZ 107, 67, 70
RG (25 September 1923) RGZ 107, 245
RGZ 108, 327
RG (11 February 1926) RGZ 113, 33
RG Urteil (4 November 1927) RGZ 118, 330
RG Urteil (20 November 1925) RGZ 112, 273
RG (10 January 1928) RGZ 119, 386
RAG (10 July 1929) BS vol 6, no 77, 320
RGZ 125, 356 (24 September 1929)
RAG (21 June 30) Bensh. Samml. Bd 9, 331
RGZ 132, 149, 159 (31 March 1931)
RAG 44/34 (4 July 1934) 21:188-191 No. 37
RG (12 October 1940) RGZ 165, 68
BAGE 3, 332, 337 (14 December 1956) = 1 AZR 29/55 = DB 1957 S 192 = AP Nr 3 zu §611 BGB
BGH (29 May 1967) BGHZ 48, 163
BAGE (10 March 1972) 3 AZR 278/71 = BB 1972, S 1005  = DB 1972 S 1486 
BAGE 27, 194 (12 June 1975) 3 ABR 13/74, DB 1975, 1559 = AP Nr 1 zu §87
BAGE 31, 11 (13 July 1978) 3 ABR 108/77. NJW 1979, 2534
Bundesverfassungsgericht (1 March 1979) BVerfGE 50, 290
BAGE 32, 39 (21 June 1979) 3 ABR 3/78, AP VetrVG 1972 §87 Sozialeinrichtung Nr 1
BGHZ 83, 106 (25 February 1982) 
BGH (20 January 1983) NJW [1983] 1910,
BGH (27 October 1986) ZIP [1987] 293, 295
BAGE 60, 78 (25 October 1988) 3 AZR 483/86
BGHZ 122, 342 (17 May 1993)
(iii) United States
Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)
Taylor v Griswold, 14 NJL 223, 27 Am Dec 33 (1834) 
People v Fisher, 14 Wend 9 (1835)
Commonwealth v Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 4 Metcalf  111 (1842)
People ex rel. Stevenson v Higgins, 15 Ill 110 (1853)
Taylor v Hutton, 24 Barbour 195 (NY 1864) 
Paul v Virginia, 75 US 168 (1868)
Tatterson v Suffolk Mfg Co, 106 Mass 56, 59 (1870) 
Franklin Mining Co v Harris, 24 Mich 115, 116 (1871)
Adams v Fitzpatrick, 125 NY 124, 26 NE 143 (1891)
Martin v New York Life Ins Co, 42 NE 416 (1895)
Pollock v Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 US 429 (1895)
Vegelahn v Guntner, 167 Mass 92 (1896)
Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578 (1897)
McNevin v Solvay Process Co, 53 NYS 98 (NY App Div 1898) 
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905)
People ex rel Manice v Powell, 201 NY 194, 94 NE 634 (1911)
Watson v Gugino, 204 NY 535, 98 NE 18 (1912)
217
Brushaber v Union Pacific Railroad, 240 US 1 (1916)
State Board of  Control v Buckstegge, 18 Ariz 277, 158 Pac 837 (1916)
General Investment Co v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 87 NJ Eq 234, 100 A 347 (NJ Ch 1917) 
Manson v Curtis, 223 NY 313, 119 NE 559 (1918)
Dodge v Ford Motor, 204 Mich 459, 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919)
Duplex Printing Press Co v Deering, 254 US 443 (1921) 
Busser v Snyder, 282 Pa 440 (1925) 
Fox v Cody, 252 NYS 395 (1930)
In re Koch, 257 NY 318 (1931) 
New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932)
Abberger v Kulp, 281 NYS 2d 373 (1935)
Railroad Retirement Board v Alton Railroad Co, 295 US 330 (1935)
Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495 (1935) 
West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937)
National Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 US 1 (1937)
Helvering v Davis, 301 US 619 (1937) 
NLRB v Newport News Shipbuilding Co, 308 US 241 (1939)
Pepper v Litton, 308 US 295 (1939) 
Menke v Thompson, 140 F2d 786 (8th Cir 1944)
United States v United Mine Workers of  America, 330 US 258 (1947)
Inland Steel Co. v NLRB, 77 NLRB 1, enforced, 170 F 2d 247 (7th Cir 1948), cert. denied, 336 US 960 (1949)
Auer v Dressel, 306 NY 427, 118 NE 2d 590, 593 (1954)
Woolfson v Avery, 6 Ill 2d 78, 126 NE 2d 70, (1955)
Campbell v Loew’s Inc, 36 Del Ch 563, 134 A 2d 852 (Ch 1957)
Essential Enterprises Corp v Automatic Steel Products, Inc, 39 Del. Ch. 93, 159 A.2d 288 (1960)
Modern Plastics Corp v NLRB, 379 F2d 201 (6th Cir 1967) 
Everett v Transnational Development Corp, 267 A 2d 627 (Del Ch 1970)
Salyer Land Co v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 US 719 (1973) 
National Broadcasting Company, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, 516 F 2d 1101 (1974)
American Telephone & Telegraph Company, CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter 79,658 (1974)
Providence & Worcester Co v Baker, 378 A 2d 121 (Del 1977)
Unilever Acquisition Corp v Richardson-Vicks, Inc, 16 F Supp 407 (1985)
Howell v United States, 775 F2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985)
Lacos Land Co v Arden Group, Inc, 517 A 2d 271 (Del Ch 1986)
Blasius Industries Inc v Atlas Corp, 564 A2d 651 (1988)
The Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F 2d 406 (DC Cir 1990)
Shoen v AMERCO, 885 F Supp 1332, 1340 (D Nev 1994)
In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 825 A 2d 275 (2003)
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010)
Business Roundtable v Securities and Exchange Commission, 647 F.3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011)
Burwell v Hobby Lobby Inc, 573 US _ (2014)
(iv) Other
Attorney General of  Canada v Nav Canada (2008) FC 71
BCE Inc v 1976 Debenture Holders [2008] 3 SCR 560
(d) Government or other reports
(i) United Kingdom
Report of  Lord Rothschild’s Committee (1898) Cmnd 8911
Old Age Pensions,  Tables  which  have been prepared  in Connexion with  the Question of  Old Age Pensions  with a Preliminary
Memorandum (1907) Cmnd 3618
Report of  the Company Law Amendment Committee (HMSO 1918) Cd 9138
Bournville Works, A Works Council in Being (1922) LSE Archives, HD5/118
Cave Committee, Report to the Ministry of  Labour of  the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Working and Effects of  the
Trade Board Acts (1922) Cmd 1645
Geddes Report, Committee on National Expenditure. First interim report of  Committee on National Expenditure  (1922) Cmd
1581
National Joint Industrial Council for the Flour Milling Industry, Group Pension Scheme as Finally Approved by the Trustees
218
(1 January 1931) LSE Archives, HD9/225
Ministry of  Labour, ‘Schemes for Providing for Pensions for Employees on Retirement from Work’ in The Ministry of
Labour Gazette (HMSO 1938) 172-174
TUC, Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction (1944)
Cohen Committee, Report of  the Committee on Company Law Amendment (1945) Cmd 6659
Watkinson Committee, National Advisory Committee on the Employment of  Older Men and Women, First Report (1952) Cmnd
9333
Government Actuary’s Department, Occupational Pension Schemes, A Survey by the Government Actuary (1958)
Report of  the Company Law Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749
Government Actuary’s Department, Occupational Pension Schemes: Third Survey by the Government Actuary (1967) 
White Paper, Strategy for Pensions (1971) Cmnd 4755
Occupational  Pensions  Board,  Solvency,  Disclosure  of  Information  and Member  Participation  in  Occupational
Pension Schemes (BPP24 1974-5) Cmnd 5904
White Paper, Occupation Pension Schemes: The Role of  Members in the Running of  Schemes (1976) Cmnd 6514
Alan Bullock, Report of  the committee of  inquiry on industrial democracy (1977) Cmnd 6706
White Paper on Industrial Democracy (May 1978) Cmnd 7231
Cadbury Committee, Report of  the Committee on the Financial Aspects of  Corporate Governance (1 December 1992)
Pension Law Reform (1993) Cm 2342
Hampel Committee, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (1998)
Lord Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2001)
Higgs Committee, Review of  the role and effectiveness of  non-executive directors (2003)
Watson Wyatt, The World’s 300 Largest Pension Funds (2006)
Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Foreign Direct Investment (2009)
Investment Company Institute,  Investment Company Factbook: A Review of  Trends and Activity in the Investment Company
Industry (50th edn 2010)
FIL Limited, Principles of  Ownership (February 2011)
Lord Hutton et al, Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report (10 March 2011)
USS, Reports & Accounts (2012)
Barclays Wealth Management and Investment, Barclays Terms: Your Agreement With Us (July 2012)
DWP, Better workplace pensions: Further measures for savers (March 2014) Cm 8840
(ii) Germany
Centralverband des deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes (1930) BankA 1930-31
Gesetzvorschlag der Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes fur das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zur Neuordnung der Deutschen
Wirtschaft (May 1950)
Bundesverband des privaten Bankgewerbes, Grundsätze uber die Ausubung des Depotstimmrechts (March 1952)
Bericht der Studienkommission des DJT, Untersuchungen zur Reform des Unternehmensrechts (1955)
Biedenkopf  Kommission, Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission der Bundesregierung: Mitbestimmung in Unternehmen (1970)
11. Bundestag Drucksache VI/334
Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten 1976/1977: Fortschreitende Konzentration bei Großunternehmen (1978)
Geßler Commission, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft - Bericht der Studienkommission
(1979)
Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bericht uber die Verhandlungen der Unternehmensrechtskommission (1980)
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Bericht des Arbeitskreises “Betriebliche Pensionsfonds”: im Auftrag des “Forums Finanzplatz
beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen.” (1998)
Bundesverband  deutscher  Banken,  Bundesverband  Deutscher  Investmentgesellschaften  und  Deutsche  Aktien-
Institut, Betriebs-Pensionsfonds - Neue Impulse fur die betriebliche Altersversorgung (1999)
K Biedenkopf, Kommission zur Modernisierung der deutschen Unternehmensmitbestimmung: Bericht der wissenschaftlichen Mitglieder
der Kommssion (2006)
BaFin, Gesamtliste aller zugelassenen Versicherungsunternehmen und Pensionsfonds mit Geschäftstätigkeit (18 November 2011)
(iii) United States
Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony (1915)
Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of  the House Committee on Education and Labor, Oversight Hearings
on the Role of  Pension Funds in Corporate Takeovers (101st Congress, 1989)
Report and Recommendations of  the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange (5 June 2006)
CalPERS Global Principles of  Accountable Corporate Governance (2010)
Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (18 March 2010)
Federal Reserve, Flow of  Funds Accounts of  the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings 2005-2010 (2011)
219
(iv) European
Institutional Shareholder Services, Shearman & Sterling and European Corporate Governance Institute, Report on the
Proportionality Principle in the European Union (12 June 2007)
European Federation for Retirement Provision, Annual Report 2011 (2011)
(e) Parliamentary or Congressional materials
(i) United Kingdom
HC Hansard Debs, Representation of  the People Bill, Third Reading (15 July 1867) cols 1543  -1546
Hansard HC Deb (23 July 1908) vol 193, cols 342-3
Hansard HC Deb (7 May 1913) vol 52, col 2032
Hansard HL vol 144  col 999 (17 December 1946) Companies Bill,  2nd Reading, Lord Jowitt  LC, col 1018, and
Viscount Maugham, col 1044
Hansard HC vol 438 col 585 (6 June 1947) Companies Bill, 2nd Reading, Sir Stafford Cripps, 585-588
Hansard HL vol 146 col 965 (1 April 1947) Companies Bill Lords 3rd Reading, Viscount Swinton
Companies Bill, 2nd Reading, Sir Stafford Cripps (6 June 1947) HC vol 438 col 585-671, 585-597
Hansard HC Deb (28 January 1955) vol 536, cols 563
Hansard HL Deb (14 July 1977) vol 385 cols 981-97, Lord Winterbottom, Second Reading
Department for Communities and Local Government, LGPS Structure Analysis (March 2014) 
(ii) Germany
Entwurf  eines Gesetzes über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf  Aktien sowie Entwurf  eines
Einführungsgesetzes nebst erläuternden Bemerkungen, Veröffentlicht durch das Reichsjustiz-ministerium, 1930,
S. 96. 
Die Grünen,  Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft: Beschränkung der Bankenmacht (18 October 1989) Bundestag Drucksache
11/5401
SPD Fraktion, Handelsblatt (16 June 1992) 6
(iii) United States
Senate, Congressional Record, 80th Congress 1st Sess (1947) 4892-94.
HR Rep No 245, 80th Cong, 1st Sess 29-30 (1947)
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of  the House Committee on Energy and Commerce , 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 241 (1985)
Rep. Peter Visclosky, 135 Congressional Record H5984–05, H6233 (1989)
(iv) International and other
World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994)
OSCE, Election Observation Handbook (6th edn 2010)
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition. The Real Wealth of
Nations: Pathways to Human Development (2010)
European Federation for Retirement Provision, Annual Report 2011 (2011)
(f) Media
New York World, ‘On Waiting in Vain for the New Masses to Denounce Nonvoting Stocks’ (1926)
L Stark, ‘New strike looms, coal official says’ (12 February 1947) NY Times, 5
‘The Business World: The Battle for the Savoy’ (12 December 1953) The Economist, 831
‘Shares Without a Say’ (14 April 1956) The Economist, 167
‘The Price of  Votes’ (27 July 1957) The Economist, 328
(13 December 1971) Wall Street Journal, 25 
NBC, Pensions: The Broken Promise (12 September 1972)
(16 February 1973) Wall Street Journal, 8
(27 March 1973) New York Times, 5
Whiteley, Builders May Strike Over Pension Issue (11 February 1974) Guardian
Elliot, Co-op Bank Employees Strike over Pensions (16 April 1974) FT
 ‘Auto Union Seeks Directors’ Seats (13 May 1976) NY Times, 51, col 8
‘Mutual Funds, Brokers Taking A Bigger Slice of  the IRA Pie’ (10 March 1986) American Banker
D Eggen, ‘Bush Warns of  Aggressive Economic Regulation. On Wall St., He Defends Bailout’ (14 November 2008)
Washington Post
220
‘UK: stewardship elusive as pension funds buck governance code’ (21 July 2010) Responsible Investor
M Cobley, ‘UK’s newest pensions group gets off  to a flying start’ (1 April 2011) efinancialnews.com
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, ‘Works Council Elections 2010: High Voter Turnout’ (2011) Newsletter in
English
B Groom, ‘More finance jobs face axe’ (21 January 2013) Financial Times, 2
S Johnson, ‘Local UK pensions driven into ‘blind alley’’ (4 May 2014) Financial Times
*****
221
Thank you
Because writing can be solitary, we sometimes regard our thinking as individual. But really, our ideas come with the
participation of  everyone around us. I’d first like to thank my school teachers, particularly Andrea Connell, Trish
Bresnahan, Neil Jennings, and Tim Jurd. I was exceptionally lucky to be given their enthusiasm for history, language
and mathematics. At university I was incredibly privileged to learn the law through the guidance and brilliance of
Marcus Krajewski,  John Phillips,  Perry  Keller,  Tim Murphy,  Keith Ewing,  Aileen  McColgan,  Oliver  Landwehr,
Christine  Windbichler,  Christoph  Paulus,  Christian  Kirchner,  Wolfgang  Zenker,  Charles  Mitchell,  Oke  Odudu,
Richard Whish, Hugh Collins, Julian Fulbrook, Giorgio Monti, Conor Gearty, Andrew Lang, Julia Black and Brian
Langille. Everything they taught me contributed to this research. During the PhD, I was learning even more, and I
thank  Vivien Prais,  Charlie  Webb,  Stephen Watterson,  Mike  Blackwell  and  Neil  Duxbury  for  being such great
colleagues.
For specific, and invaluable help, discussions and exchanges on substantive aspects of  research, I am very
grateful to Brian Cheffins, Simon Deakin, Christopher Bruner, Mathias Siems, Markus Roth, Paddy Ireland, Richard
Nolan, Janice Turner, Elizabeth Chell, Alan Manning, Joseph Le Jehan, Alexander Dreier, Henry Hansmann, Robert
Reich,  Orly  Lobel,  Larry Hunter,  Alan Hyde,  Christopher  Castaneda,  Alexander Bissels,  Peer  Zumbansen,  Dan
Ariely,  Alain Cohn, Günther Teubner, Michael Schneider, Friedrich Kübler, Heinz Dieter-Assmann and Thomas
Pflock. I am indebted to the staff  at the Scott Taylor archive, the Federal Reserve, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, the Office for National Statistics, Companies House, and various anonymous people
at fund management firms. 
I have met some wonderful people whilst writing the PhD, and so my especial thanks go to Karla, Jeff, Rob,
Johanna, Ugljesa, Sabina, Mark, Floris, Luis, Nico, Edmund, Lorenzo, Matteo, Sally-Ann, Aleks, Orly, Mark, Franck,
Stefan, Ranj and Valerio. To my friends outside university, who made life a pleasure,  are especially Savas, Dina,
Lucrezia, Marcelo, Kamilla, Leo, Dave, Rodrigo, Mike, Byron, Ryan, Toby, Lauren, Harry, Ramona, Lawrence, Lily,
Nick, Alison, Ed, Chris, Declan, Danny, Tim, Mowena, David, James, Catherine, Dan, Sacha, Patrick, Diana, Caro,
Malaika, Max, Anette, Roland, Matthias and Helga. Liv, you have made everything wonderful. I am tremendously
lucky and proud of  my family, who helped me throughout: Mum, Gavin, Sam, Cherry, Steve, Keven, Alice, Dad,
Senga, Brenda, and all my uncles, aunts and cousins. 
I am deeply grateful to my examiners Paul Davies and Marc Moore, for their encouragement and care. At
the LSE, Linda Mulcahy deserves tremendous credit for making the PhD programme a model of  organisation. I was
incredibly lucky for the supervision of  Eva Micheler and Wanjiru Njoya, and most of  all to David Kershaw. David
was tireless, and probably gave the most important advice for anyone working in the humanities and social sciences:
when you get a standard answer, to ask, ‘what does that  really mean?’ The reason that all his students think he is
brilliant is because he is inquisitive, enthusiastic, energetic, optimistic, and he cares. Finally, I have been continually
grateful for the privilege of  learning from all my students in our classes on commercial law, company law, labour law,
contracts and property. With teachers and all staff, they make what is most important about university. 
222
